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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (12 June 68) FOR OT RD 67X208

18 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS,
Period 5-26 January 1967 (U)

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1. Subject report is comprised of all available reports concerning Operation CEDAR FALLS.
2. This report has been compiled to facilitate research and study of a major operation.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

- 8 Incl
1. 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)
 2. II Field Force Vietnam
 3. 1st Infantry Division
 4. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
 5. 1st Engineer Battalion
(formerly published as CAAR 67X005)
 6. 25th Infantry Division
(formerly published as CAAR 67X004)
 7. 196th Light Infantry Brigade
 8. 1st Logistical Command

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
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173^D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP)
IRON TRIANGLE OPERATION



NIAGARA - CEDAR FALLS
5-25 Jan 67



Incl 1
FOR OT RD
67X208

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO San Francisco 96250

AVHE-SC

25 February 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

TO: Commanding General
II FPOCEV
ATTN: G3 D & T
APO San Francisco 96227

The following report is submitted in accordance with MACV Directive Number 335-8.

1. General: The wide spread terrorism in the SAIGON-CHOLON Area perpetrated the conception of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, one of the largest, most complex and one of the most effective operations in the VIETNAM WAR. Intelligence reports fed to MACJ2 indicated that the source of these terrorist activities, along with the location of the Viet Cong Military Region IV Headquarters was in fact located in the heretofore impenetrable IRON TRIANGLE north of SAIGON. The mission of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS: to seal off the Triangle and annihilate the enemy within, destroying his fortifications and generally crushing the power of the MR IV Headquarters.

The Operation was the first planned multi-division Operation in VIETNAM, employing the 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, the 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, the 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE, the 5TH ARVN DIVISION, elements of the 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT, the 18TH ENGINEER BRIGADE, and the 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE).

This marks the second time the Brigade has operated in the IRON TRIANGLE (OPORD 25-65, 8 - 14 October 1965). The task given to the 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE) was to conduct a deception or feint from a staging area near PHU LOI in the CAU DINH JUNGLE, an island of dense forest, north of a Rubber Plantation between NATIONAL HIGHWAY 13 and the THI TINH RIVER.

The IRON TRIANGLE was named in early 1963 by UPI writer Peter Arnett, a native of NEW ZEALAND and a veteran news correspondent, who noticed a basic similarity in enemy concentration between this area and the IRON TRIANGLE of the KOREAN CONFLICT. Both areas seemed virtually impenetrable owing to their difficult terrain. The people of VIETNAM refer to the area as "AN SON NORTH" meaning "new haven". The area has been a center of Viet Cong activity since early 1950. It is a transit area for VC moving from the north through the western edge, while local units move through the eastern edge. It was infected with local base camps, medical complexes and tunnel communication liaison areas. From the Triangle, the VC have been able to operate on HIGHWAY 13 to the east as well as conduct mortar and claymore mine attacks against friendly forces.

TAB A to
Incl 1

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AVDE-SC

25 February 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

2. Name of Operation: Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS
3. References: Map Sheets, VIETNAM, Series L - 7011, Sheets 6330 I, IV 6331 I, II, & IV, 6231 I, II, 6230 I.
4. Type of Operation: Search and Destroy
5. Date of Operation: 5 January 1967 to 25 January 1967
6. Location: BINH DUCNG PROVINCE, THANH DIEM FOREST RESERVE, and IRON TRIANGLE west of BEN CAT and the CAU DINH JUNGLE.
7. Command Headquarters: 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)
8. Reporting Officer: Brigadier General John R. Deane Jr.
9. Task Force Organization:

Operation NIAGARA FALLS

Task Force ALPHA

1/501d Inf
1 Engr Sqd
3 Scout Dog Tms
B/2/34th Armor
C/3/319th Arty (Dir Spt)
Tnk Plt/1/4th Cav - OPCOM

35th Ranger Bn (ARVN) supported the Operation

Operation CEDAR FALLS

Task Force DEANE

1/501d Inf - LTC FROWNER

1 Tnk Plt - 2/11th ACR
A/5/2d Arty (MW)
1 Engr Sqd
1 MP Sqd
3 Scout Dog Tms

A/501d Inf - LTC HEALY

D/16th Armor
1 Engr Sqd
1 MP Sqd
3 Scout Dog Tms

1/4th Cav. (1st Inf Div) - LTC PIPE

C/5/2d Arty (MW)

2/501d Inf - LTC SIGHOLTZ

1 Engr Sqd
1 MP Sqd
3 Scout Dog Tms

11th ACR (-) - COL COBB

2/11th ACR
3/11th ACR
1 MP Sqd

35th Ranger Bn (ARVN)

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AVFT-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

Fire Control

1 Rifle Co - L/503d Inf
E/17th Cav
3/319th Arty (+ 2d & 3d How Btry/11th ACR)
173d Engr Co (-)
335th AMCL
173d MP Plt (+ 2/A/72d MP Bn)
HMC (-)

10. Supporting Forces:

a. USAF

(1) Size of Forces:

(a) 7th Air Force

1. 3d Tactical Fighter Wing
2. 12th Tactical Fighter Wing
3. 31st Tactical Fighter Wing
4. 8th Tactical Fighter Wing
5. 35th Tactical Fighter Wing

(b) The 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron of the 504th Tactical

Control Group

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) TAC Sorties:

3d TFW	77
12th TFW	7
31st TFW	17
8th TFW	11
35th TFW	62
TOTAL SORTIES	174

(b) FAC Sorties:

19th TASS	25
(a) VNAF Sorties	2
(d) Tons of Ordnance	206
(e) Visual Reconnaissance	35
(f) Escort Missions	9

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25 February 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

(3) Results and Effectiveness:

Bomb Damage Assessments were limited due to smoke and foliage in the AO. No reports were made of ground assessments, however, numerous Viet Cong bodies were found in the areas subjected to airstrikes. Airstrikes also uncovered previously hidden VC installations.

(4) Timeliness: All sorties provided arrived within a usable time frame and most were effectively employed. Two flights were released because of ground action at the time of their arrival precluded their use. Two additional flights were released owing to the use of artillery fire also being employed in the target area.

(5) FAC (Forward Air Control) Pilots:

- (a) LTC Henry W. Burrow
- (b) CPT James T. Callaghan
- (c) CPT Eric E. Miller
- (d) CPT Arthur Roberts

b. Army Aviation:

(1) Size of Force:

During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the Brigade was supported by the following aviation units:

- (a) 11th Aviation Battalion
- (b) 145th Aviation Battalion
- (c) 335th Aviation Company (Air Mobile Light)
- (d) Brigade Aviation Platoon (Casper Platoon)

(2) How and When Employed:

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
Aerial Observer	51
Armed Helicopter	1,010
Command and Liaison	752
Medical Evacuation	9
Aerial Reconnaissance	485
Resupply	2,956
Troop Combat Assault	2,000
Miscellaneous	2,622
TOTAL	9,717

(3) Aviation rendered normal support to the Brigade during Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS. The highlight of the Operation was the employment of the Sky Cavalry concept as developed by the Brigade. This concept involves movement of small units (12 men) in the checkered fashion with the AO.

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 SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

- (4) A total of 2,245 hours were flown in support of the Operation. Aircraft flew an average of 112 hours per day.
- (5) A total of 15,653 passengers were carried during the Operation.
- (6) A total of 682 tons of cargo was moved during the Operation for a daily average of 34 tons.
- (7) Results and Effectiveness:
 - (a) The Aero Scouts proved to be highly effective in spotting enemy positions, personnel and rice caches and structures.
 - (b) The Aero Scout section captured 2 VC on two separate occasions.
 - (c) The team of scouts, gunships and slicks used in the Sky Cavalry operations proved to be very flexible and the configuration of the light elements may be tailored to fit any requirement.
- (8) Timeliness: In no case did the aviation elements fail to respond rapidly to meet a new or changing situation.

c. Artillery

(1) Size of Force:

Btry A, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)
 Btry B, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)
 Btry C, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (6 105mm How)
 How Btry, 2d Sqdn, 11th ACR (6 105mm SP) OPCON
 How Btry, 3d Sqdn, 11th ACR (6 105mm SP) OPCON
 Btry C, 2d Bn, 35th Arty (155mm SP) GSR (17 Jan 67 to 25 Jan 67)
 Btry A, 2d Bn, 35th Arty, (155mm SP) GSR (8 Jan 67 to 25 Jan 67)
 Additional Artillery from Div Arty, 1st Inf Div (8", 155mm & 175mm) also utilized throughout the operation.

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) On call missions were fired daily throughout the Operation by both ground and air observers. The air observer was used for registrations and missions as requested by ground elements. The ground observer attached to the infantry company fired contact missions and defensive concentrations in support of their units.

(b) M & I fires were planned daily by forward observers, battalion liaison officers and the battalion S3.

(c) Preparation of Landing Zones:

LZ #5 - 091051 to 091100H January 1967
 LZ #6 - 091211 to 091231H January 1967
 XT 719271, XT 716276, XT 721280, XT 717277, XT 720279 - 130730 to 130744H January and 130820 to 120830H January 1967.

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XT 692246 to XT 711250 - 150930 to 151002H January 1967
XT 737256 to XT 738254 - 160805 to 160903H January 1967
XT 721260 to XT 729260 - 180725 to 180906H January 1967
LZ #2 - 181645 to 181743H January 1967
LZ #3 - 181645 to 181700H January 1967
LZ #4 - 181705 to 181730H January 1967
LZ MIKE - 200700 to 200835H January 1967
LZ BOB - 200700 to 200835H January 1967
LZ TOM - 200700 to 200730H January 1967
Preparation for route of advance 200915 to 201040H Jan 67

(3) Results and Effectiveness: Preparatory fires on landing zones and routes of advance were very effective. Numerous secondary explosions were observed during the preparations of landing zones and routes indicated destruction of enemy mines and boobytraps. Enemy resistance was generally light and consisted mainly of harassing actions. Artillery support was therefore characterized by numerous missions of brief duration which were intended to seal off the enemy route of escape or to reduce small fortified points of resistance. H & I fires were active by day and night, restricted only by the amount of terrain not occupied by friendly elements. The effectiveness of this program is indicated by the numerous bodies with shrapnel wounds found during the operation.

(4) Timeliness:

Coordination between Artillery, TAC Air and gunships was very effective. On call fire missions were processed quickly, delays occurring only when several adjacent units were required to approve missions in the operational area to insure troop safety through verification of unit locations.

(5) Missions and Rounds Fired:

(a) 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery

Missions - 789
Rounds Expended - 28,593

(b) Operational Control Units

1. Howitzer Battery/2/11th ACR

Missions-190
Rounds Expended - 7,528

2. Howitzer Battery/3/11th ACR

Missions - 210
Rounds Expended - 7,815

4. B Troop, 17th Cavalry

(1) Size of Force:

3 Cavalry Platoons (Can be employed as Aero Rifle Platoons)
1 LRP Platoon
1 Aero Scout Section (Less OH-13's and Pilots)

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AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) The unit's mission was to conduct air mobile search and destroy operations in the rice paddies in the southwestern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE, along the SAIGON RIVER.

(b) The area of operations was confined to the rice paddies and adjacent areas along the SAIGON RIVER. Weather throughout the operation was relatively cool and dry. The terrain was characterized by inundated rice paddies cut by many deep tree lined canals varying in width from 3 to 40 feet. None of this area was considered trafficable for the surface type vehicles organic to the Cavalry Troop. Numerous straw thatched huts containing log and mud or (occasionally) concrete bunkers were located in the canal tree lines.

(c) The unit used none of its organic vehicles during the operation and organized each armored cavalry platoon into three (3) 12-man squads for airmobile operations. Each squad was normally armed with one (1) M-60 machine gun, one (1) M-79 grenade launcher, and ten (10) M-16 rifles. Each man carried both smoke (colored) and M-26 fragmentary grenades. Aircraft for the operation were attached for varying lengths of time on a day to day basis. The number and type of aircraft varied but the normal organization was as follows:

- 2 - OH-13 Aero Scouts
- 2 - UH-1B Gun Ships
- 4 - UH-1D Slicks
- 1 - Command and Control Aircraft (UH-1B)

(d) The enemy encountered was at no time larger than a squad size and normally consisted of 2 to 3 man elements. Initially, (1st and 2d day) the enemy encountered were primarily small work parties of about 3-man sized who were living along the tree lined canals with the probable mission of harvesting as much rice as possible from the surrounded rice paddies. As the main force closed in on the IRON TRIANGLE, the enemy encountered were transient groups attempting to infiltrate or exfiltrate the TRIANGLE area along the canals and through the rice paddies. Few weapons were captured and where possible, the enemy fled without a prolonged fire fight. Contact seldom lasted more than 2 to 5 minutes.

(e) The basic scheme of maneuver was as follows:

1. During the day time, 2 platoons were placed on the ground to search selected tree lines and move from one to another by helicopter as deemed necessary. The 3d platoon was held as a quick reaction force with one 12-man team (2 A/C) airborne near or over the area of operations. The armed helicopters were used to support the ground elements as follows:

a. The OH-13 Scouts performed low and slow armed recon of the area to collect and mark landing sites and to detect any enemy who might be attempting to flee from the ground elements.

b. The gun ships provided fire support for the UH-1D troop carriers while they were landing and taking off by firing suppressive fire when the situation permitted or by being ready to return enemy fire during this critical period. They also supported the movement of the ground elements and destroyed targets of opportunity with their quickly responsive fire power.

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25 February 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

c. During the hours of darkness, 12-man stay behind ambush patrols were placed in selected locations with preplanned artillery support to deny enemy freedom of movement and inflict maximum casualties.

d. All orders for the operation were verbal and Frag orders were frequently used.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: See Tab C, page 16 & 17

(4) Timeliness: N/A

e. Company D, 16th Armor

(1) Size of Force:

(a) 3 APC Platoons (4 APC's per platoon)

(b) 1 Mortar Platoon (4 4.2" mortar tracks, one (1) FDC APC)

(c) 1 Command APC

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) The mission for this unit on 9 January was to provide a screen. On 11 through 24 January 1967, the mission was to seize and hold OBJECTIVE 5 and OBJECTIVE 6.

(b) This unit was under the operational control of the 4/503d Infantry Battalion throughout the duration of the operation. Supporting units consisted mainly of artillery batteries, to include 3/319th Artillery, Army Aviation (335th AHC), organic to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), USAF, and the 4.2" mortar platoon also provided necessary support. Reaction forces were at all times available if operational requirements had made it necessary to call on them, and on one occasion, it was necessary to call on elements of the 11th ACR to aid this unit in its mission.

(3) Results and Effectiveness:

Operation CEDAR FALLS was an excellent operation as far as the use and deployment of this company's armored capabilities are concerned. On all occasions, maximum use of shock-action and fire power of the APC were utilized. The company was also used in perimeter defense, however, due to the close proximity of the other units, the caliber .50 machinegun could not be used, thus reducing the effectiveness of the company's basic weapon/vehicle, the M113 APC. The company reacted well to all types of enemy contact, and where engaged, the volume of fire returned was timely and well controlled.

(4) Timeliness: N/A

f. 173d Engineer Company

(1) Size of Force:

Two (2) Line Platoons (Combat Engineers)

One (1) Bridge Platoon (Boats)

One (1) Maintenance Platoon

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AVHE-SC 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations: After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA-CEDAR FALLS)

(2) How and When Employed: The 17th Engineer Company deployed on Operation CEDAR FALLS with the company (-) attached to three Infantry battalions. The Engineers supported the Brigade with "Tunnel Rat" Teams, demolition teams, road reconnaissance and repair, mine clearing and water point operations in addition to aiding in the securing of the northwest portion of the Brigade's perimeter. A day by day outline of the Engineer Company's activities follows:

(a) 7 - 11 January 1967:

Conducted river patrolling, river traffic control and resupply operations for the 1/503d Infantry.

(b) 8 - 10 January 1967:

1. Arrived at Position RED and established perimeter security. A water point was established in the vicinity of XT 715336.
2. Cleared TOC area, insuring that it was free of mines, boobytraps, etc.
3. Constructed TOC Command bunker
4. Conducted river reconnaissance with pneumatic assault boats, vicinity XT 738328.
5. Constructed a Refugee Center (100 meters x 150 meters) vicinity XT 733323.

(c) 11 January 1967:

1. Repaired road leading to the Refugee Center.
2. Hauled, tamped and graded laterite

(d) 12 January 1967:

1. Deployed as Infantry - sent out night ambush patrol, having negative results.
2. Destroyed a quantity of VC ammunition and grenades whose location was supplied by the 172d MI Detachment.

(e) 14 January 1967:

- heavy equipment.
1. Cleared fields of fire for the 1/503d Infantry with
 2. Cleared laterite pit of mines at Position RED.
 3. Supported the repair of ARVN Ballcoopers
 4. Sent out a night ambush patrol having negative results.

(f) 15 January 1967:

Cleared a 1,500 meter section of HIGHWAY 14.

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AVBE-3C 25 February 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

(g) 16 January 1967:

Engaged in light enemy contact on perimeter resulting in
1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 US WIA.

(h) 14 - 21 January 1967:

1. Constructed a floating mine barrier on river vicinity
of bridge XT 737332. See Special Equipment/Techniques.
2. Picked up eight (8) Chieu Hoi detainees, vicinity XT
682275.
3. Picked up three (3) Chieu Hoi detainees, vicinity XT
677290.

(i) 22 January 1967:

Discovered 30 tons of paddy rice which was evacuated to
the BSO.

(j) 23 January 1967:

Conducted Civic Action Projects, vicinity of BEN CAT.

(k) 8 - 23 January 1967:

1. Explored, mapped, and destroyed 9,000 meters of VC
tunnel network, 200 separate bunkers, and 500 meters of trench in the IENM TRI-
ANGLE.
2. Produced and distributed 139,000 gallons of potable
water to units in the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), 1st Infantry Division and
the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(3) Results and Effectiveness:

Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS found the 173d Engineer Company
expending most of its effort on tunnel exploration, mapping and destruction of
tunnels. By using small caliber pistols and flashlights, and by maintaining
communication by wire at all times at all times, the "Tunnel Rat" Teams were
able to move quickly with confidence while relaying information to other teams.
(See Tab F - Tunnel Complex Drawings)

g. 173d Military Police Platoon

(1) Size of Force: The 173d Military Police Platoon consists of 1
Officer and 50 enlisted men. During Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, the men were
employed as follows:

Brigade CP	1 Officer, 29 EM
1/503d Inf	7 EM
2/503d Inf	7 EM
4/503d Inf	7 EM

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25 February 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS)

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) To provide necessary traffic control points for movement of the Brigade to and from the tactical area of operations.

(b) To establish, operate and secure a Refugee Collection Point, vicinity of BEN CAT, RVN.

(c) Secured two bridges, vicinity of BEN CAT and provided de-file control during daylight hours.

(d) Provided escort and security for daily Brigade resupply convoys to and from BINH HOA.

(e) Maintained a PWCP (Prisoner of War Collection Point) at the Brigade Forward Base Camp.

(f) Performed other missions as required.

h. 39th Infantry Platoon Scout Dog

(1) Size of Force:

(a) 3 squads of six (6) dog teams per squad

(b) HQ section with Platoon Leader, Platoon Sergeant and a Veterinary Animal Specialist.

(2) How and When Employed:

The Scout Dog is trained to detect and give silent warning of the presence of any strange individual or group. He will prove especially useful in warning of ambushes and attempts at infiltration. The scout dog is worked by one (1) man, the handler, who has been especially trained in this type of work. The dog works on a short or long leash most of the time, however, being off the leash entirely. The dogs work in daylight or darkness, in any kind of weather and in jungle or open country. The scout dogs were employed in the following manner:

(a) Reconnaissance Patrols

(b) Combat Patrols - Search and Destroy

(c) Outposts, Listening and Observation

(d) Night Attacks

(3) Results and Effectiveness:

During Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, the scout dog teams attached to the Infantry units were instrumental in detecting VC positions, tunnels, base camps, rice and supply caches. There were twelve (12) teams deployed on the operation, participating in eighty (80) patrols. During the Operation, one dog was lost which has not been recovered.

i. 31st Chemical Detachment:

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(1) Size of Force: 1 Officer and 4 Enlisted Men

(2) How and When Employed: The 51st Chemical Detachment employed an 16 HP BUFFALO TURBINE (See Special Equipment/Techniques) mounted either on an APC or on a sling load of a UH-1D helicopter to aid in the exploration of VC tunnels. The turbine weighs 800 pounds and is capable of displacing 8,500 cubic feet per minute of air, smoke or CS into a tunnel entrance. For a complete analysis of the employment of this turbine, see page 44.

(3) Results and Effectiveness: The BUFFALO TURBINE proved to be highly effective in the following missions:

(a) Flushing VC from tunnels by pumping smoke into the shaft.

(b) Locating tunnel entrances and ventilation holes and thus tracing the configuration of the tunnel by blowing smoke into known entrances, while aerial observers mark the various exits of the smoke.

(c) Flushing smoke and Riot Control Agent (RCA) vapors from a tunnel to enable entrance of tunnel exploration teams.

(d) Furnishes fresh air in badly ventilated tunnels to aid the exploration parties.

(4) Timeliness: Few delays were experienced due to easy transportability of the equipment by helicopter or APC.

II. Intelligence

a. Operation NIAGARA FALLS - 5 January to 7 January 1967

(1) Enemy Situation Before Operation: Prior to the commencement of Operation NIAGARA FALLS, in an area consisting of the southern tip of the IRON TRIANGLE, the PHU LOI Viet Cong Local Force Battalion and the C-63d Viet Cong Companies were believed to be operating in addition to the 2d and 3d Viet Cong Main Force Battalions of the 165/A VC Main Force Regiment. The enemy's morale was believed to have been lowered by poor living conditions coupled with friendly artillery and air strikes. The enemy was attributed with the capability of:

(a) Initiating harassing attacks in the Brigade's AO and interdicting ROUTE 13 at his choosing.

(b) Reinforcing guerrilla elements with elements of the PHU LOI Local Force Battalion and the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 165/A Regiment.

(c) Defense in a limited area for a short period of time.

(d) Withdrawing from or avoiding contact at anytime and place of his choosing.

(2) Enemy Situation During Operation: During Operation NIAGARA FALLS, elements of the Brigade failed to make contact with enemy forces larger than five (5) men. One small base camp was found and a few small food and equipment caches were discovered, none of which indicated that a large size unit had used the area recently. It was believed, however, that when US of ARVN troops are not present, the VC will continue to infiltrate both men and supplies through the area.

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(3) Area of Operations:

(a) Weather and Climate: The northeast monsoon influenced the weather during Operation NIAGARA/ FALLS. Precipitation during the operation was light and was normal for the season. There was no morning fog. The weather did not appear to aid the enemy in any specific manner.

(b) Terrain: The AO was characterized by flat land with minor changes in elevation. The highest point of elevation in the AO is a gentle slope, 28 meters in height, located vicinity XT 801232. The SONG SAIGON and the SONG THI TIMM form the major drainage pattern for the AO. There are numerous small streams, tributaries, and intermittent streams interlaced throughout the entire area. The RACH ONG NANG (XT 766191 to XT 770175) provided an irrigation channel for the extensive rice fields located in the southwestern portion of the AO. The two large rivers formed major obstacles to the west and portions of the south. A relatively large number of rubber plantations were centered at XT 785210. Small islands of dense forest were located throughout the AO. The largest of these dense forests was located north of a rubber plantation between NATIONAL HIGHWAY 13 and SONG THI TIMM.

b. Operation CEDAR FALLS - 8 January to 25 January 1967

(1) Enemy Situation Before Operation: Prior to the commencement of Operation CEDAR FALLS, the 272d VC Main Force Regiment, the 7th Battalion of the 165th/A Regiment, the PHU LOI Battalion, the local force companies C61, C62 and C63 were believed to be operating within the areas of operation and interest. The 2d and 3d VC Main Force Battalions of the 165/A Regiment were believed to be within the area surrounding the Triangle, but the exact location was not known. The enemy's morale had been lowered by TAC airstrikes and intensive artillery preparations. The enemy was attributed with the following capabilities:

- (a) Initiating harassing attacks within the AO and interdicting ROUTE 13 at his choosing.
- (b) Reinforcing guerrilla elements with the PHU LOI Battalion and/or the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 165/A Regiment.
- (c) Conducting a limited defense at his choosing.
- (d) Withdrawing from or avoiding contact with US Forces.

(2) Enemy Situation During Operation: From 8 January to 25 January 1967, elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) maintained daily contact with the enemy. The sporadic contacts were usually initiated by friendly forces and terminated by VC withdrawal. The largest contact was on 16 January by C/L/50Jd Infantry with a VC platoon. Numerous VC base camps, rice caches, and tunnel systems were destroyed. The large amount of rice extracted from the operational area has reduced the VC logistical abilities. The quartered carcass of an animal which had been dead for four days was found in the operational area. This was an indication of the effects of the operation on the enemy logistical base. The enemy's low morale was reflected by the large number of ralliers who surrendered after US Forces entered the ISON TRIANGLE. Prisoners were taken from the following units: C61 LP Company, 2d Company of the PHU LOI Battalion, Group 63 (Rear Services of the MR IV), and I-4 (subordinate committee of the MR IV). An estimated 25,000 documents were captured

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during the operation. The majority of these have not been fully exploited for intelligence value since only the initial tactical screening was conducted. On several occasions, Chieu Hoi's lead friendly troops to previously undiscovered tunnels, weapons caches and rice caches. Without their assistance, these installations probably would not have been found.

(3) Area of Operations:

(a) Weather and Climate: The Northeastern Monsoon was in effect during the operation. The weather was predominantly clear, cool and dry. Two thunderstorms occurred but these did not interfere with tactical operations. A combination of gusty winds and lower nocturnal temperatures produced noticeable cold spells during one week of the operation. The weather hindered no tactical operation during the period.

(b) Terrain: The area of operations, commonly called the IRON TRIANGLE was bounded by the SONG SAIGON on the west and the SONG THI TINH on the east. The highest point of elevation in the AO was a 28 meter hill located at XT 801232. A relatively large rubber plantation was located at XT 785-210. A large dense forest area was located north of a rubber plantation between NATIONAL HIGHWAY 13 and the SONG THI TINH. NATIONAL HIGHWAY 13 was the main route in the area. The operational area was found to contain numerous underground tunnels and dwellings. The majority of these were destroyed.

c. Sources of Intelligence:

(1) General: Attached to the 172d Airborne Brigade (Separate) is a Military Intelligence Section (172d Military Intelligence), which works under the supervision of the Brigade S2 Section, and provides an Order of Battle Section, an Imagery Interpretation Section, an Interrogation Section and a Counterintelligence Section.

(2) During Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, the 172d Military Intelligence Detachment contributed significantly to the overall success enjoyed by the Brigade. As the operation developed, it became apparent that a large percentage of the caches and installations discovered were a direct result of intelligence gained through agent reports, reconnaissance and interrogation. Of particular interest during the operation was the co-location of the 341st Military Intelligence Detachment (11th ACR) with the 172d. This resulted in improved coordination between the units and a larger pool of IPW teams and CI personnel which kept the backlog of prisoners in the VCCCP to a minimum. Further it enabled the cross utilization of information. Also of significance was the number of refugees screened. In the clearing of the AO, hundreds of families were evacuated from their homes. The detachment had the responsibility of screening these people to determine those that were VC or active VC sympathizers. In total, 1,000 families were processed including 950 women, 670 children and 55 men. Through the screening process, 16 VC, 11 civil defendants, and 9 ralliers were uncovered. The civil defendants were released to the National Police and the VC ralliers were sent to the VCCCP for further exploitation. During the six days that this point was in operation, much valuable information was gained concerning VC activities in the AO. Additionally, refugees that would have ordinarily been overlooked were screened and found to be VC or ralliers. This discovery was only through the efforts of trained interrogation personnel.

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(a) Imagery Interpretation Section

1. Imagery Interpretation support for Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS consisted of preparation of immediate, detailed and route reconnaissance reports. Mosaics, weather and aerial reconnaissance and photography support were also furnished. The detail and scope of the Imagery Interpretation effort was greater on this operation than any previous operation primarily because of the relatively long lead time available. This time allowed for necessary planning which permitted both greater accuracy and wider coverage. Extensive photo support was obtained from the ASTA Platoon of the 1st Infantry Division which covered the entire operational area, including all primary access routes. The photo support obtained from the 1st Division was prompt and the photography was of uniformly high quality. A larger number of targets were discovered through aerial photography on this operation.

2. Aerial reconnaissance support was flown by both Army and Air Force aircraft. During the second week of the operation, the recon area became quite limited due to heavy artillery and air strike activity. Although there were no enemy personnel sighted on any of the recons, numerous installations such as bunkers, tunnels, foxholes, etc. were reported. FAC aircraft were used extensively in providing recon support for Operation CEDAR FALLS.

3. Imagery Interpretation support for Operation CEDAR FALLS consisted of the following items:

<u>AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
Army (UH-1B)	45	67
Air Force (L-19)	31	71
Mosaics Completed		12
<u>Photo Interpretation Reports</u>		
Immediate		13
Detailed		2
Route Recon		2

(b) Counterintelligence:

During Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, the Counterintelligence efforts were greatly enhanced by the co-location of the CI team with the IPW team. This co-location enabled immediate CI response to information obtained in the interrogation of prisoners, refugees, and Chieu Mai returnees. Close CI liaison with counterpart elements of other units participating in the operation resulted in the acquisition and subsequent exploitation of considerably valuable target information not available through other channels. The immediate liaison efforts of the USAFV Augmentation Team resulted in timely and accurate intelligence available for quick combat response.

(c) Interrogation: A statistical summary of personnel, documents and material processed during Operation CEDAR FALLS follows:

Detainees:

VC 30

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Civilians	118
Civil Defendants	2
Chieu Hoi	69
TOTAL	189

Documents	20,000
Weapons	187
Mortars	3
Ammunition	9,000 rns
Mines	54
Grenades	189
Clothing	205 lbs
Web Gear/uniforms	140 lbs
Medical Supplies	105 lbs

Radio Equipment

PRC/10	5
HT-1 Walkie Talkies	1
Handmade Radios	2

12. Mission: Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS

The mission of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) during this operation was two fold as follows:

a. The Brigade CP deployed directly from Operation CANARY/DUCK, a road security operation astride HIGHWAY 15 to PHU LOI on 4 January 1967. The Brigade passed from the Operational Control of II FFCORCEV to the 1st Infantry Division. On 5 January, the Brigade deployed the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry on Operation NIAGARA FALLS. The mission was to conduct a deceptive feint into the CAU DINH JUNGLE and conduct search and destroy operations in preparation for the larger scale, multi-division Operation CEDAR FALLS.

b. Operation CEDAR FALLS (8 January to 25 January 1967) had the mission of conducting search and destroy operations in the vicinity of the THANH DIEN FOREST RESERVE and in the IRON TRIANGLE, to kill or capture military and/or political elements of the VC Military Region IV Headquarters, Local Force Infrastructure and VC/NVA Forces. In addition, the Brigade was assigned the task of clearing the area of inhabitants, cutting belts across the IRON TRIANGLE and clearing selected LZ's within the Area of Operation. The Brigade's Task Force (TF DENNE) was under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the 1st Infantry Division throughout Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS.

13. Concept of Operations: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) conducted Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS in five (5) phases as follows:

a. PHASE I: Operation NIAGARA FALLS - D - 3 to D - 1 (5 to 7 January 1967)

TF 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (ABN), 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) and 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN), initiated Operation NIAGARA FALLS at 0730 hours under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division. The Task Force searched for the enemy in the CAU DINH JUNGLE and the THI TINH RIVER to HIGHWAY 13 Area. When Operation NIAGARA FALLS terminated at 1500 hours, 7 January, the 1/503d Infantry and the 35th Ranger Battalion were in blocking positions to support Operation CEDAR FALLS. The Operation produced light enemy contact, but its significance lies in the fact that a deceptive feint had been achieved.

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b. PHASE II - Pre-Positioning of Forces - D Day (8 January 1967)

(1) 1/503d Infantry and 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) remained in position from Operation NIAGARA FALLS to serve as a blocking force at the confluence of the THI TINH and SAIGON RIVER.

(2) 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry road marched to PMU LOI and were helilifted to Position BLUE, vicinity XT 8328.

(3) The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment road marched to the vicinity of the CAN DINH JUNGLE (XT 7823).

(4) The 1/4th Cavalry (-) moved from their AO of Operation NIAGARA FALLS to the vicinity of BEN CAT.

c. PHASE III - Attack into the IRON TRIANGLE and the THANH DIEN FOREST RESERVE - D + 1, D + 2, 9 through 10 January 1967.

(1) The 1/503d Infantry remained in its present position

(2) 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry conducted heliborne assaults into LZ's 4 and 6 in the THANH DIEN FOREST RESERVE.

(3) The 11th ACR initiated attacks across BEN CAT Bridges west into the IRON TRIANGLE.

(4) 1/4th Cavalry conducted screening of NATIONAL HIGHWAY 13.

d. PHASE IV - Attack South into IRON TRIANGLE - D + 3 through D + 16 11 January through 24 January 1967.

(1) During this Phase, the 1/503d Infantry:

(a) Served as a blocking and reserve force in position.

(b) Conducted thorough Search and Destroy Operations in the western portion of the IRON TRIANGLE.

(c) Conducted platoon sized Eagle Flights in AO.

(2) The 2/503d Infantry attacked south into the IRON TRIANGLE on the west side including airmobile assault on suspected enemy locations.

(3) The 4/503d Infantry with D/16th Armor under its OPCON attacked south into the southeastern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE.

(4) During this phase, the 11th ACR (-):

(a) Attacked south into the IRON TRIANGLE along the west flank, and then conducted search and destroy operations in the southern portion of the AO. This was conducted by 3/11th ACR.

(b) The 2/11th ACR continued security missions along the northern edge of the IRON TRIANGLE.

(c) The 2/11th ACR and 3/11th ACR linked up in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE.

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c. PHASE V - Extraction of elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) from the AO of Operation CEDAR FALLS.

(1) The 11th ACR (-) with the 2/503d Infantry OPCON left the AO of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS by road search on 24 January 1967, with a major portion of the 173d Engineer Company.

(2) The remaining elements of the Brigade departed the operational area and closed at BIEN HOA on 25 January 1967.

14. Execution: This Combat After Action Report will be handled day by day with an accompanying map (located in TAR B) to show the major unit movements of maneuver elements during the period. Additionally, changes in the basic Task Force will be included on the days that change occurred.

a. B - 1 (5 January 1967) - Operation NIAGARA FALLS

Task Force Organization: See page 2, Paragraph 9

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) initiated Operation NIAGARA FALLS at 0607 hours in the CAU DINH JUNGLE. The 1/503d Infantry conducted a heliborne assault from its assembly area at PHU LOI to LZ LOIS (XT 774237) with Company A and elements of the Battalion's HQ. The remainder of the Battalion followed, closing at 0852 hours. Team BRAVO and Team ARNOR, consisting of B/2/34th Armor (-) and recon platoon conducted search and destroy operations in the CAU DINH AO (via XT 7723). The Battalion CP and Company C displaced from LZ LOIS at 1100 hours and proceeded to their proposed CP area at XT 773224. B/2/34th Armor was released OPCON 1/503d Infantry at 1700 hours.

The 1/4th Cavalry (-) moved by road at 0700 hours with A/5-2d Arty (AR) and secured blocking positions along HIGHWAY 13 from XT 798227 to the road junction at XT 801223. B/1/4th Cavalry conducted Search and Destroy operations in the CAU DINH JUNGLE.

The 1st Engineer Battalion made the only contact of the day at 0925 hours, killing 4 VC (BC).

b. B - 2 (6 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: no changes

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued to operate in the CAU DINH JUNGLE in preparation for Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 1/503d Infantry continued its search and destroy operations in the AO.

The 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) maintained blocking positions at the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TIDN RIVERS. The 1/4th Cavalry continued to block along HIGHWAY 13 and secure the 1st Division Engineers work parties who were clearing areas in the jungle.

There were no engagements on this day with the enemy.

c. B - 3 (7 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: no changes

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Operational Summary: Operation NIAGARA FALLS was terminated at 0900 hours with the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) moving with OPCON units into position for Operation CEDAR FALLS.

The 1/503d Infantry established blocking positions along the THI TIMH RIVER with Company A in the north, Company B in the center and Company C in the south. A/5-2d Artillery, equipped with automatic weapons, were also positioned to command the river escape routes.

At 0930 hours, 1/4th Cav (-) was released of OPCON of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and returned to PHU LOI. The 35th Ranger Battalion maintained its blocking position at the confluence of the THI TIMH and SAIGON RIVERS.

d. D - Day (8 January 1967) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

Task Force Organization: see page 2, paragraph 9. The Serial March into the AO was conducted as follows:

SERIAL #1

NHC (-)

SERIAL #2

E/17th Cav (-)
D/16th Armor
Co/L/503d Inf
3/319th Arty (-)
173d Engr Co

SERIAL #3

2/503d Inf
4/503d Inf (-)

SERIAL #4

173d BSOC

SERIAL #5

Flt/E/17th Cav
C/3/319th Arty

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and OPCON units initiated Operation CEDAR FALLS by conducting movement to the vicinity of BEN CAT and PHU LOI by road convoy, helilift and Air Force Cargo aircraft. The Brigade positioned its forces for the coordinated attack (3 battalions) on D + 1. The Brigade's Task Force DEAME became OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division at 0800 hours.

The Brigade Headquarters elements began a motor march from PHU LOI to Position RED (See overlay, D - Day), using HIGHWAY 13, closing at 0915 hours. The 1/503d Infantry remained in its blocking position assumed during Operation NIAGARA FALLS.

The 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry departed BIEH NOA at 1000 hours and were flown by Air Force Aircraft to PHU LOI, closing at 1138 hours. At 1300 hours, the 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry began a helilift to Position BLUE (See Overlay). The 2/503d Infantry closed at 1313 hours. At 1700 hours the Recon Platoon of the 2d Battalion engaged 2 VC at XT 818282, wounding one before they fled south. The troops of the Recon Platoon followed the blood trail, discovering 2 more VC in the process. The VC fired 8 - 10 rounds of semi-automatic fire, fired 1 rifle grenade and threw 1 hand grenade. The Recon Platoon returned fire with unknown results. There were negative friendly casualties.

At 1210 hours, the 4/503d Infantry closed at the assembly area at Position BLUE. At the same time, the 3/319th Artillery "B" and "C" Batteries arrived at Position WHITE from PHU LOI. The E/17th Cavalry had the responsibility of securing Position WHITE. Alpha Battery, 3/319th Artillery was stationed at the Brigade CP Area, Position RED. They arrived at the CP at 1210 hours.

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The 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) remained at their blocking position held during Operation NIAGARA FALLS. The 1/4th Cavalry of the 1st Infantry Division assumed a screening mission along HIGHWAY 13 at 0800 hours. They made negative contact until 1330 hours when they killed 1 VC (BC) at XT 856226.

e. D + 1 (9 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: D/4/503d Inf became OPCON to 3/11th ACR

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade's TF DEANS attacked suspected VC formation and installation areas in the IRON TRIANGLE and the THANG DIEM FOREST RESERVE. At 0600 hours, the 11th ACR (-) attacked west from BEN CAT and secured the bridge located at XT 738728. The Regiment then pushed further west seizing Objectives 1 (at 0912 hours), 1-A (at 0-50 hours) and Objective 2 (at 1105 hours). The Regiment also provided security for elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion (of the 1st Infantry Division) who were clearing the road west from BEN CAT to Objective 2, and Engineer elements clearing the area of Objective 1 and LZ 6 (See Overlay - D + 1).

At 0800 hours, Company D/16th Armor, reinforced with one rifle Company from 4/503d Infantry screened the area northwest of BEN CAT from XT 708333 to XT 685244.

The 2/503d Infantry initiated a helicopter assault into LZ 4 from Position BLUE beginning at 1055 hours (XT 670365). The assault was completed at 1115 hours and the 2/503d Infantry linked up with the 1st Division elements to the north approximately 1/2-hour later.

At 1215 hours, the 4/503d Infantry (-) departed Position BLUE by helicopter and at 1235 hours, they assaulted LZ 6 (XT 684250). One hour and ten minutes later, the 4th Battalion and the 2d Battalion linked together and at 1430 hours, D/16th Armor (+) became under the Operational Control of the 4th Battalion. The 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry established blocking positions in their respective LZ's and conducted limited search and destroy operations in their zones. At 2105 hours, elements of C/2/503d Infantry engaged 5 VC moving east at XT 662367. Two more VC were engaged in the same area shortly thereafter. The action resulted in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 ChiCom Carbines captured. There were no Friendly casualties, (see overlay D + 1).

The 1/503d Infantry and 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) with elements of the 1/4th Cavalry remained in their blocking positions, held since the termination of Operation NIAGARA FALLS. There were no significant contacts during the day.

f. D + 2 (10 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 1/4th Cav went OPCON to 11th ACR (-)
A/5/1st Arty (AV) went OPCON to 2/11th ACR

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division continued its sweep of the area north of the IRON TRIANGLE, west of BEN CAT. The 1/503d Infantry maintained their blocking position and conducted Search and Destroy operations in the area. The 1/4th Cavalry was relieved of its screening mission along HIGHWAY 13, south of BEN CAT at 1540 hours by the 4/7th ARVN Regiment (working in conjunction with II FFORCEV), and the 2/8th ARVN Regiment. The 1/4th Cavalry then motor marched to

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a blocking position vicinity of LZ 4 and LZ 6, thereby relieving the 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry (-) in that area. At 1400 hours, the 1/4th Cavalry (-) went under the Operational Control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-).

At 0823 hours, C/2/503d Infantry engaged 2 VC at XT 662370. This contact took place near to the ambush site employed on the night of the 9th of January. Four (4) Americans received wounds resulting from this action with VC casualties unknown. Later that day, after being relieved from by the 1/4th Cav, the 2/503d Infantry began to move into harbor positions (night defense) in preparation for an attack south into the IRON TRIANGLE. This was accomplished by 1645 hours.

The 4/503d Infantry moved into its staging area after it was relieved while Company D/16th Armor returned to the Brigade CP (Position RED) to aid in its defense.

The 11th ACR continued Search and Destroy in addition to Security missions in AO HOTEL and the immediate vicinity. At 1900 hours, a tank of B/1/4th Cavalry struck a mine at XT 669359 resulting in 1 trooper being wounded and 4 road wheels being blown off the tank (Location 2, Overlay D + 2).

8. D + 3 (11 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: No Change

Operational Summary: On this day, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) TF DEANE commenced its attack south into the IRON TRIANGLE at 0900 hours. The 2/503d Infantry initiated search and destroy operations in the western portion of the Triangle while the 4th Battalion crossed into the AO on the east, all conducting search and destroy operations while moving to the south. At 1500 hours, A/4/503d Infantry discovered a boobytrapped base camp at XT 724304. The camp measured 100 meters by 200 meters and contained 40 bunkers with overhead cover. Surrounding the area was a horse shoe trench measuring 2' wide by 2' deep. Company A found nine boobytraps in the compound which were all detonated in place (Location 1). D/16th Armor attacked along the western portion toward Objective 5.

The 3/11th ACR attacked south into the IRON TRIANGLE moving down the western edge along HIGHWAY 14. In addition to clearing the road, they also seized Objectives 1 (XT 715240), 2 (XT 723240), 3 (XT 743240), and 4 (XT 744218), while simultaneously conducting search and destroy operations along the Route. All objectives were secured by 1645 hours.

Early in the morning before the attack was initiated, M/3/11th ACR engaged 5 VC at XT 702296 (Location 2). The VC fled without returning fire. The skirmish resulted in one (1) VC MIA being captured. He was subsequently evacuated to the 172d Military Intelligence Detachment for interrogation. At 1930 hours, M/3/11th ACR engaged 3 VC at XT 750231. The contact resulted in 1 VC KIA and 1 US Carbine being captured (Location 3).

1/503d Infantry Battalion was relieved of its original blocking mission by the 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) at 1200 hours. The Battalion then deployed to the Brigade CP at Position RED.

The 2/11th and the 1/4th Cavalry continued security and screening missions north of the IRON TRIANGLE under the OPCON of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-).

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B. D + 4 (12 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 2/11th ACR & 1/4th Cav became
OPCON to 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div

Operational Summary: TF DEAME continued search and destroy operations in the IRON TRIANGLE with its strength being expanded now that the 1/503d Infantry was relieved of its blocking position and could now function with the Brigade.

The 1/503d Infantry (-) moved by road from Position RED to the western portion of the IRON TRIANGLE at 0735 hours. The mission was to make a thorough search of the area along HIGHWAY 14. At this time, Company A/503d Infantry remained at Position RED to secure the Brigade CP and Fire Support Base.

At 1010 hours, the Recon Platoon/1/503d Infantry killed 2 Viet Cong at XT 677296 (Location 1). The weapons belonging to the VC were lost in the river, however, one (1) M-26 grenade and two (2) Chicom grenades were captured. At 1525 hours at XT 682235 (Location 2) the Recon Platoon of the 1st Battalion found 3 VC, one of whom had been wounded, in a bunker. Shortly thereafter, at the same location, they found 4 dead VC and 1 Chicom Carbine.

Throughout the day, the 2/503d Infantry and 4/503d Infantry continued a detailed search of their AO's with no significant contact. D/16th Armor, reinforced with Company C/4/503d Infantry, moved by APC to the vicinity of Objective 5 under the OPCON of 4/503d Infantry. At 1605 hours, the remainder of Company C joined D/16th Armor, via hoilift.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) continued its search and destroy operations in the western portion of the IRON TRIANGLE with the 3d Squadron. At 1120 hours, an element of 3/11th ACR pursued 5 VC at XT 746234. The VC led them into a claymore ambush which resulted in 3 US MIA and 4 US KIA. The VC fled before a retaliatory act could be executed, (Location 3). At 1635 hours, E/3/11th ACR received heavy semi-automatic and automatic fire from an ambush at XT 703253 (Location 4). The VC, who were estimated to be at platoon strength, damaged 1 APC with 3 rounds of 57mm Recoilless Rifle fire. There were no US casualties and enemy losses were unknown. At 2040 hours, M/3/11th ACR observed a VC attempting to tamper with one of their claymore mines. The claymore was detonated, killing the VC (XT 748230).

The 2/11th ACR and the 1/4th Cavalry were released to the Operational Control of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at 0700 hours.

E Troop, 17th Cavalry secured the Fire Support Base at Position WHITE and conducted Air Cavalry Operations under the OPCON of the 1/503d Infantry in the western portion of the AO.

1. D + 5 (13 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 2/11th ACR reverts OPCON 11th ACR (-)

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and OPCON units continued to comb the IRON TRIANGLE destroying VC, their installations and supplies. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 503d Infantry continued their detailed search of the Operational Area, making no significant contact.

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At 1640 hours, PFC Diane Simpson, a member of the 39th Infantry Platoon Scout Dog, and working with C/L/503d Infantry, alerted his patrol to the presence of an unknown number of VC at XT 725269. Simpson's Scout Dog in fact gave the silent warning. Immediately after the warning was spread, heavy automatic fire commenced. Simpson quickly returned the fire to gain superiority, killing one (1) VC. The remainder of the patrol then moved up to engage the enemy. The contact resulted in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 weapon being captured, thanks only to the quick action of the attached scout dog team.

At 1400 hours, A/L/503d Infantry received 30 to 40 rounds of semi-automatic fire at XT 728268 (Location 5 - D + 4, D + 5 Overlay). Fire was returned resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) with no US casualties.

The 11th ACR (-) continued to search its AO. At 1800 hours, the 2d Squadron reverted back to the control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

On this day, E Troop, 17th Cavalry had the mission of securing artillery elements at Position WHITE in addition to conducting Air Mobile Cavalry Operations. The Cavalry killed 10 VC in a series of actions throughout the day. At 1043 hours, at XT 714212 (Location 7) they contacted and killed 2 VC. Fifteen minutes later, another element killed 1 VC at XT 688236 (Location 8). At 1320 hours, they killed 2 VC and captured 1 VC WIA at XT 710233, also capturing one (1) US carbine and a .45 caliber pistol. Throughout the day, various elements of E/17th Cav killed 5 more of the enemy throughout their AO, in addition to discovering large quantities of rice and several sampans.

The 173d Engineer Company provided Tunnel Exploration Teams "Tunnel Rats" throughout the Operational Area for tunnel search and destruction.

J. D + 6 (14 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: No Change

Operational Summary: The Brigade's Task Force DRAME continued a detailed search of the IRON TRIANGLE, destroying VC and Viet Cong installations and supplies throughout the day.

The 1/503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in the northern portion of the Triangle, west of HIGHWAY 1A. At the same time, elements of E Troop, 17th Cavalry were working with the 1st Battalion in that area. The Battalion's activities were highly successful on this day for they discovered and destroyed 30.5 tons of Paddy Rice, 300 pounds of Chicom explosives and 36 anti-personnel mines.

In the meantime, the Cavalry Troop killed a total of 12 VC in a series of small contacts. In addition, they captured 3 VC, destroyed 63.7 tons of paddy rice, evacuated an additional 11 tons of rice, destroyed 10 sampans and several boats. (See Tab C, Small Unit Actions - E/17th Cavalry).

The 2/503d Infantry, while conducting search and destroy operations in the central portion of the IRON TRIANGLE found and destroyed several small bunkers, tunnels and a base camp area. Within the camp, a hand grenade shop was found and 25 grenades were confiscated.

The 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry conducted a thorough search of the eastern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. At 1000 hours, Company C/L/503d Infantry discovered a 100 meter tunnel, 6 feet below the surface at XT 727265 (Location 5).

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A search of the tunnel revealed 3 rooms, 5 feet by 8 feet with wooden floors. In addition, 45 tons of paddy rice, 3.4 tons of salt, 16 rifle grenades, 22 60mm mortar rounds and 2,300 feet of electrical wire were found within. At 1415 hours, an element of C/4/503d Infantry with Company D/16th Armor made contact with an estimated VC squad. The VC fired 150 - 200 rounds of semi-automatic and automatic fire. The engagement was characterized by the troopers as being extremely heated, owing not only to the enemy fire, but also the large numbers of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines encountered. The action resulted in 14 US KIA with unknown VC casualties (XT 737259 - Location 6).

The 2/11th ACR and 3/11th ACR conducted search and destroy operations in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. Throughout the day's activities, they discovered and destroyed 17 tunnels, one trench system and 18 bunkers. In addition, 500 pounds of polished rice was found and evacuated.

The 173d Engineer Company "Tunnel Rat" teams explored a total of 1,300 meters of tunnel within the AO. A total of 2,500 meters of tunnel were destroyed leaving an untold number of VC trapped within.

K. D + 7 (15 January 1967)

Changes in Task Organization: No Changes

Operational Summary: TF DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS conducting methodical search and destroy operations within the IRON TRIANGLE AO. Moving behind a massive TAC Air preparation consisting of 14 sorties dropping a total of 19,000 pounds of High Explosives, the 1/503d Infantry located and extracted a medical cache at XT 672281 containing 300 tablets of Penicillin, 10 bottles of powdered Penicillin, one bottle of alcohol, 20 bottles of latercain and 5 bottles of sterile water. At 1210 hours, elements of the 1/503d Infantry killed 3 VC (BC) at 672281 (Location 7) and captured one (1) US carbine, ammunition, documents and several maps. They also located 1 grenade, 10 bunkers, 3 sampans, 3 huts, 1 tunnel, 1 AT mine and 100-pound bomb during the day's activities.

The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry moved south through the central portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. Boobytraps at XT 693263 and XT 688266 wounded 4 men on the days operations. The Battalion located and destroyed 11 huts and 4 bunkers. At 1210 hours, Bravo Company engaged 2 VC who were busy emplacing a mine in the road at XT 712247 (Location 9). The men fired at the enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 US M-2 carbine being captured.

During their search of the eastern portion of the Triangle, the 4/503d Infantry (-) came across a triangular shaped base camp, 100 meters on each side. 35 bunkers were located on the perimeter and an additional 20 were found within the encampment. All of the bunkers were interconnected with trenches. Warm coals in the cooking fires indicated recent habitation by an estimated VC Platoon.

The 11th ACR (-) with Company D/4/503d Infantry under their Operational Control searched the southern area of the IRON TRIANGLE. At 1149 hours, an element of D/4/503d Infantry engaged 3 VC at XT 736217 (Location 10). One of the VC was killed and the remaining 2 escaped into a tunnel after firing approximately 10 rounds. One (1) sub-machinegun, 2 carbines and one (1) DM-10 claymore mine was captured. Friendly casualties were: 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. At 1310 hours, an APC from E Troop/2/11th ACR struck a mine at XT 736218 (Location 11) resulting in 6 US KIA. At 1530 hours, seven (7) personnel from M/3/11th ACR were wounded in action and 2 APCs were damaged by two (2) command estimated mines at XT 731231 (Location 12).

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E Troop/17th Cavalry was fired on by Viet Cong snipers at XT 695218 (Location 13) resulting in 2 US KIA. 40 minutes later, at XT 695218, a VC wearing black pajamas was killed at XT 095219. In addition, 6 bunkers, 6 punji pits, 1 hut, 6 sampans and 3.75 tons of rice were destroyed.

1. D + 8 (16 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: B/4/503d Infantry released OPCON of 11th ACR (-) returning 4/503d Inf

Operational Summary:

Task Force DEANG continued Operation CEDAR FALLS conducting search and destroy operations within the IRON TRIANGLE with 1/503d Infantry (-) in the western sector, 2/503d Infantry in the center and 4/503d Infantry in the east. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) was operating in the southern tip of the Triangle.

The 1st Battalion 503d Infantry in the western sector of the Triangle conducted search and destroy operations to the south. Company C and Company B were located on east and the west side of HIGHWAY 14 respectively. At 0843 hours, at XT 683255, Bravo Company made contact with 2 VC who immediately fled to the west. Shortly thereafter, B/1/503d Infantry captured one VC at XT 685255. The VC was subsequently evacuated. At XT 681278, the 1st Battalion's Recon Platoon located and destroyed a tunnel complex, 4 huts, an 8 foot sampan dock and a bunker. At 1015 hours, Bravo Company received 5 - 7 rounds of automatic weapons fire at XT 685255. Three (3) Viet Cong were captured after a brief exchange of fire, with 2 - 3 VC escaping to the south. Five minutes later, Company C located two (2) machinegun mounts, one bunker and 4 CBU's employed as boobytraps. All was destroyed with the exception of the machinegun mounts which were evacuated. Bravo Company sustained 5 casualties at 1335 hours as a direct result of an activated boobytrap at XT 685255. Four of these casualties required litters for evacuation. Shortly before this occurred, Charlie Company had discovered an extensive tunnel complex, showing signs of having been used as a hospital. One company of the 1st Battalion was employed in the security of the Brigade CP at Position MED.

The companies of the 2d Battalion 503d Infantry continued to conduct search and destroy missions, sweeping to the southeast. Company B encountered one (1) VC at XT 698262, shortly after 1100 hours. Company B suffered one KIA and 1 WIA as a result of the contact, with the VC escaping to the northeast. The Dust-off helicopter received semi-automatic ground fire during the evacuation, resulting in one of the medical personnel being wounded. Company C killed one (1) VC at 1200 hours while operating in the area XT 702216. The VC was found in a tunnel. The 2d Battalion's Recon Platoon operating in conjunction with elements of E/17th Cavalry, captured one (1) VC at XT 692237. The POW was extracted to the 32 for questioning. At 1330 hours, Charlie Company returned to the tunnel where it had previously killed one VC. At this time, a second VC was killed in the same vicinity. During the night, the Recon Platoon established ambush patrols around the Brigade TOC (vicinity 696307). At 2100 hours, they ambushed and killed one (1) VC, capturing one Canadian pistol.

At 0715 hours, airstrikes commenced on targets XT 735260, XT 740260, XT 736255 and XT 740254 in preparation for the 11th Battalion, 503d Infantry's search and destroy mission. Company A and Company B operated in the area XT 720285 to XT 734265. C/4/503d Infantry with Company D/16th Armor (-) OPCON screened the AO in the vicinity of Objective 5. At 1055 hours, Bravo Company located what appeared

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to be a claymore mine factory at XT 723272. Search of the factory revealed large quantities of metal and canisters for WP rounds. An hour and a half later, Bravo Company located a tunnel with several rooms capable of standing in. The rooms contained 500 rounds of rice and a rusted .38 caliber pistol. At 1245 hours, Company D reported one (1) WIA and called for a Dustoff. The casualty, SGT Mario Ramirez, died enroute to the hospital. 45 minutes later, Bravo Company made contact with an estimated reinforced platoon at XT 725268. Artillery was called in on the position and contact was broken 15 minutes later. The results of this action are as follows: 5 VC KIA, 10 VC WIA (possibly 15). US casualties were: two (2) US KIA (SP4 Arthur Wilkie and PFC Frank Smith) and eleven (11) US WIA, nine of whom were evacuated by helicopter. At 1435 hours, an element of D/16th Armor hit a mine at XT 734265 resulting in six (6) WIA.

The 11th ACR (-), operating in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE, located and marked for destruction one tunnel at XT 740218. They also destroyed one (1) DM-10 claymore mine at the same location. At 1245 hours, an APC struck a mine at XT 725262 resulting in one (1) US WIA. Two hours later, M/3/11th received approximately 20 rounds of semi-automatic fire from a tunnel at XT 740221. Two (2) US personnel pursued the enemy into the tunnel resulting in the death of one and the injury of the other. In contacts that took place at 1530 and 1605 hours, the 11th ACR (-) killed 2 VC (BC) and 1 possibly in addition to capturing 1 US carbine, one (1) .45 caliber pistol and one (1) Russian automatic weapon.

m. D + 9 (17 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 2/11th ACR returned to 11th ACR (-)
& 17th Abn Bde (Ssg) OPCON
2/11th ACR was released from 3d
Bde, 1st Inf Div

D/4/503d Inf attached to 11th ACR
E/17th Cav OPCON 1/503d Inf

Operational Summary: Task Force DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS conducting search and destroy operations within the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1/503d Infantry (working in conjunction with E/17th Cav) conducted operations in the western Triangle near the SANGON RIVER. The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry and the 4th Battalion (-) with D/16th Armor (OPCON) operated in the center and east respectively. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) with Company D/4/503d Infantry attached were in the southern sector of the AO.

The 1/503d Infantry secured the Brigade CP and Fire Support Base at Position RED with Alpha Company. The remainder of the Battalion conducted search and destroy operations within the AO. At XT 695245 (Location 1) one (1) VC exchanged fire with 1st Battalion elements, wounding 2 paratroopers. At 1910 hours, E/1/503d Infantry engaged 3 Viet Cong at XT 688247 resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC) and an additional VC KIA (possible). The dead VC was in a green shirt, black trousers and a bush hat. There was one (1) US KIA and 3 WIA as a result of this contact.

E Troop, 17th Cavalry engaged three (3) Viet Cong at 1330 hours killing 2 of the enemy (BC) and capturing the third at XT 671244. During a night ambush patrol, the Cavalry troopers engaged 6 VC at XT 672245 (Location 15). The action resulted in 2 VC killed and 2 weapons captured. The contact took place at 2010 hours.

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The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry located a tunnel complex at XT 708-242 containing two (2) Chicom Carbines and one (1) US Carbine. At 1120 hours, Bravo Company engaged two (2) Viet Cong at XT 713253 (Location 16) killing one of the enemy. A trench 1,600 meters in length was later located running from XT 688-247 to 695241.

Elements of the 4/503d Infantry received 1 MIA from a sniper at XT 725267. Later that day, the Battalion discovered a large weapons cache at XT 727-269. The cache contained 2 Russian Rifles, one (1) 60mm mortar, two (2) M60 machineguns, two (2) US M-1 rifles, 24 Chicom rifles, two (2) US Browning Automatic rifles, 2 French machineguns, and three (3) .45 caliber sub-machineguns.

At 0900 hours, the 3/11th ACR reported kill one (1) VC when he detonated a friendly boobytrap at XT 740221. The trap was set by elements of M Troop, 3/11th ACR. At 1030 hours, an M48-A3 tank of K Troop/3/11th ACR lost four (4) road wheels as a result of having struck a pressure type land mine at XT 739-216. Other Regimental units made no significant contact during the day.

a. D + 10 (18 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: 1/4th Cav was released from 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div OPCON & became OPCON to TF DEANE

Operational Summary: TF DEANE continued to conduct a detailed search and destroy operation within the AO of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 1/503d Infantry with E Troop, 17th Cavalry was given the responsibility of maintaining security of Position WHITE. At 1725 hours, B/1/503d Infantry engaged 2 VC at XT 693245 (Location 1). One (1) VC was killed (BC) and one (1) AK-47 rifle was captured. The VC wore a light green uniform and a pistol belt. At 1938 hours, Bravo Company again made contact with 2 Viet Cong at XT 693244 (Location 1), resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and an additional VC possibly killed. The dead VC wore a light blue uniform and was armed with a belt action rifle. In the early morning hours, elements of E/17th Cavalry were probed by an unknown number of Viet Cong at XT 716227. The Cavalry Troop opened fire on the enemy resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC).

The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry continued its search in their assigned AO, progressing toward the eastern area of the IRON TRIANGLE. At 1145 hours, C/2/503d Infantry discovered an old .45 caliber pistol (US) at XT 726258 (Location 3). During the search of the area, three (3) paratroopers were wounded by an enemy boobytrap.

The 4/503d Infantry continued to search in their AO during the day, however, their first contact was at 0330 hours in the morning. Battalion elements received several rounds of small arms fire at XT 736268 (Location 4). Artillery was called in on the enemy. Following the artillery barrage, patrols were sent forth to acquire an estimate of damage done by Artillery. It was reported that two (2) VC were killed and one (1) M-1 rifle and one (1) homemade shotgun were captured. Activities during the day consisted primarily of the discovery/destruction of numerous tunnel complexes. Exploration of two of these tunnels revealed a sizable weapons cache. One tunnel yielded one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, one (1) flare pistol, one (1) 60mm mortar bipod and base plate, eight (8) Chicom rifles, one (1) M-1 rifle and several rounds of assorted ammunition. This tunnel was located at XT 726267. Another tunnel/cache at XT 727/269 contained two (2) US Carbines, three (3) M-1 rifles, four (4) Thompson machineguns, one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, 41 belt action weapons and one (1) M-3 sub-machinegun.

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The 11th ACR (-) continued operations in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE and secured the engineer work parties to the north. At 1330 hours they were released of the security responsibility by 1/4th Cavalry. The 1/4th Cavalry became OPCON of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) at this time.

e. D + 11 (19 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: No Change

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade's Task Force DEANE continued operations throughout the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1st Battalion's Company A continued to secure Position RED while the rest of the Battalion conducted screening operations in the western portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1/503d Infantry met with little contact, however, 21 plastic type anti-personnel mines were destroyed at XT 688243. At 1005 hours, a Chieu Hoi returnee pointed out a 100 meter trench to elements of the 1/503d Infantry at XT 694249. The trench and connecting tunnel with room were destroyed by Bravo Company. Throughout the morning, B/1/503d Infantry located several caches of rice totalling approximately 10 to 12 tons. At 1300 hours, four (4) VC (3 of whom were carrying Chieu Hoi passes) were captured by the Commo Platoon south of the Brigade CP. That afternoon, the Battalion CP was displaced by foot to XT 703244 and closed at 1605 hours.

The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry searched the central portion of the IRON TRIANGLE progressing eastward. At 1530 hours, 4 VC were detained by elements of the 2d Battalion, one of whom died of a heart attack. The capture of these VC occurred at XT 733252. The Recon Platoon set ambushes that night at two sites, XT 743258 and XT 744256. On two separate occasions, each ambush killed one VC, however, no weapons were captured.

The 4th Battalion with Company D/16th Armor (OPCON) conducted a sweep in the eastern portion of the Triangle. At 0950 hours, B/4/503d Infantry engaged 3 Viet Cong in a tunnel at XT 724261. One of the enemy was killed, however, the other two managed to escape. The Battalion located and extracted one (1) Thompson sub-machinegun, one (1) US carbine and one (1) Mauser rifle from a tunnel at XT 726-203.

1/3/11th ACR, while conducting search and destroy operations in the southern sector of the IRON TRIANGLE, killed two (2) VC in a tunnel which was constructed of reinforced concrete at XT 725225.

The 1/4th Cavalry continued to secure the northern portion of the Brigade's Area of Operation. At 0725 hours, a damaged APC, being towed, struck a pressure type mine at XT 696343 and burned, resulting in the total loss of the vehicle and 3 US MIA. At 0855 hours, an Aero Scout team found 1 VC (BC) at XT 671356. In the process of confirming the KIA, the team made contact with 3 VC. The action resulted in one of the hostiles being killed (BC). At 1345 hours, B/1/4th Cavalry contacted a Viet Cong Squad at XT 643328. The enemy returned semi-automatic and automatic fire on the friendly troops. Two VC were killed and two were wounded as a result of this action. The VC wore light green shirts and black trousers. One Chicom carbine was captured.

E Troop, 17th Cavalry conducted Aero Rifle Platoon Operations in the southwestern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. At 2130 hours, they killed 5 VC at XT 679239 in addition to capturing 1 US carbine and 1 Russian carbine.

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p. D + 12 (20 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: N 3/11th ACR became OPCON 4/503d Inf

Operation 1 Summary: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation CEDAR FALLS within the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, having completed sweeping the west flank, moved to the southern portion of the AO. Alpha Company was relieved of the Brigade base security/reaction force mission and joined the Battalion at their CP location at 1025 hours. The heavy mortar platoon, however, remained at Position RED. At 0930 hours, A/1/503d Infantry located and destroyed a 200-pound bomb at XT 711244. Charlie Company, at XT 703244, located 15 - 20 tons of rice. The majority of this rice was destroyed in place, however, 15,800 pounds were evacuated. Throughout the day, the paratroopers of the 1st Battalion made numerous discoveries of rice, bunkers, bicycles, tunnels and medical supplies. At 2040 hours, Company A killed one (1) VC at XT 709228.

At 0815 hours, Companies A and B/2/503d Infantry conducted a helicopter assault employing eight (8) helicopters to an LZ vicinity XT 699270. Company C remained at the Battalion CP (XT 7352.8). After completing the lift, Companies A and B/2/503d Infantry conducted local saturation in the vicinity of the CP. Company A encountered three (1) VC at 1350 hours, killing one (XT 698272). Shortly after 1800 hours, the two companies were helilifted to the Battalion CP, closing at 1845 hours.

The 4th Battalion (-) with D/16th Armor and M/2/11th ACR OPCON moved northwest to seize Objective MIKE (XT 700273). The attack was preceded by TAC Air and Artillery preparations. The Battalion and attached units made no significant contact during the day.

The 1/4th Cavalry (1st Infantry Division) (-) attacked south from their AO to Objective TOM (XT 695277). The position was reported secure at 0909 hours. Due to the absence of significant contact, the 1st Squadron returned to its AO in the northern sector of the IRON TRIANGLE and continued to conduct search and destroy operations in addition to providing security for Engineer work parties in the area. At 0805 hours, B/1/4th Cavalry encountered 19 Chieu Hoi Raiders at XT 679285 (Location 2). The ex-VC were promoted to rally by recent air strikes and artillery fire, coupled with hunger and generally poor living conditions. At 0953 hours, A/1/4th Cavalry killed one (1) VC at 683313 (Location 3).

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) continued to conduct search and destroy operations in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. K/3/11th ACR assumed responsibility for the security of the Brigade CP and Fire Support Base at Position RED.

Troop E/17th Cavalry continued their primary mission of securing Position WHITE in addition to conducting Aero Rifle Platoon operations. At 0339 hours, elements of the Cavalry Troop killed 2 VC in a sampan at XT 689223 (Location 4). Eleven minutes later, they contacted and killed a second VC in the same vicinity. The troopers accounted for two (2) more enemy KIA before daybreak.

q. D + 13 (21 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: No Changes

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Operational Summary: TF BRANS continued Operation CEDAR FALLS conducting intensive search and destroy operations within the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry continued to conduct operations in the southern portion of the AO between the SAIGON RIVER and HIGHWAY 1, employing road patrols and platoon sized Eagle Flights. The Battalion also initiated helicopter assaults on small LZs used as short range patrol bases. At 2118 hours, A/1/503d Infantry engaged 15 Viet Cong at XT 686212 (Location 1). The VC returned the fire before fleeing southwest. The action resulted in one (1) US KIA with unknown enemy casualties.

The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry continued its operations in the east/central portion of the IRON TRIANGLE, west of the THI TINH RIVER. At 2010 hours, A/2/503d Infantry spotted 3 VC at XT 742253 (Location 2). The enemy fired 10 - 12 rounds of semi-automatic fire. The VC subsequently fled and the pursuit was taken up by elements of Alpha Company. One (1) US paratrooper was killed in the process. The Dustoff ship that was summoned to the scene also received fire during its departure.

The 4/503d Infantry with Company D/16th Armor and H/2/1st ACR GFCOM continued search and destroy operations through the heart of the IRON TRIANGLE, linking up with 2/503d Infantry 6 kilometers south of BEN CAT. At 1130 hours, C/4/503d Infantry contacted 3 - 5 VC at XT 742207 (Location 3). Two of the hostiles dropped when fired upon. One body was observed being dragged away. The other VC was confirmed KIA (BC). At 1500 hours, B/4/503d Infantry contacted two enemy personnel at XT 683257 (Location 4). The VC managed to escape after wounding one (1) US trooper.

The 11th ACR (-) conducted operations in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE at the confluence of the THI TINH and SAIGON RIVERS. At 1215 hours, L/1/11th ACR detained 3 Viet Cong who stated that they were influenced into surrender. They added that the Psy War speaker mission flown on the 20th of January near XT 723218 (Location 5) convinced them to rally. F Troop, 2/11th ACR killed two (2) VC on two separate occasions on this day at 1300 hours and at 1600 hours. All four hostiles killed were clad in black pajamas.

The 1/4th Cavalry patrolled the rubber plantation and jungle area west of BEN CAT, thereby blocking the northern escape path of those enemy elements trapped within the IRON TRIANGLE. In addition, the 1/4th Cavalry provided security for the Engineer work parties operating in the northern sector of the AO. Between 1150 and 1200 hours, C/1/4th Cavalry captured 19 detainees in the vicinity of XT 731512 and XT 735315.

E Troop, 17th Cavalry conducted platoon sized Aero Rifle Operations along the west bank of the SONG THI TINH being free of intra-Task Force boundaries.

Of special interest were the Psychological Operations conducted in the Area of Operations. As a result of the leaflet drop on 21 January, six (6) Viet Cong rallied. The circumstances behind this are as follows: On the 19th of January, two VC rallied to the GVN cause. On the following day, they were photographed together and gave the names of six of their friends among the VC ranks. The two men, who happened to be brothers, composed a message aimed directly to their six friends. On the same day, the leaflets were airdropped. Shortly thereafter, the six Viet Cong rallied, following the good advice of their comrades. In addition, a woman refugee was permitted at her own request to broadcast a message to her husband and brother. Three hours after her plea, both men turned themselves in under the Chieu Hoi Program. See TAB G for leaflet mentioned above and photographs of Psy Ops.

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SUBJECT: Curbat Operations - Aerial Reconnaissance Support for Military Highway Clearing

P. D. 1; (C. J. M. 7, 1907)

Change in Task Force Organization: See info on OCCN at
4-15-68

Operational Summary: The 7th Airborne Brigade TF DPAISE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS within the Iron Triangle. On the 8th, the 1st Infantry began moving north along the east flank of the Triangle. Search and destroy operations were conducted with the 1st Airborne Company, 1st Airborne Battalion and the 1st Airborne Company. Company 1 was on the west flank, Company 2 on the east flank and Company 3 was located in the center. At 0400 hours, at KT 7, the 1st Airborne Company located and destroyed a small tunnel containing explosives and detonating wires. Later that day, Alpha Company located and destroyed a submachine gun at 0600/200. During the day, the Battalion discovered a lot of enemy weapons, a large quantity of gas, a large quantity of enemy weapons and a large quantity of enemy weapons. The 1st Airborne Company was also discovered by elements of the 1st Infantry during the day. Contact results for the day's operation were positive.

Continuing at 0700 hours, the 1st Battalion, 3rd Infantry became under the Operational Control of the 1st Assault Cavalry Regiment (ACR). There were no contacts with the enemy until the 3rd Infantry however, several company sized battalions were located during the day's action. Most of these elements showed indications of recent use. The Cavalry Troops served primarily as blocking forces for the Infantry maneuver.

The 2nd Battalion, 50th Infantry, was concerned primarily with the destruction of tunnels within their Area of Operations. At 0900 hours, Companies C and B began digging tunnels. At 1000 hours, Company A reported that they had entered a tunnel after it was reported to contain an estimate of 200 tons. The men then became overcome by gas and all of the troops were unable to escape. At 1630 hours, PFC Hunter, 1st Light was recovered from the underground tunnel. He died enroute to the hospital. It must be mentioned here that the infantrymen who enter these tunnels are strictly volunteers.

The 14th Cavalry continued to secure engineer work parties working west of HAN CAT in order to prevent HAN CAT from attempting to block the VC engineer route to the northern sector of the IRRM. At 0600 hours, B/14th Cavalry fired on VC at AN GIANG location 21. Nine (9) of the hostiles were captured, 6 of which were transported to the 27th Military Intelligence Detachment, the other three pending medical attention.

9. U + 15 L. J. January 1967

Changes in Task Force Organization: Phase 1 (Processing OGCY) until 4-2-82
Phase 2 (Initial C&T)
Phase 3 (ACH Processing) OGCY 4-1-82
In:

Ordnance and Supplies: The 73rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation CEDAR FALLS within the IRON TRIANGLE. The 1st Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the west flank of the Triangle against INTERNATIONAL HIGHWAY 14. At 1200 hours, Charlie Company located and destroyed a 200 meter tunnel at XT 685275. The Battalion CP began dislocation at 1230 hours, ending at XT 677278 at 1515 hours without incident.

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The 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry released H/2/11th ACR from Operational control at 0700 hours. The Battalion then swept north to the east of the Triangle. At 0940 hours, Company A located in a tunnel (vicinity XT 729270) one (1) sniper rifle, three (3) pistols, one (1) Chicom carbine, ten (10) French bolt action rifles, six (6) cans of tar and fourteen (14) rolls of roofing tin. The Battalion made no significant contact during the day and were primarily concerned with the evacuation and destruction of rice caches.

The 11th ACR (-) with 2/503d Infantry OPCON continued mechanized and foot operations in the southern tip of the IRON TRIANGLE. They explored tunnels, conducted patrolling along lines of communication and secured the Engineer work parties who were clearing the area.

The 1/4th Cavalry with elements of 2/17th Cavalry patrolled the northern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE meeting with no significant contact with the enemy. Those units were situated west of BEN CAT blocking escape routes and securing Engineer work parties in the area.

t. D + 16 (24 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: B/1/503d Inf became OPCON to 1/4th Cav

Operational Summary: The 173d Airborne's Task Force DEAME continued to conduct Search and Destroy Operations in the IRON TRIANGLE and began to redeploy its forces to Base Camp in preparation for the termination of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS. The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry continued operations on the west flank of the IRON TRIANGLE proceeding northward. At 1057 hours at XT 676274, the Recon Platoon of 1/503d Infantry located and destroyed 3 tons of paddy rice. Shortly thereafter, they discovered a dead VC at XT 667302. The unit continued its movement and at XT 671271 they located and destroyed 25 additional tons of paddy rice and four (4) huts. Bravo Company was released from the Operational Control of the 1/4th Cavalry and returned to the Battalion CP at 1730 hours.

The 4th Battalion with D/16th Armor (OPCON) continued to conduct search and destroy operations to the north from XT 714289 to XT 720320. The Battalion CP and D/1/503d Infantry moved by track vehicle with D/16th Armor beginning at 0805 hours. At 1243 hours, Company D/16th Armor and two (2) platoons of D/1/503d Infantry were released from Brigade OPCON.

The 11th ACR (-) and 2/503d Infantry departed the Area of Operation at 0930 hours, clearing the IRON TRIANGLE at 1229 hours. The elements then proceeded to their respective base camps at XUAN LOC and BIEN HOA.

The 1/4th Cavalry continued its screening mission along the northern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE with B/1/503d Infantry OPCON. At 1300 hours, B/1/503d Infantry and 1/4th Cavalry contacted an estimated Viet Cong Squad at XT 664-12 (Location 1). The skirmish resulted in 6 VC KIA (DC) and 3 enemy MIA who were captured. Two (2) .38 caliber pistols were confiscated. At 1410 hours, as a direct result of this action, three (3) additional Viet Cong were captured at XT 664-12.

u. D + 17 (25 January 1967)

Changes in Task Force Organization: Signals captured during redeployment of Brigade follows:

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<u>SERIAL #1</u>	<u>SERIAL #2</u>	<u>SERIAL #3</u>
LTC HEALY - Cdr	MAJ WINKSOR - Cdr	LTC NORDIN - Cdr
1/503d Inf	D/16th Armer	E/17th Cav
L/503d Inf	HMC (-)	B & C Btry
HQ & A Btry/3/319th A ty	1 Plt Engr	3/319th Arty
	BSOC	

The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) terminated Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS at 0700 hours when it was released from the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division. The Brigade returned to Base Camp in three Serials, clearing the CEDAR FALLS AO at 0945 hours. The final elements of the Brigade closed at BINH HOA at 1327 hours. The movement was executed without incident.

15. Revolutionary Development

a. Civic Action Activities:

- (1) Construction of Refugee Center (100 meters x 150 meters at location XT 733323, BEN CAT).
 - (a) A double concertina wire protective barrier was erected around the perimeter.
 - (b) Erected four (4) ea tents, GP large.
 - (c) Constructed two (2) ea latrines, slit trench, 8 hole
- (2) Constructed a Boy Scout Den/Schoolroom, 16' x 24' using logs, 1" planking and corrugated metal roof.
- (3) Constructed 1 ea Soccer Field, 100 meters x 40 meters.
- (4) Constructed 3 ea Volley Ball courts.
- (5) Installed 36' of 24" corrugated metal culvert under access road leading to church vicinity XT 740329, BEN CAT.
- (6) Distributed to BEN CAT District Advisor the following:
 - (a) 450' of chicken wire.
 - (b) 45' - 50' miscellaneous corrugated metal culvert.
- (7) The above items were accomplished by the 173d Engineer Company.

b. Brigade S5 Activities:

- (1) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the S5 Section centered its activities in the BEN CAT DISTRICT, BINH DUONG PROVINCE. The following are totals of various S5 Activities:

(a) MEUCAP and DENTCAP

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DATE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	MEDCAP	DENTCAP
6 Jan 67	XOM RACH MAI	XT 777185	67	18
9 Jan 67	AN DIEN	XT 727318	22	6
10 Jan 67	AN DIEN	XT 727318	157	65
11 Jan 67	AN DIEN	XT 727318	154	34
12 Jan 67	NUONG CIAO	XT 730340	84	20
12 Jan 67	CHU MUI	XT 745335	15	5
13 Jan 67	NUONG CIAO	XT 730340	55	15
13 Jan 67	XOM XOAI	XT 755320	50	25
16 Jan 67	BEN CAT	XT 741330	143	38
17 Jan 67	BEN CAT	XT 741330	198	44
18 Jan 67	MY THANH	XT 765304	117	31
18 Jan 67	BEN CAT	XT 745328	56	33
19 Jan 67	BEN CAT	XT 740329	52	18
19 Jan 67	HUONG DAY	XT 750325	67	12
20 Jan 67	LO THANH	XT 734334	82	21
20 Jan 67	CHU MUI	XT 745336	28	18
21 Jan 67	AN DIEN	XT 733329	62	16
23 Jan 67	AN DIEN	XT 727318	87	12
	TOTAL	1,496	430

(b) Psychological Operations:

1. Speaker and Leaflet Missions:

DATE	MISSION	THEME	TIME/AMOUNT
9 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	5 Hrs
10 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	8 Hrs
11 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	5 Hrs
12 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	7 Hrs
13 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	5 Hrs
14 Jan 67	Speaker	"Control of Refugees/MEDCAP Instructions"	7 Hrs
16 Jan 67	Speaker	"MEDCAP Instructions"	1 1/2 Hrs
16 Jan 67	Handouts	"Calendar 1967"	210
17 Jan 67	Leaflet	"Chieu Hoi/Safe Conduct"	95,000
17 Jan 67	Speaker	"MEDCAP Instructions"	1 Hr
17 Jan 67	Handouts	"Calendar 1967"	210
18 Jan 67	Speaker	"MEDCAP Instructions"	1 Hr
18 Jan 67	Handouts	"Calendar 1967"	210
19 Jan 67	Speaker	"MEDCAP"	1 1/2 Hrs
20 Jan 67	Leaflet	"Chieu Hoi/Safe Conduct"	150,000
20 Jan 67	Speaker	"Chieu Hoi Special"	1 1/2 Hrs
20 Jan 67	Speaker	"Why You Should Rally"	2 Hrs
20 Jan 67	Speaker	"Chieu Hoi/Rally Now"	5 1/2 Hrs
21 Jan 67	Leaflet	"Chieu Hoi/Safe Conduct"	79,000
21 Jan 67	Speaker	"Rally Instructions"	1 Hr
22 Jan 67	Leaflet	"173d Good Guy"	100,000
22 Jan 67	Speaker	"173d Power"	1 Hr

TOTAL Leaflets Dropped - 424,000
 TOTAL Air Speaker Hours - 4.25 Hrs
 TOTAL Air Missions Flown - 5
 TOTAL Ground Speaker Hours - 51.75 Hrs
 TOTAL Handouts (Calendars) - 630

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2. Most noticeable Psychological Operations occurred on 19 January, when the Vietnamese brothers were united in the Chieu Hoi Compound. In an effort to get other VC to rally, they wrote a message on a leaflet that also had their picture on it and the names of six of the members of their militia squad. This leaflet was printed that night and dropped the next morning. That day, the 6 members listed on the leaflet turned themselves in as ralliers. See TAB H for leaflet.

3. In addition, 18 VC arrived at the Chieu Hoi Center with serial numbered Safe Conduct Passes that were dropped by the 173d Airborne Brigade's Pay Ops Team during this operation.

4. The following distributions were made during Operation CEDAR FALLS:

Rice (100 lb Bags)	2,081 bags
Bubble Bath	120 boxes
Cooking Oil	18 cans
Kool Aid	108 bottles
Milk, Dry	36 boxes
Bulgar Wheat (100 lb Bags)	6 bags
C-Rations (Surplus)	2 large boxes
Amo Boxes (Empty)	235 boxes

5. Impact Fund purchases in the amount of 6,030 SVN were made to support Civic Action projects during Operation CEDAR FALLS.

6. A refugee collection point was operated by the Brigade S5 Section at BEN CAT, BINH DUONG PROVINCE. Refugees from the IRON TRIANGLE were processed through this point to enable them to consolidate their personal belongings, livestock and travel to the main refugee collection point at PHU CONG in family groups. 2,740 refugees were processed by the Brigade S5.

7. During the final days of Operation CEDAR FALLS, the refugee collection point at BEN CAT was converted into an athletic field containing a soccer field, a volleyball court and a Boy Scout Hut. This was named "Sky Soldier Field" and the facility built there was dedicated for the use of the children of the BEN CAT District.

8. On Saturday, 21 January, a Rice Passing Festival was held at the BEN CAT District Headquarters. During this event, captured VC rice was distributed to 1,128 families in the BEN CAT area.

9. Ammunition boxes from the 3/319th Artillery Battalion were taken daily to the 3 permanent refugee housing areas that encompass the village of BEN CAT. These boxes were used by the Vietnamese families for floors in their homes and for firewood.

10. Summary: Civil Affairs activities in Operation CEDAR FALLS were the most productive of any operation conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) to date.

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16. Logistics/Administrative Activities:

a. General: To support Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS a Brigade Supply Office forward element was established at PHU LOI for Operation NIAGARA FALLS, and at Position RYD (HEN CAT) for CEDAR FALLS along with a Brigade Supply Operations Center (BSOC).

b. Supply and Transportation: Resupply of the Brigade was accomplished daily by road convoy from BIEM HOA. This was supplemented by drawing from the 1st Logistical Command stocks of Class V and Class III from LIA KHE. Thirty (30) 2½-ton trucks of the 48th Transportation Group moved elements of the Brigade to positions at PHU LOI from the AO of Operation CANARY/DUCK. Sixty (60) more 2½-ton trucks were employed to move the remainder of the maneuver elements to PHU LOI for airlift into an assembly area. A total of 90 2½-ton trucks from the 48th Group were used to extract the maneuver elements from the operational area at the termination of the operation. A total of 1,322.2 short tons of supplies were handled during the operation. Of this amount, 74 short tons were used for Operation NIAGARA FALLS and 1,248.2 short tons for Operation CEDAR FALLS. A breakdown by Class of Supply for each operation follows:

NIAGARA FALLS

Class I	19.3 ST
Class II & IV5 ST
Class III2 ST
Class V	<u>54.0 ST</u>
TOTAL	74.0 ST

CEDAR FALLS Bien Hoa

Class I	260.07 ST
Class II & IV	52.75 ST
Class III	574.69 ST
Class V	<u>164.79 ST</u>
TOTAL	1,052.30 ST

CEDAR FALLS Lai Khe

Class III	8.1 ST
Class V	<u>187.9 ST</u>
TOTAL	195.9 ST

A total of 739 UN-1B and 5 CH-47 resupply sorties were flown from the BSOC to forward elements of the Brigade.

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c. Maintenance: A maintenance contact team consisting of two officers and twenty enlisted men from Company "D" (Maintenance), 173d Support Battalion was located forward at Position RHD and provided direct support maintenance to Brigade elements. Back up support and resupply of repair parts was accomplished daily by road convoy. A breakdown of support provided follows:

SECTION	JOBS RECEIVED	JOBS COMPLETED	JOBS UNCOMPLETED
Mechanical Maintenance	37	37	0
Armament	141	140	1
Signal	92	92	0
Engineer	9	9	0
Service & Evacuation	17	17	0

A noticeable improvement in organizational maintenance was observed.

d. Medical: Company "F" (Medical), 173d Support Battalion, provided medical support employing four officers and thirty-five enlisted men, offering full surgical, medical and dental support. The clearing station served as the primary evacuation facility for casualties. Dustoff coverage was provided through the 1st Division Clearing Station. Daily routine evacuation was accomplished via 3/4-ton ambulance by road convoy and LCC helicopters returning to BINH HOA for the night. A total of 382 patients were treated. Casualty and patient breakdown follows (KIA, WIA and Non-Battle Injuries will be covered in Operation Results).

FUO	31
Dermatological	44
ENT	11
Eye	4
Cardio Respiratory	4
Gastro Intestinal	23
Genitourinary	77
Neuro Psychiatric	0
Other Medical	9
Dental	48
Viet Cong Medical	8

e. Communications:

(1) The Brigade CP moved directly from Operation CANARY/DUCK astride ROUTE 15 to PHU LOI on 4 January 1967. The Brigade then passed from OPCOM II FFORCEV (Hurricane) to the 1st Infantry Division (Denver). VHF communications were established from the Brigade CP at PHU LOI to DANGER FORWARD at LAI KHE. The Brigade at this time entered the 1st Division voice secure FM Radio Net. This Net was used to pass classified traffic throughout Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS. Heaviest usage was mostly in the early evening when plans for the next day's operations were being coordinated. This was the first time the Brigade made use of the VN Voice Secure Radio Equipment and the employment of this equipment continued on a day to day basis. On 8 January 1967, the CP moved from PHU LOI to a location due east of BINH CAT for the commencement of Operation CEDAR FALLS. VHF was quickly established to the 1st Infantry Division Forward at LAI KHE. Although operational communications as planned were adequate between the 1st Infantry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), some problems developed in circuit routing for telephone communication between BRIGADE FORWARD and BRIGADE REAR. Circuits from PARACHUTE to BINH HOA ARMY switchboard were routed from BINH CAT to LAI KHE to HURRICANE. The

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log from LIA KHE to PHU LOI was over an Army (USARV) system and problems developed in coordination and reaction times. Several days later, the circuits were placed on a 1st Division system from LIA KHE to PHU LOI and this improved circuit stability and quality considerably.

(2) Communications within the Brigade were primarily by FM voice radio. Those units within or on the perimeter were fed into PARACHUTE switchboard by wire. Arrangements had been made to provide 4-channel VHF system to the 11th ACR which had been placed OPCON to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) on Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 11th ACR (-) placed its main tactical CP at BEN CAT with the Brigade CP. The plan was to displace from there if necessary. With this in mind, the 4-channel VHF system (AM/MRC-112) was established with the BEN CAT perimeter. It should be noted that it took 2 1/2 days to get this 100 yard shot working due to problems in frequency interference. During this, wire line was employed between the two CP's. Once established, the AM/MRC-112 system proved to be quite stable and was utilized between the 173d Brigade CP and the 11th ACR (-) for the duration of the operation.

(3) It was during this operation that the concept of commanding from the air was fully employed. Upon direction of the CG, action was initiated to provide five command and control (C & C) helicopters at any one time. Upon examination of the Brigade resources, it was determined that five FM Radios, one UHF radio, one AM/ASC-6 modified to provide 2 FM radios each. All the above consoles are designed to provide inter-communications between the commander and the pilot. In line with this program, arrangements were made to install an external FM radio antenna on each of the six (6) OH-13 helicopters in Casper Platoon. This would facilitate the enabling of passengers to board the aircraft with their own AM/PRC-25 and connect it to the installed antenna, by using a vehicle-type headset and M-138 handset. This system proved quite workable.

f. Public Information Office:

(1) On 6 January 1967, the PIO commenced operation of a Field Press Center at the 173d Airborne Brigade CP at Position RED, vicinity of BEN CAT. The center assisted 9 newsmen on the first day of Operation CEDAR FALLS. These men were:

Mr. John Linsel, Associated Press
Mr. Bruce Morton, and two man crew, CBS
Mr. George Page, NBC
Mr. Jim Eury, NBC
Mr. Hans Peschke, NBC
Mr. Jim Compare, United Press International
Mr. Ron Callager, a free lance writer/photographer

(2) The reporters covered various aspects of the Operation such as the operations of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-), refugee evacuation, and tunnel exploration. General Deane was interviewed by Newsmen Page, Eury and Peschke. Other news correspondents who covered the Brigade's operation were:

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Miss Henny Schante, representing Dutch media
Mr. Gerald Forken, Stars and Stripes
Mr. Phil Stitt, Stars and Stripes
Mr. Carl Funnell, representing Pennsylvania Papers
Mr. John Sach, Esquire Magazine
Mr. Everett Manning, Newsweek Magazine
Mr. Leon Daniels, and his crew, United Press International
SFC William Lebus, Armed Forces Radio and Television

17. Special Equipment/Techniques:

The unique and revolutionary characteristics of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS as a multi-force operation led to the use of many pieces of special equipment in addition to the new techniques employed by Infantry and Support elements within the Brigade. The following techniques/equipment are considered to be the most significant.

a. Aero Cavalry Operations (Sky Cavalry Concept): In later September 1966, the E Troop, 17th Cavalry Commander and the Aviation Officer of the Brigade flew to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for a first hand evaluation of the limits and capabilities of employing airmobile tactics. They returned highly enthusiastic that such a mission could greatly improve the combat flexibility of the Brigade.

The aero rifle platoon concept was adopted in October 1966 with the approval and support of the Commanding General. Extensive classes and training were given to each platoon of the Troop E/17th Cavalry. Senior NCO's from each of the Cav's platoons were sent to AN KHE for first hand experience on the employment of Aero Scout techniques.

In order to initiate this concept, several principal guidelines were established. The personnel comprising the Aero Rifle squad and observers for the Aero Scouts, along with the platoon headquarters element come from the resources of the Cavalry Troop. Personnel were available within the Recon Platoon of E/17th Cavalry to form 3 - 12 man squads in addition to the platoon Headquarters element, usually consisting of three men.

In addition, the Aero Scout section was reorganized utilizing enlisted scout observers from the Troop who had already undergone extensive training in these techniques. The concept was first employed on Operation ATTLEBORO, as a reaction force for a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol team. The mission was successful, however, not until Operation CANARY/DUCK was the Aero Cavalry concept proven. During Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, this concept was used extensively by almost all Infantry elements within the Cavalry Troop.

The techniques employed are as follows. The Aero Scout Section (employing CM-13's) fly over a predesignated area in pairs (lead and chase ships) looking for trails, canals, or recently used campsites and enemy activity. After the scouts have made a significant discovery, a call is sent back to the stand by Aero Rifle

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platoon and they are issued forth to a suitable landing position near the location by armed helicopter. The area is suppressed before the landing is initiated so that friendly troops do not run head on into hostile elements. For further analysis of this technique, see Small Unit Actions (E/17th Cav - Operation CEDAR FALLS).

b. Tunnel Rat Teams: The Tunnel Rat Team consists of six to ten men including one OIC or NCOIC. The individual in charge has the responsibility of drawing the sketch of the underground complex from the information relayed from the team within. The lead elements of the Tunnel Rat Team is armed with a .22 caliber pistol equipped with a silencer, a TA-1 telephone or skull mike, a flashlight, compass and probe. An azimuth is taken, paces are counted off and the information is relayed to administrative elements above.

The major problem encountered during tunnel exploration is one of communications. The skull mike apparatus (consisting of a transmitter strapped to the back of the skull) often becomes inoperative after a short period of time necessitating repair. In addition, WD-1 wire had to be employed in lieu of light weight Canadian Assault Wire, which had become scarce. The heavier wire added a considerable amount of weight and bulk to the Tunnel Rat Team.

c. Mine Detecting Operations: The mine detector (Aural Indicating) was the primary piece of equipment employed in this type of operation. This detector will pick up any metallic object within its area of sensitivity. It can detect objects as small as one strand of conno wire up to four feet below the surface of the ground. However, this capability also proves to be a deterrent to mine detecting operations since the machine will pick up tin foil, empty shell cases, nails or any other thing containing metal as well as mines.

d. River Patrols: River Patrols employed during Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS consisted of 15 men, two of them being Engineers, with the remainder being Infantrymen. The craft utilized were 15-man pneumatic assault boats. One of the Engineers on board was a motor operator while the second was in charge of holding the boat to the shore during loading and unloading and also casting the boat off shore. The actual patrol was assigned the task of checking all Vietnamese river traffic. The boats were additionally employed in the ferrying of supplies to outposts along the river.

e. Floating Mine Barrier Techniques: Floating mine barriers proved to be the answer to the problem of tidal effect on inland waterways. Cables are stretched across the river and are allowed to sag below the water level. The bridging timbers are then attached to these cables so that they float. When the river is under tidal influence, the floating barrier rises and falls with the tide. Barriers often had to be constructed on both sides of the bridge since the tide often causes the waterway to flow in both directions.

f. Efficiency of AN/PRC-25: The AN/PRC radio with long antenna was employed on a command and liaison helicopter as a radio relay for the Battalion operations. It proved to be an extremely effective link between the CP and the front line companies.

g. Infra-Red: APC's with their organic Infra-red periscopes provided augmentation to the use of Starlight Scopes on night perimeter defense.

h. Bulldozers: Bulldozers furnished by the 1st Infantry Division Engineers were of great assistance in providing new avenues of approach to areas where the Viet Cong had heavily mined existing approaches. They were also of invaluable assistance in preparing defensive positions when they cleared LZ and fields of fire for Infantry elements.

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i. Employment of the Armor Vehicle Launcher Bridge: An Armor Vehicle Launcher Bridge was employed to span a section of bridge that had collapsed at EBN CAT, making it possible to resume road movement, and hence, normal operations, with minimum delay.

j. Weapons Used at River Blocking Positions: Twin 40mm anti-aircraft weapons were used in blocking positions along the TRI TINH and SANGON RIVERS during the operation. Quad .50 caliber machineguns were also used in similar positions and were mounted on Engineer Boats to block the river exits utilized by the enemy.

k. The following is a chronologic sequence of the employment of Special Tunnel Clearing Equipment (8,500 c.f.m. BUFFALO TURBINE) on Operation CEDAR FALLS.

(1) 14 January 1967: Elements of Company M, 3/11th ACR had earlier located a tunnel entrance within their operational area, the first tunnel confirmed by a Brigade element. The turbine was helilifted by UH-1C helicopter from the Brigade CP at Position RED with the operator crew of the 51st Chemical Detachment (Airborne) to vicinity XT 746230. The machine was mounted inside an APC of Mike Company and was utilized to ventilate the tunnel shaft. For the 173d Engineer Company's "Tunnel Rat" search party. Several tunnel entrances were discovered by the party and the APC was displaced several times following their progress from entrance to entrance. The turbine and crew remained overnight with Company M.

(2) 15 January 1967: The turbine was displaced from the base area of M/3/11th ACR by helicopter to support an Engineer Platoon of the 473d Engineer Company searching a tunnel in the 1/503d Infantry area of operation. The UH-1C helilifted turbine was set down into the bed of an Engineer Dump Truck and was moved by truck to tunnel entrance vicinity XT 683271. Tunnel smoke tracing operations were begun at 1100 hours and continued until 1430 hours. My, 30-pound smoke pots were used as a smoke source and were introduced into the tunnel entrance with air from the turbine forcing the smoke down the shaft. A recon patrol of E/17th Cavalry was airborne in a helicopter for aerial observation of emitted smoke while engineer elements on the ground moved to and marked the smoke exits. A total of eight (8) additional surface openings were located during the operation both north and south of the original location. The Engineer platoon returned the following day and collected the tunnel openings. The evening of the 15th, the turbine and crew returned to the Brigade CP with the Engineer Platoon's dump truck.

(3) 16 January 1967: The turbine and crew returned to the 1/503d Infantry area (XT 683271) still mounted on the dump truck and was further transported by road to the Squadron CP of 2/11th ACR vicinity XT 726228. Movement was delayed due to mine clearing operations on ROUTE 14 between the 1/503d Infantry and the 2/11th ACR. The machine was scheduled for work at a tunnel opening vicinity XT 736250 but did not arrive in time to be placed in operation and remained overnight at the Squadron CP.

(4) 17 January 1967: During the previous afternoon (16 January) a tunnel search party of Company M, 3/11th ACR sustaining 1 KIA and 1 MIA from VC automatic weapons fire while proceeding down a tunnel shaft vicinity XT 740200. On the morning of 17 January, the turbine and crew were displaced by vehicle from position AKA to the 3/11th ACR area and loaded into an APC attached to Company M of the 3d Squadron. The turbine was utilized for smoke tracing at the above opening. Eight additional tunnel openings were identified by smoke emissions from XT 740200 - XT 740221 - XT 740222 - XT 742221. An Engineer Platoon from the 173d Engineer Company collapsed all openings with demolition charges and detonated CS-1

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into the shafts connecting the entrances. A Recon Patrol of E/17th Cavalry again spotted from the air, smoke emission, however, no VC were observed to exit during smoke operations. The crew and turbine remained with Company M overnight.

(5) 18 January 1967: The turbine was moved by vehicle from 3/11th ACR to 2/11th ACR and conducted smoke tracing operations from 1400 hours to 1445 hours. They continued to pump fresh air from 1510 to 1700 hours for an engineer and search party from the 173d Engineer Company. At 1800 hours, the turbine and crew were displaced by UN-1 sling load to 4/503d Infantry's CP area and were mounted on an APC of D/16th Armor (OPCON 4/503d Inf) in preparation for support of Company A/4/503d Infantry. Elements of Company A while on security saw a movement and located a trap door covering a tunnel opening at the vicinity of IT 728265. Members of the 3d Platoon entered the tunnel and encountered VC a short distance from the tunnel opening. PFC Pendergast, SGT Spencer, SP4 Sprague and PFC Walden were repeatedly opposed by VC for the remainder of the afternoon and although they engaged the VC with M-79's, .38 and .45 caliber pistols, the VC continued to contest the tunnel. In the late afternoon, burning type CS grenades were thrown into the shaft of the tunnel to flush the VC. The 4/503d Infantry troopers continued to hear VC activity and could hear sounds believed to have been respiration of individuals wearing VC expedient "gas masks".

(6) 19 January 1967: On the morning of 19 January, the turbine was moved to the tunnel entrance by APC and conducted smoke flushing operations from 1050 hours to 1145 hours. At 1130 hours, 7 VC (3 males, 4 females) exited a tunnel opening at vicinity XT 721259 in Bravo Company, 2/503d Infantry's AO and were immediately apprehended. All 7 VC were suffering effects of smoke inhalation and experienced difficulty in breathing. Two of the females subsequently expired from unknown causes. The turbine continued operation from 1145 to 1245 hours flushing the smoke with fresh air. At 1300 hours, a tunnel search team of A/4/503d Infantry entered the opening. Smoke was not encountered, however, a concentration of CS gas (from the previous day's attempt to flush out VC) effused from the walls of the tunnel whenever the turbine was shut down. The concentration was sufficient to require search personnel to remain masked. From 1300 hours to 1530 hours, the search team negotiated the tunnel, identified 5 separate shafts, capturing 3 individual weapons, and exited the tunnel in the B/2/503d Infantry's area. They were informed by members of that unit of the capture of 7 VC. At no time was VC opposition encountered. In addition, several tunnel entrances were identified by seeping smoke 300 meters north of the original entrance.

(7) 20 January 1967: The turbine remained in the 4/503d Infantry area. An element of Company B escorted the equipment to the location of the previous day's operation and smoke operations were again resumed. HC smoke was continuously pumped into the tunnel from 1130 - 1430 hours, expending a total of 12 30-lb smoke pots with the turbine running at maximum capacity. Smoke was observed at locations much more distant and in greater volume than the previous day, largely as a result of greatly extended operating time. This is attributed to the fact that an extensive network will require a long period of sustained operation to displace a sufficient volume of air to fill the network and build pressure sufficient to force the smoke out exits in volume sufficient to be observed from the air. During the two days of operation, a total of 15 VC harboring inside the tunnel were captured while exiting or apprehended by search parties underground, all being taken by Company N/2/503d Infantry. Most VCC were attributed to smoke flushing operations in the 4/503d Infantry area and all at least partially so.

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(8) 20 January - 22 January 1967: The BUFFALO TURBINE and crew remained with A/503d Infantry and was utilized to provide fresh air for search parties from Company B. On 22 January, the equipment was helilifted back to the Brigade CP at Position RMD. See TAB F for drawings of VC tunnel complexes.

18. Results of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS:

a. Friendly Losses

Casualties sustained by the 173d Airborne Brigade and OPCOM Units, 11th ACR (-), 1/4th Cav of the 1st Infantry Division:

173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) Casualties:

	1st Bn	2d Bn	4th Bn	3/319th Arty	E/17th Cav	D/16th Armor	173d Engr	39th Inf SD	HHC (-)	335th AML	TOTAL
KIA	3	3	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
WIA*	27	23	48	1	8	7	1	1	2	0	118
MIA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NBD ¹	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NBI ²	1	0	2	4	0	0	3	0	1	1	12

*Two (2) WIA accounted for above died later in the hospital as a result of wounds received in action. These men were, SP4 Collins of E/17th Cavalry and SP4 Lonnie Floyd of C/4/503d Infantry.

¹NBD - Non-Battle Dead

²NBI - Non-Battle Injured

Of the 118 WIA received by the Brigade during the Operation, 21 were returned to duty, 103 had minor injuries and 6 had serious injuries.

Equipment Lost and/or Damaged - None

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) Casualties:

KIA 8
WIA 57
MIA 0
Non-Battle Dead 0
Non-Battle Injured 0

Equipment Damaged - 11th ACR (-)

APCs 8

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Tanks	4
Wheeled Vehicles	4
<u>Equipment Destroyed - 11th ACR (-)</u>	
APC's	2
Tank	1
<u>1/4th Cavalry (-) Casualties:</u>	
KIA	2
MIA	35
MIA	0
Non-Battle Dead	0
Non-Battle Injured	0
<u>Equipment Destroyed - 1/4th Cavalry (-)</u>	
Tank Recovery Vehicle	1
Tanks	1
APC's	3
M42	1
b. <u>Enemy Losses: Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS - TF DEANE</u>	
<u>Personnel Losses Inflicted by Elements of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep)</u>	
KIA (BC)	185
KIA (poss)	10
Detainees	146
Refugees	72
VCC	65
<u>Personnel Losses Inflicted by Elements of 11th ACR (-)</u>	
KIA (BC)	26
KIA (poss)	13
Detainees	74
VCC	8
Refugees	12

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Personnel Losses Inflicted by Elements of 1/4 Cavalry

KIA	37
VCC	65
Detainees	26
Refugees	38

Weapons Captured by Elements of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep)

60mm Mortars	2
3.5" Rocket Launcher	2
B-40 Rocket Launcher	1
M-60 Machineguns	2
Browning Automatic Rifles	8
French Machineguns	2
Thompson SMG	7
.45 Caliber SMG's	5
Russian AW	1
Russian Carbines	17
Russian Rifles	3
SKS Rifle	1
Chicom SMG	1
Chicom Bolt Action Rifles	65
Chicom Rifles	6
Chicom Carbines	14
Mossin Nagart Rifles	4
AK-47 Rifles	3
US M-1 Rifles	7
US M-1 Carbines	18
US M-2 Grease Gun	1
US M-3 SMG	1
US Springfield Rifles	1

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1917 Edgystone Rifle	7
US .45 Caliber Pistols	6
German Mauser Rifles	2
French Mas Rifles	3
British Infield Rifles	1
Bolt Action Rifles	12
Carbines (unk type)	2
Rifles (unk type)	2
Shotguns	3
.38 Caliber Pistols	2
P38 Pistol	1
Browning Automatic Pistol	1
Homemade Pistols	3
Homemade cal .45 Pistol	1
Pistols (Unk Type)	4
<u>Weapons Parts:</u>	
Rifle Barrels	2
Rifle Stock	1
Mortar Aiming Stakes	4
Magazines	5
Grenade Launchers	24
M-60 Barrels	2
44 Gm Mount	1
60mm Riped & Ace Plate	1
Sub-Machinegun Magazines	2
.30 Caliber MG Barrel	1
Bayonet	1

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Ammunition:

175mm Rounds	2
155mm Rounds	2
105mm Rounds	38
81mm Rounds	8
60mm Rounds	50
40mm Rounds	1
Illuminating Mortar Rounds	1
3.5" Rocket Launcher Rounds	1
B-40 Rounds	1
RP6-2 Rounds	2
57mm Rounds	3
20mm Round	1
10mm Round	1
M-79 Rounds	9
7.92 Rounds	1300
7.62 Rounds	114
5.56mm Rounds	500
Crimped Cartridges	185
Assorted SA Rounds	5030
.50 cal Rounds	100
.45 cal Rounds	700
.30 cal Rounds	6030
Grenades	282
Chicom Grenades	264
Homemade Grenades	127
M-26 Grenades	6
Rifle Grenades	18

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WP Grenades 2
Grenade Casings 300
Grenade Fuses 240

Mines:

Pressure Type Mines 2
Plastic AP Mines 21
AP Mines 68
AT Mines 45
DN-10 Claymore Mines 1
Other Claymore Mines 10
VC Claymore Mines 4
Homemade Mines 1
Mines (Unk Type) 5

Demolitions:

500 pound Bombs 3
250 pound Bombs 9
USAF Rockets 2
CBU Bombs 76
Plastic Bombs 1
Shaped Charge 1
Blasting Caps 42
C4 27.5 pounds
Detonating Cord 24 feet
TNT 7 pounds
Carbide 55 gallons
Chicom Explosives 300 pounds
Detonator 1

Transportation:

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Boats 6
 Canoe 1
 Motor Bikes 2
 Bicycles 48
 Sampans 78

Installations:

Foxholes 217
 Tunnels 153
 Bunkers 313
 Huts 147
 Base Camps 17
 Bombshelters 13
 Funji Pits 90

Food:

Rice 1,307.5 tons
 Salt 3.6 tons

Documents 20,000 estimated

Miscellaneous: 200 pieces of galvanized metal, 25 gauze bandages, 12 bottles of serum, 10 hypodermic needles, assorted medical supplies, medical kit, 1 lighter, 1 carbon lamp, 2 gold rings, 1 fuse, 3 typewriters, 10 pounds of typing paper, 1 French map, assorted clothing, 55 gallons of heavy oil, 85 gallons of gasoline, 6 gallons of tar, 2 trip flares, 32 washpans, 144 eight inch bolts, 2 cameras, 13 rucksacks, 12 pistol belts, 20 pair VN jung's boots, 1 oil skin map, 2 mosquito nets, 1 diary, 1 drafting set, 1 sewing machine, 1 300-gallon fuel tank, 6 rolls of barbed wire, 1 lantern, 1 US bunkbed, 759 - 4.5 volt batteries, 1 flare pistol, 20 flashlights, 1 reloading press, 100 pneumatic pillows, 1 bottle of kerosene, 950 pounds of nitrogen fertilizer, 8,050 feet electrical wire, 7 outboard motors, 1 ammo pouch, 300 pounds of cement, 1 entrenching tool, 4 pack harnesses.

19. Commander's Analysis and Lessons Learned:

a. Commander's Analysis

Operation NIAGARA FALLS:

Although no major contact was made with enemy elements, it was believed that the Viet Cong are using trails throughout the AO and the waterways to infiltrate small numbers of personnel and to transport food. Friendly operations in the AO have also assisted in reducing the effectiveness of the Local VC infrastructure and disclosed areas of operations which can be denied the enemy by a

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program of patrols and artillery harassing and interdiction. It is recommended that throughout the AO from time to time, forces be introduced to harass the VC and to include movement of troops and supplies through the area.

Operation CEDAR FALLS:

Judged by all standards, Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS was a major success. The mission of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and GPCON units was search and destroy. This was exactly what was done with a degree of thoroughness heretofore not achieved. The keys to this accomplishment were the saturation of the IRON TRIANGLE which US and Vietnamese Forces executed effectively owing to large amount of time made available to these combat units. The presence of highly specialized support troops and equipment provided assistance essential to the combat battalions in accomplishing their mission. This technical assistance included the employment of bulldozers (many of them with Rome plows), CS turbines, demolition teams, tunnel exploration teams, mechanized flame throwers, tank-dozers and acetylene.

Coupled with the river patrols, the Aero Cavalry, the anti-aircraft artillery, the blocking forces, and the air and artillery strikes, the Infantry and Armor on the ground applied tremendous pressure on VC hiding in the IRON TRIANGLE Area. The 185 VC who fell during the days of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS give mute testimony to the effectiveness of this pressure. The shock of relentless attack and continuing military defeat resulted in the rapid deterioration of VC morale. Psychological Operations were employed to exploit every tactical and psychological advantage with a highly effective program of speaker missions, leaflet drops, and the delivery of personal messages urging surrender. Both hard core and Local Force VC were persuaded to come out of hiding and either surrender to US Forces or rally to the Government of Viet Nam. Seventy-two (72) POW's and sixty-five (65) Chieu Hoi Ralliers taken is as significant an achievement as the VC body count. A growing trend of dissatisfaction with VC practices and VC life in general was evident in the statements of the Ralliers. A wealth of pertinent intelligence information was derived from the interrogation of these VC and much of it was exploited by units on the ground.

The IRON TRIANGLE had provided the VC with more than a military base area where he could hide, train, store supplies and equipment and stage attacks on Allied Forces and installations. The area was also a VC political entity, independent of any government of Vietnam, where the enemy had complete control of the lives of the civilian populace. The VC grip on this area had to be broken before any further military operation in the area could be considered successful.

To this end, an ambitious program of evacuating all of the Vietnamese people, their livestock and possessions from the area was undertaken in conjunction with the Search and Destroy operations. In coordination with the 1st Infantry Division, 2,740 refugees were moved with all they owned by river assault group boats, helicopters and by road march to a Refugee Village at PHU CONG which the 173d Engineer Company in coordination with the Brigade S5 helped to construct. The refugees were screened by the 172d Military Intelligence Detachment to insure that no VC had infiltrated among the civilians.

The Viet Cong contributed to this program by providing 1,502 tons of captured rice. When the rice was uncovered by the combat units in the field, it was evacuated (polished rice only) for the use of the refugees. Unpolished (Paddy) rice, however, was destroyed in place to prevent its use by the VC. This was a time

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consuming process but through the use of APC's and helicopters, the refugees were supplied with large quantities of the grain. It is ironic that the rice was probably grown by the refugees in the first place.

The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) inflicted a serious defeat on the Viet Cong in the IROC TRIANGLE. Their hold on this political and economic base has been greatly weakened if not broken. They have lost any semblance of security that this former sanctuary may have once offered. Over 300 VC will never fight again. However, the VC are still in the area, and the defeat remains less than total.

The stage has been set for the future. VC "sanctuaries" will continue to be the target of ever increasing detailed seal, search and destroy operations in the CEDAR FALLS mold. Thus, the concept of operations as employed is perhaps the most significant feature in terms of the overall security of VIET NAM. The continued use of this type operation will reduce the power of the Viet Cong to the point where the government of this country can again assume the responsibility for its own security.

b. Lessons Learned:

Item: LZ Assaults

Discussion: During the massive helicopter troop movements of 9 January involving two (2) Battalions of the 501d Infantry (173d Abn Bde (Sep)), and major elements of the 1st Infantry Division, problems were caused by LZ's being in too close proximity. Pilots became disoriented in addition to the artillery preparation mission some LZ's and landing on other LZ's already occupied by US Forces. The assault echelons came in so fast that the first troop on the ground could not maneuver before the next elements were on top of them.

Observation: During massive assaults, LZ's should be no closer than 500 meters apart. All preparation should finish prior to any landing on LZ's, to insure the safety of the Infantry elements and aircraft employed in the assault.

Item: Coordination of Units

Discussion: During all operations, coordination between units is mandatory. This should be accomplished at a predesignated, easily recognizable point. Smoke grenades, flare and aerial directions can aid in the location of the coordination point. Fire must be controlled as well as the movement of troops near the AO boundaries separating units. Rapid link up of units after a helicopter assault is essential and should be made prior to moving out to a final position. When moving into a blocking position, gaps should be covered, especially near coordination points. This may preclude the use of unit perimeters and a "Combat Outpost Line" system can be employed with proper coordination for flank and rear security. The distance covered will be less than "Back" frontages because of terrain limitations and the lack of barriers.

Item: Unit Boundary Coordination

Discussion: In order to completely cover the territory involved in this operation, all units were given smaller than usual AO's. Units were at first unable to maneuver or patrol accustomed sized AO's and would run into adjacent unit's areas. There also arose the problem of "hot pursuit" when VC were discovered in the Brigade AO and attempted to escape into the 25th Division AO along the S/HCN RIVER.

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Observation: To properly sweep an AO clean, it must be a small area. Units must intensively patrol their own area instead of sending patrols on long range but less intensive clearing missions. Units must also take the time to closely coordinate fire and maneuver plans to preclude accidental engagements with friendly troops.

Item: Battalion CP Locations

Discussion: The AO of each Battalion on this operation was small enough so that companies could be effectively controlled from a stationary CP. The Battalion CP could be co-located with another unit thereby freeing all its combat elements of security requirements thus increasing the actual strength of the unit.

Observation: Battalion Command Posts should be located where they will have organic security as long as control is maintained.

Item: Route Reconnaissance

Discussion: A route reconnaissance should be conducted by Military Police and Engineers at least 3 - 5 days in advance of the Brigade Road march, and again 1 day prior, if possible. When routes were properly reconned, no last minute route changes developed, whereas, when a route reconnaissance wasn't made, time and again routes were found to be inadequate for certain vehicles and had to be changed at the last minute.

Observation: A route reconnaissance conducted in advance of deployment tends to cut down on delays which are often encountered along Highways. It also aids in insuring the safety of vehicles, equipment and personnel who are often subjected to sabotage while enroute.

Item: Attached Units

Discussion: When having units attached, it is necessary to have the particular unit attached at least 2 - 3 days in advance of the particular operation. This allows ample time for the unit being attached to familiarize themselves with another unit's method of operation, SOP's and particularities that they may not be familiar with in their own unit. This period of time, when properly used, is well worth it and both units function better together.

Observation: Ideally, attached units should be attached in sufficient time to enable them to go on route reconnaissance with the unit to which they will be attached. This gives them a better picture of what they have in store and ideas of their own may be incorporated so that both units will be able to cope with any problems that may arise.

Item: First Aid

Discussion: Existing Dustoff procedure provides timely medical evacuation allowing combat casualties to receive hospitalization with minimum delay. Once patients were evacuated, their treatment and care was excellent. In many instances, the initial treatment of casualties is performed by infantrymen who, on more occasions than one, saved the lives of their wounded comrades. During Operation CEDAR FALLS, platoon medics again became swamped with casualties for a short period of time. Also, Medics were themselves wounded or killed. In addition, sound sized elements often operated alone without medics on their patrols.

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Observation: Training in First Aid provided to all individuals proved valuable on at least one occasion when medical aid had to be administered to combat casualties without help of a medical corpsman.

Item: VC Boobytraps

Discussion: VC Boobytraps in the AO were designed to impede friendly attacks into enemy bases. They were of the "no-delay" explosive type placed on the periphery of the bases so as to give early warning as well as inflict casualties. The VC did not appear as concerned over boobytrapping foot avenues of approach as they did in impeding vehicular traffic. These approaches were trapped with command detonated mines and boobytrapped artillery shells. The enemy also boobytrapped areas which they did not use with CBU's and grenades. Some of these areas were marked with a skull and crossbone warning sign.

Observation: Personnel are warned to be always on the alert for VC boobytraps and claymore mines when travelling on or off main routes. These conditions accounted for the major portion of friendly casualties. When moving into an area of suspected mine and boobytraps, maximum use should be made of TAC Air, Artillery and recon by fire. Also, when possible, the roads and trails should be avoided, and new trails cut. Culverts and tunnels beneath a roadway are prime locations for large AT mines, and in this respect, a bunker or foxhole next to a roadway should be investigated as an access to a mined tunnel beneath the road. On one occasion, a sheet of tin foil was found buried at a depth of several inches, probably to confuse the mine sweeping team. At a greater depth in the same location, an AT mine was found.

Item: Interrogation Methods

Discussion: NGUYEN VAN THIET was captured by the 2/503d Infantry on 19 January 1967 at XT 732259. Interrogation was initially aimed at gaining his confidence and realigning his allegiance to the GVN. He was persuaded that he must help to win his country away from communist domination. He was led to reveal information by initially questioning concerning the activities of other POW's and then information concerning Viet Cong Units. Once he started to talk, questions of tactical significance were answered along with information regarding his life and background until he had completely revealed his association and activity with the VC. His information concerning rice caches was proven to be 100% reliable. He stated that the VC were afraid to surrender because of reprisals by the VC and because they were told that the allies would not accept any surrender of VC. He also gave information concerning the CB of the PMU LOI Battalion and activities of the C-61 Company.

Observation: The questioning of VCC and Chieu Hoi Balliers is perhaps the most effective means of acquiring information directly relating to enemy activity. The willingness of captives to reveal this information can be obtained only when they are confident of the good intentions of Allied Forces.

Item: VC Population Control

Discussion: Prior to Operation CEDAR FALLS the VC had complete control over the people of the ICHN TRIANGLE Area. Friendly forces encountered people who were completely indifferent towards the Republic of VIET NAM and they supported the VC as directed.

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Observation: Once the VC were forced to flee the area, the population was left unguarded and was relocated by friendly agencies. However, the people are still under the influence of the VC Infrastructure.

Item: VC Tunnel Clearing Operations - Destruction and Exploration

Discussion: The CEDAR FALLS experience illustrates that patience is a primary weapon against VC hiding in tunnels. It is necessary to remain in a heavily fortified VC Area for an extended period of time to force the enemy to come out of their tunnels as their food is depleted and morale deteriorates. To cover these areas, a series of mechanized patrols should be used to apprehend the enemy when it becomes necessary for him to go in search of food etc.

Observation: Operations in VC tunnel areas should be prolonged over a period of 2 to 4 weeks to increase the likelihood of surrender of a hungry demoralized enemy.

Discussion: There were several instances during Operation CEDAR FALLS when Engineer Company elements were sent to destroy tunnels that had been explored by the Infantry. The Infantry in most cases kept no record or map of the tunnels they had explored. Before the Engineers could destroy the tunnel, the complex had to be re-explored. Much valuable time was lost due to this re-exploration.

Observation: When extensive tunnel systems are found, Engineer "Tunnel Rat" teams should be called to explore, map and destroy the system.

Discussion: One unit was in the process of destroying a tunnel they had explored when a serious incident occurred. Immediately after a charge was set off, a man was sent back into the tunnel to check out the damage. He was immediately overcome by toxic fumes from the explosive and a rescue team had to be sent after him. There was a demolition expert in the area that could have prevented this had he not been sent on another mission.

Observation: No one should be allowed to handle explosives except trained demolition men and they should determine when the tunnel is safe for exploration.

Discussion: On several occasions, tunnel exploration was carried on by units in the Brigade without the use of any type of communication. To state an example, two individuals were found coming out of a tunnel by an element of the Engineer Company. After questioning them, it was discovered that they did not know where they were or where their unit was located. There were other cases where two exploration teams were in a tunnel at the same time with neither team knowing of the others presence. Luckily, there was no one shot by mistake in the tunnels.

Observation: It is recommended that no one be allowed to enter a tunnel more than 50 meters without proper communications, tunnel exploration equipment and knowledge of tunnel exploration techniques.

Item: Disrupting Enemy Use of Base Areas

Discussion: Brigade Operations in the CAU DIEM JUNGLE and the INCH TRIANGLE disclosed that friendly activities in enemy base areas can be efficient in disrupting the VC plan of action. This was accomplished by intermittent interdiction by artillery fire and air strikes. The use of LERP's can measure the

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effectiveness of these fires, direct fire and air strikes, and make US presence felt without necessitating the introduction of a large force.

Observation: LRP's should be introduced periodically into recently "cleared" areas to survey the effectiveness of H & I fires and to report on VC activities resulting from previous US presence.

Item: Coordination of Ground Troops and Bulldozers

Discussion: On occasion, bulldozers, which can cut through jungle much faster than infantry elements, found themselves 300 meters to the front of the troops assigned to clear and secure their work area.

Observation: Either the bulldozers need to wait for their infantry security, or the infantry should be mounted on APC's to keep up with the bulldozers.

Item: Night Vision Devices

Discussion: Starlight Scopes and Infra-Red equipment organic to the Armor Company's APC's proved to be extremely effective on perimeter defense during hours of darkness. Infra-red equipment, however, was limited by the need to "crank" APC's to charge the batteries essential to the night vision device.

Item: Additional Training for Scout Dogs

Discussion: Recent Operations have indicated certain weaknesses in the training of Scout Dogs which must be overcome to increase effectiveness.

Observation: The following are several weaknesses that should be overcome:

- a. Dogs must be trained to work in spite of the noises of artillery and airstrikes.
- b. Dogs have to be able to work behind a point man when terrain is such that the SD team cannot maneuver at the point.
- c. Dogs must be trained to further reduce the noises they occasionally make. Noisy dogs hamper operations.
- d. Dogs and handlers must be prepared to be able to work on extended operations with resupply of dog rations and equipment for short periods.
- e. Handlers must have complete control of their animals.

Item: Dustoff Support

Discussion: During Operation CEDAR FALLS the Brigade experienced occasional delays by not having a Dustoff helicopter attached to the Brigade on a standby basis. This also caused some discrepancies in request procedures.

Observation: The Brigade should have its own Dustoff helicopter during the day while on combat operations.

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Item: Generator Maintenance

Discussion: General maintenance of generators suffered due to two oversights: They were placed too deeply in the ground causing improper ventilation and making access for maintenance difficult. In addition, units were not prepared to perform 1st and 2d Echelon maintenance, owing to a lack of preparation while in base camp.

Observation: Generator positions should allow 2 feet of clearance on all sides for ventilation and servicing. Unit must be prepared to maintain their generators to prevent breakdowns.

Item: Evacuation of Armored Personnel Carriers

Discussion: APC's, in many instances, were disabled by VC mines. This requires evacuation for repair which is, to say the least, a time consuming affair. In one case, the Armor Company was delayed 24 hours from seizing their objective due to the evacuation of disabled vehicles.

Observation: APC's can be rapidly stripped of equipment and totally destroyed on the spot if the tactical situation prohibits a lengthy evacuation process. This destruction can be executed with thermite grenades, demolitions etc. Therefore it is advisable to dispose of a vehicle that is already destroyed, rather than taking time to evacuate it.

Item: Aero Cavalry Concept

Discussion: E Troop, 17th Cavalry deployed its forces as Infantry mounted in helicopters (see Special Equipment/Techniques and Small Unit Actions, E/17th Cav). When a target was exposed, the Aero Rifle Platoons landed and attacked the VC objective. Certain requirements became apparent and procedures were developed as follows:

Observations:

1. Aircraft must be under the control of the Cavalry Troop Commander for the duration of the operations.
2. The following aircraft must be allocated for effective operations:

Two (2) OH-13 Helicopters (Aero Scouts)
Two (2) UH-1B Helicopters (Light Fire Team Ships)
Six (6) UH-1D Helicopters (Aero Rifle Platoon Ships)
One (1) UH-1B or OH-13 Helicopter (Command and Control Ship)
3. The Aero Rifle Platoon must be on constant Airborne Alert
4. Occasionally remove all aircraft from the AO to dupe the VC into a false sense of safety.
5. Organize ground elements into 6 man helicopter loads.
6. Ground elements must be equipped for fast movement and carry no excess equipment such as helmets or flack jackets.

The following is a list of equipment proven to be essential:

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- a. Ropes for canal and river crossing
- b. Steel Probe Rods
- c. Marking Panels
- d. Smoke Grenades

8. Operations must continue into the hours of darkness employing the Stay Behind Patrols and Ambush Patrols of the Cavalry Troop.

9. Troop helicopter landing should never be accomplished without proper preparation of the LZ by gunships.

Item: Aerial Observers

Discussion: Continuous air observer coverage of maneuver elements requires the alternating use of two aircraft.

Observation: This requirement may be satisfied by either two O1-E fixed wing aircraft or one O1-E and one OH-13. The latter combination is preferred if the fixed wing aircraft are not able to land near the fire support base. Complete and detailed briefing of observers prior to artillery preparations or major changes in operational plans greatly facilitate accomplishment of the mission and reduce the possibility of errors incurred by incomplete understanding of the mission by the observer.

Item: Operational Control/Artillery

Discussion: Control of more than five firing batteries exceeds the personnel and equipment resources of a direct support artillery battalion. If more than five batteries (Organic, Attached or under OPCON) are placed in support of the Brigade Operations it is also necessary that a suitable headquarters be provided to control the additional firing elements.

Observation: The span of Operational Control which can effectively be exercised by a direct support artillery battalion headquarters is limited to five firing batteries.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. B. ROBERSON
E. B. ROBERSON
CPT, AGC
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INTRODUCTION

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SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

The information below was obtained through combat interviews conducted at E/17th Cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry. This report was constructed in coordination with the visit of Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, 27 January - 1 February 1967. The material relates to isolated small unit patrol activities and ambush techniques used specifically in Operation CEDAR FALLS.

E TROOP, 17TH CAVALRY

Initially, E Troop, 17th Cavalry was given the mission of securing Position WHITE in support of artillery elements in the AO of Operation Cedar Falls. E/17 Cav arrived at Position WHITE on 8 January (approximately 8 kilometers southeast of BEN CAT), and remained there throughout the Operation.

On 11 January 1967, the Troop Commander, Major Bryan Sutton, received a warning order from higher headquarters to conduct air-cavalry activities in the western portion of the AO. This area is primarily rice paddies, crisscrossed with canals and bounded on the west by the SANGON RIVER.

Major Sutton employed two (2) OH-13 Aere Scout helicopters, code named "Hot Staff" to conduct visual reconnaissance missions in the northwest portion of the AO. The "Hot Staff" choppers flew at tree top level, relaying intelligent information to the Troop CP. An augmented rifle squad was kept in the air at all times possible, serving as a quick reaction force to the "Hot Staff" reconnaissance aircraft.

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On the ground, two squads were generally employed consisting of 9 and 12 men, two NTO's and a lieutenant. The subscribed ammunition load for riflemen was 11 magazines, however, some men carried as many as 25 full magazines. In addition, riflemen were armed with four (4) fragmentary grenades and one (1) smoke grenade per man. M-60 machine gunners carried 800 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition. Each squad was equipped with either 3 claymore mines or a demolition kit.

Aside from the ammunition loads carried by members of the Troop, several other items were employed. Identification tags and sandbags were utilized in the identification and separation of all enemy documents confiscated during the Operation. The men also carried snap links and ropes to facilitate the crossing of the numerous canals encountered.

During Operation CANARY/DUCK, the Cavalry conducted controlled experiments on the use of camouflaged soft caps in relation to the previously used steel helmet. It was discovered that soft caps enable the man to move much faster and are less fatiguing than steel pots. In addition, hearing capabilities are increased. In the jungle, sound is most often the sole means of detecting enemy movement. Consequently, soft caps have become SOP during the hours of darkness and were utilized during this Operation.

On the morning of 12 January 1967, two Aero Scout helicopters were dispatched to reconnoiter the area around the tributaries and rice paddies adjacent to the SONG SAIGON. The procedure employed by "Hot Stuff" is as follows:

- a. OH-13 helicopters are employed in pairs, designated as Lead and Chase Aircraft.
- b. OH-13's fly at tree-top level at all times at a speed of 20 knots, approximately 200 meters apart.
- c. If the lead ship is fired upon, the chase helicopter has the following three missions:
 - (1) Deliver suppressive fire
 - (2) Issue red smoke grenades for subsequent Infantry elements
 - (3) Plot the coordinates of the fire and relay this information to the Troop Commander or person responsible for initiating air assaults.

At 0757 hours, "Hot Stuff" Aero Scouts received ground fire at XT 687248. Major Sutton issued two squads of the 1st Platoon to 678264. 1LT Horace L. Rektorik, a native of Corpus Christi, Texas was in command of the Platoon (-). After being helilited to the area, Lieutenant Rektorik placed one squad on each side of the tributary from which fire was previously received. The terrain in this area was extremely difficult and the gnarled roots and vegetation along the tributary bank were such that a sampan could be completely obscured with no difficulty. Mats were constructed directly over the water, being supported by stilts.

Almost immediately after movement was initiated by the two squads, Sergeant Carl Heben, of Manhattan Beach, California, observed two men approximately 30 meters to his front moving out on a tree limb over the water. Before effective fire could be placed, they dove into the tributary. These individuals were assaulted with grenade fire, with negative results. They had apparently heard the movement and made good their escape.

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The two men had come from a straw hut with a tin roof adjacent to the water's edge. Search of the dwelling revealed a small quantity of 7.62mm ammunition, black pajamas and assorted rifle slings. LT Rektorik directed the destruction of the hut and continued patrolling along the tributary.

At 0447 hours at IT 672282, a sampan on the opposite side of the tributary was discovered and subsequently destroyed. Further search revealed a 55-gallon drum of CS previously sited by an OH-13 helicopter and another sampan.

Thorough screening of the canal area was continued, with the Cavalry troopers keeping a sharp eye for anything out of the ordinary. The search at this time was directed to a paddy area, then sweeping back to the canal. During the sweep, PVT John A. Fischer noticed what at first appeared to be a bundle wrapped in a poncho. Suddenly, two black heads popped out from behind the bundle. The 20 year old ETO informed LT Rektorik of his sighting of the 2 VC who were now approximately 5 meters from the bundle heading towards the woodline. The Lieutenant directed fire on the VC. The men fired some 20 rounds and threw grenades. When the firing had ceased, they advanced and confirmed the death of one Viet Cong. The bundle previously used for concealment contained a rucksack with miscellaneous documents which were forwarded to the Brigade S2 Section.

Stephen Miller, a Specialist 4th Class from Sonoma, California, and a member of E/17th Cavalry's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol found numerous pot holes in the banks of rice paddies and dikes throughout the AO. In many instances, these pot holes lead to subterranean tunnel complexes. It was believed that the recent VC escaped in this manner. These pot holes are destroyed by grenades whenever encountered. Later in the operation, SP4 Vernon D. Phillips, another member of the LERP, heard noises in the same area, however no movement could be detected and no VC were sighted. He suspected that the noises were in fact coming from a subterranean labyrinth below the rice paddies. Tunnel entrances were almost invariably found near huts, and in rice paddy dikes throughout the IRON TRIANGLE.

Lieutenant Rektorik's platoon was extracted from their area of operation and flown to Position WHITE shortly after this last contact.

The second Platoon was conducting patrolling operations simultaneously in another AO. The Troop Commander, Major Sutton, declined earlier to place the platoon in an area where Falcon gun ships had previously received fire. The area was prepared by a bombing strike conducted by Air Force F-105 jet fighters.

1LT Juris Jaurita, a 26 year old graduate of the University of Nebraska was the commander of the 24 man strong 2d Platoon. His unit became airborne at 1000 hours and was dropped approximately 100 - 200 meters southwest of the F-105 strike zone. The terrain in this area was characterized by dense bamboo. All dwellings were built underground and connected to one another and the surface by a vast network of tunnels. Patrolling in this area was difficult since the men were forced to remain within 6 to 8 feet of one another owing to the thickness of the vegetation. If the troopers became separated by more than ten feet, they lost visual contact with one another. The bamboo shoots grew in thick bunches approximately 12" in diameter. Screening of the area revealed numerous underground dwellings or hootches, however, only about half of these showed signs of recent use. There were no hootches whatsoever built above the ground.

Several documents were uncovered, yet only 1 set had any military or strategic value. A large roll of covering paper was the only significant find indicative of VC activity.

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Major Sutton, who was then at Position WHITE, was anxious for the 2d Platoon to speed up their movement. LT Jaunitis reported back to the Troop Commander that this was impossible, since the tunnels to be searched were numerous and the bamboo vegetation was so thick that movement was brought to a near standstill.

With this information, Major Sutton became concerned that the 2d Platoon might encounter an enemy force too large to handle effectively. Also, the rear security of this screening operation was inadequate. He therefore directed the men to a clearing, 100 feet to their front and at 1510 hours, the 2d Platoon was extracted.

At 1430 hours, the 1st Platoon, E/17th Cavalry was helilifted to the vicinity of grid coordinates XT 677234. The area of concern was a tributary near the SAIGON RIVER. A "Hot Stuff" OH-13 Observation Helicopter previously spotted a woman and a hut near this area. Upon landing, the two fire teams, "A" and "B" moved approximately 150 - 200 meters conducting patrolling activities on both banks of the tributary. Staff Sergeant Charles E. Park, "B" fire team leader, directed his unit to cross the water. Shortly thereafter, CPL Emanuel Andrews, a native of Cincinnati, Ohio had visual contact with one VC attempting to escape through the waters of the tributary, which was less than 30 meters wide at this point. At this time, SGT Thomas W. Mirick also observed the Viet Cong and followed him to a bunker type shelter. A "Hot Stuff" recon chopper flew over the bunker and pointed to it indicating that there were VC inside. SGT Mirick climbed to the top of the shelter, however he observed nothing. The M-79 man, SP4 Pullhart was soon on the scene, having already drawn his .45 caliber pistol. He observed two arms in the darkness and motioned to SGT Mirick above. The two men called for the Viet Cong to come out ("Lai Da") and upon the introduction of the muzzle of a 12 gauge shotgun, two men scurried out with their hands up.

The two GI's motioned to the prisoners that they were about to destroy the fortification with grenades. With this, one of the prisoners shouted in the direction of the bunker and almost immediately, a third prisoner jumped from his place of concealment and surrendered.

The first prisoner to come out was apparently suffering from some type of skin disease for his skin was scaly and sickly. The second prisoner was relatively healthy and the third, a boy of about 16 years, had a fresh wound in his hip. Through an interpreter, it was learned that the wound was inflicted by an OH-13 helicopter machinegun. It was further determined that the men, along with approximately 15 others was caught in a B-52 strike, killing half of the estimated party.

SGT Park directed two men to guard the prisoners while he and three other men searched the west side of the tributary. SP4 John Rutchik, one of the men accompanying SGT Park and CPL Andrews spotted a VC with both feet already in the water attempting to escape. Effective M-16 fire was placed before the VC had a chance to escape. As they advanced to confirm the KIA, SP4 Rutchik observed another VC on a bunker located in the middle part of the tributary. Andrews and Rutchik received permission to check out the site from SGT Park. When at close enough range, the men threw fragmentary grenades into the bunker.

One VC was immediately catapulted out into the open. The two men confirmed the KIA and then CPL Andrews entered the bunker alone, thinking perhaps more VC bodies were within. Inside, he could vaguely distinguish the figure of a man on the floor. When he touched the man's arm, he sprang to his feet to defend himself. The two men struggled for only a short time before Andrews succeeded in pushing the VC's head out of the door. SP4 Rutchik took aim and fired his weapon and "blew his brains out". After this incident, Andrews and Rutchik discovered a third VC body, resulting from the grenades thrown earlier.

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Shortly thereafter, another bunker was sighted in a rice paddy. Recon by M-79 fire was employed with negative results. The subsequent extraction of the 1st Platoon marked the end of the day's activities.

On the following day, 13 January, all three platoons were employed in search and destroy operations east of the SAIGON RIVER. At 0842 hours, the 2d Platoon was dropped on a canal from which fire had previously been received. LT Jernitis directed his two reinforced squads to patrol the banks of the canal, utilizing a sound on each bank. At 0850 hours, a camouflaged rice cache was located and destroyed. The platoon moved and estimated 200 meters down stream when a hootch built over the canal was discovered. The point man, PFC William J. Lewis observed movement in the vicinity of the hut. At this time, the order was given to throw grenades at the structure. Inside, unknown to the men of the 2d Platoon, were 2 women and 3 children. Luckily, the grenades only caused minor injuries and LT Jernitis immediately requested a Dustoff helicopter. Nothing else was found within the hut.

In the meantime, CPL Van Hook, a 22 year old squad leader, observed red smoke on the opposite side of the canal. He and his squad proceeded to ford the stream and discovered the location of another hootch. CPL Van Hook set up a fire support base and prepared to issue an assault. Suddenly, a VC was observed making an attempt to hide within the dwelling, however, he soon realized the futility of this maneuver and willingly surrendered.

The squad with their prisoner recrossed the waist deep stream and continued movement along the bank, resulting in the discovery of two additional crude water-side dwellings and an outboard powered canon. The river craft contained fire wood and some 500 eggs. Shortly after the destruction of the hootches and sampans, the prisoner was evacuated and the squad continued to patrol the bank of the stream.

At 1103 hours, a UH-1B helicopter reported seeing several VC in black pajamas in the vicinity of XT 698221. LT Rektorik with the 1st squad of his platoon were airborne at this time and were directed by the Troop Commander to initiate search and destroy operations in this area. This platoon landed shortly thereafter. Upon landing, the squad was immediately separated into two fire teams, one on each side of a small tributary of the SONG SAIGON. The Headquarters element, consisting of two NTO's, a Medic and LT Rektorik, spotted a bunker at the junction of the tributary and a small stream. The Lieutenant summoned anyone who might be within to come out. Receiving no response, the four men entered the bunker, finding a wounded VC. He had been wounded in the back and appeared to be totally paralyzed.

At this time, SP4 Selbon of the Headquarters element commenced firing at a hootch 75 meters to his front. Selbon had spotted a VC attempting to seek refuge within the hut. Lieutenant Rektorik with the first squad following moved in the direction of the sitting. When at close range, the VC halted from the hootch heading towards the heavily foliated area covering the bank. The subsequent open fire produced negative results however, further search of the area was successful. LT Rektorik found him hiding in the underbrush and then shot him. Search of the VC's personal items revealed several documents and small arms ammunition.

Subsequently, the building was destroyed and the squad continued screening to the south. At this time, an over zealous VC, who had apparently just witnessed the previous incident, stepped into the open gladly surrendering.

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The 3d Platoon, which had remained at Position WHITE until now, was lifted to XT 706212 on the SONG SAIGON. The Platoon was divided into three elements, two moving north along the canal and a third squad approximately 700 meters north serving as a blocking force.

The platoon had not moved far before noises were heard by the point man, SP4 Harry J. Holmes. The alerted squad proceeded forward with caution since the foliage along the canal was well suited for enemy concealment. A VC then darted out of the underbrush, surrendering. The troopers advanced to check out the VC's place of concealment. From the brush, another VC sped away before contact could be made, however, 1 Chicom P-34 machinegun, miscellaneous documents and equipment were found wrapped in a poncho.

The captured VC commenced to call his comrades into the open and surrender. One did come out, however, another VC chose to run. His choice proved to be fatal as he was killed by SP4 Donald Brown, the TFO for the fire team on the opposite side of the canal.

At this time, a curious incident occurred. Floating nonchalantly down the canal came a rather large clump of matted grass. The men of the 3d Platoon observed this for quite some distance. It passed right between the two fire teams. SP4 Donald Underwood noticed something suspicious and fired M-79's into the mass. As one would expect, a dead Viet Cong floated up from beneath the brush.

SP4 Allen, the 3d Platoon leader, suspecting more VC were either hiding or attempting to escape, intensified the saturation of this immediate area. The search revealed a crude bunker containing several maps. Further along the woodland, SP4 Richard Albertson discovered a hootch with a sizable quantity of rice a few meters away. The rear security element of Albertson's team entered the hootch discovering a .45 caliber pistol, pistol belt and one magazine.

After the hootch and rice were destroyed, the fire team pushed on toward the adjacent rice paddies. They had moved approximately 100 meters when a hut with attached bunker was found very near a dike. Subsequent search of the dwelling revealed nothing, however, a catwalk crossing the canal was spotted. The fire team set up security and three men, SP4 McDonald, PFC Gardner and PFC Chester volunteered to check out the catwalk.

They crossed the canal cautiously and found 3 trails issuing from the water crossing. As SP4 McDonald probed one of the trails, he spotted a sniper's nest 6 feet above the water. The site showed signs of recent use, for a bowl of rice was found which had been prepared approximately 2 days previous to the platoon's entry. Just a few feet further down the trail, an American made 12 gauge shotgun was resting in the fork of a tree. SP4 McDonald, fearing the weapon may be booby-trapped, proceeded with extreme caution. After thorough examination, McDonald found that the weapon was placed there only through the negligence of some VC and was not booby-trapped in any way. The three men then regressed with the rear security element on the other side of the canal. Upon their return, it was discovered that the immediate area just screened was highly booby-trapped indicating that these trails were heavily used by the Viet Cong.

SGT Albert English was at this time in charge of the 2d Squad of the 3d Platoon. He was given the mission of searching the wooded area adjacent to the rice paddies. The two point men of the squad, SFC James A. Thompson and PFC Gary De Sarno being the first to enter the area, spotted a camouflaged hatch, unobservable

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from the air. As the point men approached the hootch from the left side, they observed wires running along the length of the roof and terminating a few meters from the bamboo and straw structure. The men pulled back and informed their squad leader. SFC English then threw a hand grenade resulting in an initial and secondary explosion, confirming their suspicion that the hut was boobytrapped. The explosion blew off the roof of the hut completely off and formed a hole five feet in diameter in the floor.

Investigation of the gutted hootch revealed that it was apparently a squad sized CP or supply station. A container, housing several documents and booby-trapped with a fragmentary grenade was found and discarded. Buried in the mud behind the hut, several claymore mines and assorted hand grenades were also found.

At 1128 hours, two UH-1D helicopters were flying an extraction mission from XT 700226 to 716212. One of the two helicopters noticed a sampans in the canal below. The airship veered sharply to make a pass at the sampans, however the ship flared out too sharply and crashed on its side. Luckily, injuries were restricted to minor cuts and bruises. The crew quickly stripped the ship of its guns and they were soon evacuated.

At 1315 hours, one "Hot Stuff" and one "Falcon" gunship sited 3 VC at XT 710-322. The Falcon ship fired on the VC killing two of the enemy. The third VC waved his hands desperately, indicating his desire to surrender. He was picked up shortly thereafter by a Command and Control helicopter. The two VC KIA were armed with .45 caliber pistols at the time of their death. The prisoner was subsequently escorted to Military Intelligence and shortly after his interrogation was completed, he managed to steal a weapon and shot his ARVN guard. He then bolted from his place of captivity only to be shot and killed by a trooper of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

In the meantime, elements of the 1st Platoon were given the task of securing the previously wrecked helicopter. This was accomplished successfully and the aircraft was evacuated by CH-47 at 1350 hours. Five minutes later, the 1st Platoon was also picked up and returned to Position WHITE.

A "Hot Stuff" reconnaissance helicopter reported seeing enemy movement at XT 708228. SGT Samuel Haynes of Sanford, North Carolina and SGT McLaurea deployed to this area with a twelve man squad and dropped approximately 100 meters from a canal. The men proceeded south on the east side of the canal. After having gone 150 meters, movement was detected in the grass. A camouflaged VC was crawling through the rice paddy, however, he was out of range of small arms fire. When the squad had finally maneuvered to a position where fire could be effectively placed, the depth of the rice paddy offered the VC adequate cover. The squad's RTO radioed to a nearby gunship which subsequently suppressed the area. The squad advanced finding documents, and the VC's weapon, however, no body was found.

The squad's point man, PFC Emory D. Wagner then crossed the canal, having observed a hootch on the other side. Two transistor-type radios were found in the hut, but aside from this, nothing of value was discovered, so the search of the canal was continued. The sharp vision of the Point Man paid off again as he spotted a head pop out momentarily from the water of the canal. He fired one round at the submerged man, plunged into the water and dragged out his captive. The squad had an interpreter with them who interrogated the frightened POW. He was asked if there were other VC in the area and replied that his comrades had all fled to the west. A gunship was immediately called into the area in question. The POW's information was quite true as the gunships from the 335th Aviation Company soon spotted and killed 3 VC. The KIA were later verified by a C & C ship.

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It was now approximately 1400 hours and the squad departed from the area where the VC was captured. They moved south and then west, once again crossing the woodline searching out any remaining VC. PFC Wagner proved himself once more to be an excellent point man. 75 meters to his front, he observed the movement of three VC approaching a hootch near the woodline. Wagner alerted the squad and fire was directed on the enemy targets. The squad advanced forward to find 3 VC KIA. Subsequent search of the huts revealed several North Vietnamese flags indicating the allegiance of the inhabitants.

The 335th Aviation Company, who provided helicopter support for the E/17th Cavalry, was suffering from a shortage of aircraft and it was imperative that all shine be free by 1600 hours. With this in mind, the Cav made preparations for the extraction of all elements. The squads began to convene on the predetermined points of extraction.

On the opposite side of the canal, Squad Leader SGT Carnes was located on a dike, scanning a rice paddy to see if the area was safe for extraction. He thought he detected movement to his front. The RTG, PFC Warren Archibald, provided security by jumping into the canal so that he could observe activity to the front and cover the advancement of SGT Carnes. The MCO fired in the direction of the movement and then proceeded to check out the results: one dead camouflaged VC. The squad was almost immediately extracted after this incident and returned to Position WHITE.

The final incident of the day occurred when elements led by SGT Welch and SGT Allen encountered several dwellings and sampans along the canal on which their operations were centered. The area was subsequently searched and both sampans and huts were destroyed. SGT Allen's team then crossed the canal since several more hootches were spotted there. One VC was killed when he attempted to escape this area by the fire team crossing the canal.

Shortly after the team arrived on the opposite side, SP4 Holmes, the point man for the team, heard movement as he approached one dwelling. He hesitated outside, then entered emptying one full magazine inside the hootch. As it turned out, two VC were hiding within and were killed by Specialist Holmes' assault.

In another hootch, 20 meters away, noises were again heard. The people inside were summoned to come out by SGT Allen. This they did, all eight of them consisting of an old woman, a ten year old girl and six men. The VC suspects were all evacuated with the fire team shortly thereafter, terminating the day's activities.

At 0752 hours, 14 January, OH-13 Aero Scouts once again went airborne to recon an area where a tributary bridge was sited on the previous day's activities (XT 715228). At 0801 hours, the 2d Platoon under the command of 1LT Jaunitis was dropped at XT 719221. The third squad acted as a blocking force northwest of the bridge. The first and second squads were placed on the west and east side of the tributary respectively.

SGT Carnes, squad leader of the 2d Squad, first observed red smoke 15 meters from the point they were dropped. The red smoke was placed by OH-13's denoting that "Charlie" had been sited in the area. The squad was 30 meters from the woodline when they received 4 - 5 rounds of small arms fire. They returned approximately 15 rounds, however, caution in firing was observed since the 1st squad was operating on the west side of the tributary. As the second squad moved towards the woodline, SGT Wright observed one VC hiding in the water holding on to one of

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the gnarled roots along the bank. When at a 5 meter range, Wright fired his M-16 at the enemy. As he and SGT Carnes advanced to confirm the KIA, they found another dead VC hanging in a tree. The VC, who was shot in the face, was armed with a Russian 7.62mm carbine. Also in his possession was a plastic bag containing clothing, ammunition and an inner tube for floating in the water. A crude bunker was found near the scene. Strangely enough, no one could accept credit for the second KIA, since he was apparently struck by a wild round during the landing skirmish.

On the west side of the stream, 1LT Jaunitis and the 1st squad received several rounds of small arms fire resulting in the first casualty of the Cavalry Troop since the beginning of Operation CEDAR FALLS. Twenty year old SP4 Patrick L. Sirmuir was wounded in action while moving along a dike shortly after landing. He observed the fire coming from the woodline and quickly got down into firing position, however, he then noticed a strange sensation in his leg. He looked down to discover that a bullet was lodged below his kneecap. A Dustoff ship was immediately summoned and Sirmuir was evacuated only 10 minutes after sustaining the wound.

The 1st squad continued movement after the Dustoff was accomplished. As they searched along the woodline, the last man in the column, PFC Larry E. Smith of Parsons, Kansas, spotted an arm and a leg wrapped around a tree trunk. The contrast of the light skin against the murky water caught his eye for the undergrowth was thick along the water's edge. He fired 5 rounds at the semi-submerged figure. SGT Carnes, who was on the east side of the tributary, confirmed the KIA.

As the 1st and 2d Squads moved further north towards the bridge and location of the 3d Squad, a corpse was found floating in the stream. PFC Archibald, being a strong swimmer, volunteered to check out the body. He fought his way through the muddy stream and tangled underbrush until he reached the opposite bank where the body was lodged. Archibald determined, as best he could, that this VC had been killed recently, probably by an OH-13 helicopter. The danger involved in this type of mission is great, since the waterways in this region are clogged with treacherous vines and roots, in addition to the strong tidal effect on the tributaries.

The two squads pushed on opposite sides of the tributary, destroying several sampans, huts and uncovering a 10,000 pound, well camouflaged rice cache. The men found that the destruction of such large quantities of rice is highly time consuming.

After several hours of search, the men approached the bridge. It was evident that it was not a temporary structure as is often the case. The bridge was thirty feet long and solidly constructed with logs 12" in diameter. Major Sutton made the decision at this time not to destroy the structure and directed that the bridge remain in tact since it presented an excellent ambush site for future night patrols. (See Night Ambush, 14 - 17 January 1967, page 7D to 7F).

The 3d Squad blocking force, which was until now situated 100 meters north of the bridge, rejoined the 1st and 2d squads preparing for subsequent extraction. In order to accomplish this, several of the troopers had to cross the river. Two non-swimmers accidentally dropped their weapons in the process. The M-16's would be a fine prize for the VC, therefore, Sergeants Carnes and Wright dove into the murky water at no small risk to their own safety. A moment or two later, the two men returned to the surface having successfully retrieved the two weapons.

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The 3d Platoon, E/17th Cavalry was operating not far from the 2d Platoon. The 1st Squad was on the northeast bank of a stream and the 3d squad (led by SFC Allen) served as a blocking force approximately 1,000 meters from the 1st squad. The 2d squad was on the opposite side of the stream, thereby employing the same tactic of two squads moving parallel towards their 3d Squad blocking force.

As the 2d Squad moved north, SGT James Busie broke his unit into two fire teams. SFC George Carrillo, the pointman on the left side of the canal, moved along the dike and spotted almost directly in front of him, the hand and arm of a VC concealed in a pot hole. Carrillo opened fire, however, his weapon malfunctioned after a few rounds were expended. The wounded VC jumped out and surrendered before the point man could clear his weapon.

Shortly thereafter, Carrillo's weapon redeemed itself. The point man along with PFC Radburn had just completed the search of a nearby hut when Carrillo spotted the head of a VC in a canal some 200 meters away. He fired several rounds at the minute target. SGT Edward Armstrong reported back that the VC was hit several times in the head. The M-16 once again had proven to be a highly effective weapon.

After confirming this KIA, SGT Armstrong checked out another hutch in the same vicinity, discovering 3,000 pounds of bagged paddy rice. The rice was subsequently destroyed by cutting the bags and throwing it into the canal, making later retrieval impossible.

At this time, Major Sutton directed the platoon to back track the area just screened since it is a characteristic of the Viet Cong to return to an area immediately after American troops and helicopters depart.

This proved to be a wise tactic, for as soon as they returned to the area, two VC were spotted with their heads above the water by point man SFC Holmes. A call was made for the men to surrender, yet they refused and attempted to reach a clump of brush on the bank of the stream. Holmes fired and the VC ducked underneath the water. He then threw a grenade to interrupt their escape. PFC Earl Westmark joined Holmes in the search for the "Charlies". Holmes, who was now a few feet off shore, searched the bank of the stream for the enemy, only to have one of them swim directly between his legs, the VC having apparently lost his sense of direction. The surprised Holmes fired at the figure at point blank range with obvious results. PFC Westmark discovered the second body shortly thereafter.

A search of the immediate area was continued for approximately 30 minutes. Westmark and Holmes found a PL-4, sub-machinegun, pistol belt and various personal items belonging to the two men previously killed. The equipment was located in the hollow of a tree on the water's edge. It was believed that the VC were trying to reach this point at the time fire was placed upon them.

At this time, SGT Welch received an intelligence report from "Hot Stuff" that a sampan was traveling in their direction. The "D" fire team was dispatched to check the movement of the river craft, however, on the way they discovered 2 VC men hiding along the water's edge. SFC Albertson, the team leader first heard movement in the area. The team immediately set up a rear security and advanced around the bend in the stream. MSGT Ray Maynes then heard a noise in the brush. He observed a small opening in the undergrowth leading toward the canal which he followed to the water's edge. His vision was still obstructed so he waded approximately 7 - 8 feet into the stream. The vegetation was so thick that SGT Maynes could not see the team leader who was only a few meters away at this time. Suddenly, he spotted a VC in the water nearby. Maynes placed several rounds on the

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enemy target. Then, as he moved through the water to confirm the KIA, he spotted a second VC, 10 meters away. Again SGT Haynes placed effective fire bringing his total to two VC.

The sampan previously reported was located not far from the scene of the previous action. SP4 Holmes made use of the craft in crossing the stream for although the stream was narrow at this point, the water was still quite deep. Holmes encountered some difficulty in the execution of this maneuver since the sampan was 18' long and the stream was only 15' wide. During the process, he heard the sounds of a man running on the far side of the stream. Holmes did not fire however, since the Cav's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was operating on that side of the stream. It was later learned that the LRRP collected the KIA.

The squad regrouped shortly thereafter and the unit was extracted at 1355 hours, owing to the shortage of helicopters.

The 1st Platoon had no actual close contact with the enemy on this day, however, the search and destroy operations were not without significance. Three squads of the platoon were lifted from Position WHITE to a canal (vicinity XT 676234) at 0940 hours. Upon arrival in the AO, 1LT Raktarik directed 2 squads along the canal banks, one on each side moving parallel. A third squad was working nearby and soon discovered a hut containing a sizeable amount of M-1 ammunition. The Platoon encountered several hootches with large quantities of rice, all of which were destroyed.

They had moved approximately 600 meters north when they began to receive sporadic small arms fire. The source, however, could not be determined. Therefore, 1LT Raktarik was anxious to move out of the area since there were friendly troops operating nearby. In fact, he felt that the fire might have come from the friendly forces engaging in a fire fight. The Lieutenant decided to establish a blocking force and continue movement.

At 1008 hours, the elements on the southeast side of the canal discovered a camouflaged storage cache containing 69 - 100 pound bags of rice, M-36 hand grenades and a heath, all of which was destroyed in place. At 1047 hours, 151-100 pound bags of fertilizer were discovered.

Throughout the day, the 1st Platoon continued to uncover VC storage caches yielding 75 M-1 rounds, 4 sticks of TNT, 800 more pounds of rice, 1 Chicom rifle and 1 Chicom grenade.

Shortly after noon, the 1st Platoon started receiving fire from 600 - 700 meters across a rice paddy. 1LT Raktarik called in a Falcon gun ship who suppressed the area so that extraction could be initiated. By 1330 hours, the platoon had returned by helicopter to Position WHITE.

LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL - E/17TH CAVALRY

The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) of E/17th Cavalry consists of 61 crack paratroopers whose mission is to scout 15 to 25 kilometers forward of the CP, thereby obtaining and relaying intelligent information concerning terrain, enemy strength etc. to the commanders. Nearly all LRRP's are made up of graduates of either MACV School, Ranger School or Reconno School and are highly skilled in the techniques of jungle survival and guerrilla warfare.

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The Patrol is commanded by CPT Allan B. Phillips, a graduate of West Point Military Academy and a native of North Berwick, Maine. The men, while on patrol wear camouflaged fatigues and soft hats. They are armed with M-16's and M-3 grease guns equipped with home-made silencers. They also carry a blood expansion unit as all the men have had 1st Aid experience and training.

The Patrols themselves are made up of 6 man teams consisting of 1 patrol leader, an assistant patrol leader, 1 RTO, 1 senior scout and 2 additional scouts. They rely almost solely on helicopters for deployment since they are usually placed in areas of unknown VC strength. These small well rounded patrolling/reconnaissance units perform an invaluable service to the Cavalry Troop and the Brigade as a whole in supplying information necessary for the introduction of larger infantry elements.

During the first part of Operation CEDAR FALLS, the LRRP remained airborne almost constantly, making bomb strike assessments. On the 12th and 13th they were involved in tunnel search missions. CPT Phillips asked for and was subsequently granted permission to rejoin the Cavalry Troop. They conducted operations with the Cav on the 14th of January, this time, however, their mission was the same as the other platoons.

At 1029 hours, the LRRP was dropped at XT 680321 with the mission of searching along the canal heading northeast. One element of the LRRP moved in from the northwest and commenced patrolling along the canal bank. They soon ran across three elderly men (50 - 60 years of age). The men displayed their ID cards and bowed respectfully. SP4 Edmond D. Smith had them evacuated immediately and movement was continued down the canal. The 11th ACE was working on the opposite side at this time.

Along the way, SP4 Smith's element observed a Vietnamese off to their left working in a rice paddy. They called out to the man just as he dove into the rice paddy. The moment fire was placed on him, a secondary explosion occurred. It appeared as though the VC were about to toss the grenade into the midst of the patrol, however, his attempt was aborted. The scouts entered the rice field to confirm the KIA. The water in the paddy was chest deep in some places and made navigation extremely difficult. The search was then directed to the woodline. Shortly thereafter, the patrol linked up with another LRRP element at XT 693278 which reported negative contact, however, they did discover one VC body, who had apparently been killed a day or two earlier.

At 1041 hours, a twelve man patrol at XT 721222 found an extremely large cache of polished rice while moving north along a canal. After the destruction was completed, they moved 400 meters toward the SOME SAIGON. "Hot Stuff" had reported seeing a 55 gallon drum in this area. The drum was easily found, along with a hooton built on stilts over the canal, a rice cache, a 30' sampan with an inboard diesel engine and 3 smaller sampans. It took 30 minutes to destroy the 225 - 100 pound bags of paddy rice and the 40 - 100 pound bags of polished rice.

At 1256 hours, the patrol became airborne to coordinate XT 715213. A "Hot Stuff" report perpetrated this movement, yet nothing was discovered in the immediate area. The patrol then crossed two canals and at XT 722212 they discovered 15 sampans, an outboard motor and a half dozen hootons, all of which were destroyed. The patrols were all extracted by 1507 hours concluding the day's activities.

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On 15 January, the LERP worked with the Chemical Detachments in tunnel search and destruction. The following day, Major Sutton received the order to conduct both day time search and destroy operations in addition to night time ambush patrols. On the nights of the 16th and 17th of January, the Cav's LERP set ambush patrols near the bridge encountered two days previously by the 2d Platoon (XT 715-228).

NIGHT AMBUSH - 16 JANUARY 1967

At 1438 hours, a twelve man patrol led by SGT Michael J. Howard infiltrated the area (XT 715228) where a heavily used footbridge was located. The ambush was set up in such a manner that both the trail and the canal could be covered thoroughly. The patrol was armed with claymore mines, M-60 machineguns, M-16 rifles and hand grenades. The ambush site itself stretched over a one hundred meter area (see Annex 1 for ambush positions).

By 1500 hours, the ambush was ready. The men therefore lay motionless, observing strict silence while waiting for nightfall. At 1919 hours, a VC was seen approaching the bridge from the northwest. All was still until the man walked into the killing zone and the squad opened up, killing the VC instantly.

At 2015 hours, another VC approached the ambush using the same route as his unfortunate predecessor, however, owing to the darkness, he was undetected until he was in the center of the killing zone. Several rounds rang out at the VC but with negative effect. He then brandished a fragmentary grenade, but before he could throw it, another burst of fire rang out. The VC dropped out of sight moaning in pain. His pain ceased when his own grenade exploded beneath him.

Between the first and second encounter, several lights were observed flashing on and off, apparently some sort of signal. This second VC was more than likely a scout sent to check out the situation at the bridge, implying that perhaps a larger force was anxious to use the crossing.

It was not long after the second VC was killed than noises were heard followed by heavy enemy fire, seemingly from all directions. An estimated 15 VC were involved in the fire fight. They had seemingly infiltrated through the same route across the bridge.

At this time, SP4 Collins, on the southern side of the canal, was hit by enemy fire. All patrol members were virtually pinned down to their positions and the brush was too thick to move without being detected. Grenades were thrown to hamper the enemy fire temporarily so that SP4 Phillips and SP4 Noye could regroup in order to reach the wounded man. As their ammunition was beginning to run seriously low, the fire died down and communication was made to the elements on the north side of the canal informing them of the casualty. SGT Howard crossed the canal to give assistance to the two men as fire ceased altogether on the other side.

When he reached Phillips and Noye, he gave them a pocket-type flashlight to aid the wounded Collins. He then radioed back to SGT Bolen that two men were needed for security while First Aid was being administered. SP4 Taylor and SP4 Curtis immediately crossed the canal.

Initially, Phillips detected only one small wound in SP4 Collins's chest, yet he appeared to be in shock. The wounded man was lifted onto the dike where Phillips performed mouth to mouth resuscitation until the Dustoff ship arrived 10 minutes later. A trip flare was employed to guide the evacuation ship into the area. SGT

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Howard and Specialists Curtis and Phillips carried the wounded man across the rice paddy to the waiting helicopter. The chest high mud, the darkness and wet made the task near impossible yet they managed to maneuver to the ship and the wounded man was evacuated.

The men then returned to their positions where all was quiet until 2237 hours when 2 VC wandered directly in front of SP4 McDonald's M-60 machinegun. Detecting something wrong, the two VC stopped and exchanged a few words before McDonald fired but the weapon jammed. SGT Howard, a few meters away, immediately fired his M-16 however, it too malfunctioned due to the mud acquired during the evacuation of SP4 Collins. Seeing this, SGT Bolen opened up with his M-16 killing one VC instantly. The second VC was wounded and tried to escape over the dike, down the canal. SGT Bolen left his position and pursued the enemy to the brush at the water's edge and completed the job. The VC were armed with one carbine and one ChiCom sub-machinegun. After this, there were no more contacts, however movement was heard until around 0600 hours. Five hours later, the platoon was extracted without incident.

SP4 Collins died in the hospital 7 days later. The bullet he received pierced his cheek and lodged in his brain. The 19 year old native of Houston, Texas had spent the last 19 months in Vietnam.

NIGHT AMBUSH - 17 JANUARY 1967

A 12-man ambush patrol led by SGT Harold Kalama of Honolulu, Hawaii, infiltrated to XT 717227 at 1818 hours on 17 January. SGT Kalama positioned his unit north of a bridge on the west side of the canal. This was essentially the same site employed in the previous night's ambush, however, on the night of the sixteenth, the ambush was located south and west of the bridge, with a security element across the canal to the south.

On the ambush of the 17th of January, there was a misunderstanding between SGT Kalama and assistant team leader SSG Vigo. Sergeant Vigo was under the misconception that he, along with SP4 Smith (M-16) and SP4 Wilkinson (M-16) were to be positioned south of the bridge. Once the ambush was set, no corrective action could be taken since strict silence measures had to be observed. Claymore mines were employed to the south-west and north of their position owing to the lack of rear security (see Annex 2).

All was still until 2030 hours when SP4 Smith on the left flank security spotted 7 VC, 20 to 30 meters from the bridge. When the VC reached the bank, SGT Vigo and SP4 Smith opened fire on the unsuspecting enemy. The VC were unable to determine the direction of fire and in the confusion, one VC was killed and a second was wounded, falling from the dike out of sight.

Later that night, SGT Kalama, utilizing a starlight scope, spotted 2 VC approximately 10 meters from SP4 Miller's light machinegun position. He radioed the information to the gunner, who immediately opened fire. The results were undetermined at this time due to the darkness, however, two VC KIA were found while searching the area the next morning.

The last incident occurred between 1920 and 2000 hours when SGT Kalama again spotted an undetermined number of people to his front with the starlight scope. SP4 Rosson and SP4 Dapelle fired 6 volleys of M-79's toward the people, the sighting being provided by SGT Kalama. In the morning, 4 VC dead were found in the area of fire.

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The ambush patrol met with no opposition throughout the night. One M-79 or possibly a 60mm mortar round was received at one time, however, it produced negative results. The ambush patrol was highly successful, having a total of 5 VC KIA (BC) and an estimated 2 more KIA with friendly forces sustaining no casualties. The patrol was extracted from this position at 1000 hours, 18 January.

RESULTS OF OPERATION CEDAR FALLS - E/17th CAVALRY

12 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count 6
VC Captured 3
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed 4
 sampans Destroyed 2
Weapons Captured 1
Ammo Captured (sa arms) . . . 53 rnds
Rice Destroyed 1500 lbs

14 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count 12
VC Captured 9
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed 6
 sampans Destroyed 22
Weapons Captured 2
Ammo Captured 150 rnds
Rice Destroyed 41.5 tons
 sampans Outboard motors 4
Rucksacks Captured 8
Grenades Captured 2
TNT Captured 15 lbs
Fertilizer Destroyed 1150 lbs
Documents Many

16 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count 9
VC Captured 2
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed 3
 sampans Destroyed 6
 sampans Motors Captured 2
Rucksacks Captured 1
Rice Destroyed 5 tons
Medical Supplies Captured . . . 5 lbs

13 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count 17
VC Captured 33
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed 1
Weapons Captured 5
Ammo Captured (sa arms) . . . 150 rnds
Rice Destroyed 900 lbs
Claymores Captured 3
Grenades Captured 1
Rucksacks Captured 7
Medical Supplies Captured . . . 5 lbs
Weapons Captured 4

15 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count 1
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed 16
 sampans Destroyed 11
 sampans Motors Captured 1
Rice Destroyed 7 1/2 tons
Rucksacks Captured 1
Claymores Captured 8
Gasoline Destroyed 50 gal

17 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count 12
VC Captured 2
Huts/Bunkers Destroyed 5
 sampans Destroyed 3
Weapons Captured 5
 sampans Motors Captured 1
Rice Destroyed 5700 lbs
Medical Supplies Captured . . . 15 lbs
Rucksacks Captured 2
TNT Captured 25 lbs
Base Camp (Sqd Sigs) 1

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18 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count 8
 VC KIA by Arty Called by E/17th . . . 5
 Huts/Bunkers Destroyed 2
 Sampans Destroyed 6
 Weapons Captured 2
 Ammo Captured (sm arms) 25 rnds

20 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count 9
 Sampans Destroyed 1
 Weapons Captured 2
 Ammo Captured (sm arms) 200 rnds
 Grenades Captured 2

19 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count 9
 VC Captured 4
 Huts/Bunkers Destroyed 2
 Weapons Captured 2
 Rice Destroyed 1200 lbs

21 January 1967

VC Killed by Body Count 1
 Huts/Bunkers Destroyed 24
 Sampans Destroyed 6
 Weapons Captured 1
 Claymores Captured 1
 TWT Captured 15 lbs
 Documents Many

TOTALSVC KIA: E/17th Cavalry & Supporting Aircraft

Air Scouts 5
 Gun Ships 5
 Ground Elements 61
 TOTAL 73
 Enemy Captured 25
 Suspects Detained 13
 Weapons Captured 21
 Sampans Destroyed 22
 Huts Destroyed 38
 Rice Destroyed 132 tons (approx)
 Documents 40 lbs (approx)
 Sampans Engines 9

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"C" COMPANY, 2D BATTALION, 503D INFANTRY

On 8 January 1967, the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry was deployed from Camp Lima at the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) base camp at BIEN HOA to a staging area at PHU LOI. From this point, the Battalion was lifted to the forward assembly area at Point BLUE (XT 828829) employing 30 helicopters. They remained there until 0700 hours on 9 January 1967. The troops were given a general orientation as to their mission prior to their departing BIEN HOA.

On 9 January, the Battalion landed at two LZ's (XT 6737 & XT 6736) and the separate companies were arranged as shown in Annex 3. The Companies were given the mission of patrolling, forming blocking positions and setting up night ambushes.

Logistically, Company "C" was armed as follows: each rifleman was armed with an M-16 rifle with 400 rounds of ammunition as a basic load, 2 smoke grenades and 2 fragmentary grenades. There were two M-60 machineguns per platoon, each gunner carrying a total of 1,500 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition. In addition, each squad had 2 M-79's with 45 rounds per grenadier and generally 2 claymore mines, depending upon the mission. The company as a whole was equipped with three (3) 81mm mortars with 30 rounds per mortar. Each individual carried three C-Ration meals while on operations.

At 1115 hours, 9 January, Company C landed at the LZ and immediately established a blocking position. Captain Thomas P. Carney, Company Commander, moved to the right flank to make coordination with the CO of B/1/16th Infantry which was operating to the north. After this was completed, the 3 platoons established defense positions along an old cart road west of the SONO THI TIEN. The AO was primarily jungle with the exception of an area which had been defoliated within the last year. B/1/16th Infantry, located 200 meters to the north of the coordination point, had established a defense perimeter, whereas C/2/503d Infantry was on a line defense. CPT Carney and CPT Wilson (B/1/16th Infantry CO) decided that ambush patrols would be placed on the overgrown trail in the western portion of the 2d Battalion AO. See Annex 3.

Shortly after the 3 platoons had established a defense perimeter, patrols were sent out to search the immediate area for signs of the VC and likely ambush sites. The 3d Platoon soon discovered a hut with a small tunnel/bomb shelter attached. The hut had been inhabited very recently, for freshly cooked rice was found. Further search of the area revealed a hole containing 12 bicycles and a concrete platform with 200 pounds of polished rice. Everything was destroyed, with the exception of the bicycles which now provide transportation to the men of "Charlie" Company while in base camp.

The weapons platoon, consisting of 33 men, secured the rear of the Company CP finding nothing save one small hut. After it was destroyed, the platoon moved further east towards the THI TIEN River, running into an unfordable stream. They then returned to the company base area.

In addition, each of the 3 platoons sent out squad sized patrols to reconnoiter the front of the perimeter since there was a 100 meter gap between platoons. The Companies also employed three man observation posts during the hours of darkness.

SGT Nathaniel King, of Hartford, Connecticut, was in charge of the patrol from the 1st Platoon. When they returned to the CP, SGT King reported finding 2 foxholes showing no signs of recent use. He also reported finding a footpath running parallel to the overgrown trail in the western portion of the AO. Although the trail displayed no signs of recent use, the small foot path to the right was heavily traveled, probably because it could not be observed from the air. SGT King's patrol

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followed the path back to the CP where he relayed this information.

All patrols returned to the CP by 1630 hours. A-Battions sent a .50 caliber machinegun were brought in at this time and the company settled down to warm chow. At 1500 hours, 1LT Phillip Hayden was told to contact a night ambush 300 meters south of the Company's position. SGT Julius Brown was to be in charge of the patrol.

At approximately 1940 hours, an outpost located between the 2d and 3d platoon positions made enemy contact. SGT Frank Rothwell, SP4 Walter Johnson and PFC Joseph Russo were the three men at the post. They moved into position shortly after nightfall, situating themselves 3 meters from one another in a triangular position, thereby facilitating easy communication in addition to 360° observation. The terrain was flat, consisting of elephant grass and bamboo.

The men lay quietly in the prone position, until they detected movement 50 meters to their front right flank, seemingly approaching the CP. Their vision was obstructed by the elephant grass and being in the prone position, they could not move without being detected. SGT Rothwell could not get to his M-16 since he was in a position that any movement whatsoever could be fatal. He therefore prepared to throw a fragmentary grenade in the direction of the approaching VC.

SP4 Johnson was in such position to observe the VC, however he knew that he must come to a sitting position to fire, thereby exposing himself. The SOP for the outpost was not to fire unless absolutely necessary. As the enemy came closer, Johnson realized that there could be no time more necessary than now.

He darted up into a sitting position and fired approximately 5 rounds before his weapon jammed. As he applied immediate action, a grenade exploded and Johnson took a fragment in the neck. At this time, SGT Rothwell let loose with his grenade, which he had been holding with the pin out for 3 seconds, allowing the grenade to explode upon impact. Unfortunately, the grenade went off while in flight, raining fragments back to the CP. PFC Russo caught a fragment in the head and was unable to fire his M-79. Rothwell ran back to the CP informing them of the situation, then covered the area with M-16 fire and made a rapid retreat aiding Johnson and Russo.

Upon returning to the CP, the two wounded men were evacuated at the advice of the Company Medic. The wound in Johnson's neck, although not serious, was very close to the jugular vein. The medevac ship arrived and picked up the men 25 minutes later.

By this time, the ambush patrol was in position. CPT Carney had received reports from A/2/503d Infantry and B/1/16th Infantry that movement was detected near their Company CP's. With this in mind, he warned SGT Brown's ambush to keep on the alert for infiltrating Viet Cong.

The ambush patrol had left the CP at 1900 hours and moved south along the foot path. They passed their ambush site and backtracked to it, thereby confusing any enemy element that might be following their trail. The site was chosen because of the cover available and the indication that the path was frequently traveled at this point. There were nine men on the patrol, 6 armed with M-16's, 2 armed with M-79's and one (1) M-60 machinegun (see Annex J). The patrol maintained radio silence, however, a predesignated break switch system was employed as follows: 1 break - negative contact, 2 breaks - involved in action, 3 breaks - enemy casualties, 4 breaks - friendly casualties, 5 breaks - numerous VC in the area.

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At 1945 hours, the patrol heard fire issuing from SGT Bothwell's CP previously mentioned. Another warning was issued shortly thereafter. The patrol, on full alert, lay in anticipation of enemy movement.

At 2045 hours, several sounds of movement were heard to the northeast of the ambush site. PFC Gary Gaura became anxious when hearing the movement and crawled to SGT Brown's position a few meters away to ask him what should be done. SGT Brown told him to do nothing and be still. When Gaura crawled back to his position, he coughed, and the enemy movement, which was now only 15 meters away, halted sharply. The VC remained motionless for approximately 10 minutes, and then moved on around the patrol's killing zone. PFC Gaura counted 15 silhouettes. They crossed the trail, avoiding the ambush, yet they still remained in the immediate area.

At 2230 hours, the column of men moved further to the west, out of range and sight. 15 minutes later, machinegun fire was heard; apparently B/1/16th Infantry elements had encountered the VC. At 2300 hours, a straggler wandered directly into the ambush site. Again someone coughed, alerting the VC. This time however, there was no chance for escape. PFC Michael Farmer, an M-16 man on the southeast portion of the ambush observed the silhouette and cut loose with 5 rounds, wounding the VC. He lay on the ground moaning and shrieking in pain.

At this time, another Viet Cong straggler wandered into the ambush. He took one look at his wounded comrade and decided he wanted no part of him. As he turned to leave, the wounded man cried out once again. The other VC decided to be a good Samaritan and turned about (almost tripping over an M-60 machinegun) returning to the wounded man. He then sprayed the area with AK-47 fire, having a negative effect on the patrol.

The VC then leaned over his wounded comrade and lit a candle which brilliantly illuminated both men. Immediately after this was done, PFC Michael Hill cut loose with his M-60, however, the machinegun malfunctioned. Simultaneously, PFC Martin C. Korman bore down on the two VC with his M-16. The candle went out and all was quiet.

Silence was maintained until the morning when the two KIA were confirmed. Two AK-47 weapons were found with the bodies, and among their personal items was found a document containing the crypts for the Military Region 4 Headquarters. This document proved to be extremely important and directly led to the capture of a high official in the MR-4. The second VC was obviously a courier whose job was to transport important documents.

At 0630 hours, the ambush patrol moved out of the area and proceeded by foot to the Company CP. The documents captured from the Viet Cong courier turned out to be one of the most significant finds of the Operation.

NIGHT AMBUSH - 1ST PLATOON - B/2/5018 INFANTRY - 15 JANUARY 1967

Lt Donald B. Pordham, the 1st Platoon Leader received a mission from the Company Commander, CPT Ken Asplaf, to establish 2 ambush sites along HIGHWAY 14 on the night of 15 January 1967. After due consideration was made to likely ambush sites, Lieutenant Pordham decided to place the two ambushes at XT 706251 and XT 712218. He then divided his 31 man platoon into two groups of 16 and 15 men. The ambushes will be covered separately and will be denoted as SITE I and SITE II.

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SITE I

Staff Sergeant J. Marlow was the NCO in charge of the first ambush which went into position 500 - 600 meters from the Battalion CP along HIGHWAY 14. There were four fighting positions in the patrol (See Annex A).

The first position was located furthest north and was equipped with an M-60 machinegun. SGT Mark Peterson was in charge of this team which consisted of himself, PFC Melvin Tomlin (Machinegunner) and PFC Raymond S. Cassidy. There was also a radio at this point.

The second position was located 30 - 40 meters southeast of the first position and consisted of 4 men, 3 of them being armed with M-16's and 1 man armed with an M-79. SP4 Ely was in charge of this position.

The third position consisted of 5 men, located approximately 10 meters southeast of the second position. SGT Marlow was in charge of this group and was armed with an M-16 rifle. The NTO for the patrol, PFC Fred Scerola was also at this point in addition to SGT Clarence Blackshear (M-16), PFC Tommy Amos (M-16 and Starlight Scope) and the M-79 grenadier, SP4 Thomas Hatcher. The 4th Position was located 40 meters southeast of the 3d position, very near the junction of HIGHWAY 14 and a small heavily traveled footpath.

The patrol was in position by 1920 hours, observing strict silence. Each fighting position remained on full alert through the night. On several occasions, the men thought they heard voices, however, it was hard to distinguish whether or not it was in fact voices or the wind, which was blowing at 20 to 30 knots. There was no actual contact until early the next morning.

At 0630 hours, SGT Rount, at Position 4, spotted 3 VC at the trail/road junction, beginning to cross the Highway. It was still quite dark at this time and visibility was poor, so rather than fire immediately at the indistinct figures, SGT Rount blew his claymore mine which was located at the base of the trail. Then, the entire patrol fired at the VC employing every weapon available. As it turned out, the VC were not detected earlier since the trip flare placed across the trail failed to function.

As it was now becoming light, the patrol members took up the pursuit of the VC, following the trail on the east side of HIGHWAY 14. The search disclosed one ChiCom B-40, 3.5" rocket launcher and 2 hand grenades. The VC were not found, however, a significant blood trail was observed from the point of fire to 150 meters down the path where it vanished in a field of high grass. The patrol had by now ventured into a dense area, therefore it was decided to return to the Battalion CP rather than continue the pursuit.

The patrol met with only this one contact owing to the fact the N & I fires were landing within 200 meters of the site throughout the night, keeping enemy elements out of the area.

SITE II

Ambush Site II was located approximately 1100 meters south of Site I along HIGHWAY 14, directly north of the junction of the Highway and a small road running at a right angle (See Annex A). Around 1900 hours, while enroute to the ambush site, the patrol noticed several people darting across the highway. Later they

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SUBJECT: Small Unit Actions - 2/5034 Infantry

25 February 1967

found an anti-tank mine which they disarmed on the spot. Shortly thereafter, a hole was discovered off to the side of the Highway where someone had made preparations for another AT mine. All indications were that the hole had been abandoned only minutes earlier, for the earth was freshly dug and an entrenching tool was left behind.

The patrol passed their predetermined ambush site, and then backtracked to the position as is often done to waylay the enemy into an ambush killing zone. They established 2 fighting positions and one Administrative position to the rear where Lieutenant Feedham, the Platoon Sergeant, Harold E. Howell, a medic, SP4 Ernest Mueller and PFC John Hayward, the ETO were located. A second radio was located at Position 1.

Between 2115 and 2130 hours, SP4 Leamon Perry and SP4 Joseph Caruso at Position 1 observed 2 VC heading in their direction. When inside the killing zone, Specialist Perry gave the word to open fire. Three minutes after the fire had ceased, a party of three volunteers, consisting of SGT Thompson, SP4 Caruso and PVT Williams advanced to check out the results.


They found no bodies on the Highway where they expected, so they elected to search the clearing on the other side of the road. The three men had covered approximately 50 meters when from out of the brush, one of the VC jumped out to assault. All three troopers opened fire at almost point blank range, killing the enemy instantly.

The VC's body was dragged onto the road where it could serve as a decoy for any others who might happen by. The three men then continued the search of the area where the VC were originally fired upon, discovering 8 bundles of personal items and several documents. They also found a .45 caliber pistol and an M1 type sub-machinegun.

There were no further contacts during the night, however, on one occasion, 3 or 4 hand grenades were received. The fire was returned with apparent negative results and no friendly casualties.

In the morning, the ambush patrols from both SITE I and SITE II linked up and conducted a search of the area. They discovered numerous bundles of personal items indicative that a great number of either Viet Cong or Refugees were moving through this area before the introduction of the 2d Battalion, 5034 Infantry.

NIGHT AMBUSH - 16 JAN 67
E/17th CAV




ANNEX I
to
TABLE to Incl I

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ANNEX 2

NIGHT AMBUSH - 17 JAN 67
E/17th CAV



- UNDERGROWTH
- TRAIL
- RICE PADDY
- PSN OF PATROL MEMBERS
- CLAYMORE PSN


ANNEX 2

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ANNEX 3

POSITIONING OF 2/503 INF


B/1/16TH INF



AMBUSH POSITIONS

9 JANUARY 67


C/2/503D BATTAL




ANNEX 3

92

ANNEX 4 AMBUSH JANUARY 1967 SITE 1



SITE 2



POSITION 1

Sgt LEO JIM DUNN - TM LDR - MM
Sgt JERRY CARROLL - MM
Pvt J. E. LINDSEY - MTT
Sgt THOMPSON - MM

POSITION 2

Pvt JAMES L. LANE - MM
Pvt WALTER L. WILLIAMS - MM
Pvt ROBERT THOMPSON - MTT

POSITION 3

Sgt JAMES TUDOR - TM LDR - MM
Pvt JEROME E. ZERFASS - MM
Pvt RAYMOND BARNHARTT - MM

POSITION 4

Sgt BILLY LITMAN - MM
Pvt TERRY RAYAL - MTT
Pvt RICHARD CUNNINGHAM - MM


ADMIN PSN

Sgt FREDERICK - PT LDR
Sgt HAROLD E. BOYDALL - PT SGT
Pvt JOHN HAYWARD - RM

ANNEX 4

TUNNEL COMPLEX

SIDE VIEW




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TAB F to
Incl 1

TUNNEL COMPLEX

TOP VIEW




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
TUNNEL COMPLEX

TYPICAL VILLAGE ESCAPE TUNNELS



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TUNNEL COMPLEX TYPICAL VILLAGE ESCAPE TUNNELS




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
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
FALSE FLOOR.
FREQUENTLY BOOBY TRAPPED.
BUSH PANS FILLED WITH DIRT,
MOSTLY MADE OF WOOD.



PLUG, MADE FROM
REED, OR TREE STUMP
MADE TO FIT TIGHTLY
IN HOLE. ROPE ON END
IS TO PULL IT OUT.



PLUG IN SIDE OF
TUNNEL GENERALLY LEADS
TO ANOTHER TUNNEL OR
STORAGE ROOM.



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96266

AVFBC-D&T

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32) (U)

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96222

1. (U) OPERATION: CEDAR FALLS
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 8 January 1967 to 26 January 1967.
3. (U) LOCATION: IRON TRIANGLE - center of mass XT7030.
4. (U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: II FFORCEV.
5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER: Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seman,
Commanding General, II FFORCEV.
6. (C) MAJOR US SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS:
 - a. Major General Fred C. Weyand, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division.
 - b. Major General William E. Depuy, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.
 - c. Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles, Commanding General, 196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt).
 - d. Brigadier General John R. Deane Jr., Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep).
 - e. Colonel Marshal B. Garth, Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.
 - f. Colonel William W. Cobb, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
 - g. Colonel George E. Allin, Commanding Officer, II FFORCEV Artillery. Brigadier General Willis D. Crittenberger Jr., assumed command on 10 January 1967.
 - h. Colonel Raymond P. Campbell Jr., Commanding Officer, 12th Combat Aviation Group.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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7. (C) ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM COMMANDERS:

- a. Brigadier General Phan Quoc Thuan, Commanding General, 5th Infantry Division (ARVN).
- b. Lieutenant Colonel Ho Trung Hau, Commanding Officer, 1st Airborne Task Force.
- c. Major Nguyen Thu Luong, Commanding Officer, 1st Airborne Battalion.
- d. Major Nguyen Ba Trooc, Commanding Officer, 7th Airborne Battalion.
- e. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Chuyen, Commanding Officer, 8th Infantry Regiment.
- f. Major Tam Van Luong, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment.
- g. Major Tran Van Man, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment.
- h. Captain Trung Loan, Commanding Officer, 1st Troop, 1st Cavalry Squadron.
- i. Captain Nguyen Ky Suong, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.
- j. Major Ly Due Quan, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.
- k. Major Nguyen Van Son, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.
- l. Captain Ho Van Hoa, Commanding Officer, 39th Ranger Battalion.

8. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

- a. 1st Infantry Division:
 - (1) 173d Abn Bde (Sep) OPCON.
 - (2) 11th Armd Cav Regt (-) OPCON.
 - (3) Attached 4th Bn, 12th Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt) effective D-1.
 - (4) Detached Co B, 2d Bn, 36th Armor effective D-1.
 - (5) 168th Combat Engr Bn, 79th Engr Group (DS effective D-1).
- b. 29th Infantry Division:

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- (1) Attached 106th Inf Bde (Gen) (Lt).
- (2) Attached 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div.
- (3) 3d Bn, 34th Armor OPCON effective D-1.
- (4) 4th Inf Bn, 7th Regt, 5th Inf Div (ARVN) DS effective D+2.

c. 5th Infantry Division (ARVN):

- (1) Attached 1st Abn TF:
 - (a) 1st Abn Bn.
 - (b) 7th Abn Bn.
- (2) 8th Infantry Regiment:
 - (a) 4th Bn, 7th Inf OPCON.
 - (b) 3d Bn, 8th Inf.
 - (c) 3d Bn, 8th Inf.
 - (d) 4th Bn, 8th Inf.
 - (e) 1st Tank Troop, 1st Cav Bde OPCON.
 - (f) 35th Ranger Bn OPCON.

9. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

- a. 7th Air Force (Logistical Support).
- b. 1st Logistical Command (Logistical Support).
- c. 3d Tactical Fighter Wing (Close Air Support).
- d. II FORCER Arty (GS)
 - (1) 2d Bn, 35th Artillery (-) (155mm SP) Attached 1st Inf Div.
 - (2) 2d Bn, 32d Artillery (-) (8"/175mm SP) GSR.
 - (3) A Btry, 4th Bn, 17th Artillery (175mm SP) GSR.
 - (4) 5th Bn, 3d Artillery (ARVN) Attached.
- e. 12th Combat Aviation Group (Army Aviation Support).
- f. 79th Eng Group (GS).
- g. ARVN
 - (1) 2d Riverine Co (Navy).
 - (2) 30th River Assault Group (Navy).
 - (3) 29th Boat Co (Regional Force).
 - (4) 28th Boat Co (Regional Force).
 - (5) 35th Boat Co (Regional Force).
- h. Narrative

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(1) Logistical support furnished by 7th Air Force provided both troop lift and resupply. Support was highly effective and timely throughout the operation.

(2) Logistical support furnished by 1st Logistical Command provided continual resupply of participating combat battalions. Daily convoys were conducted from SAIGON to CU CHI and LAI KOK to relieve airlift requirements.

(3) Close air support was provided by 4th Tactical Fighter Wing. Both preplanned and immediate air support was furnished thru the Direct Air Request Net. Immediate air support was met with a minimum of delay by carefully scheduling, and quick strikes to provide constant air coverage. Airstrike operations were particularly effective.

(4) II Field Force Vietnam Artillery provided general support artillery for 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division. The 5th Battalion, 3d Artillery (AKAF) provided direct support for both divisions. Very effective results were achieved by use of the twin how guns and the quad .50 cal machine guns in a direct support role.

(5) The 74th Engineer Group (ARVN) participated in clearing landing zones, fire lanes and routes plus the destruction of tunnels, fortifications and villages throughout the IRON TRIANGLE. In addition, engineer support from the 5th Engineer Battalion (ARVN) was utilized to prepare the refugee village at THU QUONG to accommodate approximately six thousand additional refugees. The 5th Engineer Battalion (ARVN) erected tents for the village.

(6) The ARVN River Force (ARVN) was used to search and control the river system, maintain patroling and searching the waterways within the area of operations. The firepower of the armed boats enabled the refugees to be evacuated and resettled without interference.

10. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Estimate of Situation Prior to Operation:

(1) Prior to the initiation of Operation CEDAR FALLS, the

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enemy order of battle in the area of operations included the headquarters of the Viet Cong Military Region IV. The destruction of the headquarters was a principle objective of the operation. Large numbers of main force troops were not expected to be encountered nor was a large VC KIA body count expected.

(2) In addition to political and military affairs committees of Military Region IV which were believed to be at separate locations within the operational area, the principle VC units were believed to be limited to the 272d Regiment, the 1st and 7th Battalions of Military Region IV, the Phu Loi Local Force Battalion plus three local force companies. Numerous reports indicated the THANH DIEN FOREST and IRON TRIANGLE to be a major base area as well as the location of Military Region IV. The area was known to contain strongly fortified positions with the routes of approach mined and booby trapped. The suspected location of the 272d Regiment presented a threat during the initial stages of the operation but as the operation progressed the regiment displaced from the area of operations to the north. Further, it was believed that the area of operations included the BINH DUONG (THU DOW WAR) VC Provincial Committee and the BEN CAT VC District Committee. Headquarters Military Region IV and its major committees, like all VC units, move frequently to avoid detection. Based upon analysis of available information, it appeared that the Headquarters of Military Region IV and the political committee generally operated in an area bounded by XT6437, XT6437, XT6733 and XT6433 and probably would be located in grid square XT6434. The military affairs committee generally operated in the area bounded by XT6432, XT6434, XT6926 and XT6225 and probably would be located in grid square XT6434.

b. Estimate of Disposition Prior to Operations:

(1) Based on an analysis of intelligence summaries, reports, and the location of captured VC documents, it is believed that portions of the military sections, political party sections and the rear service elements of Military Region IV, NINH DUONG Province, BEN CAT District and CU CHI District were certainly disrupted, if not destroyed. These sections, which are a component part of the VC infrastructure, as well as

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the military units were dispersed throughout the area as follows:

Military Region IV sections on both sides of the SAIGON River vicinity XT6528; BINH DUONG Provincial section near BINH GIU Village (XT5834); BINH CAT District elements in the southern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE vicinity XT7027; and the CU CHI District elements in the vicinity of BINH CO (XT7091).

(2) As was expected, main force elements were not contacted in large numbers. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of Military Region IV all not contact in operations. The 4th and 5th Battalions apparently they had been directed to other areas and were not contacted. A portion of the 2d Battalion (BINH DUONG District) Battalion 2, on 12, was contacted briefly on 8 and 9 January in the southern portion of the area. The 1st and 5th Battalions were not contacted. Although some documents concerning the 1st Battalion were obtained from the western portion of the operational area.

(3) A comprehensive supply system was certainly disrupted or destroyed as indicated by the lack of food, medical supplies, weapons, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies. The majority of these supplies probably had been stored in the area by the Region or Province since only a few elements of the Service Group 21 were identified from documents, IMA, or radio, as being in the area.

(4) A review of the interrogation reports from the ralliers, prisoners and detainees resulting from the operation indicated the majority were from VC infrastructure in and around the area. Of the 832 ralliers and prisoners, the majority were from the BINH DUONG District. Personnel from other areas were also identified. Laborers account for the second largest category, about 10%. Only a few top level cadre were identified in interrogation reports. These significant personalities were an executive officer of TAY BINH Military School, a captain from Military Region IV Political Staff Section, a lieutenant from a small guard unit, and two NVA political cadre. These

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personnel were evacuated to the Combined Military Intelligence Center or were hospitalized. A listing of the various categories of ralliers and PWs follows:

	Rallier	PW 1st Inf Div	PW 25th Inf Div	Total
Propaganda - Education	24	17	1	42
Finance	11	10	0	21
Youth Associations	23	4	0	27
Rear Services	33	13	0	46
Guerillas	70	85	17	372
Farmers Associations	9	0	2	102
Laborers	70	1	5	102
Medical	16	5	4	25
Commo-Liaison	5	3	0	8
Miscellaneous	57	20	10	87
TOTAL	646	187	39	832

(5) Based primarily on a study of the location of captured documents, the following VC installations or units have been identified as having operated in or, at least, were located in the area during the course of the operation:

COGVR

Three communication-liaison stations

C139 Procurement/Transportation Company of 33d Rear Service Group.

Military Region IV

N 1 Military Staff Section Elements

N 2 Military Intelligence Section

N 7 Signal Section

Political Staff Section Elements

Political Cadre Section Office

Elements of Security Section

Military Region IV Units

J-12 Medical Supply Unit

J-13 QM/Ordnance Supply Unit

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G-20 Reconnaissance Company
G-30 Signal Company
Elements of 1st Battalion, Military Region IV
Headquarters Elements 67A Sapper Battalion

SINH DUONG (THU DAI MOT) Province

Current Affairs Office
Party Section Office
NPLSVN Front Section
Rear Service Staff
Civil Health Section/Hospital

BEN CAT District

Military Affairs Committee
District Party Headquarters
C 61 Local Force Unit

CU CHI District

District Headquarters

TAY NINH Province

Security Section Elements

(6) Enemy Installations.

In preparation for this operation, all major unit headquarters utilized a number of ADP machine run "print outs" of VC base camps, fortifications, supply depots and other installations within the area of interest based on reports from a wide variety of sources. These data summaries were compiled by the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division and contained extensive information. The value of this information was amplified by the experience of the 11th Airborne Cavalry Regiment during Operation CEDAR FALLS. This unit encountered a total of 177 separate facilities which ranged from foxholes to bunkers and tunnel complexes to rice caches of all sizes. A comparison of each of these locations with previously known intelligence information showed that 156, or 88.1% fell within 500 meters of a reported installation. The average distance was about 200 meters. The value of such a list is apparent and should be used

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as a starting point in the search of any area.

g. Terrain and Weather.

(1) Terrain:

Synopsis. The area during this period of the year provided the most favorable conditions for military operations. It was a sparsely populated, densely forested region. Vehicle movement was canalized to existing roads and some trails. Conditions influencing movement were very sensitive to precipitation. The terrain was carefully analyzed in preparation for the operation. This information was found to be substantially correct and is not duplicated here as it is included in the intelligence annex to the CEDAR FALLS Operation order.

(2) Weather:

(a) General.

During January, the northeast monsoon develops to its fullest extent. Most cloudiness was along the east coast with the interior regions of the III CTZ having relatively clear skies and little precipitation. During this period, at a minimum, ceilings were generally nonexistent and visibilities were good except in periods of early morning fog.

(b) Cloudiness, Visibility and Precipitation.

During the first ten days of this operation a light to moderate northeasterly flow of dry stable air prevailed over the area. Sky conditions were generally partly cloudy with surface visibilities unrestricted. No precipitation was reported. During the last ten days of the operation, moist air prevailed over the area causing some partly cloudy to mostly cloudy skies. Occasional light rain occurred with 3000 foot ceilings on a few days. A few afternoon and evening rainshowers also occurred on a few days causing some 3000 foot ceilings. Patchy areas of early morning ground fog occurred during this last ten day period. Minimum visibilities were one to three miles in ground fog improving by 0900H to ten miles.

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(c) Temperatures.

The daily maximum temperatures varied from 80 to 95 degrees. The daily minimum temperatures varied from 59 to 70 degrees.

(d) Soil Conditions.

Soil conditions were relatively dry during the first ten days of the operations. During the last ten days of the operation the soil conditions varied from dry to wet in accordance with local rainfall.

(e) Effects on Air Mobility.

During the first ten days of the operation the weather had no adverse effect on mobility. During the last ten days, the main effect of weather conditions was to hinder early morning air operations due to the early onset of early morning ground fog. The fog normally lifted by 0600 and the visibilities were then unrestricted.

1. An evaluation of the population of the CEDAR FALLS area concluded the people were either VC controlled civilians or low level VC cadre and guerrillas occupying the hamlets and village infrastructure. Although the VC civilians at the predominant attitude was one of apathy toward the VC cause and anxiety to escape the hazards inherent in living in a VC controlled area. These civilians later proved cooperative during interrogation and responded with timely information. Most of the ralliers had some knowledge of the Chieu Moi program, and they expressed discontent with the hardships of VC life and a desire to return to their families. In the past most low level guerrillas preferred to remain silent and be grouped as refugees. However, these guerrillas were no longer apathetic toward the VC cause. Propaganda appeals from the VC command had caused an increase in discontent among the Chieu Moi. Most refugees were voluntarily collected by the loss of their homes but after a short time turned calm and cooperative.

2. There were no POWs captured in the operation other than US forces; however, US forces were supported by eight ARVN infantry battalions, one ARVN tank troop, two VNAF boat units and three Regional Force boat companies.

11. (C) MISSION: II F. JONES attacks the THAI BIEH Forestry

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Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to destroy enemy forces, infrastructure, installations and Military Region IV Headquarters; evacuates civilian population and establishes the IRON TRIANGLE as a specified strike zone to preclude its future use as a support base for Viet Cong operation.

12. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: a. II FFORCEV attacks with two US infantry divisions (reinforced) with ARVN units in support to seal the IRON TRIANGLE, trap enemy forces, and destroy Viet Cong installations.

b. The operation was conducted in two phases:

(1) Phase I (5 Jan - 8 Jan 67) - Deceptive deployment of forces under the guise of conducting routine operations on the flanks of the IRON TRIANGLE. On D-day (8 Jan) an air assault to seal and search BEN SUC (XT5833). Further positioning of forces in blocking positions and in staging areas around the IRON TRIANGLE.

(2) Phase II (9 Jan - 26 Jan 67) - On 9 Jan, an armored attack west from BEN CAT (XT7433) to cut the IRON TRIANGLE in half, simultaneous air assaults in an arc around the THANH DIEN Forest from BEN CAT to BEN SUC to complete the northern half of the encirclement of the objective. All forces attacking 9 Jan to search and destroy south through entire objective to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TIEU Rivers (XT7520). All civilians to be interrogated and evacuated from the area. Area to be cleared with Rome plows and tunnel destruction stressed. Phase II to last two to three weeks.

13. (C) EXECUTION: a. Planning. The jungle at the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TIEU Rivers (center at XT7030) had long been considered by II FFORCEV as a possible target for a major operation. The area had been developed by the enemy because of its location 25 kilometers north of SAIGON as the headquarters of Military Region IV and a base of operations against the capital. Nicknamed the IRON TRIANGLE, it had last been penetrated in October 1965 by the 173d Airborne Brigade. That operation had resulted in hard fighting as strong enemy forces had defended their base. Intelligence since then

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had confirmed the TRIANGLE's continued use as headquarters of Military Region IV. 1st Infantry Division operations along Highway 13 on the eastern flank of the IRON TRIANGLE had frequently made contact. Similarly, 25th Infantry Division on the western flank often had operated in the FUL HUL Plantation (XT6719) and HO DO Woods (XT6129). Here, too, enemy forces were contacted repeatedly. The IRON TRIANGLE, characterized as "a dagger pointed at SAIGON", was clearly an important enemy center for controlling and supporting guerrilla and terrorist operations. It was a target to be attacked decisively and in force in order to tear apart and neutralize the enemy control structure. As II FFORCEV troop strength built up in the latter half of 1966, planning was begun for a powerful strike into the IRON TRIANGLE. At a planning meeting in September, CG, II FFORCEV discussed the possibility of operations into the TRIANGLE with COMUSMACV. COMUSMACV suggested a coordinated operation with MACV on both sides of the SAIGON River. He envisioned troops moving into positions on one side of the river to form an anvil and then a rapid move on the other side to hammer the enemy against the anvil. COMUSMACV also discussed the need for extensive engineer clearing, using Route 9 to strip the area and deprive the enemy of concealment. In November 1966, CG, II FFORCEV directed that planning begin for a massive offensive into the IRON TRIANGLE. Operation Plan ORLANDO was drawn up and intelligence collection from the objective area continued. In early December 1966, after a conference with J2, MACV, CG, II FFORCEV furnished further planning guidance: The TRIANGLE was to be attacked violently and decisively in January 1967 with all forces available. The operation was to be a surprise, routine operations would prepare the terrain. The anvil would be positioned first, and the hammer then swung through the IRON TRIANGLE. The objective area was to be sealed tightly throughout the operation to prevent enemy escape. The TRIANGLE itself was to be secured for enemy installations, cleared of all civilians, stripped of concealment, and declared a specified strike zone. This multidivision offensive was to be the first operation planned and controlled by II FFORCEV as a corps

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operation. OPLAN 53-66 (Operation CEDAR FALLS), embodying these concepts, was published on 12 December 1966.

b. Security and Deception. From the first planning conference, strict security measures were enforced to prevent disclosure of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The planning group was held to a minimum within II FFORCEV Headquarters, and wherever possible, preparations were made without specifically identifying them with CEDAR FALLS. For example, all commanders were instructed on 10 December 1966 to minimize helicopter operations during the Christmas - New Year periods in order to increase availability for operations during January. Even the unprecedented mass evacuation of civilians from the area was not disclosed before the operation. Planning for the transportation and housing of refugees was coordinated only with Mr. John Vann, Director of Region III, Office of Civilian Operations. Although supplies were earmarked for shipment to a refugee center at PHU CUONG, no construction or prestocking was started until CEDAR FALLS had commenced. CG, II FFORCEV personally briefed CG, III Corps (ARVN) on 6 January 1967. ARVN troop participation was approved at that time with the mission to support US blocking forces, to secure and transport civilian evacuees, and to support US security forces in the AN LOC/QUAN LOI area. CG, III Corps (ARVN) assisted in maintaining security by restricting dissemination of information on CEDAR FALLS. Deception was achieved by deploying troops within striking distance of the IRON TRIANGLE under the guise of small scale, local operations. Both 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division began deceptive deployment on 5 January. 1st DEANE (1st Bn, 503d Inf (Abn), 1st Bn, 4th Cavalry (-); and 35th Ranger Bn (ARVN)) initiated Operation NIAGARA FALLS at 0730H under 1st Division control. The task force searched for the enemy in the CAU BINH Jungle (XT7823) between Highway 13 and the THI TINH River. When NIAGARA FALLS terminated at 1500H, 7 January, the 1st Bn, 503d Inf (Abn), 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and 1st Bn, 4th Cavalry (-) were in blocking positions to support Operation CEDAR FALLS. 25th Infantry Division deployed 196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt) from TAY NINH to the HO BO

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Woods as part of Operation FITCHBURG. FITCHBURG has been a continuing operation in the TAY NINH area, but on 5 January the Brigade CP and trains moved to TRUNG LAP (XT7900), southwest of the IRON TRIANGLE. In the next two days, the brigade shifted forces out of TAY NINH and deployed four battalions into the HO BO Woods. These battalions, close to the west bank of the SAIGON River, were in position by 7 January to support CEDAR FALLS. Both FITCHBURG and NIAGARA FALLS made light enemy contacts, but their significance lay in the initial deceptive deployment of components of the anvil, or blocking forces for CEDAR FALLS. This deployment was to be completed on 8 January.

c. 8 January (Daily). IT SPONKAY Tactical Command Post for Operation CEDAR FALLS opened at 0700H at LONG BINH (TT0511). Twenty battalions organized in five brigades under 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions deployed around the IRON TRIANGLE during the day, completing the anvil and positioning the hammer and encirclement forces. 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division moved first, landing Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry by air assault at NGON. The company assaulted into the rice fields at the junction of the HADAM and THI THIE Rivers (XT738199) and landed under small arms fire in the landing zone, suffering light casualties. The landing zone was quickly secured. Simultaneously, Company C was making an air assault one kilometer to the south. These landings anchored the southeastern flank of the 25th Infantry Division. To the west of this action, 2d Brigade's other two battalions, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 34th Armor (-), searched northeast out of CU CHI through the FIL MOL Plantation. By nightfall, these battalions were in place in the area about five hundred meters south of the HADAM River. Northwest of 2d Brigade, 19th Brigade continued searching the HO BO Woods. All battalions of the 2d and 19th Brigades made light contact resulting in the discovery of small stores of enemy rice and munitions. By nightfall of 8 January, the 25th Infantry Division anvil was in place along the SAIGON River from the river junction (XT7900) northwest through the FIL MOL Plantation and the HO BO Woods. To the northwest of the HO BO Woods,

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2d Bde, 1st Infantry Division launched 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry by air assault to seal the village of BEN SUC (XT5833). The entire battalion landed within the village in one and one half minutes and achieved complete surprise. No preparation fires were used, and the light small arms fire that was received was quickly suppressed. As the battalion began to move out of the village, artillery and air strikes were called in on suspected enemy positions. The 1st Division Task Force Revolutionary Development (TFRD) and 3d Bn, 8th Infantry (ARVN) landed north and south of the village. By 0947H the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry had completely sealed off BEN SUC and the search by 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry (ARVN) began. 2d Brigade operations killed forty VC during the day and found large stores of rice, uniforms, and cloth in and around BEN SUC. TFRD, with ARVN assistance, began screening the population and preparing them for evacuation. The brigade CP was established at BEN SUC at 1030H. The 1st Bn, 18th Infantry remained at DAU TIENG. 3d Brigade, 1st Division and TF DEANE (-), the hammer force for CEDAR FALLS, moved into staging areas at DAU TIENG, LAI KHE, BEN CAT and PHU LOI. From these bases, they prepared to swing into the TRIANGLE on 9 January. 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (Abn), 35th Navyr Battalion (ARVN) and 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-), under OPCON of TF DEANE, remained in their blocking positions east of the TRIANGLE along the THI TIEU and SAIGON Rivers. By the end of 8 January, II FFORCEV had completed the unvil and readied the hammer. The smash into the headquarters base of Military Region IV started on 9 January.

4. 9 January (D+1). The hammer forces of 1st Division struck at 0600H with simultaneous attacks in the center and north of the IRON TRIANGLE. The 11th Armored Cavalry (-), under OPCON of TF DEANE, drove west out of BEN CAT across the center of the TRIANGLE cutting a belt from the THI TIEU River at BEN CAT to the SAIGON River at RACH BAP (XT6630). The regiment seized a base for artillery (XT6731) north of RACH BAP, searched the surrounding area, and secured engineer clearing operations in the TRIANGLE. In the north, four battalions of 3d Brigade, 1st Division air assaulted into landing zones around the north and

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northwest edges of THACH DIEN Forest Reserve, the northern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. The initial battalion (1st Battalion, 2d Infantry) touched down at 0800H, with the other three landing in succession. All the landings were unopposed. The battalions linked up and commenced search operations from blocking positions in the vicinity of the landing zones. They immediately began to uncover enemy supplies, the most important being 75 tons of loose rice found in a tunnel by 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and 709 hand grenades in barrels discovered by 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry. Only two small contacts (3 to 4 men each) were made during the day's search. TF DEANE air assaulted 2d and 4th Battalions (Abn), 503d Infantry into the eastern edge of the THACH DIEN Forest in a southern extension of the of the 3d Brigade landings. The two battalions linked up with 3d Brigade at 1140H, established blocking positions, and searched into the forest. To the south and east of their positions, Company B, 16th Armor (reinforced with one rifle company) established a screen along the edge of the forest to prevent enemy escape. These forces made no contact during the day nor did the 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry, the 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) or the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-) in the blocking positions along the THI TIEN River. Around BEN SUC, TPRD and 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry (ARVN) continued to search and screen the population. 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry attempted an air assault east of the village at 1600H but was diverted to land at BEN SUC when mines were found in their primary landing zone. The 25th Infantry Division searched actively along the west bank of the SAIGON River. Both the 2d Brigade and the 196th Brigade made light contacts with small, scattered groups of enemy. Company B, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor made the largest kill at 1645 hours. A raft with fifteen VC was sighted on the SAIGON River and all were killed with 90mm gun fire. Light contact continued after dark as the 25th Division civil forces blocked enemy movements from the IRON TRIANGLE. The operations of 9 January had tightly sealed the IRON TRIANGLE. The hammer forces of II FFORCEV started their swing into the objective area that would smash the enemy base.

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9. 10 January (D+C). II FFOCEV units continued to search out and kill small groups of the enemy, finding increasingly large amounts of supplies. 3d Brigade, 1st Division in the THANH BIEN Forest was reinforced by 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, and by an engineer clearing task force. 2d Brigade in BEN SUC was supported by a thirty truck convoy from LAI KHE that arrived at BEN SUC to transport refugees out of the village via BEN CAT. ARVN 30th River Assault Group (RAG) landed at BEN SUC in the afternoon with 1st and 7th Airborne Battalions (ARVN) aboard. The airborne troops were to relieve the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry of the seal mission and assist in securing and screening the population of BEN SUC and the nearby villages while the RAG boats were to transport refugees to the camp at PHU COUONG. The search forces of 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and TF DEANE found more rice and 118 small arms in several caches. Resistance was light and scattered throughout the day. Similarly, 25th Division had light contact during the day and into the night. Small enemy supply points were uncovered and many bunkers and tunnels were destroyed. 2d Bn, 7th Infantry (ARVN) supported 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division along the SAIGON River. By 1200H, 10 January, 8th Regiment (ARVN) forces relieved 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry of its blocking mission east of the THI TIEN River. The 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) became OPCON to the 8th Regiment. By the end of 10 January, II FFOCEV was well into the ICHU TRIANGLE and operations were going according to plan. The enemy had lost 161 KIA (MC), 29 captured and 272 detained. US losses were 17 KIA and 98 WIA. Captured enemy bases contained 217 weapons, quantities of ammunition, 210 tons of rice, 6,800 uniforms and miscellaneous supplies of all types from fish sauce to printing presses. At 1700H, 10 January, the first news reports on CEDAR FALLS were released.

10. 11 - 26 Jan 67. On the morning of 11 January, CG, II FFOCEV sent a message to the Commanding Generals of the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions congratulating them on achieving initial surprise and on the encouraging results of Operation CEDAR FALLS. He concluded by saying, "...I want a thorough search to be made of areas of

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responsibility... I particularly desire that the IRON TRIANGLE be completely covered." It was in the spirit of this message that CEDAR FALLS was carried out for the next sixteen days. Both divisions searched meticulously, uncovering increasing amounts of supplies and stripping the IRON TRIANGLE area of its value to the enemy. Enemy defenses were weak and disorganized and had evidently been shattered by the mass and surprise of the attack. Mines, booby traps, and snipers were encountered but there were no organized defenses or counterattacks by enemy forces. The enemy had evidently ordered units to disperse and try to escape. Because of the tight seal around the TRIANGLE, this was difficult. As the operation continued, the number of ralliers grew well beyond previous totals. PSYOP field teams effectively exploited these ralliers by printing rapid reaction leaflets containing surrender appeals from the ralliers to their VC friends. Five hundred eighteen ralliers and two hundred thirteen PW were taken. These figures totaled 731; more than the 720 VC body count. This indicated that the enemy was defeated, trapped and demoralized in his own base area. The evacuation of all civilians from BEN SUC and other villages in the IRON TRIANGLE continued through 16 January. The ARVN Airborne Battalions and River Assault Groups were most valuable during the civilian evacuation operations. The refugees, with their livestock and most of their personal possessions, were evacuated to PHU COUNG by military transportation. Approximately 3,000 were transported by truck convoys through BEN CAT while another 3,000 were either flown out in CH-47s or transported down the SAIGON River in the boats of the River Assault Groups. This unprecedented mass evacuation, executed on short notice due to security restriction, required a tremendous effort by US and ARVN military and civilian agencies. It resulted in a humane and efficient evacuation that deprived the enemy of a major resource in the IRON TRIANGLE. 1st and 7th Airborne Battalions (ARVN) relieved 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry of the BEN SUC seal missions. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry was then committed to a search of the IRON TRIANGLE thus raising the 1st Division search

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force to nine infantry battalions and three armored cavalry squadrons. This large force combed the enemy sanctuary day after day, finding huge quantities of rice and hundreds of documents, destroying enemy tunnels and bunkers and stripping trees and underbrush along roads and trails. 1st Division forces began gradually withdrawing from CEDAR FALLS on 14 January. By 18 January, the 1st and 3d Brigades had withdrawn from the IRON TRIANGLE. TF DEANE continued the search with three infantry battalions, three armored cavalry squadrons and engineer forces until 24 January when it departed for its base camps. 1st Infantry Division continued tunnel exploration, demolitions and clearing in the TRIANGLE with TF FIVE, a composite force of armored cavalry, engineers and infantry. 25th Infantry Division continued to search the enemy base areas in the HO SO Woods and FIL HOL Plantation while blocking enemy escape routes out of the IRON TRIANGLE. Company B, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mech) engaged an enemy platoon on 13 January and Company C, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry destroyed a sampan with thirteen VC aboard on 16 January. However, most contacts were with small scattered groups attempting to escape. Buddy operations, employing US troops and the 5th River Assault Group (ARVN), patrolled both banks of the SAIGON River to help seal off the TRIANGLE. Saturating the area with mine maneuver battalions (including 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, ARVN), the 25th Infantry Division destroyed many enemy supplies and fortifications. The division's operations proved so profitable that the 2d Brigade continued to search the area as part of Operation ALA MOANA after the termination of CEDAR FALLS on 26th January 1967. In nineteen days, TF Field Force Vietnam converted the IRON TRIANGLE from a safe haven to a deathtrap, and then to a military desert. Years of work spent tunnelling and hoarding supplies were nullified. The vital civilian population was removed, thus making any enemy efforts to rebuild doubly difficult. Concealment, particularly along lines of communications, was stripped away, baring the area to future surveillance. Finally, the area was designated a specified strike zone so that it could be interdicted with ease should the enemy attempt to

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rebuild. In Operation CEDAR FALLS, a strategic enemy base was decisively engaged and destroyed.

14. (C) RESULTS:

a. US LOSSES: 72 KIA, 327 WIA.

Damaged: 9 APC's, 2 - $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, 2 LOR, 3 tanks, 1 tank doper.

Destroyed: 3 APC's, 1 tank.

b. ARVN LOSSES:

(1) ARVN: 11 KIA, 8 WIA, 3 individual weapons lost.

(2) CG/ITL: None.

(3) Navy: None.

c. VC LOSSES: 770 KIA (MC), 213 PW's, 518 ralliers, 517 detainees, 5967 refugees, 25 crew served weapons, 555 individual weapons, 474 artillery and mortar rounds, 1960 grenades, 60,323 rounds small arms ammunition, 391 assorted mines, 1111 bunkers, 424 tunnels, 509 structures, 3702 tons rice, more than 100,000 pages of assorted documents.

d. Not all air strikes and B-52 strikes were followed up by ground forces; however, visual reconnaissance was conducted in all cases.

e. Credited to the 5th Inf Div (ARVN) are 18 VC KIA, 70 PW's, 23 ralliers and 31 weapons captured. (These figures not included in C, above).

15. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. a. Supply:

(1) Ammunition management. Effective control over ammunition under ASR can be maintained only when accurate issue data is reported. In the course of this operation, it became apparent that the 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (CFA) at LAI NHE was not reporting ASR ammunition transactions and that sizable issues had been made but not debited against any allocations. During a liaison visit to LAI NHE to determine the cause of the problem, the OIC of the Ammunition Point stated that he had not been instructed to report issue of all ASR ammunition. In future operations employing FSA prior coordination must be effected to determine required reports and reporting channels. It should be noted that most units lived within the ASR on controlled ammunition. Only 105mm HE and illumination ASR of the major caliber items were exceeded.

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(2) Water for Evacuees and Refugees. Prior to the operation, a request was received from II FFORCEV G5 for water trailers to supply cooking and drinking water for 6,000 refugees from the area of operations. The G4 office established an initial requirement for two 5,000 gallon semi-trailers, six 400 gallon tankers and six 400 gallon trailers for water delivery. As the refugee population began to expand into thousands, it became apparent that this would not be adequate. A message was dispatched to USARV the night of 12 January requesting an additional 5,000 gallon tanker. At 0730H the following morning, it was determined that there were none in the supply depot and that the tanker would have to be obtained from some unit on a loan basis. The tanker was obtained from 64th QM Bn and transported from BEN CAT to PHU LOI and placed in service. 1st Infantry Division also obtained nine additional 400 gallon trailers to support the operations.

(3) Transportation. Airlift of personnel, equipment and supplies functioned well. Demands placed on US Army Support Command, Saigon, were met. USAID requested the use of trucks for 7 days beginning 9 January 1967 to assist in the establishment of the refugee center. Ten trucks were provided for the period requested; however, the requirement for trucks continued until 2 February 1967.

(4) Maintenance. There were no significant or unique maintenance problems called to the attention of this headquarters during the operation. The maintenance problems that were encountered prevailed due to the composition and location of the supported forces. The support elements, limited in the number of support teams they could provide, found it difficult to provide on-site maintenance at all locations with respect to manpower and repair parts. Equipment downtime was further prolonged due to insecure road nets used for delivery of repair parts or replacement of end items.

16. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: a. ARVN Navy and RF boat companies were utilized for evacuation of captured equipment and resettling of refugees. The boats provided their own security during

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river convoys. In addition, during the latter stage of the exercise, the 25th Division used the boats for detailed search by US troops of canals and streams leading into the main river system. This proved extremely effective in locating VC bodies killed by air and artillery strikes in inaccessible areas.

b. The engineer task force of 5th bulldozers and 4th plows performed an essential role in the success of the operation. Part of the overall mission was to destroy bunkers and tunnels and to cut road ways and landing zones for future operations in the IRON TRIANGLE. The engineer task force followed the 11th ACR into the battle area on D-1 when the 11th ACR attacked west from BEN CAT.

c. Tunnel destruction was very effective on large tunnel complexes. This was accomplished by first sealing the tunnels then stringing demolition charges throughout the tunnel system. This was followed by injecting acetylene into the complex and detonating the charges.

d. Quad .50 cal machine guns from the 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery were mounted on Vietnamese River Assault Boats and used to control the junction of the SAIGON and THI TIEN rivers. The fire power of these weapons plus the mobility of the assault boats proved an effective deterrent to VC use of the waterway.

e. Armor was effectively employed in a blocking role by the 25th Division west of the SAIGON River and by the 1st Division in employment of the 11th ACR in both screening and search and destroy operations.

17. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: a. Surprise. Security in planning and deception in deployment resulted in surprise on the enemy. The light initial contact and the lack of a well coordinated defense indicated that not only did the enemy not expect our attack but was unable to react when it came. The final casualty figures show that he had been in the IRON TRIANGLE in considerable strength, despite his weak defense.

b. Mass. II FFORCEV quickly and effectively sealed and thoroughly searched the objective area by using a higher troop density than has been possible before. This greatly improved the effectiveness of the cordon and the search as indicated by the very high proportion of ralliers.

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These men could neither hide nor escape; their choice was to surrender. The price paid for massing II FTORCEY was acceptable. There was no loss of security in other areas because of the troop concentration for CEDAR FALLS. Further, the density of troops reduced the total time required for the search operation.

c. Cooperation. Cooperation between US and Vietnamese military and civilian agencies was excellent. This was particularly true in the evacuation of the civilian population. Both the ARVN airborne units and the River Assault Groups provided invaluable assistance in securing and transporting the refugees. Civilian and military personnel of both nations worked in close harmony to organize and build the PHU CUONG refugee camp on very short notice. On the purely military side, ARVN units contributed significantly to the effectiveness of the cordon. The ARVN River Assault Groups made a unique contribution by their patrolling along the river lines.

d. Psychological Operations. In spite of the security limitations placed on preparations, psychological operations rapidly exploited the initial success of CEDAR FALLS. They were particularly effective in bringing to the trapped enemy the hopelessness of his situation. The CHIEU HOI program provided him with an acceptable alternative at a great reduction in friendly losses.

e. Effects on Enemy. (1) A major portion of the enemy's base and control center for operations against the Capital Military District has been destroyed. This represents the loss of an investment of twenty years. Enemy facilities and fortifications were destroyed, 10 VC killed, 555 individual weapons and 23 crew served weapons captured.

(2) Over 3700 tons of rice have been captured or destroyed. This is enough to feed five fully manned regiments for a year. More significant than the loss itself is the resultant diversion of manpower to reconstitute his stores.

(3) All of the civilian inhabitants of the area, some 6000, plus their livestock were evacuated. This will deny the enemy food, manpower, revenue, transportation and intelligence.

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(4) The capture of over 500,000 separate pages of documents, including crypto material, has given us valuable intelligence. The enemy's security programs have been compromised to include records continuity.

(5) The enemy's offensive capability against the Capital Military District has been reduced by loss of personnel, equipment and facilities.

(6) Realization of the seriousness of these losses by the leadership in North Vietnam, CONVN and the VC dominated populace will have a serious psychological impact. They must reevaluate the relative capabilities of their forces as opposed to ours.

Jonathan O. Seaman
JONATHAN O. SEAMAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

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II FORCEV
1450-66

HQ. II Field Force Vietnam
LONG BINH (YT052111) RVN
121200H Dec 66
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OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U)

References: a. Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, sheets 6231 I, II, 6230 I, 6331 III, IV and 6330 IV.

b. OPLAN 16-66 (Op UNIONTOWN) (U), HQ. II FORCEV, 101200H Jan 66.

c. OPLAN 52-66 (Op FAIRFAX) (U), HQ. II FORCEV, 181200H Nov 66.

1. **(c) SITUATION.**

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A - Intelligence.

b. Friendly Forces:

- (1) See current II FORCEV SITREPS.
- (2) 7th Air Force provides logistical support.
- (3) 1st Log Cmd provides logistical support.
- (4) USAECV (P) provides engineer support.

c. Assumptions:

- (1) That enemy activity during Op CEDAR FALLS will permit US base camps and installations to be secured with minimum forces as follows:

- (a) CU CHI - 1 bn.
- (b) PHUOC VINH - 1 bn.
- (c) LAI KHE - 1 bn.
- (d) BIEN HOA/LONG BINH - 1 bn (Op UNIONTOWN).
- (e) LONG GIAO - 1 sqdn.
- (f) TAY NINH - 1 bn.
- (g) DAU TIENG - 1 bn.

- (2) That MACV will release 17th Abn Bde (Sep) from the General Reserve for participation in this operation.

2. **(c) MISSION.** II FORCEV conducts operations via THANH DINH Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to locate and destroy military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; and clear area of inhabitants.

3. **(c) EXECUTION.**

a. Concept of Operations:

- (1) This operation employs elements of two US div (reinf) to conduct S&D operations in the IRON TRIANGLE and THANH DINH Forestry Reserve area and to block the escape of VC from the area.
- (2) The operation will be conducted in two phases:
 - (a) Phase I (D-Day) - limited positioning of forces under the guise of conducting routine operations in HO BO Woods, FIL HOL Plantation, and via BEN CAT.
 - (b) Phase II (D+1 to D+?) - an all-out assault in the northern portion of the area of operation and simultaneous positioning of a blocking force along the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers on D+1. Following the assault, S&D operations will be conducted by the assault force south to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers. Blocking forces will be positioned by foot and/or vehicle on D+1. Mechanized/armor forces will be used to block VC escape routes on the southeastern and southwestern flanks of the assault force. Particular attention will be devoted to searching built up areas, suspected location of

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PER INSTRUCTIONS OF II FVV
MSG DTG 9 JAN 68

~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED~~
~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN~~
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military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, and thorough interrogation of personnel found therein. Tunnel destruction and clearing of areas using Rome Plows and bulldozers will be stressed. All inhabitants of area to be searched will be interrogated and, depending on their legal status, processed through VN or US military channels. It is anticipated that this phase will last from two to three weeks.

b. 1st Inf Div:

(1) Attachments and Detachments:

- (a) 173d Abn Bde (Sep). OPCON effective D-Day.
- (b) 11th ACR (- one sqdn). OPCON effective D-1.
- (c) One combat engr bn, 79th Engr Gp. Direct support effective D-1.

- (d) Attached. One bn, 199th Lt Inf Bde, effective D-1.
- (e) Detached. Co B, 2d Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1.

(2) Phase I (D-Day). Exercise maximum security when positioning forces under guise of conducting routine operations.

(3) Phase II (D+1 to D+7) (See Annex B):

- (a) Deploy blocking force by surface transportation on D+1. Blocking force will be positioned along east bank of THI TINH River from vic XT6835 to vic XT7620 to seal AO (Psn ZULU).
- (b) Conduct airborne assault into northern portion of AO (Psn XRAY).
- (c) Prevent VC infiltration into and exfiltration from AO.
- (d) Conduct S&D operations to the south in zone to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers.
- (e) The LOC to BEN CAT and LAI KHE will be secured and opened daily for log support.
- (f) Conduct PSYOP (see Coordinating Instructions).
- (g) Be prepared to evacuate noncombatants from AO (see Coordinating Instructions).

c. 9th Inf Div:

- (1) Continue current mission.
- (2) Be prepared to deploy one bn anywhere in II FFORCEIV area.

d. 25th Inf Div:

- (1) Attachments and Detachments. OPCON 2d Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1.
- (2) Phase I (D-Day). Exercise maximum security when positioning forces under guise of conducting routine operation.
- (3) Phase II (D+1 to D+7) (See Annex B):
 - (a) Deploy blocking force by surface transportation on D+1. Blocking forces will be positioned along west bank of SAIGON River from vic XT5633 to vic XT7520 to seal AO (Psn YANKEE).
 - (b) Prevent VC infiltration into and exfiltration from AO.
 - (c) Conduct PSYOP (see Coordinating Instructions).
 - (d) Continue Op FAIRFAX and Op LANIKAL.
 - (e) Be prepared to evacuate noncombatants from AO (see Coordinating Instructions).
 - (f) Provide and maintain one inf bde as II FFORCEV Reserve.

e. 173d Abn Bde (Sep). OPCON 1st Inf Div effective D-Day.

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- f. 19th Lt Inf Bde (Sep):
 - (1) Assume Op UNIONTOWN on D-1.
 - (2) Provide one bn to 1st Inf Div to secure PHUOC VINH on D-1.
 - (3) Continue current mission.
- g. 11th ACR:
 - (1) Regiment minus one sqdn OPCON 1st Inf Div effective D-1.
 - (2) One sqdn continue current mission via LONG GIAO.
- h. 1st ATF. Continue current mission.
- i. 2d Bn, 34th Armor. OPCON 25th Inf Div effective D-1.
- j. II FFORCEV Army. Within capabilities support 1st Inf Div and 25th Inf Div. (See Annex C - Fire Support)
- k. 12th Avn Gp:
 - (1) Provide maximum airlift capability on D-1 to position up to two bde TF on northern boundary of 1st Inf Div zone.
 - (2) Provide support as required (see Coordinating Instructions).
- l. 79th Engr Gp. Provide one engr bn direct support to 1st Inf Div for support during search operations. It is anticipated primary tasks will include tunnel search/destruction and jungle clearing operations.
- m. II FFORCEV Reserve:
 - (1) Bde, 25th Inf Div.
 - (2) Bn, 9th Inf Div.
- n. Coordinating Instructions:
 - (1) This plan effective for planning on receipt, execution on order.
 - (2) Requests for air support to be submitted to this HQ, ATTN: G3 Air.
 - (3) Boundaries - see Annex B.
 - (4) Coordination with Vietnamese nationals or US advisors will NOT be made prior to D-1.
 - (5) The search area will be declared a free fire zone upon completion of operation.
 - (6) All noncombatants in the area of operations east of the SAIGON River and west of the THI TINH River will be evacuated. Noncombatants released following interrogation will be turned over to the appropriate district chief for resettlement. When feasible, the personal belongings and livestock of noncombatants should be evacuated with the personnel.
 - (7) Unit commanders will provide assistance to the district chief to care for noncombatants until USAID is able to assume this function.
 - (8) Units will conduct tactical PSYOP commencing D-1. Themes and target audiences will be identified as the tactical situation develops. Rapid reaction leaflets will be a priority. Leaflets designed for use during the operation will be requested or printed prior to D-1. Maximum use will be made of standard leaflets during the operation.
 - (9) Handling and classifying PW and detainees. All innocent civilians, returnees, PW and civil defendants apprehended or in US custody will be handled and classified IAW MACV Dir 190-3, dated 29 Oct 66 and MACV Dir 20-5, dated 21 Sep 66.
 - (10) Control of traffic on THI TINH River is the responsibility of the 1st Inf Div.
 - (11) Control of traffic on the SAIGON River is the responsibility of the 25th Inf Div.
- 4. (U) ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS.
 - a. Admin O 4-66, HQ, USASC, dtd 25 Oct 66 in effect.

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OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (I?) (Cont'd)

- b. Requests for log support beyond own capability are to be submitted to 1st Log Cnd, info this HQ, ATTN: G4.
 - c. ASR is in effect.
 - 9. (U) COMMAND and SIGNAL.
 - a. Signal. Current SOI remains in effect.
 - b. Command. II FFORCEV CP - no change.
- Acknowledge.

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ANNEXES:

- A - Intelligence
- ~~B - Concept of Operations (Drawing)~~ withdrawn, Hqs, Da
- C - Fire Support Plan

DISTRIBUTION: X plus

- 3 - 9th Inf Div
- 3 - 199th Lt Inf Bde (Sep)
- 3 - 79th Engr Cp
- 1 - MACJ2
- 1 - 525th MI Gp
- 1 - 1st MI Bn (AAS)

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

References: a. OPLAN 58-66

b. Map, Vietnam, Series 1:7014, Scale 1:50,000, Sheets 6231 I, II: 6230 I; 6331 III, IV: 6330 IV.

c. II FFRCEV Intelligence Estimate #2 of the Situation in III CTZ.

(c)
1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION:

a. Area of Interest. The area of interest is generally bounded by the following coordinates: XT 5040, XT 8040, XT 8015, XT 6315. Contained within this area is the Iron Triangle, Fihol Plantation, Thanh Dien Forest Reserve, and portions of the Ho Bo and Boi Loi Woods. The Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers dissect the area and present major obstacles to ground forces. See Appendix 4 for complete details on the terrain, helicopter landing zones, and status of LOC's. The Iron Triangle and Thanh Dien Forest areas have not been penetrated by large scale US FFRCEV operations in the last year. Frequent operations have been conducted in the Ho Bo, Boi Loi, and adjacent areas on the eastern side of the Saigon River. Almost invariably these operations encounter numerous mines, boobytraps, extensive tunnel and bunker systems. Additionally the enemy withdraws from these areas and reoccupies them following the exit of friendly forces. It can be assumed that the enemy will follow this same general pattern in the future. The Iron Triangle has long been a major VC stronghold and base area. Numerous agent reports and visual reconnaissance reveal that the Iron Triangle is a major base area. Of primary concern in the area is the presence of elements of the headquarters of VC Military Region IV. This headquarters controls the activities of the VC 103A Regiment, all other forces and is the political organization for VC Military Region IV, which encompasses all of Gia Dinh Province and parts of Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces. (See II FFRCEV Estimate #2 of the Situation in III CTZ for boundaries of MR IV). The destruction of this organization is vital as it is responsible for the numerous acts of sabotage and terrorism which occur in and around Gia Dinh Province. These acts of sabotage, terrorism, and the attacking of isolated outposts and installations constitutes the greatest enemy threat in III CTZ at the present time. The continuance of these acts will seriously affect the confidence of the populace in the GVN and provides the VC with extremely valuable propaganda.

b. Order of Battle. See Appendix 1 to this Annex.

c. Known and Reported VC Installations. See Appendix 2 to this Annex.

d. Organization and Personnel. See Appendix 3 to this Annex.

(c)
2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (OIR).

a. EEI:

- (1) Where are the major elements of VC Military Region IV located?
- (2) What elements and persons of VC Military Region IV are located in Saigon? In Gia Dinh Province? Where are they located? What are their names, descriptions, and place of birth?

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AMEMB SAIGON (100) to CPTAN 38-06 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- (3) Who are the members of the infrastructure in the area of interest? Where are they located? What are their names, description and places of birth?
- (4) Does the Liberation News Agency (LNA) operate a radio propaganda station in this area? Does the LNA operate any other propaganda activities in this area?

b. OIR:

- (1) Where are the major VC supply installations, hospitals, and dispensaries? How are they supplied?
- (2) What are the crossing points used by the VC on the Saigon River?
- (3) What is the attitude of the local populace toward the GVN? Toward the VC?
- (4) Does the local populace actively support the VC with food, intelligence, and money?

3. ^(c) INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS:

a. Order to Subordinates:

- (1) Report on EEL and OIR as obtained.
- (2) Report information as acquired in response to the following SICR:
 - (a) U-UPH-U0751 - US, RVN and FWMF Prisoners of War (U)
 - (b) U-UPH-U0741 - NVA/VC Tunnel Systems (U)
 - (c) U-UPH-U0671 - VC Order of Battle Gia Dinh Province (U)
 - (d) U-UPH-U0609 - VC Liberation Press Agency and Liberation Radio (U)
 - (e) U-UPH-U0609 - Rendezvous (U)
 - (f) U-UPH-U0586 - VC Guerrillas (U)
 - (g) U-UPH-U0502 - 165A Regiment (U)
 - (h) U-UPH-U0393 - Captured USAID Materials (U)
- (3) Devote particular attention to the satisfaction of the requirements of SICR U-UPH-U0609 - Rendezvous and II FORCEV OPORD 32-66 (OP Rendezvous) (U)
- (4) Advise this HQ NLT 25 Dec 67, requirements for interrogation and interpreter personnel in excess of organic assets.
- (5) 1st Infantry Division: Request this HQ and all major participating units be furnished a copy of ADP showing VC installations in the area of interest.
- (6) 25th Infantry Division is requested to provide all participating units and this HQ a copy of ADP on personalities on current black list in area of operations.

b. Request to higher and adjacent units:

- (1) MACV J2:
 - (a) Request that additional interrogation teams and interpreters be made available as requested.
 - (b) Requesting indication of movement of the 272d VC Regiment into the area of operations be furnished this headquarters.
- (2) 52nd MI Group: Request all available information on the personalities and locations of the various committee members of VC Military Region IV be furnished this headquarters on a priority basis.
- (3) DSA III Corps: Request a priority intelligence effort be made to rapidly interrogate ralliers and prisoners knowledgeable of the activities of MR IV.
- (4) Detachment A, 1st MI Bn (ARS): Request this headquarters be advised of the status and availability of aerial photo coverage in the area of interest.

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

4. (U) TERRAIN AND WEATHER:

a. Terrain: See Appendix 4 to this Annex.

(c) b. Weather: See II FFORCEV January 1967 Climatic Summary for III CTZ.

5. ~~SW~~ MISCELLANEOUS:

a. To accomplish the mission of destroying VC Military Region IV, a complete detailed interrogation and through classification must be made on all detainees. Further, all personnel in the area must be detained and classified.

b. The procedure for classification of detainees and their disposition is contained in Confidential Message, AVFBB, 120528, HQ II FFORCEV, 160145Z Dec 66, Subject: Processing, Accounting, and Making Reference to VC Detainees and Prisoners of War (U).

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Acknowledge

Appendices:

1. Order of Battle
2. Known and Reported VC Installations
3. Organisation and personalities of MR IV.
4. Terrain

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Appendix I (Order of Battle) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66
(OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (CNP) The following list shows the current probable locations of enemy units in and adjacent to the area of interest:

UNIT	LOCATION
272d VC Regt	Vic XT 6643
1st Bn 165A Regt	Vic XT 6223
7th Bn 165A Regt	Vic XT 6422
C120 Local Force Bn	Vic XT 5233
C81 Local Force Co	Vic XT 5542
C64 Local Force Co	Vic XT 5542
C61 Local Force Co	Vic XT 7427
241 Arty Bn, USO Arty Regt	Unlocated, possibly in Long Nguyen Secret Zone
Military Affairs Committee MR IV	See paragraph 5
Political Committee MR IV	See paragraph 5

An ARVN MI agent reported that on 24 Nov 66, an unknown VC unit was ordered to turn on a generator to recharge batteries for a large signal unit in Boi Loi Forest (XT 5035). This signal unit was reportedly located deep underground in that area. Members of this unit were involved in radio intercept, telephone wire tapping, code breaking, and were fluent in many languages. The VC stated that because of this unit they had advance warning of GVN and Allied Operations. (Information unevaluated and supposedly obtained from a VC platoon leader.)

2. (CNP) The following units are available for reinforcements within 24-36 hours:

UNIT	LOCATION
Phu Loi Bn	Vic XT 8440
2d Bn, 165A Regt	Vic XT 8307
3d Bn, 165A Regt	Vic XT 9213

Elements of the 9th VC Division (-272d Regt) could re-inforce in battalion or regimental strength within 48 hours.

3. (CNP) Recent reported enemy movements:

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	DATE
XT 838387	Phu Loi Bn	10 Oct 66
XT 892398	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	6 Nov 66
XT 811376	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	14 Nov 66
XT 976363	C2 Co, 800 Bn	1 Nov 66
XT 974372	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	7 Nov 66
XT 937457	100 VC	12 Nov 66
XT 966421	VC Bn	

4. (CNP) a. The suspected location of the 272d VC Regt is a threat during the initial stages of the operation. A decision to commit with this regiment could hinder the initial phases of the operation. As the operation progresses the regiment could attack friendly forces from the rear.
- b. It can be assumed the enemy will defend his supply, base and headquarters areas with the security forces currently available. In this respect, it is anticipated that these positions will be well fortified, and the approach routes mined and boobytrapped.
- c. Due to the lack of friendly operations in the Iron Triangle since October 65, very little hard intelligence is available in this area. Since this has

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Appendix I (Order of Battle) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66
(OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- long been a VC stronghold, it can be assumed that extensive fortification and tunnel systems are present throughout the area.
5. (C) HQ MR IV and its major committees, like all VC units, move frequently to avoid detection. Based upon analysis of all available information it appears that the HQ of MR IV and the Political Committee generally operate in an area bounded by XT 6437, XT 6637, XT 6733, XT 6433, and will most likely be located in grid square XT 6434. The Military Affairs Committee operates generally in an area bounded by XT 6432, XT 6939, XT 6928, XT 6225, and will be most likely located in grid square XT 6527.

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Appendix 3 (Organization and Personnel) (Add 10) to Annex A (Intelligence)
 1. UPLAN 55-56 (OP CENAP 55-125) (1)

1. **C. GENERAL.** The VC Military Region IV, (MR IV)(T) also known as the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh-Special Zone (SCGZ) is a well organized military and political headquarters. This organization is responsible for and controls all VC actions within the boundaries of MR IV. See II FFORCEV Estimate #2 of the situation in III CTZ for the boundaries of MR IV. The headquarters and elements of the various committees, sections and subsections are known to be in the area of interest.

3. ~~COM~~ LOCATIONS. It is highly unlikely that the HQ of MR IV and its major military and political committee will be found in one specific area. All indications show that the Military Affairs Committee and the Political Committee are normally separated. The HQ and the majority of the following committees and sections are believed to be in the area of operations: HQ MR IV (SCGDSZ Party Committee), Military Party Committee, Current Affairs Committee, Military Affairs Committee, Forward Supply Council, Finance and Economy Section, Postal, Transportation and Communication Section, Base Section and the Security Section. The various proselyting sections, and the civil health section must by the nature of the duties and objectives be located through out VC MR IV. Certain representatives of these sections are possibly located in the area of operation. The areas in and around Phu An (XT 7222) and An Dien (XT 7027) are frequently mentioned in numerous agent reports as meeting areas, stop over points and committee and section headquarters areas.

3. **C. ORGANIZATION.** Military Region IV is well organized and possesses all the major military and political committees and sections found in the other Military Region HQ. This organization is duplicated for the most part at the district, village and hamlet level throughout MR IV. All sections are active in those areas which the VC control and provide the semblance of a legal government. These sections operate covertly in those areas under GVN control in MR IV. See Inclosure 1 to this appendix for a diagram of the organization of MR IV. Inclosure 2 provided the names of key members of the Infrastructure as known to this HQ. CICV Research and Analysis Study ST67-012, dated 4 Sep 66 provides a wealth of data on the organization, structure and personalities of MR IV.

Acknowledge.

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- 1-Organization of MR IV
2-Personalities of MR IV

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
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MILITARY REGION IV STRUCTURE



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Inclosure 2 to Appendix A (Classification and Responsibilities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to GFM 77-26 (OPC/PAR FILES) (U)

PERSONALITIES OF MR IV

The following list of personalities has been compiled by the CI Section of
this headquarters based upon: MACV VC Political OB, Agent Reports,
interrogation of ralliers, and I W's.

1. Military Affairs Committee: (Cover Number A66-0301)

Chief: Colonel Hal Phung (Chief of Staff MR 4)
Field Cadre: Nam Thu
Political Officer: Dong Quang
Members: Chu, Ba Tien

a. Military Staff:

Chief of Staff: Major Bay Nam
Deputy Chief of Staff: Nam (in charge of militia)

(1) Correspondence (Section) Military Staff

Chief: Lieutenant Tran Hung Ky (captured)
Assistant: Muoi Hal

Administrative Clerk: Nguyen Van Xuan

(2) Operations and Training Section/Military Staff

Chief: Bay Ung
Assistant: Bay Son (Senior-Captain)
Assistant: Ba Hai
Assistant: Applicant Tu Tien

(3) Artillery and Support Section/Military Staff

Chief: Senior Captain Nam Ha

(4) Signal Section/Military Staff

Chief: Tu Quan

(5) Combat Operations Section/Military Staff

Chief: Captain Hal Son

(6) Reception Section/Military Staff

Chief: Phoi Hung
Cadre: Ba Thien

(7) Sapper and Engineer Section/Military Staff

Chief: Tam Hanh
Assistant: Ban

(8) Militia Section/Military Staff

Chief: Captain Muoi Duyen
Cadre: Nam Cai

(9) Military Personnel Section/Military Staff

Chief: " "
Assistant: Senior Lieutenant Ba Tien

(10) Military Intelligence Section/Military Staff

Chief: Senior Captain Tu Minh
Assistant: Sau Hoi, or Huynh
Captain Tam Thanh
Captain Nam Duc

(11) Crypto Section/Military Staff

Chief: Lieutenant Ray Tho
Members: Hal Son, Truong, Phu, Thanh, Duc

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Inlosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to PLAN 58-06 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

Chief of Crypto Element: Lieutenant Tu Huan
Radio Operators: Hung, Toan, Phia
Members: Hiep, Mat, Danh, Khac, Kiet

(12) Map Cell/Military Staff

Cell Leader: Long
Member: On, Nghe, Hai Nho

(13) Recruit Training School/Military Staff

Director: Captain Nam Binh
Deputy: Senior Lieutenant Ba Quang, aka
Ba Nhuong

Political Officer: Ut Minh

Instructors: Tam Dot, So Viet
Nam Dung (Sapper; returned from
regroupment to North
Vietnam)

Ba Phuoc (Sapper)
Ba Quoc (Infantry)
Tu Du, Ut Trieu, aka Luu Do
Sau Kieu, Tam Hoa
Ba Soan, aka Luu Do

Chief of Administrative Section: Tu Tien

Members: Ut Tam, Tu Manh, Ba Duong

b. Political Staff/Military Affairs Committee

Chief: Major Tu Quy

Assistant: Tam Phong
Bay Nuyen (in charge of training)
Tu Minh (in charge of Information and Press)

(1) Administrative Staff/Political Staff

Chief: Sau Ky

(2) (Staff) Assistant for Emulation/Political Staff

Captain Tu Hai

(3) (Staff) Assistant for Party Affairs and Labor Youth/Political Staff

Captain Hai Thuan

(4) Enemy Proselyting Section/Political Staff

Assistant: Bay Hoa

(5) Security Section/Political Staff

Chief: Bay Duong

Senior Lieutenant: Ba Viet

(6) Cadre Section/Political Staff

Bay Tung

Senior Captain: Hai Thanh

(7) Organization Section/Political Staff

Assistant Captain: Tam Hong (in charge of Work Emulation)

(8) Propaganda and Training Section/Political Staff

Chief: Tu Dat

c. Rear Service Staff/Military Affairs Committee

Chief: Hai Thanh

Assistant for Planning: Tu Long
Sau Tinh

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Enclosure 2 to Appendix 1 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to OPMAN 54-2 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- (1) Ordnance Section Work Unit K.11-161/Rear Service Staff
Chief: Ba Mai
 - (2) Medical Section K.12 - 1.72/Rear Service Staff
Chief: Doctor Tu Vu
 - (3) Quartermaster Section K.13 - 1.83/Rear Service Staff
Chief: Tu Pho
Assistant: Nam Non
Military Provision Cell (Leader): Nam Gia
Financial Affairs Cell (Leader): Nam Non and Tu Minh
2. Administrative Staff/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Ding Cong Det (captured)
Assistant:
Members: Ba Hoa (administrative clerk)
Chin Ngiam (administrative clerk in charge of finance)
Ba Phuong (typist)
Nam Chan (typist)
Tam Kiet (typist)
Thi Anh (typist)
Thi Xuan (typist)
Thi Huong (typist)
Uc Tien (Liaison (agent))
3. Information and Propaganda/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Sau Rau (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on the situation in the rural areas)
Cadre: Sau Duc (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on the situation in cities)
Old man Chin Lih (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on current events)
Members: Bay Phu (making copies of the bulletin)
Nam Hau
Tu Minh
- The Information and Propaganda Section is composed of two branches:
Chief of Rural Area Branch: Lu Lan
Cadre: Ba Phat, Ba Thuc, Nam Da, Ba Ho (Liaison (agents))
Chief of City Branch: Tu Tan
Cadre: Hai Vo, Thanh Huong, Nam Non (female)
- a. Urban School/Propaganda
Chief: Hai Lan (also Assistant Chief of the Propaganda and Training Section)
Assistant: Tu An (Instructor)
Cadre: Bay Van (female; Instructor)
- b. Rural School/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Bay An (also Chief of the Propaganda and Training Section)

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to CUBAN SO-ON (OF CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- Assistant:** Tu Duong (Instructor)
Cadre: Tu Hon (Instructor)
- 4. Writer and Artist (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section**
Chief: Truong Binh Tong, aka Tu Truong (musician)
Cadre: Hai Phuong, aka Vien Phuong (play writer)
 (In charge of urban area)
 Nam Trieu, aka He Trieu (composer of theatrical works)
 Sau Vinh (in charge of rural area)
 Muoi Hung
- 5. (Psywar) Entertainment (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section**
Chief: Muoi Hung
Assistant: Nam Trieu
Members: Ut Ho (in charge of administration)
 Thi Huan (singer and singer of modern music)
 Thi Vinh (singer of modern music and dancer)
 Thi Loi (singer of traditional music)
 Tu Duong (singer of traditional music)
- 6. Urban Commo-Liaison (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section**
Chief: Sau Nghi
Member: Sau Si (Security Guard)
- 7. Urban Propaganda Network/Propaganda and Training Section**
Chief: Tu Quang (killed on 10 Dec 64 in Cu Chi)
Assistant: Ba Rau (in charge of an element operating within the capital)
Cadre: Nam Trieu, Bay Hien, High Comp Det (captured)
- 8. Painting and Sculpture (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section**
Chief: Thi Huan (It is reported that this man is a professor of the Gia Dinh Fine Arts School)
Members: Tu Hoa (painter)
 Sau Thi, Ut Du, Chia Chot
- 9. Motion Picture (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section**
Chief: Doan Bay
Members: Ba Thanh, Nam Nho, Bay Tuan, Nam Dat, Sau Nghia
- 10. Radio (Communication) and Picture (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section**
Chief: Bay Hien
Specialists: Bay Hien
- 11. Metal Type Printing (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section**
Cadre: Bay Hien
Specialists: Bay Hien
- 12. Memeograph House/Propaganda and Training Section**
Chief: Nam Nho
Members: Hai Lan, Nam Nho
- 13. Supply and Liaison Sub-Section/Propaganda and Training Section**
Chief: Bay Mot
Assistant: Sau Dong

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (3P CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

14. Youth Proselyting Section/Special Region (Party) Committee
Chief: Sau Tham
15. Organization Section - Cover number A74 - D. 303/Special Region (Party) Committee
Chief: Anh Mot, aka Ut Mot
Assistant: Hai Thanh
Cadre: Huynh, Kiet
Pa Tu (transferred from the military
proselyting section)
Tu Cu (administrative staff)
16. Security Section, Cover number A. 71 - D. 304/Special Region (Party) Committee
Chief: Nam Tan
Assistant: Tam Phong (in charge of rural security)
Members: Ba Long (in charge of urban security)
17. Military Proselyting Section, Cover number A. 69 - D. 305/Special Region (Party) Committee
Chief: Nam Tay (member) Current Affairs
Committee of Special Region (Party)
Committee
Cadre: B. Tu (in charge of Rural Military Prosely-
ting)
Tam Tien (in charge of Urban Military
Proselyting)
Ba Do, aka Ba Tu, Ba Ho, Bay Dat, aka
Diet, Nam Mat Kien
18. Economy and Finance Section, Cover number A70-D. 306/Special Region
(Party) Committee
Chief: Ba Dai
Cadre: Chin Ha
Hai Anh (Rural economy and finance)
Tu Nuoc (Rural economy and finance)
Hai Don (Rural economy and finance)
Ong Muoi A (Rural economy and finance)
Tam Gia (in charge of Capital Economy -
Finance)
Ong Ba, Tu Son
19. Commo-Liaison Section, Cover number D. 307/Special Region (Party)
Committee
Cadre: Ba Tan
Bai Tai
Ut Thanh
20. Base Security (Guard) Section, Cover number A. 77-D. 308/Special Region
(Party) Committee
Section Chief: Tu Hung (concurrently Commander of Area
"A")
Cadre: Bay Hoang, Tu Mau
Consist of two areas: (Strength: 120 men)
Commander of Area "A" Tu Hung

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Enclosure 1 to report of 1954-1955 and personalities of MR IV to
 Annex A (intelligence to CIA) AN 55-06 (OP CHINA FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- Assistant: Tu Dao
 Commander of Area: Muoi Phung
21. Postal Transportation and Communication Section Cover number A. 75-
 a. Special Region (Party) Committee
 Section Chief: Tai Binh
 Address: Tu Dao
22. Front/Civilian Proselyting Section Cover number A. 72-D. 307/Special
 Region (Party) Committee
 Section Chief: Son Hien (in charge of Current Affairs
 of Special Region (Party) Committee)
 Assistant: Boi Ha
 a. Youth's Branch
 Cadres: (in charge of Sect 6)
 Tu Dao, Tu Dao
 b. Women's Branch
 Cadres: (in charge of Sect 7)
 c. Farmer's Branch
 Cadres: (in charge of Sect 7)
 d. Students and Teachers
 Cadres: (in charge of Sect 7)
23. Operational Intelligence Section Cover number A. 73/Special Region
 (Party) Committee
 Section Chief: Tu Dao
24. Propaganda Culture and Information Section (Special Region (Party)
 Committee)
 Chief: (in charge of Sect 7)
 (in charge of Sect 7)
 (in charge of Sect 7)
25. Propaganda Cell
 Chief: (in charge of Sect 7)
 Cadre in charge of the cell: (in charge of Sect 7)
 Cadre in charge of the cell: (in charge of Sect 7)
 Leader of Liberation Cell: (in charge of Sect 7)
 Members: (in charge of Sect 7)
 Leader of Propaganda Cell: (in charge of Sect 7)
 Members: (in charge of Sect 7)
 Member in charge: (in charge of Sect 7)

26. RM Detached Security Element
 Chief: Tai Binh
27. (Party) Civil Affairs Committee 1921, 3500 Element/Special Region
 (Party) Committee
 Chief: Muoi Phung
 Assistant: Naoi Om

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- a. Administrative Staff/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
Chief: Chin Tiet
Clerk: Tran Van Dung
Typist: Thi Yen
Commo-Liaison: Tu Nho
Security Guard: Tam Rac, Chung
- b. Military Affairs Sub-Committee/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
Chief: Ba Te, aka Ba Liem (captured in Jun 64)
Cadre: Tu Ngoc Anh, Ba Den, Sau Nguyen
- c. Propaganda Section/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
Chief: Nam Om (Asst Chief of (Party) Civil Affairs Committee)
Cadre: Sau Nam, Hal Cut, Ket
- d. Base and Commo-Liaison Section/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
Chief: Tu Long
- e. Training, Education Section/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
Chief: Nam Om (Asst Chief of (Party) Civil Affairs Committee)
Cadre: Muoi Deng, Mot Chuan, aka Sau Gia
Commo-Liaison Agent: Ba Thong
28. AC 2053 Section / Special Region (Party) Committee:
Chief: Bay Tan
Cadre: Lam Son (Concurrently Representative
Gia Dinh Region (Party) Committee)
Commo-Liaison Agent: Chi Ha
29. Worker Proselyting (Liberation) Workers Association of Saigon-Gia Dinh Area
Chief: Chin (in charge of Current Affairs of
Region (Party) Committee)
Assistant: Tu Nam (in charge of Current Affairs of
Region (Party) Committee)
(Committee) Member: Lam Hiet (in charge of Current Affairs of
Region (Party) Committee)
30. Youths, School Children and Students Association Cover number A. 531
Saigon - Gia Dinh Area Special Region (Party) Committee
Command Cadre: Bay Binh (Asst Secretary of Region (Party)
Committee)
Nam Thuc
31. Chinese Proselyting, Cover number A. 533/Special Region (Party) Committee:
Chief: Sau Lam
Cadre: Hal Ly (in charge of Information)
Sau, Ba
32. Bourgeois Front Cover number A. 534/Special Region (Party) Committee:
Chief: Sau Lam
Cadre: Bay Viet
33. City Central Area
a. I and III Inter-Precinct (Party) Committee Cover number A. 535
Secretary: Sau Tan (Region (Party) Committee Member)
Assistant: Muoi Phai
Cadre: Muoi Trung (in charge of Propaganda-
Culture and Indoctrination)

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)
b. II and IV Inter-Precinct (Party) Committee Cover number A.536
Secretary: Tu Hiep (alternate member of Region
(Party) Committee)
Assistant: Sau Hoang (Female)
Cadre: Tu A (Female)

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II PLAN 58-66

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Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (CMT) PURPOSE AND LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS:

- a. Purpose. This study is to be used as part of the intelligence annex to operations PLAN 58-60. Study area is confined to the operational area contained in the operations plan.
- b. Limitations. Information presented is based on data obtained from maps, intelligence documents, various terrain studies and aerial reconnaissance. Ground reconnaissance was not made.

2. (CMT) GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TERRAIN:

- a. Synopsis. The area during this period of the year provides the most favorable conditions for military operations. It is a sparsely populated, densely forested region. Vehicle movement is canalized to existing roads and some trails. Conditions influencing movement are very sensitive to precipitation.
- b. Topography.
 - (1) Relief is predominantly low and flat. There are two small hills, vicinity XT 715255 and XT 684330, which rise 32 and 38 meters above sea level.
 - (2) Drainage. There are two rivers of importance in the operational area, the Song Saigon and the Song Thi Tinh. Both of these rivers are navigable all year by sampans, river barges, LCM's and LCT-LCU's. The Song Saigon is approximately 100-150 meters wide and 2.4 meters deep at mean water. At mean water the current ranges from 0.5-1.8 meters per second. The Song Thi Tinh varies 20 to 50 meters width and is 2.5 meters deep at low water. The river bottom of both rivers is clay and silt. This area is affected by tidal action, but to what extent is unknown.
 - (3) Vegetation. The operational area consists of three general types of vegetation: (1) Broadleaf Evergreen secondary forest, (2) Rubber Plantations, (3) Wetland Rice. The secondary forest consists of Broadleaf Evergreen trees 75-90 feet in height. The canopy is usually discontinuous and the undergrowth is extremely dense. The undergrowth consists of low trees, shrubs, bamboo and vines. In the rubber plantations the trees are spaced on 15-20 foot centers and the undergrowth is sparse, consisting of grasses and shrubs. The wetland rice will have been harvested and the fields drained, leaving flat land with approximately six inches of stubble.
 - (4) Surface material. There are generally three types of soil found within the area:
 - (a) Hydromorphic clays and silts. This type soil is found in north and central sections of the area in the vicinity of the Song Saigon and Song Thi Tinh. It is composed mostly of silty clays (CL) or clayey silts (ML) and is several meters deep.
 - (b) Peat Soils. This type soil is found in the southern section of the area in the vicinity of the Song Saigon and the Song Thi Tinh. Peat soils consist of from one to several

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Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- meters of predominantly organic material (PT) underlain by highly compressible clay (CI).
- (c) Red clayey silt. This soil covers the majority of the area. When dried out a hard surface crust forms and it is very dusty. This soil is more favorable for tunnel construction than either of the above mentioned types. The crusting ability and dusty characteristics provide special problems in tunnel destruction. Extensive and complex tunnel systems have been found in this soil type in other locations.
- (5) Manmade features. The significant manmade features in the area of interest include routes LTL 14 on the west and an unnumbered route on the eastern border. Route LTL 14 has numerous cuts between XT 670283 and XT 715244. Access into the area is restricted by the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers on the west south and east. Only one bridge crosses the Thi Tinh River at Ben Cat (XT 715244). It is a class 12 Eiffel, Type II Bridge. There are no bridges across the Saigon River. Details on routes are contained on inclosure 2 and 3. Enemy fortifications in the area include the following:
- (a) Trench System XT 698240
 - (b) Trench System XT 684257
 - (c) Trench System XT 696211
 - (d) Trench System XT 694243
 - (e) Trench System and 5 AA/AW Positions XT 694243
 - (f) Trench System XT 692405
 - (g) Foxholes XT 692481
 - (h) Trench and AA/AW Positions XT 736274
 - (i) 12 AA/AW Positions XT 731280
 - (j) Trench System XT 716279
 - (k) AA/AW Positions XT 733240
 - (l) AA/AW Positions XT 747241
 - (m) Dunker System XT 707316
 - (n) Foxholes XT 723317
 - (o) Foxholes XT 723324
 - (p) In addition to the above fortifications, entrances to underground installations are located at:
XT 719240 XT 710284 XT 717285
XT 738216 XT 702297
 - (q) There are no towns in this area, however the roads are lined with hamlets and villages.
 - (r) The airfield at Loc 590 (XT 773330) is the only facility capable of landing C-130 aircraft. At the present time this field is closed for rehabilitation. The estimated date of reopening is 31 December. Helicopter landing areas extend from 500 to 3000 meters on each side of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. This area is covered by rice paddies which are expected to be dry during the next 90 days and suitable for helicopter landing zones.

3.(CNS) MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN:

a. Tactical Aspects.

- (1) Observation. Observation throughout the area depends entirely

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Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- upon the vegetation. In the wetland rice areas the observation will be very good. In the secondary forest regions the observation will be poor, both ground and aerial, due to the dense undergrowth. The rubber plantations will afford poor to fair observation, depending on the density of the undergrowth.
- (2) **Fields of fire.** Fields of fire are extremely limited in these areas of dense forests and heavy undergrowth. The wetland rice areas offer the best fields of fire.
- (3) **Cover.** The principal cover for both units and installations is afforded by bunkers and trench systems found in the operational area.
- (4) **Concealment.** All forested areas and plantations offer good concealment from both air and ground observation. The villages and hamlets located within the area offer good concealment for small foot mobile units. The wetland rice areas offer no concealment.
- (5) **Obstacles.**
- (a) Song Saigon flows generally from the northwest to the southeast across the area with widths of 100-150 meters. Banks are low and gentle composed of clayey silty soil.
 - (b) Song Thi Tinh flows generally from the north to the south across the area with a width of 20-50 meters. Banks are low and gentle composed of clayey silty soil.
 - (c) The dense forest which dominates the center section of the operational area constitutes a major obstacle to movement of any sort.
 - (d) Protective friendly minefields are at the following locations of types and quantity indicated:

1.	XT 910310	M-16	800Ea
2.	XT 856216	M-16	264Ea
3.	XT 828268	M-16	280Ea
4.	XT 815290	M-16	800Ea
5.	XT 798425	M-16	60Ea
6.	XT 744330	M-16	253Ea
7.	XT 765295	M-16	280Ea
8.	XT 776263	M-16	380Ea
9.	XT 713188	M-16	119Ea
10.	XT 375342	M-16	250Ea
11.	XT 667173	AT	Quantity Unknown
12.	XT 435472	Type and Quantity Unknown	
13.	XT 440348	Type and Quantity Unknown	
- (6) **Movement.** Cross country movement, within the operational area, is effected to varying degrees by vegetation, soil conditions, relief, hydrography and urbanization (See Inclosure I).
- (7) **Key Terrain Features.** The area of interest consists of level plains with local relief being less than 35 meters with slopes less than 3%. There are no prominent terrain features in this area.
- (8) **Avenues of approach.** The existing route shown on Inclosures 2 and 3 provide the best routes of movement into the objective area. Movement to and around the area is passable via the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers both of which will accommodate LCM and LCU landing craft. Cross country movement around the

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Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

edges of the objective area is hampered and highly compartmented by soft rice paddy lands. Conditions for APC's, tanks, and 2 1/2 ton trucks is fair to poor during the period of the operation. In the center of the area the dense jungle creates conditions that are unsuited for all types of vehicular movement and poor for foot troops. Inclosure 1 contains details on cross country movement conditions.

Acknowledge.

3 Incl

1. Lines of Communication
2. Lines of Communication
3. Cross Country Movement

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Annex C (Fire Support Plan) to OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (U) SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A - Intelligence to OPLAN 58-66.

b. Friendly Forces. OPLAN 58-66.

c. Attachments and Detachments. No change from basic plan.

2. ~~(S)~~ MISSION. II FFFORCEV conducts operation vic THANH DINH Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to locate and destroy military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; and clear area of inhabitants.

3. ~~(S)~~ EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. OPLAN 58-66.

b. Air Support. TAC air support available through II FFFORCEV TOC, priority of air support to 1st Inf Div.

c. Artillery Support.

(1) Field arty.

(a) 23d Arty Gp:

1 Attach one 105mm towed bn (= one btry) to 25th Inf Div o/a D-1.

2 One 105mm towed btry remains attached to 1st Inf Div.

3 Attach two 155mm towed btry to 25th Inf Div o/a D-1.

4 Provide one 155mm towed bn (= two btry). GSR 1st Inf Div Arty from position vic PHU LOI.

5 Provide one 105mm btry at LAI KHE o/a D-1 with mission of supporting 1st Inf Div Arty.

6 Provide one 175mm btry at PHU LOI o/a D-1 with mission of GSR 1st and 25th Inf Div Arty, priority of fires to 1st Inf Div.

7 Provide one 8"/175mm btry at CU CHI o/a D-1 with mission of GSR 25th Inf Div Arty.

8 Remaining units - no change from present mission.

(b) 54th Arty Gp:

1 Attach one 105mm btry to 1st Inf Div o/a D-1.

2 Provide one 105mm btry with mission of GSR 10th ARVN Div Arty.

3 Attach one 155mm bn (SP) to 1st Inf Div o/a D-1.

4 Remaining units - No change from present missions.

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(2) Air defense arty.

II FFFORCEV Arty:

(a) Attach two btry (+3 sec quad .50 MG), 5/2d Arty (AW)(SP) to 1st Inf Div o/a D-1.

(b) Attach two btry (+3 sec quad .50 MG), 5/2d Arty (AW)(SP) to 25th Inf Div o/a D-1.

4. Coordinating instructions:

(1) Arty fire plans prepared by divisions and separate brigades.

(2) Direct coordination authorized between divisions and 23d and 54th Arty Gp.

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Annex C (Fire Support Plan) to OPLAN 15-1 (Capitol Hill FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

4. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE and LOG INFO. OPLAN 15-1-66.
5. (U) COMMAND and SIGNAL:
 - a. Signal. Current SOI/SSI in effect.
 - b. Command. OPLAN 15-1-66.

Acknowledge.

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DISTRIBUTION:
Same as basic plan

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1st INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96343

13 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation CEDAR FALLS

1. (U) Name and type of Operation: CEDAR FALLS was a seal and search/ search and destroy/jungle clearing operation. Reference: Maps Vietnam, 1:50,000, sheets: 6231 II, 6331 III, 6230 I, 6330 IV.

2. (U) Dates of Operations: Initiated 080730 January 1967, terminated 262400 January 1967.

3. (C) General: Operation CEDAR FALLS was a II FFV controlled operation involving units of the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, 196th Infantry Brigade, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and ARVN airborne and ranger battalions. The 173d Airborne Brigade and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment were placed under operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. The operation was aimed at the destruction of BQ, Military Region IV and its associated base camps and supply areas within the Iron Triangle and THANH DUE Forestry Reserve. The 1st Division was employed as the search force and conducted extensive search and destroy, tunnel and base camp destruction and jungle clearing operations throughout the area. This operation proved to be one of the most successful undertaken by the BIG RED ONE. Of particular significance was the large amount of jungle cleared and the unusually high number of ralliers that turned themselves in to GVN authorities as a result of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The general area of operation is at Annex E.

a. The reporting officer for this report is Major General William E. DePuy, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

b. Task Organization. Control of the operation was exercised by Headquarters, II FFV. 1st Division forces were controlled from a forward command post located at LAI KHE. The initial task organization is listed below. Subsequent changes are shown, as they occurred, in paragraph 7 of this report. Commanders are shown at Annex A.

<u>IV DEANE (173d Abn Bde, Sep)</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>
1-303 Inf	1-26 Inf
2-303 Inf	2-18 Inf
4-303 Inf	1-7 Arty (-) DS
1-4 Cav (-) (OPCON)	
11th ACR (-1 sqdn) (OPCON)	<u>Div Arty</u>
A & B Btry (Mainf) 5-2 Arty (AMBP)	8-6 Arty GSR 2-33 Arty
3-319 Arty DS	8-2-32 Arty Mainf 8-4 Arty
New Btry, 11th ACR, DS 11th ACR	2-35 Arty (-) GSR 2-33 Arty
<u>3d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
1-2 Inf	1st Avn Bn
1-16 Inf	1st Engr Bn
1-28 Inf	121st Sig Bn
2-28 Inf	D-1-4 Cav
2-33 Inf	

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4. (C) Intelligence:

a. Intelligence prior to operation. The Iron Triangle and southern LONG NGUYEN (TRUNG DIEN Forestry Reserve) had not been deeply penetrated by US or ARVN forces in over a year. The area had long been a major Viet Cong controlled area and contained numerous base camps, supply installations, and production and medical facilities. Viet Cong political and military units were known to be based in the area. Current indications were that the majority of Military Region IV (known as the S. J. G. C. C. D. L. D. I. M. Special Committee), the R. I. M. D. U. O. M. Provincial Committee, and the South B. E. N. C. A. T. District Committee were located in the operational area. The significance of these elements was that they controlled all of the military and political activities of their respective areas. Experience gained in previous operations in the near-by S. U. I. L. O. I. and M. J. B. O. Woods indicated that the base camps and supply installations were well protected by extensive bunker systems and tunnel complexes. It was expected that the Viet Cong would make extensive use of mines and booby traps in defending critical zones.

b. No major contact was made by the 1st Infantry Division units during the operation. The entire operation was characterized by small unit actions contacting VC elements of platoon size or smaller. As expected, the VC units did not defend their base areas in force, but elected to flee, leaving behind token resistance in the form of snipers, booby traps, and mines. During the operation numerous VC local guerrillas as well as headquarters personnel from MR IV rallied. In addition many local guerrillas were captured trying to infiltrate through friendly lines. Others went underground in an effort to escape capture.

c. Terrain and weather

(1) Cross country movement in the area was affected to varying degrees by heavy jungle and soil conditions. The area was void of prominent terrain features and consisted of level plains with relief varying less than 35 meters in elevation. Cross country movement around the edges of the objective area was hampered by soft rice paddy lands. In the center of the area the dense jungle created conditions that were unsuited for all types of vehicular movement and poor for foot troops.

(2) January is a northeast monsoon or dry month over all the III Corps Tactical Zone. The northeast air flow produces the best overall weather of the year in this area. Cloud cover was at its annual minimum and had no adverse effects on the operation. Early morning fog was prevalent between the hours of 0400 and 0900, but this did not hamper airborne operations or close air support.

d. Base camps uncovered were extensive in size and construction. Foxholes and fighting positions were usually connected by either tunnels or trenches. Most of the fighting positions were constructed with overhead cover, consisting of logs approximately 4 inches in diameter covered with hard soil approximately 6 inches in thickness. One fortified village was discovered by the 2nd Brigade vicinity XT 5636. The houses had reinforced sides with short tunnels leading to bomb shelters. Major means of destruction were airstrikes after the inhabitants had been evicted. Extensive tunnel systems were found throughout the area, with the largest tunnel complex located at the village of BIN SIC. Tunnel rats were utilized to explore tunnels prior to their destruction with explosive or acetylene destructive devices augmented with explosives (See para 11 C).

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a. Civil Affairs/Psychological operations

(1) All civilians in the operational area were presumed to be either members of VC families or VC laborers working under VC control. The concept of operation provided for the orderly evacuation of all civilians.

(2) At 080600 Jan 67, the seal forces landed by helicopter in BEN SUC. A loudspeaker helicopter orbited the town telling the people not to run but to remain in their homes and await further instructions. The people followed the instructions, and only one civilian was wounded during the sealing operation. After the town was sealed, the 3rd Bn, 8th ARVN Regt was landed under operational control of the 1st Division's Revolutionary Development Task Force. The airborne loudspeakers broadcast a message directing the populace to congregate at the school in the center of the town. When the people were assembled, they were screened, and all males from 15 to 45 years of age were evacuated to the interrogation center at PHU CUONG for further screening. When the initial search of the village was completed, the people were allowed to return to their homes, and they were directed to assemble their belongings in preparation to be moved. On the 9th and 10th of Jan, the search of the village continued, and the people from the area surrounding BEN SUC were assembled in the village with their belongings in preparation for the move to PHU CUONG. VNM river boats arrived on 10 Jan, bringing two battalions of ARVN paratroops who assumed responsibility for the security of BEN SUC and assisted the people in the move. Starting on the 11th, the people were evacuated by riverboat and CH 47 helicopter. The people took all their belongings to include livestock.

(3) On 9 Jan, the 11th ACR attacked across the north side of the Iron Triangle. The attack was preceded by the loudspeaker helicopter which cautioned the people not to run and to remain in their homes and await further instructions. The cavalry crossed the area without injuring any civilians. A loudspeaker message was broadcast and leaflets were dropped which advised the people to assemble their belongings. It had been assumed that some people would move without waiting for assistance, and a refugee collecting point had been established at BEN CAT by the 773d Airborne Bde. Unfortunately, some ill-informed troops of the 11th ACR started evicting the people in BEN SUC and then started burning homes. This caused the people in the area to stream into BEN CAT without their possessions. By mid-afternoon, over 1,000 people were assembled at the refugee collecting point at BEN CAT. These people had to be sent back to their homes to collect their belongings. It had been planned to evacuate the people between BEN SUC and BEN CAT in an orderly manner with ARVN assistance after the BEN SUC evacuation was well under way. However, the premature destruction of homes necessitated immediate action. Under RDTF control, seventy trucks were assembled on 10 Jan and the people were moved with their belongings to PHU CUONG on 10, 11, and 12 Jan. Livestock and carts were driven overland to PHU CUONG.

(4) The people were moved to a temporary refugee relocation center at PHU CUONG which was to have been set up and operated by provincial officials assisted by GCO. By Tuesday the 10th, it became obvious that the civilian agencies were not able to establish the refugee center quickly enough to receive the number of people that were enroute. This was true due to a lack of adequate responsive assets and underestimation of the problem. To provide for the refugees, the Division established a control and coordination center at the refugee camp. Military assets were assembled and the camp was set up in time to house the refugees. After the camp was set up, the civilian agencies were able to operate it, and the military support was phased out. At the close of the operation, 6,108 people had been moved to the refugee center. There were 608 men, 3,672 women, and 3,628 children.

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(5) PsyOps. During the first two days of the operation, the airborne loudspeaker broadcast standard CHIEU HOI appeals in between the messages used to control the civilians. In addition, stock CHIEU HOI leaflets and Safe Conduct Passes were air dropped over the area. On the second day of the operation, an unprecedented flow of ralliers from the area of operations started to turn themselves in to both US units and GVN representatives. Additional PsyWar intelligence and propaganda writing support was requested from II FFV. A team with two interpreters and two interrogators/leaflet writers was received from the 246th PsyOps Co. The team was located at the BINH DUONG CHIEU HOI Center under the control of a U-5 officer. Special leaflets and tape recorded appeals were prepared daily. Appeals were directed toward specific groups and individuals that ralliers knew were still in the area of operations. In addition, some wives among the refugees sent to their husbands' hiding places and persuaded them to rally. During the operations, four million leaflets were dropped of which approximately half were special appeals developed during the operation. The airborne loudspeaker broadcast an average of eight hours each day. As a result of these efforts, 471 ralliers came in during the operation. The large influx of ralliers overloaded the CHIEU HOI Center. To help handle the ralliers, the Division provided tents, cots, and food to the Center. In addition, supporting engineers dug two new wells in the Center.

5. (C) Mission: 1st Infantry Division conducts operations vicinity THUAN DIEN Forestry Reserve and Iron Triangle. Kill or capture military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; clear area of inhabitants; cut belts across Iron Triangle and clear selected LZ's within the AO.

6. (C) Concept of Operation: The seal of the Iron Triangle was to be executed in conjunction with an airborne assault on the village of BEN SUC (XT5883) on 8 January 1967. The 25th Infantry Division was to occupy blocking positions along the west bank of the SAIGON River from vicinity XT5434 to vicinity XT7418. A cavalry squadron and 2 battalions of infantry were to occupy blocking positions along the east bank of the THI THIEN River from T/AN AN XA (XT7433) to BEN CAT (XT7433). On 9 January, 4 infantry battalions were to conduct airborne assaults into landing zones north and west of the THUAN DIEN Forestry Reserve. Two additional battalions would be airlifted into landing zones along the THI THIEN River east of the THUAN DIEN Forestry Reserve. The untried cavalry regiment, accompanied by supporting engineers, would conduct a thrust westward from BEN CAT, cutting through the Iron Triangle. On 11 January, 2 ARVN battalions would assume the mission of evacuating the inhabitants of BEN SUC to PHU CUONG.

7. (C) Execution:

8 January -- The 2d Brigade initiated Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0730 hrs by conducting a seal and search of BEN SUC (XT580335). The 1-26 Inf, reinforced with 1/2-18 Inf conducted the assault in 60 OH-13 helicopters, encountering sporadic sniper fire in the LZ's. During the day, the battalion killed 20 VC (BC) and captured 6 PW's. The Revolutionary Development Task Force searching BEN SUC accounted for 7 VC KIA (BC), 5 PW's, and 150 detainees. TF DEANE joined Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0800 by moving into staging areas and blocking positions. Bde HQ moved to a position in the vicinity of XT7532 at 0915. The 2-503 Inf and the 4-503 Inf were airlifted to a staging area in the vicinity of XT8228 at 1410 hrs. The 1-503 Inf remained in a blocking position in the CAN DINH Jungle (XT7723). The 35th ARVN Ranger Bde occupied blocking positions in the vicinity of XT765185.

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9 January — Changes in Task Organization (cont. narrative)

The 1-26 Inf continued the seal and search of BEN SUC. A/2-18 Inf was detached at 1600 hrs. At 1600 hrs the 2-18 Inf became OPCON 3d Bde and commenced air assault via XT612342. Landing was aborted due to a mined landing zone. The battalion landed on BEN SUC and reverted to OPCON 2d Bde.

The 3d Bde entered Operation CEDJA FALLS with a 4 battalion assault north of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The 1-2 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 1 (XT637389) at 0800 hrs. No hostile fire was received during the landing. The Bn found 80 tons of rice during the day. The 1-16 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 2 (XT661383) at 0840 hrs. No hostile fire was received. The 2-28 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 3 (XT607365) at 0920 hrs. No hostile fire was received. During the day, the battalion captured 28 tons of rice, 725 Chicoms grenades and 14 weapons. The 1-28 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from DAU TIENG to LZ 5 (XT622384) at 1155 hrs. No hostile fire was received.

TF DEANE attacked west from BEN CAT at 0800 hrs with the 11th ACR (-) seizing obj 1 (XT678298) and obj 2 (XT665300) and securing engineer work parties clearing the road west from BEN CAT to obj 2. The 2-503 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 4 (XT670365) at 1115 hrs. No hostile fire was received. The 4-503 Inf (-) conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 6 (XT680350) at 1235 hrs. No hostile fire was received.

10 January — Changes in Task Organization

2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-28 Inf (0800)
1st ARVN Abn Bn (1700)
7th ARVN Abn Bn (1700)

3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf (0800)

At 0845 hrs a River Assault Group boat convoy departed LAI THIEU with the 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns on board. Both battalions became OPCON 2d Bde upon closing BEN SUC and prepared to evacuate refugees from the village. The 1-2 Inf, the 1-16 Inf, the 1-28 Inf, and 2-28 Inf located a total of 262 tons of rice via XT6035 and captured 135 weapons during the day. The 2-18 Inf moved by road to conduct search and destroy operations vicinity XT 624330. The 1-4 Cav was relieved of its security mission along the THI THINH River by 4-9 ARVN Bn and 2-9 ARVN Bn. At 1440 hrs, 1-4 Cav became OPCON 11th ACR and relieved the 2-503 Inf and the 4-503 Inf in blocking positions.

11 January — Changes in Task Organization

2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-28 Inf
1st ARVN Abn Bn
7th ARVN Abn Bn

3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf

TF DEANE: 1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
11th ACR (-)
1-4 Cav

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The 1-26 Inf was relieved of the BEN SUC seal at 1224 hrs by the 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns and moved north of BEN SUC to conduct search and destroy operations. The first river convoy of refugees departed BEN SUC for PHU CUONG at 1225 hrs with 872 personnel and their belongings and two LCM's of cattle. The 1-2 Inf, the 1-16 Inf, the 2-18 Inf, and the 1-28 Inf continued search and destroy operations in sector. Numerous tunnels, base camps, rice caches and small arms were found throughout the day. Only sporadic enemy resistance was encountered. The 2-503 Inf, and the 4-503 Inf entered the Iron Triangle from the north, conducting search and destroy operations sweeping southward. The 3-11 ACR screened the Brigade's west flank along Hwy 14.

12 January -- Changes in Task Organization

3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf
1-4 Cav (0800)
2-11 ACR (0800)

By this time in the operation it had become fairly apparent that there would be no large scale enemy contact. However, VC supplies and equipment continued to be captured in large quantities. 1,800 tons of rice had been discovered to date plus 189 small arms and 971 grenades. Even more remarkable were the 85 ralliers who turned themselves in. The 2d RAG convoy departed BEN SUC for PHU CUONG carrying 849 Vietnamese with all of their personal belongings. The 1-2 Inf located a 100 bed underground hospital with blankets and equipment vicinity XT612387. The 2-18 Inf located 180 tons of rice vicinity XT61834. TF DEANE continued search and destroy operations in sector.

13 January -- Changes in Task Organization

TF DEANE: 1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
1-4 Cav (1700)
11 ACR (-)
A & B Btry, 5-2 Arty (AMSP)

The 1-26 Inf continued search and destroy operations north of BEN SUC with no significant contact. The 2-28 Inf located 160 tons of rice in their AO vicinity XT597373. Evacuation of BEN SUC continued with 408 persons, 73 water buffalo, and 159 cows being transported to PHU CUONG. 103 refugees, 165,000 lbs rice and 35 oxen were helilifted by CH-47 to PHU CUONG. The 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns continued to seal and evacuate BEN SUC.

The 1-2 Inf helilifted into an LZ vicinity XT619327 and commenced search and destroy operations along the southeast edge of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The 1-16 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vicinity XT635355. The 1-28 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vicinity XT619373. The 1-4 Cav screened southwest of the 3d Bde AO vicinity XT692312, and the 2-11 ACR screened the southern edge of the AO. At 1700 hrs the squadron returned OPCOM TF DEANE. The TF continued search and destroy operations in sector.

14 January -- The 2-28 Inf located an extensive base camp vicinity XT594346 containing rifles, mines, grenades and ammunition. The 1-28 Inf helilifted to LAI KHE at 1445 hrs. The 3d RAG convoy moved to PHU CUONG. The 1-503 Inf destroyed a mine factory vicinity XT673283.

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15 January -- The 2d Bde, employing the 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns and the 1st Division Engineers, commenced destruction of BEN SUC. All other units continued search and destroy operations in sector with sporadic enemy contact.

16 January -- Elements of the division participating in Operation CEDAR FALLS met sporadic sniper fire throughout the day as they continued to locate and destroy VC stores and equipment within the Iron Triangle. The 2-28 Inf located a fresh grave site containing 20 VC bodies vicinity XT599350. The 1-16 Inf terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0858 hrs and helilifted to LAI KHE at 1130 hrs. The CHIEF MAJ results continued to rise with 199 the total to date.

17 January -- Changes in Task Organization

3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf
2-28 Inf (1600)
2-11 ACR

The 2d Bde terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS. CP units returned to DI AN, closing at 1707 hrs. The 2-28 Inf helilifted from BEN SUC to LAI KHE at 1600 hrs. The last elements leaving BEN SUC activated the timing device on 5 tons of demolitions planted in the area. The purpose of the explosives was to destroy remaining tunnels and any VC who returned to the area after US forces departed. The detonation occurred at 1934 hrs, leaving a large crater in the center of the razed village. The 3d Bde continued Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 1-2 Inf, the 2-18 Inf, and the 1-4 Cav remained in the Iron Triangle area with scattered enemy contact. The 1-26 Inf acted as BKF at LAI KHE.

TF DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS with the 1-503 Inf, the 2-503 Inf, the 4-503 Inf and E/11th ACR operating in the Iron Triangle. Scattered contact accounted for 17 VC KIA (BC), 1 PW, and 164 tons of rice.

The 1-7 Arty (-) displaced from Arty Base II to DI AN; the 6th Arty (-) displaced from Arty Base V to PHU LAI; and B/2-32 Arty displaced from Arty Base V to LAI KHE.

18 January -- Changes in Task Organization

1-2 Inf to 1st Bde (1730)
2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-18 Inf (1310)

The 1-2 Inf helilifted from Operation CEDAR FALLS AO to PHUOC VINH, closing at 1730 hrs. The 2-18 Inf departed Operation CEDAR FALLS AO by convoy and arrived at DI AN at 1310 hrs. The 3d Bde terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS. TF DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS with the 1-503 Inf, 2-503 Inf, 4-503 Inf, 11th ACR, and the 1-4 Cav (-). Sporadic enemy contact continued throughout the day.

19-24 January -- Activities during this period consisted of limited search and destroy activities by TF DEANE and engineer jungle clearing and tunnel destruction by 1st Division engineers. General locations of security forces and engineer parties were as follows:

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1-503 Inf - southwest portion of the Iron Triangle between the SAIGON River and Hwy 14
 2-503 Inf - central portion of the Iron Triangle
 4-503 Inf and 4/2-11 ACR - roadrunner patrols throughout the Iron Triangle
 11 ACR (-) - security operations near the confluence of the SAIGON and THI THINH Rivers
 1-4 Cav - screening west of BEN CUI along route 13

25 January -- Changes in task organization

3d Bde: 1-16 Inf
 1-28 Inf
 2-28 Inf
 1-4 Cav

TP DEANE terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS and reverted to OPCON II FFV at 0700 hrs. TP FIFE, consisting of 1-4 Cav (-), C/2-2 Inf, B/2-28 Inf and 1st Engineer Bn (-), continued jungle clearing, tunnel destruction and security operations in the Iron Triangle. As a result of tunnel clearing operations during the day, TP FIFE captured 20 VC.

26 January -- Operation CEDAR FALLS terminated at 262400 Jan 1967. C/2-2 Inf and B/2-28 Inf returned to their units. The 1-4 Cav continued road security in the Iron Triangle for departing engineer work parties.

8. (C) Supporting Forces:

- a. Artillery: See Annex F.
- b. Signal: See Annex G.
- c. US Army Aviation.

(1) For the initial airmobile assaults in Operation CEDAR FALLS, sixty UH-1D's were made available to the division. Although the majority of aircraft was provided by non-organic aviation battalions, the 1st Aviation Battalion played a major role in planning, coordinating, and executing lift operations. All airlifts were controlled by either the 1st AVN Bn or 11th AVN Bn. The movement of six infantry battalions on 9 February was marked with precise timing by the aviation, infantry, and artillery units participating. The schedule of airlifts on 8 & 9 February is shown below:

Unit	NR of A/C	Stage from	LT Landing Time	Control	
91-26 Inf (+)	60	DAU TIENG	BEN SUC	0800	1st AVN Bn
1-2 Inf	60	LAI KHE	1	0800	11th AVN Bn
1-16 Inf	60	LAI KHE	2	0800	1st AVN Bn
2-28 Inf	60	LAI KHE	3	0920	11th AVN Bn
2-503 Inf	60	XT 8228	4	1115	1st AVN Bn
1-23 Inf	60	DAU TIENG	5	1155	11th AVN Bn
4-503 Inf	60	XT 8228	6	1235	1st AVN Bn

* conducted on 8 Jan; all others on 9 Jan.

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(2) After 9 February the average daily aviation support to the division was 27 aircraft per day. These aircraft were used mainly for small unit moves and resupply. Aircraft from the organic aviation battalion flew a total of 431 sorties (UH-1D), transporting 3,682 personnel during Operation COLDK FALLS. Average aircraft availability during the period was 63.7%.

d. US Air Force Close Air support

(1) The mission of tactical air was as follows:

- (a) Neutralization of enemy forces
- (b) Destruction of enemy forces in contact with division units.
- (c) Destruction of enemy base camps and tunnel complexes.
- (d) Interdiction of enemy liaison/communication routes.

(2) Control. All air strikes were controlled by Forward Air Controllers using O-1 type aircraft.

(3) The 7th Air Force flew a total of 747 sorties in support of 1st Infantry Division elements during the operation. A total of 910 tons of ordnance was delivered. Requests for immediate TAC support were answered with a minimum of delay.

(4) Effectiveness. TAC Air was employed successfully on both preplanned and immediate targets. The 7th Air Force support contributed significantly to the success of the operation by uncovering several large base camps, destroying previously found base camps, suppressing ground fire and conducting Landing Zone preparations. Clearance procedures prior to delivery of strikes were simplified through the use of PsyOps messages. Vietnamese in the area were instructed to move to designated areas where they would be safe from US bombings. All personnel remaining in jungle areas would be considered Viet Cong and engaged accordingly. This measure precluded the large number of civilians in the area being injured by supporting fires.

e. Engineer. Engineer support was provided to the division from assets of the 79th Engineer Group. A total of 40 bulldozers and Rome plows was made available to the 1st Engineer Task Force. During the operation the task force cleared 2,233 acres or approximately 9 square kilometers of jungle. Dozer teams consisted of two tank dozers and six dozers. The tank dozers preceded the dozers and cut through the jungle exposed to sniper fire and booby traps. The following dozers cut swaths through the jungle along the infantry routes of march. The use of the dozers to open jungles as part of combat operations was a unique and challenging task. Since the Iron Triangle contained well over 100 square kilometers of heavy jungle and large rubber trees, a mass clearance-type operation was abandoned as impractical. Therefore, to open up the jungle for future operations, it was felt that cutting swaths across the jungle together with working dozer teams directly in support of the advancing infantry would provide the best results.

f. B-52 Strikes. A total of ten B-52 strikes was delivered in support of 1st Division operations. The strikes were based on intelligence and were delivered against heavily fortified areas. The strikes were particularly effective in destroying bunkers, collapsing tunnels and uncovering VC supply bases.

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9. (C) Results:

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a. Friendly losses:

KHA 32
MHA 181
Equipment damaged: 2 OH-13, 4 APC, 1 M551, 3 M60A1
Equipment destroyed: none

b. Enemy losses:

(1) Personnel:

KIA (BC) 389
PW 180
CHIEF MCH 471
Detainees 365

(2) Weapons and ammunition:

Small arms 429
Machine guns 18
Mortars 6
Recoilless rifles 2
Grenade launchers 3
Small arms ammo 49,593
Mortar rounds 219
Grenades 1,496
Arty rounds 28
Mines 188
CBU's 142

(3) Foodstuffs:

Rice (tons) 3,347
Peanuts (lbs) 3,550
Salt (lbs) 7,600
Tea (lbs) 40

(4) Supplies:

Uniforms 7,622
Bags, nylon cloth 6
Rolls poncho material 100
6 hp engine 1
Outboard motors 5
Sewing machines 3
Bolts cloth 54
Typewriters 3
Sheets Roofing Tin 700
Sawpans 189
Gasoline (gallons) 1,520
TMT (lbs) 928
Motor oil (gallons) 845
Jungle boots (pairs) 20

(5) Installations:

Huts 169
Bunkers 207
Punji pits 85
Tunnels 173

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10. Administrative Matters:

a. The administrative planning for Operation CEDAR FALLS proved to be adequate, and the logistical support was able to answer effectively to the demands placed on it throughout the operation. All logistical support was provided from base areas outside of the Iron Triangle at established base areas at DAU TIENG, QUAN LOI, LAI KHE, and PHU LOI. The evacuation of refugees from the operational area was a problem which became of major logistical concern. Prior planning programmed the evacuation of refugees by civilian agencies; however, the large number of refugees to be evacuated from the area necessitated US military support. LAI KHE was established as a Forward Logistics Base, using the normally assigned combat service support elements of the base camp. Additional augmentation from Support Command units was extremely limited. The 1st Logistical Command furnished a Forward Ammunition Supply Point and trailer transfer point. Considerable improvement of the ASP area was made. PHU LOI became a logistical base with the establishment of a 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area handling Class I and III supplies. The Support Command Forward CP was established at LAI KHE in the Division Headquarters (Forward). The CP was co-located with the AC of S, G-4 element in the Logistics Operations Center (LOC) expandable van. The LOC functions were: to supervise and coordinate all support rendered and to receive, evaluate, consolidate, and transmit to Div Log Base in DI AN all requests for supply and service support for appropriate action; to coordinate demands exceeding the capabilities of the Support Command with the Logistical Command; and through aggressive follow up action, to insure that all valid demands were satisfied in the shortest possible time. The element also served as the focal point for the consolidation of information pertaining to the status of all CI I, II & IV, III and V supplies such as consumption, receipts, on hand, and due in. This information was translated into concrete planning data to insure the uninterrupted, adequate and timely flow of all classes of supplies to the ultimate consumer.

b. Supply

(1) LAI KHE

(a) The 3d Forward Supply Section of the battalion at LAI KHE, augmented with selected personnel, was the mainstay of supply support to the tactical units participating in the operation. All classes of supply (less Class V) were provided from LAI KHE as well as CR services. Of particular note were the POL Jump Teams dispatched to provide refueling services to infantry and engineer units operating in locations where normal fueling by tank trucks was either impractical or altogether impossible. Petroleum equipment operators, together with dispensing equipment and 500-gallon collapsible drums, were airlifted to provide this service.

(b) Bath and Laundry service was provided by the Bath and Laundry Section, 624th Quartermaster Co, 29th Group, 1st Logistical Command.

(2) PHU LOI

(a) As a result of various tactical units staging through PHU LOI during Operation CEDAR FALLS, the supply support provided by the 4th Forward Supply of the 1st S & T Bn increased by approximately 25%. No particular problems were experienced. Shower and Laundry facilities were provided by the 1st Logistical Command.

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(b) The 4th Forward Supply Section provided all class III support (diesel fuel and lubricants) to the RAC-beat and LCM flotilla operating on the SAIGON River during the refugee resettlement phase of the operation at the river landing in PHU CUONG.

(3) QUAN LOI

The 5th Forward Supply Section of the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion at QUAN LOI played no major role in the support of Operation CEDAR FALLS, but was fully geared to provide class I and III support on a major scale if needed.

(4) DAU TIENG

A POL team was dispatched to this location on 4 January 1967 and remained operational until 10 January for the refueling of helicopters participating in diversionary maneuvers at the outset of Operation CEDAR FALLS.

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5. Experience Factors

A. Class I: Figures in parentheses represent stockage.

Objective: Issue is stockage objective
for A rations.

1. Daily and Average Issue and On-Hand Balances

a. LAI KHE

DATE	A Rations		B Rations (163,900)		C Rations (54,500)	
	Issue	O/H End	Issue	O/H End	Issue	O/H End
8	9,100	11,900	0	209,940	1,996	32,720
9	9,700	2,300	67,900	142,040	3,933	23,762
10	10,475	525	0	153,920	3,104	25,673
11	11,055	20	1,327	152,593	3,796	21,322
12	8,410	1,710	2,490	197,443	2,320	39,562
13	10,516	0	2,745	209,602	2,930	45,582
14	10,925	8,475	0	211,602	3,302	43,000
15	10,325	7,150	0	211,602	3,458	40,612
16	9,195	21,385	36,700	174,822	4,800	35,812
17	9,090	30,335	0	174,822	696	35,116
18	9,015	30,920	0	174,822	1,392	33,724
19	7,800	23,120	0	174,822	1,548	32,176
20	7,800	15,320	20,840	145,932	4,400	27,776
21	7,635	17,585	0	156,432	2,040	25,736
22	7,535	19,647	0	156,432	2,064	23,652
23	7,060	22,582	49,420	107,062	10,340	13,312
24	6,350	23,757	0	107,062	553	12,954
25	6,175	31,612	0	107,062	848	12,106

AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:

8,675 20,267 2,436

HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:

11,055 67,900 10,340

PERCENT OF AVERAGE:

127% 334% 411%

TOTAL ISSUES:

138,221 189,547 52,610

AVERAGE O/H FOR PERIOD:

15,191 164,096 2,922

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AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/O:

0 +1,390 -1,890

AVERAGE HEADCOUNT: 8,790

TOTAL SUPPLIES ISSUED: 798

b. 1

DATE (Jan)	A Rations		B Rations (87,000)		C Rations (29,000)	
	Issues	O/I End	Issues	O/I End	Issues	O/I End
8	6,600	6,600	0	100,200	0	27,409
9	6,600	6,600	42,015	57,395	230	29,179
10	5,800	7,400	0	57,395	0	29,179
11	5,700	12,700	0	57,395	100	29,079
12	5,800	12,700	0	57,395	0	29,079
13	6,250	14,090	300	57,095	1,100	29,975
14	6,300	14,350	1,300	55,895	0	27,975
15	6,000	14,950	0	55,895	0	27,975
16	6,000	14,750	43,715	12,180	0	27,975
17	6,000	8,750	500	11,680	1,740	26,235
18	6,000	6,616	0	11,680	276	25,999
19	3,866	2,750	1,933	9,747	400	25,599
20	6,200	4,820	0	99,747	2,100	23,499
21	4,132	19,318	0	99,747	928	22,531
22	11,630	19,318	0	99,747	0	22,531
23	0	21,318	462	53,547	0	22,531
24	12,920	6,269	3,150	50,397	220	26,111
25	616	7,702	1,100	46,297	1,416	40,775

AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:

5,497 3,308 866

HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:

12,920 43,715 2,100

PERCENT OF AVERAGE:

2355 1,0325 2425

TOTAL ISSUES:

106,384 98,191 8,510

AVERAGE ON HAND PER PERIOD:

11,344 25,191 27,350

AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/O:

0 -31,907 -1,650

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AVERAGE HEADCOUNT: 5,912

TOTAL SUBMITTALS ISSUED: 159

a. QUIN LOI

DATE	A Nations		B Nations (13,500)		C Nations (4,500)	
	Issue	O/H End	Issue	O/H End	Issue	O/H End
8	250	4,450	750	5,070	400	2,498
9	350	3,900	0	5,070	400	2,098
10	250	3,650	0	5,070	400	1,698
11	250	3,400	750	4,320	200	1,298
12	250	3,150	0	5,020	200	3,510
13	250	2,900	0	5,020	900	2,610
14	750	2,650	750	5,070	900	4,534
15	250	2,400	0	5,070	428	4,106
16	1,450	1,700	0	5,070	200	3,026
17	750	1,250	2,250	5,020	120	3,706
18	800	3,390	0	5,020	0	3,706
19	750	2,640	0	5,020	104	3,322
20	677	1,923	900	4,920	0	3,322
21	990	2,751	0	6,756	0	9,972
22	750	3,633	0	8,750	0	9,972
23	950	5,572	200	9,302	0	9,972
24	950	4,572	0	19,302	900	9,472
25	950	4,572	0	19,302	0	10,944

AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:

607 237 297

HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:

1,450 2,250 904

PERCENT OF AVERAGE:

230% 949% 304%

TOTAL ISSUES:

11,777 6,200 5,944

AVERAGE ON HAND FOR PERIOD:

3,244 6,179 5,071

AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/D:

0 -5,321 4511

AVERAGE HEADCOUNT: 654

TOTAL SUBMITTALS ISSUED: 23

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2. Daily Receipts and Method of Transport

a. LBI KNE

DATE	A Rations			B Rations			C Rations		
	Rations	a/t Air	a/t Rwy	Rations	a/t Air	a/t Rwy	Rations	a/t Air	a/t Rwy
8	3,400	11.2	0	0	0	0	12,200	0	33.0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	8,000	10.0	0	11,000	0	16.5	0	0	0
11	10,550	12.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	10,100	13.0	0	47,340	0	79.1	20,000	0	73.0
13	6,006	6.0	0	14,004	0	22.3	10,000	0	73.0
14	19,400	15.9	0	2,000	0	1.5	0	0	0
15	9,000	15.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	23,400	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	10,000	20.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	9,600	3.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	9,900	2.2	0	10,500	0	15.7	0	0	0
22	9,000	7.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	10,000	12.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,333	0	35.0
25	16,700	72.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TOTALS:

172,994 216.1 0 56,624 0 126.1 40,621 0 221.0

b. FBU LOK

DATE	A Rations			B Rations			C Rations		
	Rations	a/t Air	a/t Rwy	Rations	a/t Air	a/t Rwy	Rations	a/t Air	a/t Rwy
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	6,600	0	2.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	6,600	0	11.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	11,000	0	14.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	6,600	0	7.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	6,600	0	5.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	6,600	0	11.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	6,600	0	11.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	5,000	0	13.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	3,006	0	4.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,333	0	35.0
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	14,147	0	31.5

TOTALS:

100,766 0 134.3 90,000 0 135.0 20,400 0 126.5

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e. QUAN LOI: **CONFIDENTIAL**

DATE	A Rations			B Rations			C Rations		
	Rations	a/t	s/t	Rations	a/t	s/t	Rations	a/t	s/t
21	1,778	5.2	0	1,846	2.7	0	6,650	23.2	0
22	1,607	2.6	0	1,984	2.7	0	0	0	0
23	2,914	2.6	0	11,520	40.0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	950	2.2	0	0	0	0	1,476	28.3	0

TOTALS:

7,249	12.6	0	15,390	46.0	0	8,126	28.3	0
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NOTE: No Class I receipts 8 - 20 January 1967 at QUAN LOI.

d. PHU CUONG Refugee camp:

The following items were issued during the period 11-15 Jan

Powdered Milk (cs)	-	80
Beef and Gravy (cs)	-	45
Noodles, Chow Mein (cs)	-	30
Lunchmeat Meat (meal)	-	120,000
Pork Sausage (meal)	-	113,000
Frankfurters (meal)	-	192,000
Eggs, Dehydrated (meal)	-	205,000
Milk, Chocolate, canned (meal)	-	29,000

B. Class III:

(1) Daily and Average Issues and On-Hand Balances:

(a) LAI KHA:

DATE	UP - 4 (60,000)		MUGLS (10,000)		MUGLS (4,000)		MUGLS (4,000)	
	Issues	Q/H End	Issues	Q/H End	Issues	Q/H End	Issues	Q/H End
8		63,000		12,000		35,000		31,000
9	28,000	50,000	1,000	12,000	10,000	40,000	6,000	35,000
10	10,000	80,000	1,000	16,000	5,000	30,000	2,000	55,000
11	10,000	75,000	0	16,000	7,000	43,000	11,000	44,000
12	10,000	65,000	3,000	13,000	8,000	45,000	9,000	45,000
13	16,000	75,000	1,000	12,000	5,000	44,000	3,000	45,000
14	17,500	62,000	3,000	9,000	13,000	36,000	18,000	29,000
15	12,000	50,000	1,000	9,000	13,000	25,000	12,000	18,000
16	13,000	80,000	1,000	16,000	2,000	50,000	2,000	46,000
17	14,000	70,000	3,000	14,000	7,000	46,000	10,000	40,000
18	15,000	85,000	0	14,000	7,000	49,000	5,000	45,000
19	13,000	72,000	1,000	13,000	1,000	48,000	5,000	40,000
20	28,000	74,000	1,000	17,000	8,000	10,000	5,000	35,000
21	2,000	72,000	0	17,000	10,000	30,000	8,000	37,000
22	1,000	71,000	0	17,000	2,000	43,000	2,000	60,000
23	3,000	68,000	0	17,000	8,000	50,000	10,000	50,000
24	8,000	60,000	2,000	15,000	10,000	40,000	5,000	45,000
25	7,000	53,000	0	15,000	4,000	36,000	3,000	42,000

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AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:

10,600 970 5,133 7,250

HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:

23,000 3,000 13,000 12,000

PERCENT OF AVERAGE:

264% 326% 253% 249%

TOTAL ISSUES:

207,510 17,000 120,000 116,000

AVERAGE DAILY Q/T:

69,166 12,000 40,000 41,222

AVERAGE VARIATION FROM Q/Q:

+9,160 -7,112 41,222

b. PER LOT:

DATE	JP - 4 (75,000) Issues Q/H End	AVOLS (15,000) Issues Q/H End	EDOLS (25,000) Issues Q/H End	DEKEL (30,000) Issues Q/H End
8	41,000	14,000	16,775	22,375
9	21,000 45,300	4,000 10,300	5,075 21,000	4,075 39,000
10	5,300 60,000	3,000 12,000	9,100 22,000	10,300 25,700
11	15,000 60,000	2,300 9,620	5,340 21,960	1,300 37,200
12	25,000 54,150	1,600 8,000	4,200 26,960	12,450 29,750
13	19,150 55,000	0 13,000	3,000 23,160	3,500 36,250
14	15,000 65,000	2,320 16,000	3,160 20,000	16,250 25,300
15	49,700 25,300	0 16,000	5,000 23,000	7,600 17,400
16	22,300 43,300	4,000 12,000	4,000 26,000	7,200 20,200
17	12,600 45,700	1,000 16,000	2,100 29,000	5,300 24,400
18	19,700 46,300	4,000 17,300	5,000 29,000	4,400 31,300
19	15,200 42,000	2,000 15,000	7,600 26,400	7,300 27,500
20	14,000 30,000	4,000 11,000	5,400 12,000	7,300 20,000
21	13,400 59,600	1,200 9,000	5,300 23,000	5,000 20,000
22	2,600 62,000	0 14,000	2,300 26,000	2,300 23,000
23	12,000 70,000	0 14,000	2,300 29,000	5,500 22,500
24	20,300 70,000	0 19,000	3,000 36,000	5,300 22,000
25	20,300 55,000	3,000 16,000	0,000 33,300	12,000 25,000

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<u>JP-4</u>	<u>AVGAS</u>	<u>100/100</u>	<u>DIESEL</u>
<u>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:</u>			
10,030	1,307	4,942	6,366
<u>HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:</u>			
47,000	4,000	9,000	16,250
<u>PERCENT OF AVERAGE:</u>			
465%	305%	102%	255%
<u>TOTAL ISSUES:</u>			
354,000	33,000	60,075	110,075
<u>AVERAGE DAILY O/H:</u>			
52,413	13,021	24,042	26,443
<u>AVERAGE VARIATION FROM O/H:</u>			
-22,507	-1,119	-950	-3,557

e. QUIN 101

DATE	JP-4 (40,000)	AVGAS (20,000)	100/100 (5,000)	DIESEL (2,000)
	Issues O/H End	Issues O/H End	Issues O/H End	Issues O/H End
8	115,527	24,630	5,900	55,675
9	300 115,227	0 24,630	300 50,600	0 55,675
10	400 114,027	0 24,630	5,050 45,510	200 55,475
11	2,000 112,027	0 24,630	1,200 44,310	0 55,475
12	300 112,727	0 24,600	575 43,735	145 55,330
13	2,500 109,227	1,100 23,900	300 43,435	0 55,330
14	450 108,777	190 23,210	400 43,135	100 55,230
15	750 108,027	100 23,210	400 42,635	100 55,130
16	3,700 104,327	220 22,350	900 42,135	200 54,930
17	6,027 97,900	1,230 21,160	500 41,635	100 54,830
18	2,700 94,000	0 21,160	300 41,335	500 54,700
19	1,300 93,000	0 21,160	400 40,935	100 54,600
20	2,000 92,000	0 21,160	600 40,335	200 54,400
21	600 91,200	0 21,160	1,900 38,775	50 54,200
22	900 90,000	0 21,110	375 38,025	40 54,000
23	2,300 88,000	100 21,110	600 37,425	450 53,500
24	1,240 86,760	0 20,900	600 36,625	20 53,100
25	300 86,460	0 20,900	200 36,625	20 53,100
<u>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:</u>				
1,370	152	974	111	

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JP-4	AVIATION	MOGAS	DIESEL
<u>HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:</u>			
6,027	1,230	5,090	111
<u>PERCENT OF AVERAGE:</u>			
900%	600%	600%	411%
<u>ADDITIONAL ISSUES:</u>			
29,067	3,970	14,275	2,965
<u>AVERAGE DAILY O/R:</u>			
101,127	22,520	42,130	54,741
<u>AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/O:</u>			
+61,127	+2,520	+37,130	+34,741

d. NEW TIRRE

DATE	JP-4 Issues	O/R End	AVIATION Issues	O/R End	MOGAS Issues	O/R End	DIESEL Issues	O/R End
7	0	30,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	2,777	27,223	0	0	0	0	0	0

2. Daily Receipts and Method of Transport

a. L.I. RHE

DATE	JP-4	AVIATION	MOGAS	DIESEL
	a/t	a/t	a/t	a/t
	Gallons	Galons	Galons	Galons
8	0,000	24	0	0
9	15,000	0	45	0
10	40,000	0	120	5,000
11	5,000	15	0	0
12	20,000	15	45	0
13	6,000	10	0	0
14	16,000	13.5	0	0
15	0	0	1,000	3
16	43,000	9	120	0
17	4,000	12	0	1,000
18	30,000	0	90	0
19	0	0	0	0
20	30,000	0	90	5,000
21	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	15,000
23	0	0	0	15,000
24	0	0	0	15,000
25	0	0	0	0

DATE	JP-4	AVIATION	MOGAS	DIESEL
217,500	122.5	31.0	20,000	15
121,000	42	31.5	100,000	36

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b. FUEL LOG

DATE	JP-4			JP-4			HOGAR			DIESEL		
	Gallons	air	By	Gallons	air	By	Gallons	air	By	Gallons	air	By
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	25,000	0	75	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	15,000	0	45
10	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30	0	0	0
11	15,000	0	45	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
12	20,000	0	60	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
13	20,000	0	60	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	10,000	0	30
14	25,000	0	75	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
15	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	0	0	0
16	55,000	0	165	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
17	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30
18	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30
19	15,000	0	45	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
20	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	5,000	0	15	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15
22	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
23	20,000	0	60	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
24	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15
25	5,000	0	15	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	15,000	0	45

TOTAL: 290,000 0 895.5 35,000 0 105 105,000 0 315 115,000 0 330

c. FUEL LOG and DWT TEND

No receipts during the operation.

3. JP - 4 Consumption Experiences During Assault Airlift of Infantry Battalions.

a. During this operation some airlifts were monitored by personnel at the refueling points and aircraft crews. The following is the results, which appear to contain variables which preclude these figures for detailed planning.

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JP-4 CONSUMPTION		ASSULT AIRLIFT OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS			
UNIT	HE L/C	TOTAL G/L	AV/L	DIST to LZ	SIZE UNIT DATE
BOHEM BOD	10	1700	170	9 MI	One Inf Bn 9 Jan
HEHEHE	10	1610	161		
TOT THINGS	10	1850	185	19 MI	One Inf Bn
HEHEHE	10	1910	190		
VULVARS	10	1850	185	12 MI	One Inf Bn
COMBOS	10	1850	185		
TOT THINGS	10	1240	124	20 MI	One Inf Bn 15 Jan
BOHEM BOD	10	1240	124		
HEHEHE	6	650	108		
TOTAL	66 L/C	13,520	1,352	10 MI	4 Bn
AVERAGE	9.6 L/C	1,592.7	159.3	12.2	1 Bn
	Per Hel Co	Per Hel Co	Per L/C	Per L/C	

b. The following planning factors are used by Combat Aviation Battalions for planning purposes, and have proven reliable.

- (1) An Assault Helicopter Company has 10 HH-1D's.
- (2) To lift one Infantry Company it requires 20 HH-1D's.
- (3) To lift one Infantry Battalion it requires 60 HH-1D's.
- (4) The difference between the straight line distance to the LZ and the deceptio flight route is 15% more distance.
- (5) For combat assaults, HH-1D's carry 1400 lbs of fuel, or 210.4 gals each.
- (6) Fuel consumption of the HH-1D is 12 lbs, or 1.9 gals, per minute at 30 knots speed.
- (7) "Clicks" will fly 2 hrs on a fuel load. Gunships will fly 1.5 hours.
- (8) One "Click" will use 550 lbs, or 82.5 gals per flying hour.
- (9) Most Infantry Battalion lifts use 2 Assault Helicopter Companies making 3 sorties per company (total of 60 sorties).
- (10) JP-4 weighs 6.42 lbs per gal. To convert lbs to gals multiply by 0.156.
- (11) The more aircraft used in a lift, the greater the fuel consumption rate will be.

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C. Class II - IV

1. All Class II & IV support for operation CHINA FILL was provided by the 3rd FSC, LVI MHL. A breakdown of issues of fast moving items follows.

Paper Plates (ea)	-	59,533
Paper Cups (ea)	-	67,000
Plastic Knives (ea)	-	74,000
Plastic Forks (ea)	-	75,000
Plastic Spoons (ea)	-	74,000
Battery B. 30 (ea)	-	900
Battery B. 30 (ea)	-	12,550
Water Cans, 5 gal (ea)	-	150
Spray, aerosol,		
insect repellent (ea)	-	1,366
Soap, GI (lbe)	-	60
De Lize clothing pack (ea)	-	6

2. The following Class II & IV items were furnished in support of refugee and CHINA MLI resettlement:

Tent, GP - Mod	-	44
Tent, Horizontal	-	150
55 - gal drums	-	926*
Field Kitchen fire units	-	6
Field Kitchen cooking utensils	-	29
Field Kitchen stove cabinets	-	2
Shower unit	-	1
Water Can, 5 gal	-	1,125*
Water Trailers, 400 gal	-	15
Water Trailers, 500 gal	-	2
Gasoline Tank truck,		
500 gal	-	1
Pump, 55 GPM	-	1
Light set	-	1
Generator, 1.5 KW	-	1
Generator, 1.5 KW	-	2
Barbed wire, rolls	-	34*
Concertina, Bille	-	13*
Light, GP, 300	-	5*

NOTE: Items with asterisk (*) were outright issues, all others were furnished on a loan basis.

3. Total tonnage of Class II & IV items issued:

a. TOTAL Class II & IV tonnage:	45 a/t
b. Carrier Material only:	30 a/t

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D. Class V:

1. LAI HIE MSP storage objectives:

The following storage objectives were maintained initially at the LAI HIE MSP. During the latter part of the operation these objectives were adjusted downward:

ITEM		STOCK/AGE OBJECTIVE
17mm	HE	117 rds
5"	HE	1200 rds
105mm	HE	32400 rds
4.2"	HE	792 rds
105mm	HE	3960 rds
60mm	HE	1800 rds
40mm	HE	3200 rds
120mm	HE (TK)	3000
90mm	HE (TK)	620 rds
90mm	HE (TK)	960 rds

Items not listed were stocked in accordance with USARPAC Reg 710-15.

2. Ammunition Tonnage:

Approximately 7934.09 tons of ammunition were shipped from the LOGO HIEH Line Depot in support of Operation CHINA FALLS. This quantity is broken down as follows:

	AMMUNITION	SMALL ARMS
Land LOC:	6376.25	436.99
Air LOC:	1146.27	4.82
TOTALS:	7522.22 c/s	441.81 c/s

3. Class V Consumption (Issue) Data

	Tonnage Issued (all Land LOC)
Small Arms:	64,003 c/s
Artillery:	308,439 c/s

4. Expenditure data (Artillery)

	By Rule Type	Total
MMR	MMR (TK)	MMR (TK)
4.2" Mortar	17 Rds/Tube/Day	1642
105mm How	199 Rds/Tube/Day	51915
155mm How	100 Rds/Tube/Day	30043
175mm How	32 Rds/Tube/Day	1006
5" How	68 Rds/Tube/Day	3940

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(e) Services:

(1) Graves Registration - remains processed

(a) LAI KHE 30
(b) PHU LOI 13
(c) QUAN LOI 0

(2) Showers provided (1st Log Cnd)

(a) LAI KHE 3,523
(b) PHU LOI 3,256
(c) QUAN LOI 2,227

(3) Lbs of Laundry Processed (1st Log Cnd)

(a) LAI KHE 16,136
(b) PHU LOI 15,490
(c) QUAN LOI 6,188

e. Maintenance

(1) 701st Maintenance Battalion: Due to the limits of the area of operations, the service rendered to the division did not differ greatly from the normal day-to-day support operations. Other than usual technical assistance visits, no special maintenance teams were organized for the operations. The back-up support units for the division remained the same. The main repair parts re-supply source was HQ and A company, DI AN, which in turn supplied the forward support companies: B (DI AN), C (LAI KHE), and D (PHUOC VINH). Of the latter, C Company was involved to a greater degree due to its close proximity to the Iron Triangle. On occasion, contact teams were sent by the company in support of their customers.

(2) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the 701st Maintenance Battalion experienced the following workload:

Job orders received	3,268
Jobs orders completed	3,455
Records	16,465
Issues	12,014
Total Transactions	27,816
Average ASL on hand	608
Average demand accommodation	725
Tons moved to Forward Support Companies	253
Technical Assistance Visits	299

(3) The following data lists the important major and items involved in Operation CEDAR FALLS. In all cases, the number of items reported represents an average figure due to the shifting of tactical units to and from other concurrent operations. The number of major assemblies replaced represents the type of work done on these major and items.

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TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	AVERAGE NR SUPPORTED	REPAIR/REPLACEMENTS
M113	75	5 Transmissions 7 Engines 2 Sprockets 5 Road Wheel Arms 1 Transfer 80 Road Wheels
M113A1	63	1 Transmission 3 Engines 5 Road Wheel Arms
M243	30	1 Transmission 1 Final Drive 26 Track Blocks 20 Road Wheels 3 Road Wheel Arms
M32A1	6	22 Sprockets
M577A1	13	1 Engine
M578	5	30 Road Wheels 151 Track Pads
M58	5	1 Transmission 1 Final Drive 1 Engine 1 Road Wheel Arm
105 How	56	2 Tubes 3 Recoil Mechanisms 1 Sight
155 How	20	6 Tubes 6 Recoil Mechanisms 5 Obturator Spindles
8" How	5	2 Recoil Mechanisms 1 Obturator Spindles 3 Sights 1 Counter Recoil Mechanism 1 Manti 1 Converter

(A) If any comparison can be drawn between Operation CEDAR FALLS and earlier operations, it may be said that consumption rates of repair parts and maintenance efforts reported were at lower levels for Operation CEDAR FALLS than previously experienced. This is probably due to the better maintenance posture of the division at the present time.

d. Medical

(1) The operation was primarily supported by Company B, located at LAI KHE base camp. Company A, 8 Jan through 11 Jan, and Company C, 11 Jan through 17 Jan, medically supported Operation LAI KHE throughout the operation. All other elements of the battalion supported the operation from their base camps by being ready to reinforce the forward companies or to send out a treatment section as required. Two

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air ambulances were located at LAI KHE in general support. These air ambulances were controlled by Company B. 1st Medical Battalion also supported the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the operation.

(2) (C) Total number of patients treated:

(a) DRHA	41
(b) ERHA	263
(c) NBI & DIS	1,087
(d) Vietnamese civilians	412
(e) ARVN	29
(f) Viet Cong	52
(g) Viet Cong Suspects	4
(h) American civilians	1

(3) (U) Medical services rendered:

The 1st Medical Battalion rendered the normal services to all elements of the Division and units we were directed to support. The normal services are hospitalization, treatment, evacuation, dental care, psychiatric care, and medical re-supply.

(4) (C) Air evacuations:

Battle casualties in urgent and priority categories were evacuated to the 3d Surgical, 3d Field, 93d Evacuation and 12th Evacuation Hospitals according to the type wound or disease and the tactical situation at the time of evacuation. Helicopters made 161 field patient pick-ups from the operational area in the vicinity of LAI KHE and on two occasions two additional helicopters were requested to assist in evacuation. On 13 Jan a CH-47 Chinook was used to assist in evacuating 23 patients from the clearing station at LAI KHE to Army hospitals.

(5) (C) Medical Supplies:

During the operation 39,300 pounds of medical supplies were shipped to units involved in the support of the operation. In addition, 5,500 pounds of medical supplies were furnished for the refugee camp at PHU CUONG. All medical re-supply was accomplished by dust-off aircraft. Normal supply support was accomplished without any major problems. Prior planning to increase our stock levels by 25% made it possible to fill 90% of all requisitions immediately and the remainder within a 24 hour period.

(6) (C) Males Blood:

A total of 229 units of whole blood was shipped to units in support of the operation.

c. Transportation

(1) Division Transportation Officer:

(a) During Operation CEDAR FALLS the Division Transportation Office was divided into two main elements, one functioning at DI AN and one at LAI KHE. The DI AN element was composed of personnel to operate the airstrip and the traffic control center. Airstrip operations included controlling all cargo loading of aircraft. The prompt movement of replacement personnel to and from the forward area was also accomplished by airstrip control personnel.

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(b) The traffic control center was responsible for road clearances in and around the DI AN area to include SAIGON. They further coordinated all convoy movements in the division TAGE with the DTO element in the forward area.

(c) The Division Transportation Officer and the Assistant Division Transportation Officer operated the DTO section of the Logistics Operation Control Center. From here, all fixed-wing traffic in the division was controlled along with all convoy movement. Requests for aircraft were received, processed and passed on to II FFV headquarters. Allocations were then made requesting units. Requests for convoy clearances were submitted to the DTO element at LAI KHE as well as to the TCC at DI AN. Assistance was also given to the Military Police in lining up convoys departing the LAI KHE area and assisting in their control as they departed.

(d) All convoy scheduling for route 13 was done in LAI KHE. The procuring of trucks for various re-supply missions was done by the LAI KHE DTO element.

(e) Support to the division was rendered by the 48th Transportation Group. In addition to the vehicles supplied for the evacuation of refugees from BEN SUC to PHU LOI.

(2) Transportation Data:

(a) Division Transportation Offices:

(1) Convoy Data:

During Operation CGLM FALLS 18 re-supply convoys were run to LAI KHE. Included in these were 2,000 re-supply vehicles carrying approximately 14,000 tons of supply, mostly class V.

(2) Airlift Data (Logistical):

The following sorties were flown in

logistical support:

1. LAI KHE: 34 sorties C 123; 16 sorties C7A
2. PHUOC VINH: 26 sorties C 123; 13 sorties C7A
3. QUAN LOI: 26 sorties C 123; 13 sorties C7A
4. MINH THANH: 2 sorties C7A
5. DU BIEP: 1 sortie C7A

TOTAL SORTIES: 86 C 123
45 C7A
TOTAL: 131

(b) 1st Supply and Transport Battalions

Convoys DI AN to LAI KHE:

DATE (JAN)	TOTAL NO. VEHICLES	CL I a/a	CL II & IV a/a	CL III (BULK) a/a	CL III (PKG) a/a
8	8	4	4	0	0
9	9	0	0	0	0
10	22	2	5	15	0
11	24	15	2	7	0
12	24	15	2	7	0
13	12	9	2	0	1

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DATE (JAN)	TOTAL NO. VEHICLES	CL I a/t	CL II & IV a/t	CL III (BULK) a/t	CL III (PKG) a/t
14	3	2	1	0	0
15	3	2	1	0	0
16	27	0	5	20	2
17	2	0	2	0	0
18	8	0	0	8	0
19	2	1	1	0	0
20	12	0	1	11	0
21	5	5	0	0	1
22	10	0	0	9	1
23	6	0	2	2	1
TOTAL	153	40 a/t	26 a/t	80 a/t	7 a/t

NOTE: All vehicles carrying bulk CL III were dispatched by the 64th GBN

f. Communications

(1) Operations:

A definite improvement in the operation of the communication equipment plus an increase in the quality of VHF system was evident during this operation. This can be attributed to: the training classes the battalion conducted prior to the operation; and the reorganizing of Battalion Systems Control.

(2) FM Radio:

(a) Greater range was realized by the infantry battalions by having them erect 60 foot masts with multiple heads where feasible.

(b) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the Division realized the need to give the infantry battalion commanders more communications between the ground forces and the UH-1D helicopter. The task of improving the communication capability of the UH-1D was given to the Signal Battalion. The battalion R & D team planned, designed and built a console that could be mounted on the ceiling of the UH-1D. The console consisted of three AN/PRC 25's plus two control heads and four headsets. This gave the commander the capability of four monitoring positions, two transmitting, plus intercom between all personnel utilizing the console and the pilots. One major advantage of this console is that it can be installed and removed in less than three minutes. Also, the console is out of the way and allows the helicopter to be utilized in air lifts without the necessity of removing the console. Further, no additional radios are required other than what the commander has in his possession. In other words, the commander brings his own organic radios (AN/PRC 25) with him and inserts them into the console for airborne operation. Once he lands, he can use the same radios for portable operation. The radio's power in or out of the console comes from an authorized dry cell battery.

(3) VHF: The MRC-112 proved to be advantageous in establishing a rapid 4 channel system. Being light and easily air lifted it can be deployed rapidly and put on the air in a relatively short period of time. One major disadvantage is that the radio utilizes the same frequencies as the tactical FM net and frequencies must be carefully selected.

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(4) TTY: The handling time for teletype traffic was reduced significantly during the period of the operation. This handling time reduction is attributed to new procedures whereby tactical traffic was expedited by typing the format line only and processing the tape immediately and to concerted effort on the part of the GIC and NEO supervisors.

(5) The operation must be considered, as far as operating here in Vietnam is concerned, routine. The Battalion was very extensively committed, more than ever before, therefore leaving less equipment for back up. The construction of 120 foot AB216 Tower the Division Forward location allowed greater distances to be obtained from VHF system along with retaining high quality voice circuits.

g. Personnel

(1) U.S. losses during Operation CEDAR FALLS were 32 KIA and 181 MIA.

(2) Enemy losses during Operation CEDAR FALLS were 389 VC KIA (BC), 180 VC PW, 471 CREW HOI, and 365 detainees.

11. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. An engineer, artillery navy was innovated to seal the confluence of the SICON and the THI THUAN Rivers at the southern tip of the Iron Triangle. The engineers used two M16 floats as rafts, powered by a 27 foot utility boat. A quad .50 cal and 6 in. .30 cal machine guns were mounted on the vessel. Two of these craft were constructed and proved very effective at controlling river traffic and searching inlets.

b. The use of bulldozers to open jungle as a part of combat operations was initiated during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Fifty-two bulldozers took part in the operation. A dozer-infantry concept was employed with dozer teams consisting of two tank dozers and six bulldozers. The tank dozers preceded the bulldozers and cut through the jungle, exposed to sniper fire and booby traps. The dozers that followed cut smashes through the jungle along the infantry route of march. The concept proved very practical and effective. 2,233 acres of jungle in the Iron Triangle were dozed away. Numerous roads and LZ's were cut throughout the area.

c. Acetylene was used for destruction of almost 10 kilometers of tunnels. Generators were used to pump acetylene into the tunnels, where it was ignited. Acetylene was found excellent for destruction of tunnels with not more than 7 foot overburden. Later experiments using HE and acetylene together proved more successful for tunnels as deep as 15-20 feet below the surface.

d. The 11th ACR employed the XENON searchlight mounted on the helicopter. The device proved to be ineffective when the aircraft was at 1,000 ft or higher. Accordingly, the attempt to conduct night aerial surveillance of river banks and rivers was not considered successful.

e. The 2d Bde employed flame throwers to assist in the capture of enemy personnel located in bunkers and tunnels. The flame throwers reduced the amount of oxygen in the tunnels and produced an adverse psychological effect on the VC.

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12. (C) Commander's Analysis: Operation CEDAR FALLS was long overdue. The Iron Triangle and nearby village of BEN SUC had been lucrative targets for some time. However, this was the first time sufficient forces and equipment were available to properly execute such an undertaking.

The Triangle had been a notorious VC haven. From its confines attacks were launched on the surrounding area, and VC control over such areas was unchallenged. Railliers confirmed that the Triangle contained numerous tunnels and bunkers and huge stores of foodstuffs and equipment. Continual bombing and artillery fires certainly disrupted VC activity, but civilian occupants in the area hampered free-fire activities. Additionally, B-52 strikes and artillery bombardment could not be exploited with ground troops. There were simply no access routes, air or ground, into the heart of the Triangle. The few existing overland roads and foot trails were heavily mined and booby trapped. The 100 square kilometers of the Iron Triangle provided a secure jungle haven which no one division could seal, search and destroy.

BEN SUC, northwest of the Triangle, was VC dominated. It served as a major tax collection headquarters for the heavy traffic moving up and down the SAIGON River between DAN TIENG and SAIGON. It was also a logistical headquarters. VC supplies were brought in by road and boat and transported through BEN SUC to the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and the Iron Triangle. If BEN SUC was threatened by US or ARVN forces, the VC retreated into their nearby jungle base camps.

We had no idea at the beginning that Operation CEDAR FALLS would turn out to be the most significant operation thus far conducted by the 1st Infantry Division. It is most significant in many respects. First of all, it was aimed at the headquarters, Military Region IV. This headquarters is responsible for operations in and around SAIGON. The headquarters directed attacks on TAN SON NHUT and on US troop billets in SAIGON itself.

Because the 27th Division started two days earlier than we did, the bulk of the personnel of Military Region IV came across the river to the north, in the operation area of the 1st Division.

Although the 1st Division killed twice as many VC in Operation EL PASO and ATTLESBORO, the number of VC who were captured and who surrendered in Operation CEDAR FALLS, when added to the killed, brings the grand total to the largest achieved in any single operation in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

The US forces involved captured, mostly in tunnels and caves, the vast majority of the records and plans of Military Region IV. Over 235,000 pages of MR IV documents have been processed by MACV documents section. Some of these documents described in detail the activities of MR IV from 1962 through 1966, and their intelligence value is tremendous. These contain the strengths of VC units, the names of their members, the towns and villages in which they operate, some of their meeting places, and a great amount of information on exactly how they operate and what their future plans are.

In the course of the Operation, 7,000 refugees were resettled from the area. These refugees, who were mostly VC families, provided the labor corps and the logistic support for VC units throughout the entire area. The medical facility discovered by the 1st Battalion 28th Infantry contained medical supplies in a depot on which all the main force regiments in the III Corps area drew for their principal support.

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For the first time in the history of the war in Vietnam, infantry-engineer bulldozer teams cut their way through the jungle, finding and destroying base camps, creating landing zones, pushing back the jungle from roads which can now be used for rapid repenetration of the area. One entire jungle area was completely eliminated. All in all, the engineers cut down 9 square kilometers of solid jungle. This is a technique which will be used again in the penetration of other VC war zones and base areas--a technique pioneered by the 1st Division. Everyone who worked with the engineers recognizes the tremendous contribution they made to the success of the operation.

In addition to the destruction of the base area of Military Region IV, the most significant and unexpected result was the surrender, as of 26 January, of 471 Viet Cong. This has never happened before in the war in Vietnam, and in this area at least, is a reflection of the complete breakdown in confidence and morale on the part of the VC.

Although I do not expect the war to end quickly, I believe this has been a decisive turning-point in the III Corps area; a tremendous boost to the morale of the Vietnamese Government and Army; and a blow from which the VC in this area may never recover.

13. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions: Operation CEDAR FALLS proved to be one of the more successful operations of the 1st Infantry Division and may be a major turning point in the III Corps Tactical Area. The operation significantly eliminated VC supply bases and staging areas. The enemy's fighting strength was reduced by over 1,000 (KIA, PW, and ralliers), and his available labor force, in the form of the six thousand inhabitants, was removed from his control. The removal of this labor force and agricultural resources has significantly reduced the Iron Triangle's value as a logistics and headquarters base. The enemy-initiated incidents decreased dramatically during the latter part of January and February. This decrease is probably due to Operation CEDAR FALLS. The use of engineer-infantry teams in jungle clearing operations was very effective. The removal of jungle growth is the only sure means of denying unobserved use of the area by VC forces.

b. Lessons Learned:

During Operation CEDAR FALLS, bulldozers required refueling in as many as six locations daily. Normally, field refueling is performed by a POL team of two men with a 50 GPM pump transported in a CH-47 with bladders slung underneath. Refueling in this manner would have required two CH-47 teams all day. A more efficient method was developed during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Units accomplished their own refueling by having a dozer dig itself into a trench deeper than ground level. 55 gallon drums of diesel fuel were placed on the edge of the trench and gravity-fed into the fuel tank. The same method will be used if similar operations are conducted in the future.

Present TO&L personnel are insufficient to operate battery and battalion fire direction centers on a 24 hour basis. However, there is a continual requirement to operate both fire direction centers on a 24 hour basis since batteries are very frequently separated from the battalion by great distances and must always be prepared to operate independently. Recent investigation of artillery incidents indicated that extremely long duty hours of fire direction center personnel is a contributing factor to the incident. TO&L personnel authorizations must be increased to insure competent, accurate fire direction procedures.

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LC construction is a continual problem in jungle terrain. The M-1 chain demolition and Bangalore torpedos have proved very effective against bamboo thickets and thick underbrush. Positive control is increased if the demolitions are fired electrically.

The desert team of two tank dozers and six bulldozers proved very effective during Operation CEDAR FALLS, particularly when working in a joint effort with infantry. Infantry provided security, whenever the infantry stopped, dozers cleared resupply LC's. The dozers destroyed tunnels, fortifications and base camps as they were discovered. This technique is recommended for use in future operations. One or two APC's or a VM should be attached to each team for maintenance support.

Good 50's were belittled by CM-47 into ambush positions inaccessible to track and wheel vehicles. The results were excellent. Positions were secured by infantry, and, if necessary, platforms were constructed. Due to site selection the machine guns were able to engage targets at all ranges.

The GVN has established the GREEN BOI program to provide a means for the VC to return to government control. Due to the relatively limited assets and shortage of trained leaders available to GVN, it is essential that U. S. military units assist the GVN in making the program work. Experience shows that the following are required:

- (1) US troops must be informed so they will honor promises made.
- (2) Command interest is required to obtain universal support.
- (3) Division representatives must be assigned to GREEN BOI centers to assist in the operation of the center and to keep the Division informed.
- (4) Higher efforts must support the program.
- (5) Aid in job placement of defectors after release from the centers is necessary.

Defectors have a detailed knowledge of VC methods and beliefs. Knowing how the VC think, they are able to prepare excellent propaganda material. As a living example of the benefits of defecting, they are the best face-to-face salesman for the GVN program. They are also an excellent intelligence source.

During Operation CEDAR FALLS it became apparent that VC combat units move regularly and do not have time to dig tunnels. They rely on foxholes, trenches and bunkers for protection. Tunnels are dug and inhabited by relatively permanent VC elements. Therefore, although not primary, efforts to frequently reveal the general location of tunnels, efforts to precisely locate tunnels should be focused on local cadre and rear service personnel.

The 7,000 refugees resettled during Operation CEDAR FALLS caused major problems in transportation, site clearing, shelter erection, provision of water and food and caring for livestock. The military has the necessary assets to take care of massive initial problems encountered. Experience has shown that the GVN assisted by the Office of Civilian Operations can assume full responsibility for refugees after a camp is established. Military units must plan to handle the initial phase of any disorbis refugee relocation.

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Experience has shown the value of the pictorial supplement and the use of low oblique photographs by the 1st Aviation Battalion. The battalion briefs all flight leaders prior to any mission with these graphic aids. Therefore, the actual reconnaissance can be accomplished in one pass over the objective area, thus minimizing the probability of the reconnaissance flights giving away an impending operation. The flight leaders in turn by use of the photographs are able, to better brief their separate flights giving each member of the flight a vivid tool in picking out the assigned LZ.

In the event of low level air assaults on an objective, it is mandatory that each flight leader is able to positively identify his assigned LZ, i.e., "LZ 1 will be marked with yellow smoke, LZ 2 with green smoke, etc".

To keep to a minimum time spent on the ground by paratroopers, re-landing points must be planned far with sufficient personnel to prepare the ammunition and assist the crews in re-landing the aircraft. Re-landing points and refueling points should be in close proximity to each other. This insures the objective area with continuous coverage during the initial stages of the air assault.

FOR THE COMMANDER

E. J. HEDGECOCK
E. J. HEDGECOCK
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

ATTACHMENTS:

- 1 - List of Commendations Withdrawn, Hqs. DA
- 2 - Operations Overview See fold-outs
- 3 - 21 Hqs After Action Report
- 4 - 31 Hqs After Action Report
- 5 - 11th Air Division After Action Report Distributed separately.
- 6 - Division Artillery After Action Report
- 7 - 121st Airborne Division After Action Report
- 8 - 173rd Airborne Division After Action Report (Distributed Separately)
- 9 - Pay Reports Withdrawn, Hqs. DA

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO U.S. FORCES 96345

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JTB:JMP

14 February 1967

Subject: Combat Operations After Action Report (MCR/CS/J3/J2)

From: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: JTB:JMP
APO San Francisco 96345

To: Commanding General
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J3
APO U.S. Forces 92243

1. (U) Name and Type of Operations: Operation CLAR FALLS: an airborne assault to seal and search the village of B. SUC, the preparation for and the evacuation of the inhabitants of B. SUC in conjunction and cooperation with THUD and GVN, and search and destroy operations in a no.

2. (U) Date of Operations: 080725H Jan 1967 to 171700H Jan 1967.

3. (C) Summary: Operation CLAR FALLS was initiated by Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Plan 30-66 dated 301200H December 1966. The B. SUC CP and 2/18 Inf departed B. SUC at 070650H by road to B. SUC Airfield then airlifted to B. SUC TILG (X7495474) closing at 0855H in preparation for Operation CLAR FALLS. The 2/16 and 1/18 Inf continued operations in B. SUC and L. SUC respectively and became OIC 3 1st Bde at 070700H Jan 1967. The 1/26 Inf was airlifted from PHUOC VIEH at 070945H closing B. SUC TILG at 1109H becoming OPCOM 2d Bde. Co B 2/2 Inf (Mech) was attached to 1/7 Arty (-). 1/7 (-) was airlifted by CH-47 at 0805H closing Arty Base IV at 1424H. The operation commenced at 080725H with the conduct of an airborne assault by the 1/26 Inf (+) to seal the village of B. SUC. The next two days the Bde prepared for and commenced the evacuation of the inhabitants of the B. SUC combined with a thorough search of the village. S&D operations were also conducted to the N of the village. 2/18 Inf remained NVP until becoming OPCOM 3d Bde at 100700H. 2/28 Inf became OPCOM 2d Bde at 110800H conducting S&D operations to the N of B. SUC. Bde received 1st Div Prog O 1-67 dated 071850H Jan and prepared for and executed the following missions: 1. Be prepared to assist in the opening of the road from B. SUC to B. SUC; 2. On order provide one rifle company to reinforce and escort TF Bravo; 3. Be prepared for OPCOM J. S. Task Force; 4. After arrival J. S. TF, 1/26 Inf in B. SUC in readiness for employment as Div reserve (1 hour alert); 5. Secure B. SUC Route via B. SUC. The evacuation of all inhabitants with personal belongings, the destruction of B. SUC and S&D ops in area continued until the completion of the operation on 17 Jan 1967.

a. Reporting Officers: Col and James A. Grimsley, Commanding Officer, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division

b. Task Organization:

- (1) 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry: Lt Col H. H. Big
- (2) 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry: Lt Col Alvin B. Pendleton
- (3) 3d Battalion, 28th Infantry: Lt Col L. E. Swenson
- (4) Co B, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry: Captain Edward L. C.
- (5) HHC, 2d Brigade, 1st Inf Div: Captain Sharon A. Goldberg
- (6) 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery: Lt Col George L. McFadden
- (7) Division Tunnel Team: Lt Charles Barber, Team Leader

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 17 YEARS
DOO ONE 5290.10

ANNEX C
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4. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operations: All intelligence concerning the operation was received from the Division G-2. Units and organizations that were reported to be in the area were the 7th Bn, 165th Regiment, 661 Local Force Company, the headquarters and security elements of Military Region 4 Committee, the BINH DUONG Province Committee, and local guerrillas in the around BEI SUC (XT587735). General locations were known but none of the units were reported in the brigade area of operations. There was no estimate of the strength of these units.

b. Enemy Situation During Operations: There was no contact made with an organized unit following the insertion of the Brigade in the operational area. Contact was made on a daily basis with small groups of VC in and around BaL SUC. These were apparently VC elements guarding cohes and local guerrillas.

Following the aml of HEC-50C on 6 January 1967, 104 individuals were detained. Of these twenty-eight were classified as Viet Cong. Most of those were local VC who were of little intelligence value and had virtually no information. On 12 Jan the Platoon leader of 82 Platoon (139 Group) was captured. This platoon transported rice in the area as well as B&B S&C. Captured documents and interrogation of prisoners indicated that this area was designated Snow Zone G by the VC and Rear Service Unit (Group 8) was the major unit normally stationed in the area.

6. Terrain and Weather: Weather was excellent during the operation. Days were clear and relatively cool. There was no precipitation of f.g. Terrain in the operational area was flat along the SAIKOK River with dried rice paddies extending inland 500 to 1,000 meters. Observations and fields of fire were excellent in this area. Cover and concealment were provided by the dikes between rice fields. To the north of the SAIKOK River vegetation consisted of old rubber plantations and dense jungle. Concealment in the jungle was excellent, however, fields of fire were restricted. The SAIKOK River could be crossed by boat. The DUT MO Stream via XT602341 could be forded by truck vehicles and foot troops. A ford or bridge would have to be constructed for wheeled vehicles.

d. Fortifications: In hamlets were located (see Annex 1 and 2). Also one fortified village was located via XT5636. The hamlets had reinforced sides with short tunnels leading to dug shelters. The tunnels were still occupied. Approximately 335 bunkers were located and destroyed, the majority of which were used for protection from airstrikes and artillery. Major means of defense included destroying these fortifications as well as airstrikes and artillery follow-up by occupation of the area.

One major tunnel complex was found in the town of El DUC (see Annex 3). Tunnel rats were used to explore and destroy this complex.

The night discovery made by Lt. Briggs was the location of 828 tons of rice. Cracks were located along the HWY 10 Street from XT602345 to XT603380. The rice was stored on platforms with tin roofs over them and the four walls open. Fifty tons of rice was found in the village of Da NUC. Following the vacuation of the inhabitants of 828 SOC, ball-bombs started destruction and caused damage and cracks. These were holes lined with woven matting, one to two feet below the surface and filled with loose rice (See Annex 4 for illustrations and photos taken on Operation CHALK HILL).

8. Civil Action and Psychology: 1961 Harvard Symposium

(1) Civic Action: National Civic Action program during the operation were limited to one which was held on the first day of the operation in the village of E-50C by the 2ND MACG team. A total of 357 personnel were screened, examined, and treated. 177 personnel also served as a meal to 3,612 personnel on the same day. The civic action/civil affairs functions performed during the remainder of the operation were confined to evacuation of the populace and their belongings to isolate the enemy/entire and rice, bagging of rice found in numerous enemy war houses, and destruction of houses, fruit trees, and rice which could not be evacuated. All of these activities were undertaken jointly by TF-26 and 2d Bde 3-5 actions. Amounts of personnel, animals and material evacuated were as follows:

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BOI		CH-47					
Date	Personnel	Rice	Own/Cattle	Personnel	Rice	Carts	Pigs
11 Jan	872	unk	11	315	none	None	19
12 Jan	555	unk	113	398	98,000#	70	8
13 Jan	308	unk	232	195	149,000#	45	none
14 Jan	181	140,000#	76	none	none	5	none
15 Jan	No lift this date			No lift this date			
16 Jan	0	140,000		No lift this date			
Sub Totals	1,916	280,000#	432	899	247,000#	120	27
Totals	2,815	527,000#	432	899		120	27

In addition to the amounts of rice indicated above, each family which was evacuated took some amount of rice along. No figures are available as to how much rice was taken on board boats during the first three days of the evacuation, but estimates of more than fifty (50) tons have been made.

When first informed of the evacuation, the populace became extremely concerned, and while not openly hostile, were definitely unfriendly. Once the Province Chief, Col Ly Tay Ba, had spoken to the citizens, and had informed them that the evacuation would take place, and that no alternatives would be entertained, all personnel seemed to accept the fact, and seemed eager to leave. It is interesting to note that in not one case did the citizens make any attempt whatsoever to take with them the rice which was later found in caches underground. In all instances these caches were left undisturbed by the inhabitants of the houses and were discovered by demolitions or bulldozer operators during the destruction phase. Many houses were destroyed by bulldozer operations, thatched houses were destroyed largely by fire. Fruit trees were cut down by personnel, or uprooted by bulldozers. Those rice caches which could not be salvaged or barged for evacuation due to time limitations were soaked with diesel fuel and left in place. In some cases, rice was dumped on walls or burned inside houses.

(2) Psychological Operations: Because of the nature of this mission, Psy War activities by 2d Bn C-3 section were limited to the first day of the operation. During the conduct of operations on 8 January, three missions were flown for a total of seven hours loudspeaker broadcast time. The first mission was conducted over the village of BEN SUC during the morning to inform the villagers that the village was surrounded by Allied Forces, that they should remain in their houses and wait for instructions, and that they would not be harmed. The second mission was flown to inform the populace of the evacuation, and instruct them to gather in the center of the village at the school house. The third mission was flown along the highway to the East of BEN SUC, informing all personnel there that the area was to be evacuated, and that they were to gather all their possessions and move to the school house in BEN SUC.

These missions were highly successful in that all instructions given were followed by the populace rapidly and to the letter. No incidents occurred in which the explanation that "I did not understand" was given. Rules of engagement were plain, and were understood. Personnel from outside the immediate environs of the village followed instructions and came into BEN SUC within a very short time.

(a) Conclusions:

1. That messages used were clear, well-phrased and easily understood.

2. That the use of Psy Ops aircraft materially assisted in the success of the cordon and search, and in the subsequent evacuation of the community.

(b) Recommendations:

1. That Psy Ops missions continue to be used in such future operations.

2. That commanders at all levels examine plans for future operations to determine the advisability of including Psy Ops activities.

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Annex 1 to Part 4 (Intelligence) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

The following information pertains to the Base camp located at XT76347.

a. The base camp was discovered by C 1/26 Inf on 12 Jan 67 and was reentered 131320H with demolition teams and tunnel rats to explore then destroy the complex. Only one (4) bunker of the four was damaged by indirect fire and air strikes both of which were very extensive. The base camp had one well-used trail entering from the west and the thick natural undergrowth was such that the camp could not be seen from the air.

b. Building #1 was approximately 9' wide by 18' long and 10' below the surface of the ground. The building had cement on all four sides and flooring about 5" thick. The only overhead protection was afforded by sheets of tin. On the NW corner was a bunker with no overhead protection. Beds and tables were on the floor.

Building #2 was approximately 9' wide by 12' long and 10' below the surface. It had concrete identical to Building #1. Overhead cover over one-half of the structure consisted of 5" logs and 3" packed dirt. There were no fighting positions located near the building and beds were located on the 1st floor and on top of the overhead protection. Buildings #3 and #4 were exactly identical to building #2.

c. Bunker #5 located north of the camp and connected by tunnel to building #3 had overhead protection of 5" logs and 3 feet of packed dirt. There were four firing apertures, each 2" high and 4-6" wide and each could cover an area over 100m wide to the front.

d. The second level tunnel going north was made so that at every 10-15m it came to a dead end; and a trap door on the floor connected with a tunnel which went down-around and back up to the other side and on the same level with the fake dead end. There were two small holes in the dead end permitting one man to observe and fire through the tunnel.


e. It is estimated that the four bunkers/buildings are 100% destroyed and the tunnel system 75% destroyed connecting the buildings. It is thought that this complex possibly could have been a safe haven for high ranking VC passing through. (See Appendix 1 for Diagram).

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Annex 3 to Part 4 (INTELLIGENCE) - Operation CEDAR FALLS




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Annex 2 to Part 4 (INTELLIGENCE) - Operation GEAR FALLS

The following information pertains to the Base Camp located at XT566370.


a. West Camp: The four buildings were all 10' x 10'. Building #1 was only 4' below surface and was used only for sleeping apparently. Buildings 2 & 3 were 7' below surface and had overhead cover of about 1 foot of dirt and 1 foot of logs. The kitchen was above ground and had a tin roof above it. Building #2 had a large amount of photographic material and is assumed to be the location where film was developed. None of the buildings were burned and the tunnels were left untouched.

b. East Camp: This camp, which might consist of more buildings than indicated, was assumed to be the headquarters of a propaganda unit (LCH 664/3865A). The buildings were very large, 12' x 35' and 6-7' below the surface. All buildings had overhead cover consisting of one foot of log and 1 foot of dirt. In building #4 there were three large tables and at least 10 lbs of loose paper, the type used to make small envelopes and letters. Due to the limited time the area was not searched properly. The buildings were burned to the ground (See Appendix 2 - Diagram).

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Appendix 1 to Annex 2 to Part 4 (Operation CEDAR FALLS)



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Annex A to Part 4 (INTELLIGENCE) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

Hard installations and caches found on Operation CEDAR FALLS:

XT585334 - tunnel	XT596346 - tunnel complex
XT582333 - tunnel	XT603348 - 3 foxholes
XT610367 - bunkers - airstrike	XT550368 - 1 concrete bunker (destroyed)
XT563359 - bunkers - airstrike	XT599345 - 2 bunkers
XT560362 - foxholes - airstrike	XT550360 - 5 bunkers (destroyed)
XT613345 - foxholes & trenches	XT582336 - bunkers & tunnels
XT596335 - base camp	XT566365 - tunnel
XT576332 - tunnel	XT595348 - base camp, 9 huts
XT585242 - tunnel	XT586337 - foxholes
XT577327 - tunnel	XT584313 - tunnel
XT587336 - tunnel (destroyed)	XT566370 - base camp (photo equipment)
XT589336 - tunnel	XT570355 - 3 bunkers
XT579313 - bunker (destroyed)	XT551366 - 3 huts, 40 bunkers
XT579342 - bunker (destroyed)	XT599347 - base camp (9 huts, 3 bunkers)
XT579312 - bunker (destroyed)	XT596335 - rice cache
XT584337 - tunnel	XT597335 - rice cache
XT582345 - tunnel	XT593345 - rice cache
XT586341 - bunker (destroyed)	XT569350 - ammo cache
XT587333 - tunnel	XT581312 - rice & medicine
XT593363 - base camp	XT574324 - rice
XT605349 - AM position	XT589314 - medicine
XT561384-572309 - trenches & tunnels	XT582316 - rice
XT575397 - possible base camp	XT577338 - ammo (mines)
XT575335 - tunnel	XT567336 - medicine
XT581336 - tunnel	XT580314 - rice
XT563353 - tunnel	XT584311 - rice
XT584339 - tunnel	XT577331 - ammo (mines)
XT559363 - bunkers	XT582345 - arms & ammo
XT569343 - bunkers	XT582354 - rice and bike parts
XT566357 - trench	XT572326 - rice
XT559363 - bunkers	XT605364 - ammo
XT605364 - bunker	XT604341 - rice
XT601363 - base camp	XT601362 - ammo
XT541378 - bunkers	XT604364 - ammo
XT566357 - trench	XT601362 - rice
XT565364 - 3 bunkers (destroyed)	XT599359 - rice
XT585365 - foxholes	XT596359 - rice
XT585324 - tunnel	XT601379 - weapons and uniforms
XT577334 - tunnel	XT603366 - rice
XT576347 - base camp 3 huts/berm	XT601371 - ammo
XT576347 - 3 concrete bunkers;	XT597356 - rice
3-4 story tunnel	XT600366 - rice
XT555365 - bunkers, trench partially destroyed	XT594356 - rice
XT552362 - 1 bunker (destroyed)	XT594346 - rice
XT576347 - 2 bunkers (destroyed)	XT574347 - ammo
XT558413 - 8 bunkers (destroyed)	XT594361 - rice
XT582361 - 6 bunkers (destroyed)	XT590373 - rice
XT585347 - 4 bunkers (destroyed)	XT584313 - ammo
XT600352 - 1 large concrete tunnel	XT583332 - weapons, ammo, & uniforms
XT552367 - 10 bunkers	XT592355 - rice
XT583332 - tunnel	XT596367 - rice
XT626427 - base camp	XT582334 - rice
XT647403 - base camp	XT567355 - rice
XT566368 - base camp, 7 huts	XT568354 - rice
XT557364 - tunnel	XT596359 - rice
	XT596346 - weapons & ammo

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5. (C) MISSION: 4-Hour, D-Dry 2d Bde conducts airmobile assault from DAN TIEB (DETROIT) to seal and search village of B.1 SUC (BALTDAK); prepares to evacuate village inhabitants on Del; conducts S&D operation in area; clears and secures Arty Base II via BALTDAK; in conjunction with US 11D and GVN Forces, prepares to commence evacuation of inhabitants of BALTDAK by R.C. boats on Del; and prepares to detach one battalion to 3d Bde on order on or after Del.

6. (C) EXECUTIVE:

Chronology:

7 Jan 67 (Prepositioning of Forces) - The Bde T-6 CP and 2/18 Inf departed DI AM at 0654H by road to BURN HAM airfield then airlifted to DAN TIEB (XT495474) closing at 0655H in preparation for Opn CEDAR FALLS. 2/18 Inf and 1/18 Inf were detached at 0700H and placed UFGM 1st Bde. 1/26 Inf was airlifted from PHUOC VIEH at 0945H closing DAN TIEB at 1109H becoming OFCM 2d Bde. 1/7 Arty with Co B 2/2 Inf (Nuch) attached moved by road and CH-47 closing Arty Base IV (XT527278) at 1626H.

8 Jan 67 - 2d Bde initiated Opn CEDAR FALLS. 2/18 Inf (-) initiated Opn CEDAR FALLS remaining at DETROIT as B's HQ. Co 4 was attached to 1/26 Inf. At 080725H 1/26 Inf (+) conducted simultaneous air assaults into multiple LZ's and sealed the northern sector of the village of B.1 SUC. Sixty helicopters touched down and off-loaded the 1/26 Inf within 45 seconds. Elements of 1/26 Inf conducted S&D operations north and east of the village with A 2/18 Inf attached. At 0805H via XT562339 C 1/26 Inf apprehended 8 detainees. B 1/26 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC via XT563331 at 0815H. C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 booby traps at 0830H via XT562357. At 0833H via LZ CHALIE; A 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC attempting to flee on bicycle. At 0830H A 2/18 touched down at LZ HOTEL and received sporadic small arms fire from the west with neg casualties. At 0856H B 1/26 received S&D sniper fire via XT576332 and returned fire killing 1 VC. At 0858H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 3 VC mines at XT583340. At 0900H C 1/26 located and destroyed 3 booby traps via west end of LZ DELVO. D 1/26 captured 3 women; Vietnamese via XT576331 at 0903H. At 0907H via XT564330 A 2/18 searched a series of huts and apprehended 17 detainees who were evacuated to HELPER. At 0910H B 1/26 apprehended 2 detainees via XT576338. At 0925H A 2/18 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 15 detainees. At 0930H 1/26 killed 1 VC in coordination with B-LIEB 78 who engaged by helicopter. VC flushed into the Saigon River. At 0927H A 1/26 moved to search area via XT569331 where several VC had been observed in bunkers. At 0945H via XT576330 A 2/18 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 4 detainees. At 1020H A 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC attempting to flee across the river via XT569330. At 1025H A 2/18 via XT564330 evacuated to HELPER 1 detainee. At 1025H C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 mine via XT583357. At 1033H via XT574338 D 1/26 located and destroyed 12 sampans. At 1046H via XT578340 C 1/26 located and destroyed 8 VC mines. Elements of C 1/26 observed 6 VC with weapons and immediately engaged resulting in 1 R KIA. At 1057H Recon 1/26 was alerted for S&D mission where VC were observed via XT500313. A 1/26 found a VC body via XT589331 at 1113H. At 1115H via XT583339, Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 8 booby traps. At 1126H C 1/26 located and destroyed 3 VC mines via XT578340. Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 3 sampans via XT582317. At 1140H A 2/18 found VC bag with documents, wallet and ID card via XT589333. At 1151H via XT576340 A 1/26 received small arms fire; fire was returned by mortars and artillery with unknown results. At 1311H via XT581316 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 1 sampan. D 1/26 captured 1 VC with weapon via XT576331 at 1315H. VC was evacuated for interrogation. Via XT585341, A 1/26 captured 3 VC attempting to escape across river at 1336H. B 1/26 found 1 AK rifle via XT576332 at 1335 H. At 1340H via XT576332 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 3,400 lbs of rice. In addition Recon 1/26 found at XT5813315 2 sampans containing 6,815 uniforms, rolls of assorted color cloth, 6 bags nylon cord, and 7 bags of nylon netting. Sampans were destroyed and other items evacuated. At 1426H A 1/26 requested evacuation of 1 detainee, 2 VC KIA, 2 VCC, and 1 VC KIA from via XT585340. At 1425H via XT574333 D 1/26 located and destroyed 14 sampans and 200 lbs rice. At 1415H via XT566342 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 booby trapped 105mm rd. At 1543H Recon 1/26 located a bunker containing 3 waterproof packs containing mine clothing, documents, diary, and several rds of Russian 7.62 mm. At 1620H Recon 1/26 was airlifted to Base II to secure Arty Base adjacent to LZ H.T.L. A 1/26 via XT589332 found 4 small sampans and 3 large sampans with cabins and outboard motors. The sampans were destroyed and not re-evacuated at 1630H. At 1651H via XT566342 C 1/26 blew a bunker which yielded 1 VC claymore and several Di 30 batteries. At 1733H via Base II, Recon 1/26 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 1 detainee. At 1800H 1/26 assumed night defensive posture. At 1835H via XT585333, A 1/26 located 2 VC KIA in tunnel.

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which A 1/26 had contaminated earlier with CS gas. At 1855H vic XT586212, C 1/26 located and destroyed 4 VC mines. B 1/26 received small arms, M-79 and 50 caliber fire from vic XT573342 at 1855H and fire was returned with mortars, artillery and M-79 with unknown results. At 1905H vic XT565342 C 1/26 received ineffective carbine fire from vic XT571342, fire was not returned. C 1/26 at 1920H received mortar fire from the north vic XT535345, counter mortar fire was placed in the area, there were no friendly casualties. At 1930H vic XT565342 C 1/26 also received an evacuated pack with wallet containing pictures and documents. At 1930H a flare ship was called on station for continuous illumination throughout the night. At 2005H vic XT590340 A 1/26 engaged 3 VC moving toward their position, capturing 1 female VC with pack and 1 VC male. At 2005H 2/18 Inf engaged and killed one VC that set off trip flare vic XT584327. At 2012H A 1/26 received mortar fire with no casualties vic XT590341. At 2025H vic XT584326 A 2/18 killed 1 VC with weapon and web gear. At 2045H vic XT581331 Recon 1/26 was fired on by 6 VC and fire was returned with unk results. At 2150H vic XT572333 A 1/26 received AM fire and carbine fire. At the same time vic XT577328 A 2/18 received SA fire. Artillery and mortar fire was placed on suspected area. At 2152H vic XT584339 C 1/26 received several hand grenades and immediately engaged suspected location with M-79 and mortar fire. At 2157H A 2/18 received AM fire from vic XT575325. The area was illuminated and artillery fires called in. At 2236H vic XT584340 C 1/26 received one hand grenade. The night passed without further contact. B Trp 1/4 Cav conducted Eagle flights in S portion of BULHANG. At 0646H, Trp reported circular trenches vic XT605350. SA fire was received and artillery was called in the area. At 0630H Trp engaged 1 VC fleeing on a bicycle vic XT593391 resulting in 1 VC KIA (DC). At 1055H vic XT573324, a rice cache was located and at 1055H vic XT561313 another rice cache was located. Three VC were engaged resulting in 3 VC KIA (DC) and 4 weapons captured. Area was exploited by Recon 1/26 Inf in the afternoon. At 1150H another rice cache was located vic XT574324. Trp was relieved GCO. At 1200H, 2/2 Inf (Black) relieved at Arty Base IV. The 3d Bn 1st CG CP airlifted from BULHANG closing BULHANG at 1030H. TFND with 3/8 AMV began search of BULHANG at 0945H. At 1245H search forces located a tunnel vic XT585334 containing 6 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (DC) and 5 VC PW's (3 of which were wounded). A search of the village resulted in 106 detainees being converted to THU Ghat and 16 to LIA KHA. S-5 Pay Ops ships broadcast on over BULHANG engaged 3 VC vic XT663255 resulting in 3 VC KIA (DC). Airstrikes vic XT610317 resulted in 2 VC KIA and extensive bunker destruction.

9 Jan 67 - 2d Bn continued Opn CUBA FALLS. 2/18 Inf (-) continued Opn CUBA FALLS remaining at BULHANG as Div HQ. At 1345H the Bn was placed WFOA 3d Bn and reverted WFOA 2d Bn at 1630H. The Bn HQ'd vic BULHANG (XT595343). Co B 2/2 Inf (Black) continued to secure Arty Base IV until 1305H at which time it moved by road to LIA KHA at 1715H reverting WFOA 3d Bn. 1/26 Inf with a 2/18 Inf attached continued mission of sealing JEN SUC, conducting S&D operations in CO's CHUCK, HAN, and DICK; provided security for Arty Base II and conducted S&D operations vic LZ DUVO. At 0950H vic XT585328 A 2/18 engaged 5 VC vic XT589329 with unknown results. At 0950H vic XT588326 A 2/18 engaged weapon on river with 2 VC aboard resulting in 2 VC KIA (DC) and 1 weapon destroyed. At 0705H A 2/18 vic XT584327 reported 1 carbine, 4 VC bodies, and 1 wounded VC female with carbine. At 0737H A 2/18 reported 1 VC KIA vic XT583327. Recon 1/26 reported 1 VC KIA with pistol belt and gear pouch vic XT582334 at 0757H. At 0822H element of B 1/26 received SA and M-79 fire vic XT573335. The area was engaged with M-79 and mortar fire with unk results. At 0840H A 2/18 captured one VC with transistor radio hiding in water hole vic XT585328. At 0852H vic XT585323, A 2/18 located and destroyed 1 hut and 2 weapons. At 0924H C 1/26 vic XT579341 located and destroyed 2 VC mines. At 0930H vic XT592327, A 1/26 engaged with grenades, 1 VC in a swamp. The VC was thrown into the river and the swamp was captured together with 6 uniforms, 2 red books and assorted dishes. At 0938H 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC vic XT561344. The VC had a carbine, 25 lbs of ammo, cards and a triangular team flag. At 0942H A 2/18 located and destroyed 2 weapons vic XT588329. At 1000H vic XT577336, B 1/26 located and destroyed 10 mines. At 1017H vic XT573339 B 1/26 located and destroyed 10 weapons. At 1020H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 1 bunker, 1 can motor oil, 1 bag of bicycle parts, and 1 pack of rice. At 1024H C 1/26 located a bunker vic XT579342. At 1035H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 2 butterfly looms. At 1105H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 2,300 lbs rice vic XT572339. At 1117H C 1/26 apprehended 1 individual hiding under straw vic XT591337, they also discovered 1 VC pack, 1 protective mask, 1 mosquito net, 1 uniform, and several documents.

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At 1115H via XT578342 B 1/26 located and destroyed 3 awans, 16 mines, and 3 CUU bombs. At 1224H via XT583339 C 1/26 located extensive tunnel system. Tunnel rats were requested to search tunnel complex. The search yielded a large amount of NVN currency and documents, 5 muscar rifles, 450 rls 30 caliber ammo, 50 rls muscar ammo, 1 mine, 1 both fuso, 200 rls 7.62 ammo, and 8 rifle bolts (for muscars). All items were evacuated. At 1314H via XT591313 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 2,000 lbs of rice. At 1342H via XT593338 A 1/26 located 2 muscar's mines, 3 awans, several 50 caliber rls, large carbide lamp and fishing equipment. Mines and awans were destroyed, other items evacuated. At 1340H B 1/26 located and destroyed 14 M-16 mines via XT575340. At 1353H 1/26 via XT574316 located and evacuated 2 sandbags of coars wire, 7-3' by 75' bolts of cloth and 6-100 lb bags of white paper. At 1452H via XT586342 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 15 small awans. At 1509H Recon 1/26 closed Base II and assumed a 2/18 area of responsibility. A 2/18 was detached from 1/26 effective 1600H. At 1610H via XT590241 A 1/26 had a claymore detonated against an OF with 2 friendly MIA, and 1 friendly KIA. Blocking fires were called in and WHA's and KIA evacuated. 1/26 closed nighttime positions by 1600H. At 1646H via XT566341 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 bunker position. At 2000H via XT576339 a claymore was detonated against B 1/26 with neg friendly casualties. The area was placed under surveillance with a starlight scope. At 2010H via XT577339 C 1/26 observed 1 VC and engaged with hand grenades with unk results. At 2041H via XT567343, LP of A 1/26 engaged unidentified number of VC with claymores, mortar fire was placed in the suspected area with results unknown. At 2046H A VC were observed near the same location through starlight scope and the VC were again engaged with claymores and mortar fire with unk results. At 2046H via XT576344 C 1/26 detected an unidentified number of VC and engaged them with artillery with unk results. At 2116H via XT578342 C 1/26 detected unidentified number of VC moving toward his location, artillery was placed on the area and movement ceased. At XT575335 B 1/26 engaged and destroyed a sampan with M-79 at 2153H. At 2156H C 1/26 had light probe by VC and engaged with SA fire via XT576344. Movement ceased. At 2346H via XT574333 unidentified number of VC were detected between B 1/26 line and an LP. VC were engaged with hand grenades with unk results. TND continued to search village of HATHA and coordinate Form-1000 Center 1 Center. At 0410H 2 VC were apprehended via XT579335. At 1010H via XT593336 search forces located 9-5 gal drums of medical supplies and documents. Two VC with hand grenades were apprehended at 1010H via XT576335; 200 lbs of rice was also located. At 1055H via XT563341, 2 VC I.D.'s were apprehended and 3 persons detained. Two VC detainees were apprehended at 1248H via XT560340. At 1125H via XT564337, a tunnel was located containing numerous links, sandals and medical supplies. Two VC were apprehended in the tunnel. At 1110H via XT577337, another tunnel was located at night in French 30 mil S.C. Search forces had contact with 1 VC at 1555H via XT569336. VC fled and a search uncovered 1 Russian carbine. At 1710H via XT578332 contact was made with 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (3C and 2 VC POW'S).

10 January 1967 - 2d Div continued Opn CINDA F.I.L.S. 2/16 Inf continued Opn CINDA F.I.L.S. burning UGCI 3d Rte at 0730H. At 1100H B 1/26 engaged a sampan with M-79 fire with unk results via XT575335. At 0817H C 1/26 received incoming grnade from VC via XT575333. The area was illuminated and 1 VC was observed and engaged with SA and artillery. At 0842H C 1/26 observed and engaged with artillery 3 VC moving toward their location via XT583340 with unk results. At 0944H via XT575335 B 1/26 observed and engaged 5-7 VC attempting to infiltrate from village resulting in 2 VC KIA. Via XT582339 C 1/26 received heavy mortar attack at 0410H. Counter mortar fire and artillery was initiated and enemy mortars were silenced without casualty. The crater analysis at first light confirmed that at least 44 60mm rls and 2-62mm rls were received. At 0424H 1/26 fired offensive mortar concentrations which produced a secondary explosion in A 1/26 area via XT583346. At 0424H A 1/26 observed 2 VC fleeing east to west and engaged with SA with unk results. At 0507H a flare ship was called on station for constant illumination and defensive fires were increased to disrupt and prevent attack. At 0522H via XT585342, A 1/26 observed 15-20 VC wearing camouflage helmets and received 10-20 rls SA fire. VC was pulled back 1/26 prepared for possible attack. At 0546H A 1/26 reported 16-20 VC to their front via XT586342. VC were engaged with artillery resulting in 3 VC KIA (1C). At 0655H 1/26 initiated a sweep to the front of their position. At 0745H via XT575335 B 1/26 apprehended and evacuated 1 HATHA 1 detainee, who later was confirmed as a VC. At 0800H via XT567343 A 1/26 had two personnel slightly wounded by an LP mine during sweep of the area. A minesweeper team was called in to check area. At 0943H via XT577334 B 1/26 captured and evacuated 3 VC with documents. At 0945H via XT565342 C 1/26 located and evacuated 1 commercial transistor radio found in a hut. At 0951H via

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 XT56342 A 1/26 located and destroyed 4 bunkers, 1 pistol belt, 1 pair sandals. At 1035H via XT573345 C 1/26 apprehended and evacuated to 2 detainees. At 1045H via XT574376 B 1/26 located 3 sampans filled with 25 balis cloth, 26-70" cargo straps, 1 pack, 5,000 feet silk rope, 80 spools of thread, 2 bags of buttons, 25 rds 5.56 mm, 18 rifle grenades, 155 rolls waterproof cloth, 100 rolls poncho material, 400 shirts, 135 bolts nylon, 25 bundles cotton flannel. Samples of the materials were evacuated, the remainder destroyed. At 1045H via XT574376 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 tunnel complex running northwest and southeast. At 1050H via XT573339 C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 shape charges. At 1201H via XT567354 C 1/26 located a hut containing 6,000 lbs of rice, 20 bicycle tires and 16 pigs. Items were destroyed. At 1225H via XT569352 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 large sampan. At 1225H via XT569326 A 1/26 located and destroyed 1 24' sampan. At 1335H via XT577326 B 1/26 located and destroyed 2,500 lbs of rice. At 1315H via XT569326 B 1/26 located and destroyed 100 lbs rock salt and 1 mine. At 1415H via XT564326 C 1/26 located and destroyed a tunnel complex. At 1425H via XT590326 A 1/26 located and destroyed 1 40' sampan with inboard motor, and 1 40' sampan containing 3 tons of black and blue cloth. At 1435H via XT574323 B 1/26 engaged and wounded 1 VC who fled leaving his medical pack. At 1445H via XT576334 B 1/26 apprehended and evacuated 1 detainee. 1/26 elements closed perimeter by 1600H and ARVN personnel arrived and tied in with A and B 1/26 by 1730H. At 1845H via XT573321 C 1/26 located 12-60mm mortar rds with neg casualties. Mortars and artillery fired counter mortar fires on suspected locations. At 1855H gunships were also on station. At 1858H flare ships arrived on station. At 1900H a gunship via XT574351 spotted light flashes along river and adjusted artillery on area extinguishing the lights. At 1945H a flare ship began illuminating 1/26 area. At 2025H via XT574333 L of B 1/26 engaged 3 VC with M-79 fire with unk results. At 2057H via XT575334 10 15 VC tried to break out of town, attempting to break seal in B 1/26 sector at two locations along the perimeter. The VC drove cattle ahead of them while throwing grenades and firing their weapons. They were engaged with claymores, small arms and M-79 resulting in 2 VC KIA, 4 VC WIA, 5 VC, 3 M-79's and 1 carbine captured. The wounded and captured VC were evacuated for treatment and interrogation. Maximum illumination was called in and the area kept under surveillance. At 2130H via XT574322 C 1/26 detonated a claymore against 3 VC with unk results. At 2105H A 1/26 received 1 mortar rd with neg casualties. Counter mortar fires were called in suspected areas. At 2204H C 1/26 engaged undetermined number of VC with mortars and artillery via XT561343 with unk results. TFEB continued population control. Search forces at 0900H located a tunnel via XT561336. At 1015H a detainee was apprehended in a tunnel via XT563335. At XT563335 a boat motor and Russian carbine were located. At 1040H 1st flashlight batteries were located via XT576331. One POW was captured at 1140H via XT576332 along with a carbine, 15 magazines of ammo, 500 lbs of wire, sugar, clothing, documents, medicine, and batteries. Ten VC were captured in a tunnel at 1545H via XT567333 and at 1645H via XT563334 two more detainees were apprehended with documents and a 43 cal pistol.

11 Jan 67 - 2d Bde continued Opn CHAM FALLS. TFEB continued population control and began evacuating refugees. 672 persons were evacuated by 3 G boat and another 315 by CH-47 (9 lifts). ARVN TF in cooperation and conjunction with 2d Bde relieved 1/26 Inf at 1225H and assumed mission of maintaining a cordon of BALTIMORE. 1/26 was relieved from the seal mission BALTIMORE by ARVN, and initiated S&D operations to the north. At 0011H via XT591334 A 1/26 engaged and wounded 2 VC who attempted to flee from village. VC were evacuated for interrogation. At 0512H via XT575335 B 1/26 engaged an undetermined number of VC with SA and M-79 fire with unk results. At 0711H via XT561331 Bde 1/26 detained one VC who surrendered with a safe conduct pass in his possession. Railier was evacuated. At 0715H via XT575335 B 1/26 hwy 2 VC surrender with safe conduct passes. At 0845H B 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC who attempted to flee when challenged. At 1245H relief of 1/26 by ARVN was completed. At 1745H A 1/26 commenced attack north in AO ALPHA. At 1850H via XT564344 the lead elements of A 1/26 received SA fire resulting in one US slightly wounded. Artillery was immediately called in on the area. At 1330H 1/26 S-3 while airborne located a trench extending 300-500 meters north to northeast which ended underground via XT564357, also located were bunkers or storage areas extending 200 meters east and west. At 1430H via XT569343 a fire team site point element of A 1/26 moved into the fringe of a heavily fortified VC area containing elaborate tunnel and trench systems. The area was heavily mined with AP mines and by trip. Grenades hanging from trees covered the area, and claymores were set up to protect the perimeter of the fortified positions. As the element

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96266

AVFEC-D&T

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32) (U)

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96222

1. (U) OPERATION: CEDAR FALLS
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 8 January 1967 to 26 January 1967.
3. (U) LOCATION: IRON TRIANGLE - center of mass XT7030.
4. (U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: II FFORCEV.
5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER: Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman,
Commanding General, II FFORCEV.
6. (C) MAJOR US SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS:
 - a. Major General Fred C. Weyand, Commanding General, 29th
Infantry Division.
 - b. Major General William E. Deput, Commanding General, 1st
Infantry Division.
 - c. Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles, Commanding General,
196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt).
 - d. Brigadier General John R. Deane Jr., Commanding General,
173d Airborne Brigade (Sep).
 - e. Colonel Marshal B. Garth, Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade,
4th Infantry Division.
 - f. Colonel William W. Cobb, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment.
 - g. Colonel George R. Allin, Commanding Officer, II FFORCEV
Artillery. Brigadier General Willis D. Crittenger Jr., assumed command
on 10 January 1967.
 - h. Colonel Raymond P. Campbell Jr., Commanding Officer, 12th
Combat Aviation Group.

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7. (C) ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM COMMANDERS:

- a. Brigadier General Phan Quoc Thuan, Commanding General, 5th Infantry Division (ARVN).
- b. Lieutenant Colonel Ho Trung Hau, Commanding Officer, 1st Airborne Task Force.
- c. Major Nguyen Thu Luong, Commanding Officer, 1st Airborne Battalion.
- d. Major Nguyen Ba Truoc, Commanding Officer, 7th Airborne Battalion.
- e. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Chuyen, Commanding Officer, 8th Infantry Regiment.
- f. Major Tam Van Luong, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment.
- g. Major Tran Van Man, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment.
- h. Captain Trung Luan, Commanding Officer, 1st Troop, 1st Cavalry Squadron.
- i. Captain Nguyen Ky Suong, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.
- j. Major Ly Duc Quan, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.
- k. Major Nguyen Van Son, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.
- l. Captain Ho Van Hoa, Commanding Officer, 15th Ranger Battalion.

8. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

- a. 1st Infantry Division:
 - (1) 173d Abn Bde (Sep) OFCCN.
 - (2) 11th Armd Cav Regt (-) OFCCN.
 - (3) Attached 4th Bn, 12th Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt) effective D-1.
 - (4) Detached Co B, 2d Bn, 34th Armor effective D-1.
 - (5) 168th Combat Engr Bn, 79th Engr Group (DS effective D-1).
- b. 29th Infantry Division:

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- (1) Attached 106th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt).
- (2) Attached 3d Bde, 6th Inf Div.
- (3) 2d Bn, 34th Armor OPCON effective D-1.
- (4) 4th Inf Bn, 7th Regt, 9th Inf Div (ARVN) DS effective D+2.

c. 5th Infantry Division (ARVN):

- (1) Attached 1st Abn TP:
 - (a) 1st Abn Bn.
 - (b) 7th Abn Bn.
- (2) 8th Infantry Regiment:
 - (a) 4th Bn, 7th Inf OPCON.
 - (b) 2d Bn, 8th Inf.
 - (c) 3d Bn, 8th Inf.
 - (d) 4th Bn, 8th Inf.
 - (e) 1st Tank Group, 1st Cav Sqdn OPCON.
 - (f) 35th Ranger Bn OPCON.

9. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

- a. 7th Air Force (Logistical Support).
- b. 1st Logistical Command (Logistical Support).
- c. 3d Tactical Fighter Wing (Close Air Support).
- d. II FFORCEV Arty (GS)
 - (1) 2d Bn, 35th Artillery (-) (155mm SP) Attached 1st Inf Div.
 - (2) 2d Bn, 32d Artillery (-) (8"/175mm SP) GSR.
 - (3) A Btry, 6th Bn, 27th Artillery (175mm SP) GSR.
 - (4) 5th Bn, 21 Artillery (AWCP) Attached.
- e. 12th Combat Aviation Group (Army Aviation Support).
- f. 79th Eng Group (G).
- g. ASVE
 - (1) 21st Riverine Co (Navy).
 - (2) 30th River Assault Group (Navy).
 - (3) 25th Boat Co (Regional Force).
 - (4) 28th Boat Co (Regional Force).
 - (5) 35th Boat Co (Regional Force).
- h. Narrative

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(1) Logistical support furnished by 7th Air Force provided both troop lift and resupply. Support was highly effective and timely throughout the operation.

(2) Logistical support furnished by 1st Logistical Command provided continual resupply of participating combat battalions. Daily convoys were conducted from SAIGON to CU CHI and LAI KOK to relieve airlift requirements.

(3) Close air support was provided by 1st Tactical Fighter Wing. Both preplanned and immediate air requests were furnished thru the Direct Air Request Net. Immediate air requests were met with a minimum of delay by carefully coordinated, well-planned strikes to provide constant air coverage. Aerial close support was particularly effective.

(4) II Field Force Vietnam Artillery provided general support artillery for 1st Infantry Division and 5th Infantry Division. The 5th Battalion, 1st Artillery (ARVN) provided direct support for both divisions. Very effective results were achieved by use of the twin 160mm guns and the dual 140mm mortar guns in a direct support role.

(5) The 7th Engineer Group (ARVN) participated in clearing landing zones, fire lanes and runways plus the destruction of tunnels, fortifications and villages throughout the IRON TRIANGLE. In addition, engineer support from the 5th Engineer Battalion (ARVN) was utilized to prepare the refugee village at THU QUONG to accommodate approximately six thousand additional refugees. The 5th Engineer Battalion (ARVN) erected tents for the village.

(6) The 1st Amphibious Brigade (ARVN) was used to search and evacuate the refugees, maintain patroling and searching the waterways within the area of operation. The firepower of the armed boats enabled the refugees to be evacuated and resettled without interference.

10. (c) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Estimate of Situation Prior to Operation:

(1) Prior to the initiation of Operation CEDAR FALLS, the

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enemy order of battle in the area of operations included the headquarters of the Viet Cong Military Region IV. The destruction of the headquarters was a principle objective of the operation. Large numbers of main force troops were not expected to be encountered nor was a large VC KIA body count expected.

(2) In addition to political and military affairs committees of Military Region IV which were believed to be at separate locations within the operational area, the principle VC units were believed to be limited to the 272d Regiment, the 1st and 7th Battalions of Military Region IV, the Phu Loi Local Force Battalion plus three local force companies. Numerous reports indicated the THANH DIEN FOREST and IRON TRIANGLE to be a major base area as well as the location of Military Region IV. The area was known to contain strongly fortified positions with the routes of approach mined and booby trapped. The suspected location of the 272d Regiment presented a threat during the initial stages of the operation but as the operation progressed the regiment displaced from the area of operations to the north. Further, it was believed that the area of operations included the BINH DUONG (THU DUNG SUU) VC Provincial Committee and the BEN CAT VC District Committee. Headquarters Military Region IV and its major committees, like all VC units, move frequently to avoid detection. Based upon analysis of available information, it appeared that the Headquarters of Military Region IV and the political committee generally operated in an area bounded by XT6437, XT6437, XT6733 and XT6433 and probably would be located in grid square XT6435. The military affairs committee generally operated in the area bounded by XT6432, XT6434, XT6928 and XT6225 and probably would be located in grid square XT6432.

b. Estimate of Disposition Prior to Operations

(1) Based on an analysis of intelligence summaries, reports, and the location of captured VC documents, it is believed that portions of the military sections, political party sections and the rear service elements of Military Region IV, BINH DUONG Province, BEN CAT District and CU CHI District were certainly disrupted, if not destroyed. These sections, which are a component part of the VC infrastructure, as well as

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the military units were disrupted throughout the area as follows:
Military Region IV sections on both sides of the SAIGON River vicinity
XT6528; BINH DUCNG Provincial section near BEN GUC Village (XT5834);
BEN CAT District elements in the southern portion of the ICHN TRIANGLE
vicinity XT7027; and the CU CHI District elements in the vicinity of
BEN CO (XT7091).

(2) As was expected, both sides' elements were not contacted
in large numbers. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of Military
Region IV all not contact in operations in the area. Apparently
they had been directed to other areas and were not in the area. A portion of the
2d Battalion (NVA 2nd District) Battalion 2, 1st and 2nd Battalions were
on 8 and 9 January in the area. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the
1st and 6th Battalions were also in the area. Although some documents
concerning the 1st Battalion were found in the area, they were in the western
portion of the operational area.

(3) A comprehensive VC supply system was certainly disrupted
or destroyed as indicated by the large quantities of rice, medical supplies,
weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, and other supplies found in the area,
and building supplies that were found in the area. The majority of
these supplies probably had been transported to the area by the Region
or Province since only a few elements of the 1st Division Group 25 were
identified from documents, IMA, or other sources in the area.

(4) A review of the interrogation reports from the ralliers,
prisoners and detainees resulting from the operation indicated the
majority were from VC infrastructure in and around the area. The
the 812 ralliers and prisoners were from the 1st Division Group 25
elements in the area. The majority of the prisoners were from the
District. Personnel from other units were also found in the area.
Laborers account for the second largest category, about 25%. Only a few
top level cadre were identified in interrogation reports. These
significant personalities were an executive officer of TAY BINH Military
School, a captain from Military Region IV Political Staff Section, a
lieutenant from a small guard unit, and two NVA political cadre. These

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personnel were evacuated to the Combined Military Intelligence Center or were hospitalized. A listing of the various categories of ralliers and PWs follows:

	Rallier	PW 1st Inf Div	PW 25th Inf Div	Total
Propaganda - Education	4	17	1	42
Finance	11	10	0	21
Youth Associations	24	4	0	27
Rear Services	33	13	0	46
Guerillas	70	89	17	372
Farmers Associations	9	9	2	102
Laborers	70	1	9	102
Medical	16	5	4	25
Commo-Liaison	5	1	0	8
Miscellaneous	57	10	10	87
TOTAL	606	187	39	832

(5) Based primarily on a study of the location of captured documents, the following VC installations or units have been identified as having operated in or, at least, were located in the area during the course of the operations:

COSVN

Three communication-liaison stations

C139 Procurement/Transportation Company of 834 Rear Service Group.

Military Region IV

N 1 Military Staff Section Elements

N 2 Military Intelligence Section

N 7 Signal Section

Political Staff Section Elements

Political Cadre Section Office

Elements of Security Section

Military Region IV Units

J-12 Medical Supply Unit

J-13 QM/Ordnance Supply Unit

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G-20 Reconnaissance Company

G-50 Signal Company

Elements of 1st Battalion, Military Region IV

Headquarters Elements 67A Sepper Battalion

SINH DUONG (TRU DAI MOT) Province

Current Affairs Office

Party Section Office

WFLSVN Front Section

Rear Service Staff

Civil Health Section/Hospital

BEN CAT District

Military Affairs Committee

District Party Headquarters

C 61 Local Force Unit

CU CHI District

District Headquarters

TAY NINH Province

Security Section Elements

(6) Enemy Installations.

In preparation for this operation, all major unit headquarters utilized a number of AOP machine run "print outs" of VC base camps, fortifications, supply depots and other installations within the area of interest based on reports from a wide variety of sources. These data summaries were compiled by the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division and contained extensive information. The value of this information was amplified by the experience of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation CEDAR FALLS. This unit encountered a total of 177 concrete facilities which ranged from foxholes to bunkers and tunnel complexes to rice caches of all sizes. A comparison of each of these locations with previously known intelligence information showed that 156, or 88.1% fell within 500 meters of a reported installation. The average distance was about 200 meters. The value of such a list is apparent and should be used

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as a starting point in the search of any area.

g. Terrain and Weather.

(1) Terrain:

Synopsis. The area during this period of the year provided the most favorable conditions for military operations. It was a sparsely populated, densely forested region. Vehicle movement was canalized to existing roads and some trails. Conditions influencing movement were very sensitive to precipitation. The terrain was carefully analyzed in preparation for the operation. This information was found to be substantially correct and is not duplicated here as it is included in the intelligence annex to the CEDAR FALLS Operation order.

(2) Weather:

(a) General.

During January, the northeast monsoon develops to its fullest extent. Most cloudiness was along the east coast with the interior regions of the III CTZ having relatively clear skies and little precipitation. During this period, at a minimum, ceilings were generally nonexistent and visibilities were good except in periods of early morning fog.

(b) Cloudiness, Visibility and Precipitation.

During the first ten days of this operation a light to moderate northeasterly flow of dry stable air prevailed over the area. Sky conditions were generally partly cloudy with surface visibilities unrestricted. No precipitation was reported. During the last ten days of the operation, moist air prevailed over the area causing some partly cloudy to mostly cloudy skies. Occasional light rain occurred with 3000 foot ceilings on a few days. A few afternoon and evening rainshowers also occurred on a few days causing some 3000 foot ceilings. Patchy areas of early morning ground fog occurred during this last ten day period. Minimum visibilities were one to three miles in ground fog improving by 0900H to ten miles.

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(c) Temperatures:

The daily maximum temperatures varied from 80 to 95 degrees. The daily minimum temperatures varied from 59 to 70 degrees.

(d) Soil Conditions:

Soil conditions were relatively dry during the first ten days of the operations. During the last ten days of the operation the soil conditions varied from dry to wet in accordance with local rainfall.

(e) Effects on Military Forces:

During the first ten days of the operation the weather had no adverse effect on military forces. During the last ten days, the main effect of weather conditions was to hinder early morning air operations due to the early onset of early morning ground fog. The fog normally lifted by 0600 and the visibility was then unrestricted.

1. An evaluation of the population of the CEDAR PALES area concluded the people were either VC controlled civilians or low level VC cadre and guerrillas who occupied positions within the hamlet and village infrastructure. Within the VC civilian area the predominant attitude was one of anxiety toward the VC cause and anxiety to escape the hazards inherent in living in a VC controlled area. These civilians later proved cooperative during interrogation and responded with timely information. Most of the ralliers had some knowledge of the Chieu Hoi program, and they expressed discontent with the hardships of VC life and a desire to return to their families. In the past most low level guerrillas preferred to remain silent and be grouped as refugees. However, these guerrillas were no longer affected by the VC propaganda program. It appears that the VC propaganda and threat of treatment accorded Hoi Chieu Hoi refugees were occasionally affected by the loss of their homes but after a short time became calm and cooperative.

2. There were no POWs captured in the operation other than US forces; however, US forces were supported by eight ARVN infantry battalions, one ARVN tank troop, two VNA boat units and three Regional Force boat companies.

11. (C) MISSION: II SQUADRY attacks the THANH DIEM Forestry

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Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to destroy enemy forces, infrastructure, installations and Military Region IV Headquarters; evacuate civilian population and establish the IRON TRIANGLE as a specified strike zone to preclude its future use as a support base for Viet Cong operation.

12. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: a. II FFORCEV attacks with two US infantry divisions (reinforced) with ARVN units in support to seal the IRON TRIANGLE, trap enemy forces, and destroy Viet Cong installations.

b. The operation was conducted in two phases:

(1) Phase I (5 Jan - 8 Jan 67) - Deceptive deployment of forces under the guise of conducting routine operations on the flanks of the IRON TRIANGLE. On D-day (8 Jan) an air assault to seal and search BEN SUC (XT5833). Further positioning of forces in blocking positions and in staging areas around the IRON TRIANGLE.

(2) Phase II (9 Jan - 26 Jan 67) - On 9 Jan, an armored attack west from BEN CAT (XT7433) to cut the IRON TRIANGLE in half, simultaneous air assaults in an arc around the THANH DIEN Forest from BEN CAT to BEN SUC to complete the northern half of the encirclement of the objective. All forces attacking 9 Jan to search and destroy south through entire objective to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TENH Rivers (XT7520). All civilians to be interrogated and evacuated from the area. Area to be cleared with Rome plows and tunnel destruction stressed. Phase II to last two to three weeks.

13. (C) EXECUTION: a. Planning. The jungle at the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TENH Rivers (center at XT7030) had long been considered by II FFORCEV as a possible target for a major operation. The area had been developed by the enemy because of its location 25 kilometers north of SAIGON as the headquarters of Military Region IV and a base of operations against the capital. Nicknamed the IRON TRIANGLE, it had last been penetrated in October 1965 by the 173d Airborne Brigade. That operation had resulted in hard fighting as strong enemy forces had defended their base. Intelligence since then

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had confirmed the TRIANGLE's continued use as headquarters of Military Region IV. 1st Infantry Division operations along Highway 13 on the eastern flank of the IRON TRIANGLE had frequently made contact. Similarly, 25th Infantry Division on the western flank often had operated in the FUL HOL Plantation (XT6719) and HO DO Woods (XT6129). Here, too, enemy forces were contacted repeatedly. The IRON TRIANGLE, characterized as "a dagger pointed at SAIGON", was clearly an important enemy center for controlling and supporting guerrilla and terrorist operations. It was a target to be attacked decisively and in force in order to tear apart and neutralize the enemy control structure. As II FFORCEV troop strength built up in the latter half of 1966, planning was begun for a powerful strike into the IRON TRIANGLE. At a planning meeting in September, CG, II FFORCEV discussed the possibility of operations into the TRIANGLE with COMUSMACV. COMUSMACV suggested a coordinated operation with forces on both sides of the SAIGON River. He envisioned troops moving into positions on one side of the river to form an anvil and then a rapid move on the other side to hammer the enemy against the anvil. COMUSMACV also discussed the need for extensive engineer clearing, using Route 9 to strip the area and deprive the enemy of concealment. In November 1966, CG, II FFORCEV directed that planning begin for a massive offensive into the IRON TRIANGLE. Operation Plan ORLANDO was drawn up and intelligence collection from the objective area continued. In early December 1966, after a conference with J2, MACV, CG, II FFORCEV furnished further planning guidance: The TRIANGLE was to be attacked violently and decisively in January 1967 with all forces available. The operation was to be a combined, routine operations would prepare the area. The anvil would be positioned first, and the hammer then swung through the IRON TRIANGLE. The objective area was to be sealed tightly throughout the operation to prevent enemy escape. The TRIANGLE itself was to be secured for enemy installations, cleared of all civilians, stripped of concealment, and declared a specified strike zone. This multibattalion offensive was to be the first operation planned and controlled by II FFORCEV as a corps

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operation. OPLAN 53-66 (Operation CEDAR FALLS), embodying these concepts, was published on 12 December 1966.

b. Security and Deception. From the first planning conference, strict security measures were enforced to prevent disclosure of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The planning group was held to a minimum within II FFORCEV Headquarters, and wherever possible, preparations were made without specifically identifying them with CEDAR FALLS. For example, all commanders were instructed on 10 December 1966 to minimize helicopter operations during the Christmas - New Year periods in order to increase availability for operations during January. Even the unprecedented mass evacuation of civilians from the area was not disclosed before the operation. Planning for the transportation and housing of refugees was coordinated only with Mr. John Vann, Director of Region III, Office of Civilian Operations. Although supplies were earmarked for shipment to a refugee center at THU CUONG, no construction or prestocking was started until CEDAR FALLS had commenced. CG, II FFORCEV personally briefed CG, III Corps (ARVN) on 6 January 1967. ARVN troop participation was approved at that time with the mission to support US blocking forces, to secure and transport civilian evacuees, and to support US security forces in the AN LOC/QUAN LOI area. CG, III Corps (ARVN) assisted in maintaining security by restricting dissemination of information on CEDAR FALLS. Deception was achieved by deploying troops within striking distance of the IRON TRIANGLE under the guise of small scale, local operations. Both 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division began deceptive deployment on 5 January. 1st DEANE (1st Bn; 503d Inf (Abn), 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-); and 39th Ranger Bn (ARVN)) initiated Operation NIAGARA FALLS at 0730H under 1st Division control. The task force searched for the enemy in the CAU BINH Jungle (X17823) between Highway 13 and the THI TON River. When NIAGARA FALLS terminated at 1500H, 7 January, the 1st Bn, 503d Inf (Abn), 39th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-) were in blocking positions to support Operation CEDAR FALLS. 25th Infantry Division deployed 196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (LT) from TAY NINH to the HO BO

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Woods as part of Operation FULBRIGHT. FULBRIGHT has been a continuing operation in the TAY NINH area, but on 5 January the Brigade CP and trains moved to TRUNG LAM (XT9900), southwest of the IRON TRIANGLE. In the next two days, the brigade shifted forces out of TAY NINH and deployed four battalions into the HO BO Woods. These battalions, close to the west bank of the SAIGON River, were in position by 7 January to support CEDAR FALLS. Both FULBRIGHT and NIAGARA FALLS made light enemy contacts, but their significance lay in the initial deceptive deployment of components of the main, or blocking, force for CEDAR FALLS. This deployment was to be completed on 8 January.

c. 8 January (Day). II SPANISH Tactical Command Post for Operation CEDAR FALLS opened at 0700H at LONG BINH (YT0511). Twenty battalions organized in five brigades under 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions deployed around the IRON TRIANGLE during the day, completing the envelop and positioning the barrier and encirclement forces. 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division moved first, landing Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry by air assault at 0600H. The company assaulted into the rice fields at the junction of the SAIGON and THI THIE Rivers (XT738199) and landed in a zone under small area fire in the landing zone, suffering light casualties. The landing zone was quickly secured. Simultaneously, Company C was making an air assault one kilometer to the south. These landings anchored the southwestern flank of the 25th Infantry Division. To the west of this action, 2d Brigade's other two battalions, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 34th Armor (-), searched northeast out of CU CHI through the FIL MOL Plantation. By nightfall, these battalions had moved on in the dark to five hundred meters south of the SAIGON River. Northwest of 2d Brigade, 190th Brigade continued searching the HO BO Woods. All battalions of the 2d and 190th Brigades made light contact resulting in the discovery of small stores of enemy rice and munitions. By nightfall of 8 January, the 25th Infantry Division envelop was in place along the SAIGON River from the river junction (XT7500) northwest through the FIL MOL Plantation and the HO BO Woods. To the northwest of the HO BO Woods,

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2d Bde, 1st Infantry Division launched 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry by air assault to seal the village of BEN SUC (XT5833). The entire battalion landed within the village in one and one half minutes and achieved complete surprise. No preparation fires were used, and the light small arms fire that was received was quickly suppressed. As the battalion began to move out of the village, artillery and air strikes were called in on suspected enemy positions. The 1st Division Task Force Revolutionary Development (TFRD) and 3d Bn, 8th Infantry (ARVN) landed north and south of the village. By 0847H the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry had completely sealed off BEN SUC and the search by 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry (ARVN) began. 2d Brigade operations killed forty VC during the day and found large stores of rice, uniforms, and cloth in and around BEN SUC. TFRD, with ARVN assistance, began screening the population and preparing them for evacuation. The brigade CP was established at BEN SUC at 1030H. The 1st Bn, 18th Infantry remained at DAU TIENG. 3d Brigade, 1st Division and TF DEANE (-), the hammer force for CEDAR FALLS, moved into staging areas at DAU TIENG, LAI KHE, BEN CAT and PHU LOI. From these bases, they prepared to swing into the TRIANGLE on 9 January. 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (Abn), 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-), under OPCOM of TF DEANE, remained in their blocking positions east of the TRIANGLE along the THI TIEU and SAIGON Rivers. By the end of 8 January, II FFORCEV had completed the assault and readied the hammer. The smash into the headquarters base of Military Region IV started on 9 January.

d. 9 January (D+1). The hammer forces of 1st Division struck at 0800H with simultaneous attacks in the center and north of the IRON TRIANGLE. The 11th Armored Cavalry (-), under OPCOM of TF DEANE, drove west out of BEN CAT across the center of the TRIANGLE cutting a belt from the THI TIEU River at BEN CAT to the SAIGON River at RACH RAP (XT6630). The regiment seized a base for artillery (XT6731) north of RACH RAP, searched the surrounding area, and secured engineer clearing operations in the TRIANGLE. In the north, four battalions of 3d Brigade, 1st Division air assaulted into landing zones around the north and

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northwest edges of TRAM DIEN Forest Reserve, the northern portion of the IRON TRIANGLE. The initial battalion (1st Battalion, 2d Infantry) touched down at 0800H, with the other three landing in succession. All the landings were unopposed. The battalions linked up and commenced search operations from blocking positions in the vicinity of the landing zones. They immediately began to uncover enemy supplies, the most important being 75 tons of loose rice found in a tunnel by 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and 709 hand grenades in barrels discovered by 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry. Only two small contacts (3 to 4 men each) were made during the day's search. TF DEANE air assaulted 2d and 4th Battalions (Abn), 503d Infantry into the eastern edge of the TRAM DIEN Forest in a southern extension of the of the 3d Brigade landings. The two battalions linked up with 3d Brigade at 1140H, established blocking positions, and searched into the forest. To the south and east of their positions, Company D, 16th Armor (reinforced with one rifle company) established a screen along the edge of the forest to prevent enemy escape. These forces made no contact during the day nor did the 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry, the 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) or the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry (-) in the blocking positions along the THI TIEN River. Around BEN SUC, TFRO and 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry (ARVN) continued to search and screen the population. 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry attempted an air assault east of the village at 1605H but was diverted to land at BEN SUC when mines were found in their primary landing zone. The 25th Infantry Division searched actively along the west bank of the SAIGON River. Both the 2d Brigade and the 196th Brigade made light contacts with small, scattered groups of enemy. Company B, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor made the largest kill at 1645 hours. A raft with fifteen VC was sighted on the SAIGON River and all were killed with 90mm gun fire. Light contact continued after dark as the 25th Division and forces blocked enemy movements from the IRON TRIANGLE. The operations of 9 January had tightly sealed the IRON TRIANGLE. The hammer forces of II FFORCEV started their swing into the objective area that would smash the enemy base.

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e. 10 January (D+C). II FFORCEV units continued to search out and kill small groups of the enemy, finding increasingly large amounts of supplies. 3d Brigade, 1st Division in the THANH DIEN Forest was reinforced by 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, and by an engineer clearing task force. 2d Brigade in BEN SUC was supported by a thirty truck convoy from LAI KHE that arrived at BEN SUC to transport refugees out of the village via BEN CAT. ARVN 30th River Assault Group (RAG) landed at BEN SUC in the afternoon with 1st and 7th Airborne Battalions (ARVN) aboard. The airborne troops were to relieve the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry of the seal mission and assist in securing and screening the population of BEN SUC and the nearby villages while the RAG boats were to transport refugees to the camp at PHU CUONG. The search forces of 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and TF DEANE found more rice and 118 small arms in several caches. Resistance was light and scattered throughout the day. Similarly, 25th Division had light contact during the day and into the night. Small enemy supply points were uncovered and many bunkers and tunnels were destroyed. 2d Bn, 7th Infantry (ARVN) supported 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division along the SAIGON River. By 1200H, 10 January, 8th Regiment (ARVN) forces relieved 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry of its blocking mission east of the THI THIEP River. The 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) became OPFOR to the 8th Regiment. By the end of 10 January, II FFORCEV was well into the ICHN TRIANGLE and operations were going according to plan. The enemy had lost 161 KIA (BC), 29 captured and 272 detained. US losses were 17 KIA and 98 WIA. Captured enemy bases contained 217 weapons, quantities of ammunition, 210 tons of rice, 6,800 uniforms and miscellaneous supplies of all types from fish sauce to printing presses. At 1700H, 10 January, the first news reports on CEDAR FALLS were released.

f. 11 - 16 Jan 67. On the morning of 11 January, CG, II FFORCEV sent a message to the Commanding Generals of the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions congratulating them on achieving initial surprise and on the encouraging results of Operation CEDAR FALLS. He concluded by saying, "...I want a thorough search to be made of areas of

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responsibility... ..I particularly desire that the IRON TRIANGLE be completely covered." It was in the spirit of this message that CEDAR FALLS was carried out for the next sixteen days. Both divisions searched meticulously, uncovering increasing amounts of supplies and stripping the IRON TRIANGLE area of its value to the enemy. Enemy defenses were weak and disorganized and had evidently been shattered by the mass and surprise of the attack. Mines, booby traps, and snipers were encountered but there were no organized defenses or counterattacks by enemy forces. The enemy had evidently ordered units to disperse and try to escape. Because of the tight seal around the TRIANGLE, this was difficult. As the operation continued, the number of ralliers grew well beyond previous totals. PSYOP field teams effectively exploited these ralliers by printing rapid reaction leaflets containing surrender appeals from the ralliers to their VC friends. Five hundred eighteen ralliers and two hundred thirteen PW were taken. These figures totaled 731; more than the 720 VC body count. This indicated that the enemy was defeated, trapped and demoralized in his own base area. The evacuation of all civilians from BEN SUC and other villages in the IRON TRIANGLE continued through 16 January. The ARVN Airborne Battalions and River Assault Groups were most valuable during the civilian evacuation operations. The refugees, with their livestock and most of their personal possessions, were evacuated to PHU COUNG by military transportation. Approximately 3,000 were transported by truck convoys through BEN CAT while another 3,000 were either flown out in CH-47s or transported down the SAIGON River in the boats of the River Assault Groups. This unprecedented mass evacuation, executed on short notice due to security restriction, required a tremendous effort by US and ARVN military and civilian agencies. It resulted in a humane and efficient evacuation that deprived the enemy of a major resource in the IRON TRIANGLE. 1st and 7th Airborne Battalions (ARVN) relieved 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry of the BEN SUC seal missions. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry was then committed to a search of the IRON TRIANGLE thus raising the 1st Division search

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force to nine infantry battalions and three armored cavalry squadrons. This large force combed the enemy sanctuary day after day, finding huge quantities of rice and hundreds of documents, destroying enemy tunnels and bunkers and stripping trees and underbrush along roads and trails. 1st Division forces began gradually withdrawing from CEDAR FALLS on 14 January. By 16 January, the 2d and 3d Brigades had withdrawn from the IRON TRIANGLE. TF DEANE continued the search with three infantry battalions, three armored cavalry squadrons and engineer forces until 24 January when it departed for its base camps. 1st Infantry Division continued tunnel exploration, demolitions and clearing in the TRIANGLE with TF FIFE, a composite force of armored cavalry, engineers and infantry. 25th Infantry Division continued to search the enemy base areas in the HO BO Woods and FIL HOL Plantation while blocking enemy escape routes out of the IRON TRIANGLE. Company B, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mech) engaged an enemy platoon on 13 January and Company C, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry destroyed a sampson with thirteen VC aboard on 16 January. However, most contacts were with small scattered groups attempting to escape. Bold operations, employing US troops and the 5th River Assault Group (ARVN), patrolled both banks of the SAIGON River to help seal off the TRIANGLE. Saturating the area with nine maneuver battalions (including 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, ARVN), the 25th Infantry Division destroyed many enemy supplies and fortifications. The division's operations proved so profitable that the 2d Brigade continued to search the area as part of Operation ALA MOANA after the termination of CEDAR FALLS on 26/01/67. In nineteen days, II Field Force Vietnam converted the IRON TRIANGLE from a safe haven to a deathtrap, and then to a military desert. Years of work spent tunnelling and hoarding supplies were nullified. The vital civilian population was removed, thus making any enemy efforts to rebuild doubly difficult. Concealment, particularly along lines of communications, was stripped away, baring the area to future surveillance. Finally, the area was designated a specified strike zone so that it could be interdicted with ease should the enemy attempt to

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rebuild. In Operation CEDAR FALLS, a strategic enemy base was decisively engaged and destroyed.

14. (C) RESULTS:

a. US LOSSES: 72 KIA, 327 WIA.

 Damaged: 9 APC's, 2 - $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, 2 LCR, 3 tanks, 1 tank dozer.

 Destroyed: 3 APC's, 1 tank.

b. ARVN LOSSES:

 (1) ARVN: 11 KIA, 8 WIA, 3 individual weapons lost.

 (2) US/AVL: None.

 (3) Navy: None.

c. VC LOSSES: 720 KIA (DC), 313 PW's, 518 ralliers, 51 detainees, 5967 refugees, 23 crew served weapons, 555 individual weapons, 476 artillery and mortar rounds, 1960 grenades, 60,323 rounds small arms ammunition, 391 assorted mines, 1111 bunkers, 426 tunnels, 509 structures, 3702 tons rice, more than 100,000 pages of assorted documents.

d. Not all air strikes and B-52 strikes were followed up by ground forces; however, visual reconnaissance was conducted in all cases.

e. Credited to the 5th Inf Div (ARVN) are 18 VC KIA, 70 PW's, 25 ralliers and 11 weapons captured. (These figures not included in C, above).

15. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. a. Supply:

 (1) Ammunition management. Effective control over ammunition under ASR can be maintained only when accurate issue data is reported. In the course of this operation, it became apparent that the 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (1st LFA) at LAI KHE was not reporting ASR ammunition transactions and that sizable issues had been made but not debited against any allocations. During a liaison visit to LAI KHE to determine the cause of the problem, the OIC of the Ammunition Point stated that he had not been instructed to report issue of all ASR ammunition. In future operations employing FSA prior coordination must be effected to determine required reports and reporting channels. It should be noted that most units lived within the ASR on controlled ammunition. Only 105mm HE and illumination ASR of the major caliber items were exceeded.

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(2) Water for Evacuees and Refugees. Prior to the operation, a request was received from II FFORCEV G5 for water trailers to supply cooking and drinking water for 6,000 refugees from the area of operations. The G4 office established an initial requirement for two 5,000 gallon semi-trailers, six 400 gallon tankers and six 400 gallon trailers for water delivery. As the refugee population began to expand into thousands, it became apparent that this would not be adequate. A message was dispatched to USARV the night of 12 January requesting an additional 5,000 gallon tanker. At 0730H the following morning, it was determined that there were none in the supply depot and that the tanker would have to be obtained from some unit on a loan basis. The tanker was obtained from 64th QM Bn and transported from BEN CAT to PHU LOI and placed in service. 1st Infantry Division also obtained nine additional 400 gallon trailers to support the operations.

(3) Transportation. Airlift of personnel, equipment and supplies functioned well. Demands placed on US Army Support Command, Saigon, were met. USAID requested the use of trucks for 7 days beginning 9 January 1967 to assist in the establishment of the refugee center. Ten trucks were provided for the period requested; however, the requirement for trucks continued until 2 February 1967.

(4) Maintenance. There were no significant or unique maintenance problems called to the attention of this headquarters during the operation. The maintenance problems that were encountered prevailed due to the composition and location of the supported forces. The support elements, limited in the number of support teams they could provide, found it difficult to provide on-site maintenance at all locations with respect to manpower and repair parts. Equipment downtime was further prolonged due to insecure road nets used for delivery of repair parts or replacement of end items.

16. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: a. ARVN Navy and RF boat companies were utilized for evacuation of captured equipment and resettling of refugees. The boats provided their own security during

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river convoys. In addition, during the latter stage of the exercise, the 25th Division used the boats for detailed search by US troops of canals and streams leading into the main river system. This proved extremely effective in locating VC bodies killed by air and artillery strikes in inaccessible areas.

b. The engineer task force of 54 bulldozers and 48 mine plows performed an essential role in the success of the operation. Part of the overall mission was to destroy bunkers and tunnels and to cut road ways and landing zones for future operations in the IRON TRIANGLE. The engineer task force followed the 11th ACR into the battle area on D-1 when the 11th ACR attacked west from BEN CAT.

c. Tunnel destruction was very effective on large tunnel complexes. This was accomplished by first sealing the tunnels then stringing demolition charges throughout the tunnel system. This was followed by injecting acetylene into the complex and detonating the charges.

d. Quad .50 cal machine guns from the 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery were mounted on Vietnamese River Assault Boats and used to control the junction of the SAIGON and THI TIEN rivers. The fire power of these weapons plus the mobility of the assault boats proved an effective deterrent to VC use of the waterway.

e. Armor was effectively employed in a blocking role by the 25th Division west of the SAIGON River and by the 1st Division in employment of the 11th ACR in both screening and search and destroy operations.

17. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: a. Surprise. Security in planning and deception in deployment resulted in surprise on the enemy. The light initial contact and the lack of a well coordinated defense indicated that not only did the enemy not expect our attack but was unable to react when it came. The final casualty figures show that he had been in the IRON TRIANGLE in considerable strength, despite his weak defense.

b. Map II FFORCEV quickly and effectively sealed and thoroughly searched the objective area by using a higher troop density than has been possible before. This greatly improved the effectiveness of the cordon and the search as indicated by the very high proportion of ralliers.

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These men could neither hide nor escape; their choice was to surrender. The price paid for massing II FTORCEV was acceptable. There was no loss of security in other areas because of the troop concentration for CEDAR FALLS. Further, the density of troops reduced the total time required for the search operation.

c. Cooperation. Cooperation between US and Vietnamese military and civilian agencies was excellent. This was particularly true in the evacuation of the civilian population. Both the ARVN airborne units and the River Assault Groups provided invaluable assistance in securing and transporting the refugees. Civilian and military personnel of both nations worked in close harmony to organize and build the PHU CUONG refugee camp on very short notice. On the purely military side, ARVN units contributed significantly to the effectiveness of the cordon. The ARVN River Assault Groups made a unique contribution by their patrolling along the river lines.

d. Psychological Operations. In spite of the security limitations placed on preparations, psychological operations rapidly exploited the initial success of CEDAR FALLS. They were particularly effective in bringing to the trapped enemy the hopelessness of his situation. The CHIEU HOI program provided him with an acceptable alternative at a great reduction in friendly losses.

e. Effects on Enemy. (1) A major portion of the enemy's base and control center for operations against the Capital Military District has been destroyed. This represents the loss of an investment of twenty years. Enemy facilities and fortifications were destroyed, 1000 killed, 555 individual weapons and 23 crew served weapons captured.

(2) Over 3700 tons of rice have been captured or destroyed. This is enough to feed five fully manned regiments for a year. More significant than the loss itself is the resultant diversion of manpower to reconstitute his stores.

(3) All of the civilian inhabitants of the area, some 6000, plus their livestock were evacuated. This will deny the enemy food, manpower, revenue, transportation and intelligence.

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(4) The capture of over 500,000 separate pages of documents, including crypto material, has given us valuable intelligence. The enemy's security programs have been compromised to include records continuity.

(5) The enemy's offensive capability against the Capital Military District has been reduced by loss of personnel, equipment and facilities.

(6) Realization of the seriousness of these losses by the leadership in North Vietnam, COSVN and the VC dominated populace will have a serious psychological impact. They must reevaluate the relative capabilities of their forces as opposed to ours.

Jonathan O. Seaman
JONATHAN O. SEAMAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

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HQ, II Field Force Vietnam
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OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U)

References: a. Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, sheets 6231 I, II, 6230 I, 6331 III, IV and 6330 IV.

b. OPLAN 16-66 (Op UNIONTOWN) (U), HQ, II FFORCEV, 101200H Jan 66.

c. OPLAN 52-66 (Op FAIRFAX) (U), HQ, II FFORCEV, 181200H Nov 66.

(c)
1. (S-REF) SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A - Intelligence.

b. Friendly Forces:

- (1) See current II FFORCEV SITREPS.
- (2) 7th Air Force provides logistical support.
- (3) 1st Log Cnd provides logistical support.
- (4) USAECV (P) provides engineer support.

c. Assumptions:

- (1) That enemy activity during Op CEDAR FALLS will permit US base camps and installations to be secured with minimum forces as follows:

- (a) CU CHI - 1 bn.
- (b) PHUOC VINH - 1 bn.
- (c) LAI KHE - 1 bn.
- (d) BIEN HOA/LONG BINH - 1 bn (Op UNIONTOWN).
- (e) LONG GIAO - 1 sqdn.
- (f) TAY NINH - 1 bn.
- (g) DAU TIENG - 1 bn.

- (2) That MACV will release 171st Abn Bde (Sep) from the General Reserve for participation in this operation.

2. (S-REF) MISSION. II FFORCEV conducts operations via THANH DINH Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to locate and destroy military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; and clear area of inhabitants.

3. (S-REF) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations:

- (1) This operation employs elements of two US div (reinf) to conduct S&D operations in the IRON TRIANGLE and THANH DINH Forestry Reserve area and to block the escape of VC from the area.

- (2) The operation will be conducted in two phases:

- (a) Phase I (D-Day) - limited positioning of forces under the guise of conducting routine operations in HO BO Woods, FIL HOL Plantation, and vic BEN CAT.
- (b) Phase II (D+1 to D+?) - an arm-hill assault in the northern portion of the area. Simultaneous and simultaneous positioning of a blocking force along the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers on D+1. Following the assault, S&D operations will be conducted by the assault force south to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers. Blocking forces will be positioned by foot and/or vehicle on D+1. Mechanized/armor forces will be used to block VC escape routes on the southeastern and southwestern flanks of the assault force. Particular attention will be devoted to searching built up areas, suspected location of

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OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, and thorough interrogation of personnel found therein. Tunnel destruction and clearing of areas using Rome Plows and bulldozers will be stressed. All inhabitants of area to be searched will be interrogated and, depending on their legal status, processed through VN or US military channels. It is anticipated that this phase will last from two to three weeks.

b. 1st Inf Div:

(1) Attachments and Detachments:

- (a) 173d Abn Bde (Sep). OPCON effective D-Day.
- (b) 11th ACR (- one sqdn). OPCON effective D-1.
- (c) One combat engr bn, 79th Engr Gp. Direct support effective D-1.
- (d) Attached. One bn, 199th Lt Inf Bde, effective D-1.
- (e) Detached. Co B, 2d Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1.

(2) Phase I (D-Day). Exercise maximum security when positioning forces under guise of conducting routine operations.

(3) Phase II (D+1 to D+7) (See Annex B):

- (a) Deploy blocking force by surface transportation on D+1. Blocking force will be positioned along east bank of THI TINH River from vic XT5835 to vic XT7620 to seal AO (Psn ZULU).
- (b) Conduct airmobile assault into northern position of AO (Psn XRAY).
- (c) Prevent VC infiltration into and exfiltration from AO.
- (d) Conduct S&D operations to the south in zone to the confluence of the SAIGON and THI TINH Rivers.
- (e) The LOC to BEN CAT and LAI KHE will be secured and opened daily for log support.
- (f) Conduct PSYOP (see Coordinating Instructions).
- (g) Be prepared to evacuate noncombatants from AO (see Coordinating Instructions).

c. 9th Inf Div:

- (1) Continue current mission.
- (2) Be prepared to deploy one bn anywhere in II FFORCEV area.

d. 25th Inf Div:

(1) Attachments and Detachments. OPCON 2d Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1.

(2) Phase I (D-Day). Exercise maximum security when positioning forces under guise of conducting routine operation.

(3) Phase II (D+1 to D+7) (See Annex B):

- (a) Deploy blocking force by surface transportation on D+1. Blocking forces will be positioned along west bank of SAIGON River from vic XT5633 to vic XT7520 to seal AO (Psn YANKEE).
- (b) Prevent VC infiltration into and exfiltration from AO.
- (c) Conduct PSYOP (see Coordinating Instructions).
- (d) Continue Op FAIRFAX and Op LANIKAL.
- (e) Be prepared to evacuate noncombatants from AO (see Coordinating Instructions).
- (f) Provide and maintain one inf bde as II FFORCEV Reserve.

e. 173d Abn Bde (Sep). OPCON 1st Inf Div effective D-Day.

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- c. 19th Lt Inf Bde (Sep):
 - (1) Assume Op UNIONTOWN on D-1.
 - (2) Provide one bn to 1st Inf Div to secure PHUOC VINH on D-1.
 - (3) Continue current mission.
- d. 11th ACR:
 - (1) Regiment minus one sqdn OPCON 1st Inf Div effective D-1.
 - (2) One sqdn continue current mission via LONG GIAO.
- e. 1st ATF. Continue current mission.
- f. 2d Bn, 34th Armor. OPCON 25th Inf Div effective D-1.
- g. II FFORCEV Arty. Within capabilities support 1st Inf Div and 25th Inf Div. (See Annex C - Fire Support)
- h. 12th Avn Gp:
 - (1) Provide maximum airlift capability on D-1 to position up to two bde TF on northern boundary of 1st Inf Div zone.
 - (2) Provide support as required (see Coordinating Instructions).
- i. 79th Engr Gp. Provide one engr bn direct support to 1st Inf Div for support during search operations. It is anticipated primary tasks will include tunnel search/destruction and jungle clearing operations.
- j. II FFORCEV Reserve:
 - (1) Bde, 25th Inf Div.
 - (2) Bn, 9th Inf Div.
- k. Coordinating Instructions:
 - (1) This plan effective for planning on receipt, execution on order.
 - (2) Requests for air support to be submitted to this HQ, ATTN: G-1 Air.
 - (3) Boundaries - see Annex B.
 - (4) Coordination with Vietnamese nationals or US advisors will NOT be made prior to D-1.
 - (5) The search area will be declared a free fire zone upon completion of operation.
 - (6) All noncombatants in the area of operations east of the SAIGON River and west of the THI TINH River will be evacuated. Noncombatants released following interrogation will be turned over to the appropriate district chief for resettlement. When feasible, the personal belongings and livestock of noncombatants should be evacuated with the personnel.
 - (7) Unit commanders will provide assistance to the district chief to care for noncombatants until USAID is able to assume this function.
 - (8) Units will conduct tactical PSYOP commencing D-1. Themes and target audiences will be identified as the tactical situation develops. Rapid reaction leaflets will be given priority. Leaflets destined for the search area will not be requested or printed prior to D-1. Maximum use will be made of standard leaflets during the operation.
 - (9) Handling and classifying PW and detainees. All innocent civilians, returnees, PW and civil defendants apprehended or in US custody will be handled and classified LAW MACV Dir 190-3, dated 29 Oct 66 and MACV Dir 20-5, dated 21 Sep 66.
 - (10) Control of traffic on THI TINH River is the responsibility of the 1st Inf Div.
 - (11) Control of traffic on the SAIGON River is the responsibility of the 25th Inf Div.
4. (U) ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS.
 - a. Admin O 4-66, HQ, USASC, dtd 25 Oct 66 in effect.

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OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (I) (Cont'd)

- b. Requests for log support beyond own capability are to be submitted to 1st Log Cnd, info this HQ, ATTN: G4.
- c. ASR is in effect.
- 5. (U) COMMAND and SIGNAL.
 - a. Signal. Current SOI remains in effect.
 - b. Command. II FFORCEV CP - no change.

Acknowledge.

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
ANNEXES:

- A - Intelligence
- ~~B - Conceptual Operations (Planning)~~ Withdrawn Hqs, Da
- C - Fire Support Plan

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- 3 - 9th Inf Div
- 3 - 199th Lt Inf Bde (Sep)
- 3 - 79th Engr Cp
- 1 - MACJ2
- 1 - 525th MI Cp
- 1 - 1st MI Bn (ARS)

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

References: a. OPLAN 58-66

b. Map, Vietnam, Series 1:7014, Scale 1:50,000, Sheets 6231 I, II: 6230 I: 6331 III, IV: 6330 IV.

c. II FFRCEV Intelligence Estimate #2 of the Situation in III CTZ.

(c)

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION:

- a. Area of Interest. The area of interest is generally bounded by the following coordinates: XT 5040, XT 8040, XT 8015, XT 6315. Contained within this area is the Iron Triangle, Fihol Plantation, Thanh Dien Forest Reserve, and portions of the Ho Bo and Boi Loi Woods. The Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers dissect the area and present major obstacles to ground forces. See Appendix 4 for complete details on the terrain, helicopter landing zones, and status of LOC's. The Iron Triangle and Thanh Dien Forest areas have not been penetrated by large scale US FFWMAF operations in the last year. Frequent operations have been conducted in the Ho Bo, Boi Loi, and adjacent areas on the eastern side of the Saigon River. Almost invariably these operations encounter numerous mines, boobytraps, extensive tunnel and bunker systems. Additionally the enemy withdraws from these areas and reoccupies them following the exit of friendly forces. It can be assumed that the enemy will follow this same general pattern in the future. The Iron Triangle has long been a major VC stronghold and base area. Numerous agent reports and visual reconnaissance reveal that the Iron Triangle is a major base area. Of primary concern in the area is the presence of elements of the headquarters of VC Military Region IV. This headquarters controls the activities of the VC 165A Regiment, all other forces and is the political organization for VC Military Region IV, which encompasses all of Gia Dinh Province and parts of Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces. (See II FFRCEV Estimate #2 of the Situation in III CTZ for boundaries of MR IV). The destruction of this organization is vital as it is responsible for the numerous acts of sabotage and terrorism which occur in and around Gia Dinh Province. These acts of sabotage, terrorism, and the attacking of isolated outposts and installations constitutes the greatest enemy threat in III CTZ at the present time. The continuance of these acts will seriously affect the confidence of the populace in the GVN and provides the VC with extremely valuable propaganda.
- b. Order of Battle. See Appendix 1 to this Annex.
- c. Known and Reported VC Installations. See Appendix 2 to this Annex.
- d. Organization and Personnel. See Appendix 3 to this Annex. See Appendix 4 to this Annex.

2. (c) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (OIR).

- a. EEI:
 - (1) Where are the major elements of VC Military Region IV located?
 - (2) What elements and persons of VC Military Region IV are located in Saigon? In Gia Dinh Province? Where are they located? What are their names, descriptions, and place of birth?

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- (3) Who are the members of the infrastructure in the area of interest? Where are they located? What are their names, description and places of birth?
- (4) Does the Liberation News Agency (LNA) operate a radio propaganda station in this area? Does the LNA operate any other propaganda activities in this area?

b. OIR:

- (1) Where are the major VC supply installations, hospitals, and dispensaries? How are they supplied?
- (2) What are the crossing points used by the VC on the Saigon River?
- (3) What is the attitude of the local populace toward the GVN? Toward the VC?
- (4) Does the local populace actively support the VC with food, intelligence, and money?

(c)

3. ~~END~~ INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS:

a. Order to Subordinates:

- (1) Report on EEL and OIR as obtained.
- (2) Report information as acquired in response to the following SICR:
 - (a) U-UPF-U0751 - BS, RVN and FVMAF Prisoners of War (U)
 - (b) U-UPF-U0741 - NVA/VC Tunnel Systems (U)
 - (c) U-UPF-U0671 - VC Order of Battle Gia Dinh Province (U)
 - (d) U-UPF-U0669 - VC Liberation Press Agency and Liberation Radio (U)
 - (e) U-UPF-U0609 - Rendezvous (U)
 - (f) U-UPF-U0586 - VC Guerrillas (U)
 - (g) U-UPF-U0502 - 165A Regiment (U)
 - (h) U-UPF-U0393 - Captured USAID Materials (U)
- (3) Devote particular attention to the satisfaction of the requirements of SICR U-UPF-U0609 - Rendezvous and II FFORCEV OPORD 32-66 (OP Rendezvous) (U)
- (4) Advise this HQ NLT 25 Dec 66, requirements for interrogation and interpreter personnel in excess of organic assets.
- (5) 1st Infantry Division: Request this HQ and all major participating units be furnished a copy of ADP showing VC installations in the area of interest.
- (6) 25th Infantry Division is requested to provide all participating units and this HQ a copy of ADP on personalities on current black list in area of operations.

b. Request to higher and adjacent units:

- (1) MACV J2:
 - (a) Request that additional interrogation team and interpreters be made available as requested.
 - (b) Request that, in addition to movement of the 272d VC Regiment into the area of operations be furnished this headquarters.
- (2) 51st MI Group: Request all available information on the personalities and locations of the various committee members of VC Military Region IV be furnished this headquarters on a priority basis.
- (3) DSA III Corps: Request a priority intelligence effort be made to rapidly interrogate ralliers and prisoners knowledgeable of the activities of MR IV.
- (4) Detachment A, 1st MI Bn (ARS): Request this headquarters be advised of the status and availability of aerial photo coverage in the area of interest.

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 38-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

4. (U) TERRAIN AND WEATHER:

a. Terrain: See Appendix 4 to this Annex.

(e) b. Weather: See II FFORCEV January 1967 Climatic Summary for III CTZ.

5. ~~SW~~ MISCELLANEOUS:

a. To accomplish the mission of destroying VC Military Region IV, a complete detailed interrogation and through classification must be made on all detainees. Further, all personnel in the area must be detained and classified.

b. The procedure for classification of detainees and their disposition is contained in Confidential Message, AVFHB, 120528, HQ II FFORCEV, 160145Z Dec 66, Subject: Processing, Accounting, and Making Reference to VC Detainees and Prisoners of War (U).

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Acknowledge

Appendices:

1. Order of Battle
2. Known and Reported VC Installations
3. Organization and personalities of MR IV.
4. Terrain

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Appendix 1 (Order of Battle) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66
(OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (C) The following list shows the current probable locations of enemy units in and adjacent to the area of interest:

UNIT	LOCATION
272d VC Regt	Vic XT 6643
1st Bn 165A Regt	Vic XT 6223
7th Bn 165A Regt	Vic XT 6422
C320 Local Force Bn	Vic XT 5233
C81 Local Force Co	Vic XT 5542
C64 Local Force Co	Vic XT 5542
C61 Local Force Co	Vic XT 7427
241 Arty Bn, U80 Arty Regt	Unlocated, possibly in Long Nguyen Secret Zone
Military Affairs Committee MR IV	See paragraph 5
Political Committee MR IV	See paragraph 5

An ARVN MI agent reported that on 24 Nov 66, an unknown VC unit was ordered to turn on a generator to recharge batteries for a large signal unit in Boi Loi Forest (NT 5035). This signal unit was reportedly located deep underground in that area. Members of this unit were involved in radio intercept, telephone wire tapping, code breaking, and were fluent in many languages. The VC stated that because of this unit they had advanced warning of GVN and Allied Operations. (Information unevaluated and supposedly obtained from a VC platoon leader.)

2. (C) The following units are available for reinforcements within 24-36 hours:

UNIT	LOCATION
Phu Loi Bn	Vic XT 8440
2d Bn, 165A Regt	Vic XT 8307
3d Bn, 165A Regt	Vic XT 0213

Elements of the 9th VC Division (-272d Regt) could re-inforce in battalion or regimental strength within 48 hours.

3. (C) Recent reported enemy movements:

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	DATE
XT 838387	Phu Loi Bn	10 Oct 66
XT 892398	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	6 Nov 66
XT 811376	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	14 Nov 66
XT 976363	C2 Co, 800 Bn	1 Nov 66
XT 974372	3d Co, Phu Loi Bn	9 Nov 66
XT 937457	100 VC	12 Nov 66
XT 966421	VC Bn	

4. (C) a. The suspected location of the 272d VC Regt is in the area of the initial stages of the operation. A detailed assessment with this regiment could hinder the initial phases of the operation. As the operation progresses the regiment could attack friendly forces from the rear.
b. It can be assumed the enemy will defend his supply, base and headquarters areas with the security forces currently available. In this respect, it is anticipated that these positions will be well fortified, and the approach routes mined and boobytrapped.
c. Due to the lack of friendly operations in the Iron Triangle since October 65, very little hard intelligence is available in this area. Since this has

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Appendix 1 (Order of Battle) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66
(OP CEDAR FALLS) (U). (Cont'd)

long been a VC stronghold, it can be assumed that extensive fortification and tunnel systems are present throughout the area.

5. (C) HQ MR IV and its major committees, like all VC units, move frequently to avoid detection. Based upon analysis of all available information it appears that the HQ of MR IV and the Political Committee generally operate in an area bounded by XT 6437, XT 6637, XT 6733, XT 6433, and will most likely be located in grid square XT 6434. The Military Affairs Committee operates generally in an area bounded by XT 6432, XT 6934, XT 6528, XT 6225, and will be most likely located in grid square XT 6527.

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Appendix 1 (Organization and Personnel) of Vol IV; to Annex A (Intelligence)

3. **COMM. GENERAL.** The VC Military Region IV (MR IV) is also known as the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh-Special Zone (SCGZ). It is a well organized military and political headquarters. This organization is responsible for and controls all VC actions within the boundaries of MR IV. See II FFORCEV Estimate 42 of the situation in III CTZ for the boundaries of MR IV. The headquarters and elements of the various committees, sections and subsections are known to be in the area of interest.

3. ~~COM~~ LOCATIONS. It is highly unlikely that the HQ of MR IV and its major military and political committee will be found in one specific area. All indications show that the Military Affairs Committee and the Political Committee are normally separated. The HQ and the majority of the following committees and sections are believed to be in the area of operations: HQ MR IV (SCGDSZ Party Committee), Military Party Committee, Current Affairs Committee, Military Affairs Committee, Forward Supply Council, Finance and Economy Section, Postal, Transportation and Communication Section, Base Section and the Security Section. The various proselyting sections, and the civil health section must by the nature of the duties and objectives be located through out VC MR IV. Certain representatives of these sections are possibly located in the area of operation. The areas in and around Phu An (NT 7222) and An Dien (XT 7027) are frequently mentioned in numerous agent reports as meeting areas, stop over points and committee and section headquarters areas.

3. ~~CICV~~ ORGANIZATION. Military Region IV is well organized and possesses all the major military and political committees and sections found in the other Military Region HQ. This organization is duplicated for the most part at the district, village and hamlet level through MR IV. All sections are active in those areas which the VC control and provide the semblance of a legal government. These sections operate covertly in those areas under GVN control in MR IV. See Inclosure 1 to this appendix for a diagram of the organization of MR IV. Inclosure 2 provided the names of key members of the Infrastructure as known to this HQ. CICV Research and Analysis Study ST67-012, dated 4 Sep 66 provides a wealth of data on the organization, structure and personalities of MR IV.

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balcones:

- 1-Organization of MR IV
2-Personalities of MR IV

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
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MILITARY REGION IV STRUCTURE



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Inlosure 2 to Appendix 1 (Classification and Responsibilities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to GIL AN 22-06 (OP CEMAR FAMILS) (U)

PERSONALITIES OF MR IV

The following list of personalities has been compiled by the CI Section of
this headquarters based upon: MAC JVC Political OB, Agent Reports,
interrogation of soldiers and PWs.

1. Military Affairs Committee: (Cover Number A66-0301)

Chief: Colonel Hai Phung (Chief of Staff MR 4)
Field Cadre: Nam Thu
Political Officer: Dong Cuong
Members: Chu, Ba Tien

a. Military Staff:

Chief of Staff: Major Bay Nam
Deputy Chief of Staff: Nam (in charge of militia)

(1) Correspondence Section/Military Staff

Chief: Lieutenant Tran Hong Ky (captured)
Assistant: Muoi Hai
Administrative Clerk: Nguyen Van Nuan

(2) Operations and Training Section/Military Staff

Chief: Bay Ung
Assistant: Bay Son (Senior-Captain)
Assistant: Ba Hai
Assistant: Aspirant Tu Tien

(3) Artillery and Support Section/Military Staff

Chief: Senior Captain Nam Hia

(4) Signal Section/Military Staff

Chief: Tu Chien

(5) Combat Operations Section/Military Staff

Chief: Captain Hai Son

(6) Reception Section/Military Staff

Chief: Phung Hung
Cadre: Ba Thien

(7) Sapper and Engineer Section/Military Staff

Chief: Tam Hanh
Assistant: Ban

(8) Militia Section/Military Staff

Chief: Captain Muoi Duyen
Cadre: Nam Cai

(9) Military Personnel Section/Military Staff

Chief: Senior Captain Ba Tien
Assistant: Senior Captain Tu Minh

(10) Military Intelligence Section/Military Staff

Chief: Senior Captain Tu Minh
Assistant: Sau Huynh or Huynh
Captain Tam Thanh
Captain Nam Duc

(11) Crypto Section/Military Staff

Chief: Lieutenant Bay Tho
Members: Hai Son, Truong, Phu, Thanh, Duc

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to PLAN 58-06 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

Chief of Crypto Element: Lieutenant Tu Huu
Radio Operators: Hung, Toan, Phia
Members: Hiep, Mat, Danh, Khac, Kiet

(12) Map Cell/Military Staff

Cell Leader: Long
Member: On, Nghe, Hai Nho

(13) Recruit Training School/Military Staff

Director: Captain Nam Binh
Deputy: Senior Lieutenant Ba Quang, aka
Ba Nhuong

Political Officer: Ut Minh

Instructors: Tam Dot, So Viet
Nam Dung (Sapper: returned from
regroupment to North
Vietnam)
Ba Phuoc (Sapper)
Ba Quoc (Infantry)
Tu Du, Ut Trieu, aka Lau Do
Sau Kieu, Tam Hoa
Ba Soan, aka Lau Do

Chief of Administrative Section: Tu Tien

Members: Ut Tam, Tu Manh, Ba Duong

b. Political Staff/Military Affairs Committee

Chief: Major Tu Quy

Assistant: Tam Phong
Bay Nuyen (in charge of training)
Tu Minh (in charge of Information and Press)

(1) Administrative Staff/Political Staff

Chief: Sau Ky

(2) (Staff) Assistant for Emulation/Political Staff

Captain Tu Hai

(3) (Staff) Assistant for Party Affairs and Labor Youth/Political Staff

Captain Hai Thuan

(4) Enemy Proselyting Section/Political Staff

Assistant: Bay Hoa

(5) Security Section/Political Staff

Chief: Bay Duong

Senior Lieutenant: Ba Viet

(6) Cadre Section/Political Staff

Bay Tung

Senior Captain: Det Thanh

(7) Organization Section/Political Staff

Assistant Captain: Tam Hong (in charge of Work Emulation)

(8) Propaganda and Training Section/Political Staff

Chief: Tu Dat

c. Rear Service Staff/Military Affairs Committee

Chief: Hai Thanh

Assistant for Planning: Tu Long
Sau Tinh

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Inclusion 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 34-1 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- (1) Ordnance Section Work to K. 11-151/Rear Service Staff
Chief: BA Mai
 - (2) Medical Section K. 12 - 1.12/Rear Service Staff
Chief: Doctor Tu Vu
 - (3) Quartermaster Section K. 13 - 1.83/Rear Service Staff
Chief: Tu Pho
Assistant: Nam Non
Military Provision Cell (Leader): Nam Gia
Financial Affairs Cell (Leader): Nam Non and Tu Minh
2. Administrative Staff/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Ding Cong Det (captured)
Assistant:
Members: Ba Hoa (administrative clerk)
Chin Nghiem (administrative clerk in charge of finance)
Ba Phung (typist)
Nam Oanh (typist)
Tam Kiet (typist)
Thi Anh (typist)
Thi Xuan (typist)
Thi Huong (typist)
Uc Tien (Liaison (agent))
3. Information and Propaganda/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Sau Kau (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on the situation in the rural areas)
Cadre: Sau Duc (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on the situation in cities)
Old man Chin Lich (in charge of preparing weekly information bulletin on current events)
Members: Bay Phiu (making copies of the bulletin)
Nam Hau
Tu Minh
- The Information and Propaganda Section is composed of two branches:
Chief of Rural Area Branch: Lu Lan
Cadre: Ba Phat, Ba Thuc, Nam Da, Ba Ho (Liaison (agents))
Chief of City Branch: Tu Tan
Cadre: Hai Vo, Thanh Huong, Nam Nui (female)
- a. Urban School/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Hai Tan (also Assistant Chief of the Propaganda and Training Section)
Assistant: Tu An (instructor)
Cadre: Bay Van (female; instructor)
- b. Rural School/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Bay An (also Chief of the Propaganda and Training Section)

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to COMLON 54-06 (P) CEDAR FALLS (U) (Cont'd)

- Assistant: Tu Duong (Instructor)
Cadre: Tu Hon (Instructor)
4. Writer and Artist (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Truong Binh Tong, aka Tu Truong (musician)
Cadre: Hai Phuong, aka Vien Phuong (play writer)
(in charge of urban area)
Nhan Trieu, aka Ho Trieu (composer of
theatrical works)
Sau Vinh (in charge of rural area)
Thuy Huong
5. (Paywar) Entertainment (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Mau Hung
Assistant: Nam Thinh
Members: Ut Hu (in charge of administration)
Thi Huong (actress and singer of modern
music)
Thi Vach (singer of modern music and
dancer)
Thi Loi (singer of traditional music)
Phu Huong (singer of traditional music)
6. Urban Commo-Liaison (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Sau Loi
Member: Sau Si (Security Guard)
7. Urban Propaganda Network/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Sau Quang (killed on 10 Dec 64 in Cu Chi)
Assistant: Ba Han (in charge of an element operating
within the capital)
Cadre: Ba Huong, Bay Khim, Binh Cong Det (captured)
8. Painting and Sculpture (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Thi Huong (it is reported that this man
is a professor of the Gia Dinh Fine
Arts School)
Members: Tu Hon (printer)
Sau Thinh, Ut Du, Chia Chot
9. Motion Picture (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Doan Bay
Members: Ba Thanh, Nam Nho, Bay Tuan, Nam Dat,
Sau Nghia
10. Radio (Communication) and Picture (Section)/Propaganda and Training
Section
Chief: Bay Hoang
Specialists: [illegible]
11. Metal Type Printing (Section)/Propaganda and Training Section
Cadre: [illegible]
Specialists: [illegible]
12. Mimeograph House/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Nam Nam
Members: Hoi Lun, Nam Nho
13. Supply and Liaison Sub-Section/Propaganda and Training Section
Chief: Bay Mot
Assistant: Sau Dong

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Inlosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (DP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

14. Youth Proselyting Section/Special Region (Party) Committee

Chief: Sau Tham

15. Organization Section - Cover number A74 - D. 303/Special Region (Party) Committee

Chief: Anh Mot, aka Ut Mot

Assistant: Hai Thanh

Cadre: Huynh, Kiet

Pa Tu (transferred from the military
proselyting section)

Tu Cu (administrative staff)

16. Security Section, Cover number A. 71 - D. 304/Special Region (Party) Committee

Chief: Nani Ton

Assistant: Tam Phon (in charge of rural security)

Members: Ba Long (in charge of urban security)

17. Military Proselyting Section, Cover number A. 69 - D. 305/Special Region (Party) Committee

Chief: Nam Thu, (member) Current Affairs
Committee of Special Region (Party)
Committee

Cadre: B. Tu (in charge of Rural Military Prosely-
ting)

Tam Tien (in charge of Urban Military
Proselyting)

Ba Do, aka Ba Tu, Ba Ho, Bay Dat, aka
Diet, Nam Mat Kien

18. Economy and Finance Section, Cover number A70-D. 306/Special Region (Party) Committee

Chief: Ba Dai

Cadre: Chin Ha

Hai Anh (Rural economy and finance)

Tu Nuoc (Rural economy and finance)

Hai Don (Rural economy and finance)

Ong Muoi A (Rural economy and finance)

Tam Gia (in charge of Capital Economy -
Finance)

Ong Ba, Tu Son

19. Commo-Liaison Section, Cover number D. 307/Special Region (Party) Committee

Cadre: Tu Son

Son Tel

Ut Thanh

20. Base Security (Guard) Section, Cover number A. 77-D. 308/Special Region (Party) Committee

Section Chief: Tu Hung (concurrently Commander of Area
"A")

Cadre: Bay Hoang, Tu Mau

Consist of two areas: (Strength: 120 men)

Commander of Area "A" Tu Hung

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Instructions for Agents of MR IV to
 Annex A (attached to MR IV) (OP-CHINA-PALEST) (U) (Cont'd)

- Assistant: Tu Do
 Commander of MR IV: Muoi Phuc
21. Postal Transportation and Communication Section Cover number A. 75-
 a. Special Agent on (Party) Committee
 Section Chief: Hai Binh
 Cadres: Tu Do
22. Front/Civilian Proselyting Section Cover number A. 79-D.309/Special
 Region (Party) Committee
 Section Chief: Son Hien (in charge of Current Affairs
 of Region (Party) Committee)
 Assistant: Do Hoa
 a. Men's Branch
 Cadres: (in charge of MR IV in Oct 61)
 Tu Do, Tu Do
 b. Women's Branch
 Cadres: (in charge of MR IV)
 c. Farmer's Branch
 Cadres: (in charge of MR IV)
 d. Student and Teacher
 Cadres: (in charge of MR IV)
23. Operations/Intelligence Section Cover number A. 73/Special Region
 (Party) Committee
 Section Chief: Tu Do
24. Propaganda/Culture and Education Section (Special Region (Party)
 Committee)
 Chief: (in charge of MR IV)
 (in charge of MR IV)
 (in charge of MR IV)
25. Foreign-Cell Division
 Chief: (in charge of MR IV)
 Cadre in charge of MR IV: (in charge of MR IV)
 Cadre in charge of MR IV: (in charge of MR IV)
 Leader of Liberation Cells: (in charge of MR IV)
 Members: (in charge of MR IV)
 Leader of Propaganda Cell: (in charge of MR IV)
 Members: (in charge of MR IV)
 Member in charge: (in charge of MR IV)
26. "R" Detached Security Member
 Chief: (in charge of MR IV)
27. (Party) Civil Affairs Committee
 (Party) Committee
 Chief: (in charge of MR IV)
 Assistant: (in charge of MR IV)

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- a. Administrative Staff/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
Chief: Chin Tiet
Clerk: Tran Van Dung
Typist: Thi Yen
Commo-Liaison: Tu Nho
Security Guard: Tam Rae, Chung
- b. Military Affairs Sub-Committee/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
Chief: Ba Te, aka Ba Idem (captured in Jun 64)
Cadre: Tu Ngoc Anh, Ba Den, Sau Nguyen
- c. Propaganda Section/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
Chief: Nam Om (Asst Chief of (Party) Civil Affairs Committee)
Cadre: San Nam, Hai Cut, Ket
- d. Base and Commo-Liaison Section/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
Chief: Tu Tong
- e. Training, Education Section/ (Party) Civil Affairs Committee:
Chief: Nam Om (Asst Chief of (Party) Civil Affairs Committee)
Cadre: Muoi Dong, Mot Chuan, aka Sau Gia
Commo-Liaison Agent: Ba Thang
28. AC 2053 Section / Special Region (Party) Committee:
Chief: Bay Son
Cadre: Lam Son III (concurrently Representative
Gla Dinh Region (Party) Committee)
Commo-Liaison Agent: Chi Hui
29. Worker Proselyting (Liberation Workers Association of Saigon-Gla Dinh Area
Chief: Chi Hui (in charge of Current Affairs of
Region (Party) Committee)
Assistant: Tu Nam (in charge of Current Affairs of
Region (Party) Committee)
(Committee) Member: Lam Huiet (in charge of Current Affairs of
Region (Party) Committee)
30. Youths, School Children and Students Association Cover number A. 531
Saigon - Gla Dinh Area Special Region (Party) Committee
Command Cadre: Bay Binh (Asst Secretary of Region (Party)
Committee)
Nam Thuc
31. Chinese Proselyting, Cover number A. 533/ Special Region (Party) Committee:
Chief: Sau Lam
Cadre: Hai Ly (in charge of Information)
Sau, Ba
32. Bourgeois Front Cover number A. 532/ Special Region (Party) Committee:
Chief: Sau Lam
Cadre: Bay Viet
33. City Central Area
a. I and III Inter-Precinct (Party) Committee Cover number A. 535
Secretary: Sau Tan (Region (Party) Committee Member)
Assistant: Muoi Phai
Cadre: Muoi Trung (in charge of Propaganda-
Culture and Indoctination)

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Inclosure 2 to Appendix 3 (Organization and Personalities of MR IV) to
Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)
b. II and IV Inter-Precinct (Party) Committee Cover number A. 536
Secretary: Tu Hiep (alternate member of Region
(Party) Committee)
Assistant: Sau Huang (Female)
Cadre: Tu A (Female)

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II PLAN 58-66

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Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (CNS) PURPOSE AND LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS:

- a. Purpose. This study is to be used as part of the intelligence annex to operations PLAN 58-60. Study area is confined to the operational area contained in the operations plan.
- b. Limitations. Information presented is based on data obtained from maps, intelligence documents, various terrain studies and aerial reconnaissance. Ground reconnaissance was not made.

2. (CNS) GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE TERRAIN:

- a. Synopsis. The area during this period of the year provides the most favorable conditions for military operations. It is a sparsely populated, densely forested region. Vehicle movement is canalized to existing roads and some trails. Conditions influencing movement are very sensitive to precipitation.
- b. Topography.
 - (1) Relief is predominantly low and flat. There are two small hills, vicinity XT 715255 and XT 684330, which rise 32 and 38 meters above sea level.
 - (2) Drainage. There are two rivers of importance in the operational area, the Song Saigon and the Song Thi Tinh. Both of these rivers are navigable all year by sampans, river barges, LCM's and LCT-LCU's. The Song Saigon is approximately 100-150 meters wide and 2.4 meters deep at mean water. At mean water the current ranges from 0.5-1.8 meters per second. The Song Thi Tinh varies 20 to 50 meters width and is 2.5 meters deep at low water. The river bottom of both rivers is clay and silt. This area is affected by tidal action, but to what extent is unknown.
 - (3) Vegetation. The operational area consists of three general types of vegetation: (1) Broadleaf Evergreen secondary forest, (2) Rubber Plantations, (3) Wetland Rice. The secondary forest consists of Broadleaf Evergreen trees 75-90 feet in height. The canopy is usually discontinuous and the undergrowth is extremely dense. The undergrowth consists of low trees, shrubs, bamboo and vines. In the rubber plantations the trees are spaced on 15-20 foot centers and the undergrowth is sparse, consisting of grasses and shrubs. The wetland rice will have been harvested and the fields drained, leaving flat land with approximately six inches of stubble.
 - (4) Surface material. There are generally three types of soil found within the area:
 - (a) Hydromorphic clays and silts. This type soil is found in north and central sections of the area in the vicinity of the Song Saigon and Song Thi Tinh. It is composed mostly of silty clays (CL) or clayey silts (ML) and is several meters deep.
 - (b) Peat Soils. This type soil is found in the southern section of the area in the vicinity of the Song Saigon and the Song Thi Tinh. Peat soils consists of from one to several

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Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- meters of predominantly organic material (PT) underlain by highly compressible clay (CII).
- (c) Red clayey silt. This soil covers the majority of the area. When dried out a hard surface crust forms and it is very dusty. This soil is more favorable for tunnel construction than either of the above mentioned types. The crusting ability and dusty characteristics provide special problems in tunnel destruction. Extensive and complex tunnel systems have been found in this soil type in other locations.
- (5) Manmade features. The significant manmade features in the area of interest include routes LTL 14 on the west and an unnamed route on the eastern border. Route LTL 14 has numerous cuts between XT 712243 and XT 715244. Access into the area is restricted by the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers on the west south and east. Only one bridge crosses the Thi Tinh River at Yen Cut (XT 715244). It is a class 12 Eiffel, Type II Bridge. There are no bridges across the Saigon River. Detailed data on routes are contained on enclosure 2 and 3. Enemy fortifications in the area include the following:
- (a) Trench System XT 695246
 - (b) Trench System XT 694247
 - (c) Trench System XT 696241
 - (d) Trench System XT 694243
 - (e) Trench System and 5 AA/AW Positions XT 694243
 - (f) Fortification XT 707247
 - (g) Foxholes XT 707248
 - (h) Trench and AA/AW Positions XT 734274
 - (i) 12 AA/AW Positions XT 733250
 - (j) Trench System XT 718279
 - (k) AA/AW Positions XT 733246
 - (l) AA/AW Positions XT 747241
 - (m) Dunker System XT 707316
 - (n) Foxholes XT 723317
 - (o) Foxholes XT 723324
 - (p) In addition to the above fortifications, entrances to underground installations are located at:
 XT 719240 XT 710284 XT 717285
 XT 738216 XT 702297
 - (q) There are no towns in this area, however the roads are lined with hamlets and small villages.
 - (r) The airfield at Lon Phou (XT 773340) is the only facility capable of landing C-130 aircraft. At the present time this field is closed for rehabilitation. The estimated date of reopening is 31 December. Helicopter landing areas extend from 500 to 3000 meters on each side of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. This area is covered by rice paddies which are expected to be dry during the next 90 days and suitable for helicopter landing zones.

3. (CNS) MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN:

a. Tactical Aspects.

- (1) Observation. Observation throughout the area depends entirely

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Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OP CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

- upon the vegetation. In the wetland rice areas the observation will be very good. In the secondary forest regions the observation will be poor, both ground and aerial, due to the dense undergrowth. The rubber plantations will afford poor to fair observation, depending on the density of the undergrowth.
- (2) **Fields of fire.** Fields of fire are extremely limited in these areas of dense forests and heavy undergrowth. The wetland rice areas offer the best fields of fire.
- (3) **Cover.** The principal cover for both units and installations is afforded by bunkers and trench systems found in the operational area.
- (4) **Concealment.** All forested areas and plantations offer good concealment from both air and ground observation. The villages and hamlets located within the area offer good concealment for small foot mobile units. The wetland rice areas offer no concealment.
- (5) **Obstacles.**
- (a) Song Saigon flows generally from the northwest to the southeast across the area with widths of 100-150 meters. Banks are low and gentle composed of clayey silty soil.
 - (b) Song Thi Tinh flows generally from the north to the south across the area with a width of 20-50 meters. Banks are low and gentle composed of clayey silty soil.
 - (c) The dense forest which dominates the center section of the operational area constitutes a major obstacle to movement of any sort.
 - (d) **Protective friendly minefields** are at the following locations of types and quantity indicated:
 - 1. XT 910310 M-16 800Ea
 - 2. XT 856216 M-16 264Ea
 - 3. XT 828268 M-16 280Ea
 - 4. XT 815290 M-16 800Ea
 - 5. XT 798423 M-16 60Ea
 - 6. XT 744330 M-16 255Ea
 - 7. XT 765295 M-16 280Ea
 - 8. XT 776263 M-16 380Ea
 - 9. XT 713188 M-16 119Ea
 - 10. XT 575342 M-16 250Ea
 - 11. XT 667173 AT Quantity Unknown
 - 12. XT 435472 Type and Quantity Unknown
 - 13. XT 440348 Type and Quantity Unknown
- (6) **Movement.** Cross country movement, within the operational area, is effected to varying degrees by vegetation, soil conditions, relief, hydrography and urbanization (See Inclosure I).
- (7) **Key Terrain Features.** The area of interest consists of level plains with local relief being less than 35 meters with slopes less than 3%. There are no prominent terrain features in this area.
- (8) **Avenues of approach.** The existing route shown on Inclosures 2 and 3 provide the best routes of movement into the objective area. Movement to and around the area is passable via the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers both of which will accommodate LCM and LCU landing craft. Cross country movement around the

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Appendix 4 (Terrain) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 58-66 (OF CEDAR FALLS) (U) (Cont'd)

edges of the objective area is hampered and highly compartmented by soft rice paddy lands. Conditions for APC's, tanks, and 2 1/2 ton trucks is fair to poor during the period of the operation. In the center of the area the dense jungle creates conditions that are unsuited for all types of vehicular movement and poor for foot troops. Inclosure 1 contains details on cross country movement conditions.

Acknowledge.

3 Incl

1. Lines of Communication
2. Lines of Communication
3. Cross Country Movement

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Annex C (Fire Support Plan) to OPLAN 58-66 (Op CEDAR FALLS) (U)

1. (U) SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex A - Intelligence to OPLAN 58-66.
- b. Friendly Forces. OPLAN 58-66.
- c. Attachments and Detachments. No change from basic plan.

2. (U) MISSION. II FFORCEV conducts operation via THANH DINH Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE to locate and destroy military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; and clear area of inhabitants.

3. (U) EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operation. OPLAN 58-66.
- b. Air Support. TAC air support available through II FFORCEV TOC, priority of air support to 1st Inf Div.
- c. Artillery Support.

(1) Field arty.

(a) 23d Arty Gp:

- 1. Attach one 105mm towed bn (- one btry) to 25th Inf Div o/a D-1.
- 2. One 105mm towed btry remains attached to 1st Inf Div.
- 3. Attach two 155mm towed btry to 25th Inf Div o/a D-1.
- 4. Provide one 155mm towed bn (- two btry). GSR 1st Inf Div Arty from position via PHU LOI.
- 5. Provide one 105mm btry at LAI KHE o/a D-1 with mission of supporting 1st Inf Div Arty.
- 6. Provide one 175mm btry at PHU LOI o/a D-1 with mission of GSR 1st and 25th Inf Div Arty, priority of fires to 1st Inf Div.
- 7. Provide one 8"/175mm btry at CU CHI o/a D-1 with mission of GSR 25th Inf Div Arty.
- 8. Remaining units - no change from present mission.

(b) 54th Arty Gp:

- 1. Attach one 105mm btry to 1st Inf Div o/a D-1.
- 2. Provide one 105mm btry with mission of GSR 10th ARVN Div Arty.
- 3. Attach one 155mm bn (SP) to 1st Inf Div o/a D-1.
- 4. Remaining units - No change from present missions.

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(2) Air defense arty.

II FFORCEV Arty:

- (a) Attach two btry (+3 sec quad .50 MG), 5/24 Arty (AW)(SP) to 1st Inf Div o/a D-1.
- (b) Attach two btry (+3 sec quad .50 MC), 5/24 Arty (AW)(SP) to 25th Inf Div o/a D-1.

4. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) Arty fire plans prepared by divisions and separate brigades.
- (2) Direct coordination authorized between divisions and 23d and 54th Arty Gp.

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Annex C (Fire Support Plan) to OPPLAN 53-66 (LHAR FALLS) (II) (Cont'd)

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS: OPPLAN 53-66.

5. (U) COMMAND and SIGNALING:

a. Signal. Current SOP/SSI in effect.

b. Command. OPPLAN 53-66.

Acknowledge.

PRASA
LTC

DISTRIBUTION:

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1st INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

13 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation CEDAR FALLS

1. (U) Name and type of Operation: CEDAR FALLS was a seal and search/ search and destroy/jungle clearing operation. Reference: Maps Vietnam, 1:50,000, sheets: 6231 II, 6331 III, 6230 I, 6330 IV.

2. (U) Dates of Operation: Initiated 080730 January 1967, terminated 262400 January 1967.

3. (C) General: Operation CEDAR FALLS was a II FFV controlled operation involving units of the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, 196th Infantry Brigade, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and ARVN airborne and ranger battalions. The 173d Airborne Brigade and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment were placed under operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. The operation was aimed at the destruction of HQ, Military Region IV and its associated base camps and supply areas within the Iron Triangle and THAM DIEU Forestry Reserve. The 1st Division was employed as the search force and conducted extensive search and destroy, tunnel and base camp destruction and jungle clearing operations throughout the area. This operation proved to be one of the most successful undertaken by the BIG RED ONE. Of particular significance was the large amount of jungle cleared and the unusually high number of ralliers that turned themselves in to CVN authorities as a result of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The general area of operation is at Annex B.

a. The reporting officer for this report is Major General William E. DePuy, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

b. Task Organization. Control of the operation was exercised by Headquarters, II FFV. 1st Division forces were controlled from a forward command post located at LAI KHE. The initial task organization is listed below. Subsequent changes are shown, as they occurred, in paragraph 7 of this report. Commanders are shown at Annex A.

<p><u>TF DEAME (173d Abn Bde, Sep)</u></p> <p>1-503 Inf 2-503 Inf 4-503 Inf 1-4 Cav (-) (OPCON) 11th ACR (-1 sqdn) (OPCON) A & B Btry (Reinf) 5-2 Arty (AMBP) 3-319 Arty DB How Btry, 11th ACR, DB 11th ACR</p>	<p><u>2d Bde</u></p> <p>1-26 Inf 2-18 Inf 1-7 Arty (-) DB</p> <p><u>Div Arty</u></p> <p>8-6 Arty CSR 2-33 Arty 8-2-32 Arty Reinf 8-6 Arty 2-33 Arty (-) CSR 2-33 Arty</p>
<p><u>3d Bde</u></p> <p>1-2 Inf 1-16 Inf 1-28 Inf 2-28 Inf 2-33 Inf</p>	<p><u>Div Trps</u></p> <p>1st Avn Bn 1st Engr Bn 121st Sig Bn D-1-4 Cav</p>

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4. (C) Intelligence:

a. Intelligence prior to operation. The Iron Triangle and southern LONG NGUYEN (TRANG DINH Forestry Reserve) had not been deeply penetrated by US or ARVN forces in over a year. The area had long been a major Viet Cong controlled area and contained numerous base camps, supply installations, and production and medical facilities. Viet Cong political and military units were known to be based in the area. Current indications were that the majority of Military Region IV (known as the SUDON-CHOLON-DL DINH Special Committee), the BINH DUONG Provincial Committee, and the South BEN CAT District Committee were located in the operational area. The significance of these elements was that they controlled all of the military and political activities of their respective areas. Experience gained in previous operations in the area by SOI LOI and FV B Woods indicated that the base camps and supply installations were well protected by extensive bunker systems and tunnel complexes. It was expected that the Viet Cong would make extensive use of mines and booby traps in defending critical zones.

b. No major contact was made by the 1st Infantry Division units during the operation. The entire operation was characterized by small unit actions contacting VC elements of platoon size or smaller. As expected, the VC units did not defend their base areas in force, but elected to flee, leaving behind token resistance in the form of snipers, booby traps, and mines. During the operation numerous VC local guerrillas as well as headquarters personnel from MR IV rallied. In addition many local guerrillas were captured trying to infiltrate through friendly lines. Others went underground in an effort to escape capture.

c. Terrain and weather

(1) Cross country movement in the area was affected to varying degrees by heavy jungle and soil conditions. The area was void of prominent terrain features and consisted of level plains with relief varying less than 35 meters in elevation. Cross country movement around the edges of the objective area was hampered by soft rice paddy lands. In the center of the area the dense jungle created conditions that were unsuited for all types of vehicular movement and poor for foot troops.

(2) January is a northeast monsoon or dry month over all the III Corps Tactical Zone. The northeast air flow produces the best overall weather of the year in this area. Cloud cover was at its annual minimum and had no adverse effects on the operation. Early morning fog was prevalent between the hours of 0600 and 0900, but this did not hamper aircraft operations or close air support.

d. Base camps uncovered were extensive in size and construction. Foxholes and fighting positions were usually connected by either tunnels or trenches. Most of the fighting positions were constructed with overhead cover, consisting of logs approximately 4 inches in diameter covered with hard soil approximately 6 inches in thickness. One fortified village was discovered by the 2nd Brigade vicinity XT 5636. The houses had reinforced sides with short tunnels leading to bomb shelters. Major means of destruction were airstrikes after the inhabitants had been evacuated. Extensive tunnel systems were found throughout the area, with the largest tunnel complex located at the village of BEN SUC. Tunnel rats were utilized to explore tunnels prior to their destruction with explosive or acetylene destructive devices augmented with explosives (See para 11 c).

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a. Civil Affairs/Psychological operations

(1) All civilians in the operational area were presumed to be either members of VC families or VC laborers working under VC control. The concept of operation provided for the orderly evacuation of all civilians.

(2) At 080600 Jan 67, the seal forces landed by helicopter in BEN SUC. A loudspeaker helicopter orbited the town telling the people not to run but to remain in their homes and await further instructions. The people followed the instructions, and only one civilian was wounded during the sealing operation. After the town was sealed, the 3rd Bn, 8th ARVN Regt was landed under operational control of the 1st Division's Revolutionary Development Task Force. The airborne loudspeakers broadcast a message directing the populace to congregate at the school in the center of the town. When the people were assembled, they were screened, and all males from 15 to 45 years of age were evacuated to the interrogation center at PHU CUONG for further screening. When the initial search of the village was completed, the people were allowed to return to their homes, and they were directed to assemble their belongings in preparation to be moved. On the 9th and 10th of Jan, the search of the village continued, and the people from the area surrounding BEN SUC were assembled in the village with their belongings in preparation for the move to PHU CUONG. VNN river boats arrived on 10 Jan, bringing two battalions of ARVN paratroopers who assumed responsibility for the security of BEN SUC and assisted the people in the move. Starting on the 11th, the people were evacuated by riverboat and CH 47 helicopter. The people took all their belongings to include livestock.

(3) On 9 Jan, the 11th ACR attacked across the north side of the Iron Triangle. The attack was preceded by the loudspeaker helicopter which cautioned the people not to run and to remain in their homes and await further instructions. The cavalry crossed the area without injuring any civilians. A loudspeaker message was broadcast and leaflets were dropped which advised the people to assemble their belongings. It had been assumed that some people would move without waiting for assistance, and a refugee collecting point had been established at BEN CAT by the 173d Airborne Bde. Unfortunately, some ill-informed troops of the 11th ACR started evicting the people in BEN CAT and then started burning homes. This caused the people in the area to stream into BEN CAT without their possessions. By mid-afternoon, over 1,000 people were assembled at the refugee collecting point at BEN CAT. These people had to be sent back to their homes to collect their belongings. It had been planned to evacuate the people between BEN SUC and BEN CAT in an orderly manner with ARVN assistance after the BEN SUC evacuation was well under way. However, the premature destruction of homes necessitated immediate action. Under RDTF control, seventy trucks were assembled on 10 Jan and the people were moved with their belongings to PHU CUONG on 10, 11, and 12 Jan. Livestock and carts were driven overland to PHU CUONG.

(4) The people were moved to a temporary refugee relocation center at PHU CUONG which was to have been set up and operated by provincial officials assisted by GCO. By Tuesday the 10th, it became obvious that the civilian agencies were not able to establish the refugee center quickly enough to receive the number of people that were enroute. This was true due to a lack of adequate responsive assets and underestimation of the problem. To provide for the refugees, the Division established a control and coordination center at the refugee camp. Military assets were assembled and the camp was set up in time to house the refugees. After the camp was set up, the civilian agencies were able to operate it, and the military support was phased out. At the close of the operation, 6,108 people had been moved to the refugee center. There were 608 men, 1,672 women, and 3,828 children.

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(5) PsyOps. During the first two days of the operation, the airborne loudspeaker broadcast standard CHIEU HOI appeals in between the messages used to control the civilians. In addition, stock CHIEU HOI leaflets and Safe Conduct Passes were air dropped over the area. On the second day of the operation, an unprecedented flow of ralliers from the area of operations started to turn themselves in to both US units and GVN representatives. Additional PsyWar intelligence and propaganda writing support was requested from II FFV. A team with two interpreters and two interrogators/leaflet writers was received from the 246th PsyOps Co. The team was located at the BINH DUONG CHIEU HOI Center under the control of a G-5 officer. Special leaflets and tape recorded appeals were prepared daily. Appeals were directed toward specific groups and individuals that ralliers knew were still in the area of operations. In addition, some wives among the refugees went to their husbands' hiding places and persuaded them to rally. During the operations, four million leaflets were dropped of which approximately half were special appeals developed during the operation. The airborne loudspeaker broadcast an average of eight hours each day. As a result of these efforts, 471 ralliers came in during the operation. The large influx of ralliers overloaded the CHIEU HOI Center. To help handle the ralliers, the Division provided tents, cots, and food to the Center. In addition, supporting engineers dug two new wells in the Center.

5. (C) Mission: 1st Infantry Division conducts operations vicinity THUAN DIEN Forestry Reserve and Iron Triangle. Kill or capture military Region IV, local VC infrastructure, and VC/NVA forces; clear area of inhabitants; cut belts across Iron Triangle and clear selected LZ's within the AO.

6. (C) Concept of Operation: The goal of the Iron Triangle was to be executed in conjunction with an airborne assault on the village of BEN SUC (XT5883) on 8 January 1967. The 25th Infantry Division was to occupy blocking positions along the west bank of the SAIGON River from vicinity XT5434 to vicinity XT7418. A cavalry squadron and 2 battalions of Infantry were to occupy blocking positions along the east bank of the THI THUAN River from T/M AN XA (XT7433) to BEN CAT (XT7433). On 9 January, 4 Infantry battalions were to conduct airborne assaults into landing zones north and west of the THUAN DIEN Forestry Reserve. Two additional battalions would be airlifted into landing zones along the THI THUAN River east of the THUAN DIEN Forestry Reserve. The armored cavalry regiment, accompanied by supporting engineers, would conduct a thrust westward from BEN CAT, cutting through the Iron Triangle. On 11 January, 2 ARVN battalions would assume the mission of evacuating the inhabitants of BEN SUC to PHU CUONG.

7. (C) Execution:

8 January - The 2d Brigade initiated Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0730 hrs by conducting a seal and search of BEN SUC (XT580335). The 1-26 Inf, reinforced with 1/2-18 Inf conducted the assault in 60 UH-1H helicopters, encountering sporadic sniper fire in the LZ's. During the day, the battalion killed 20 VC (BC) and captured 6 PW's. The Revolutionary Development Task Force searching BEN SUC accounted for 7 VC KIA (BC), 5 PW's, and 150 detainees. TF DEANE joined Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0800 by moving into staging areas and blocking positions. Bde HQ moved to a position in the vicinity of XT7532 at 0915. The 2-503 Inf and the 4-503 Inf helilifted to a staging area in the vicinity of XT8228 at 1410 hrs. The 1-503 Inf remained in a blocking position in the CAM DIEN jungle (XT7723). The 39th ARVN Ranger Bde. occupied blocking positions in the vicinity of XT763185.

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9 January -- Changes in Task Organization (see narrative)

The 1-26 Inf continued the search of BEN SUC. A/2-18 Inf was detached at 1600 hrs. At 1600 hrs the 2-18 Inf became OPCON 3d Bde and commenced air assault via XT612342. Landing was aborted due to a mined landing zone. The battalion landed on BEN SUC and reverted to OPCON 2d Bde.

The 3d Bde entered Operation CEDAR FALLS with a 4 battalion assault north of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The 1-2 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 1 (XT637389) at 0800 hrs. No hostile fire was received during the landing. The Bn found 80 tons of rice during the day. The 1-16 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 2 (XT661383) at 0840 hrs. No hostile fire was received. The 2-28 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from LAI KHE into LZ 3 (XT607365) at 0920 hrs. No hostile fire was received. During the day, the battalion captured 28 tons of rice, 725 Chicom grenades and 14 weapons. The 1-28 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from DAU TIENG to LZ 5 (XT622384) at 1155 hrs. No hostile fire was received.

TP DEANE attacked west from BEN CAT at 0800 hrs with the 11th ACR (-) seizing obj 1 (XT678298) and obj 2 (XT665300) and securing engineer work parties clearing the road west from BEN CAT to obj 2. The 2-503 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 4 (XT670365) at 1115 hrs. No hostile fire was received. The 4-503 Inf (-) conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 6 (XT680350) at 1235 hrs. No hostile fire was received.

10 January -- Changes in Task Organization.

2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-28 Inf (0800)
1st ARVN Abn Bn (1700)
7th ARVN Abn Bn (1700)
3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf (0800)

At 0845 hrs a River Assault Group boat convey departed LAI THIEU with the 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns on board. Both battalions became OPCON 2d Bde upon closing BEN SUC and prepared to evacuate refugees from the village. The 1-2 Inf, the 1-16 Inf, the 1-28 Inf, and 2-28 Inf located a total of 262 tons of rice via XT6035 and captured 135 weapons during the day. The 2-18 Inf moved by road to conduct search and destroy operations vicinity XT 622330. The 1-4 Cav was relieved of its security mission along the THI THINH River by 4-9 ARVN Bn and 2-8 ARVN Bn. At 1440 hrs, 1-4 Cav became OPCON 11th ACR and relieved the 2-503 Inf and the 4-503 Inf in blocking positions.

11 January -- Changes in Task Organization

2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-28 Inf
1st ARVN Abn Bn
7th ARVN Abn Bn
3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf
TP DEANE: 1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
11th ACR (-)
1-4 Cav

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The 1-26 Inf was relieved of the BEN SUC seal at 1224 hrs by the 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns and moved north of BEN SUC to conduct search and destroy operations. The first river convoy of refugees departed BEN SUC for PHU CUONG at 1225 hrs with 872 personnel and their belongings and two LCM's of cattle. The 1-2 Inf, the 1-16 Inf, the 2-18 Inf, and the 1-28 Inf continued search and destroy operations in sector. Numerous tunnels, base camps, rice caches and small arms were found throughout the day. Only sporadic enemy resistance was encountered. The 2-503 Inf, and the 4-503 Inf entered the Iron Triangle from the north, conducting search and destroy operations sweeping southward. The 3-11 ACR screened the Brigade's west flank along Hwy 14.

12 January -- Changes in Task Organization

3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf
1-4 Cav (0800)
2-11 ACR (0800)

By this time in the operation it had become fairly apparent that there would be no large scale enemy contact. However, VC supplies and equipment continued to be captured in large quantities. 1,800 tons of rice had been discovered to date plus 189 small arms and 971 grenades. Even more remarkable were the 85 ralliers who turned themselves in. The 2d RAG convoy departed BEN SUC for PHU CUONG carrying 849 Vietnamese with all of their personal belongings. The 1-2 Inf located a 100 bed underground hospital with blankets and equipment vicinity XT612387. The 2-18 Inf located 180 tons of rice vicinity XT61834. TF DEANE continued search and destroy operations in sector.

13 January -- Changes in Task Organization

TF DEANE: 1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
1-4 Cav (1700)
11 ACR (-)
A & B Btrys, 5-2 Arty (AMSP)

The 1-26 Inf continued search and destroy operations north of BEN SUC with no significant contact. The 2-28 Inf located 160 tons of rice in their AO vicinity XT597373. Evacuation of BEN SUC continued with 408 persons, 73 water buffalo, and 159 cows being transported to PHU CUONG. 103 refugees, 165,000 lbs rice and 35 canteens were helilifted by CH-47 to PHU CUONG. The 1st and 7th ARVN Abn Bns continued to seal and evacuate BEN SUC.

The 1-2 Inf helilifted into an LZ vicinity XT619327 and commenced search and destroy operations along the southeast edge of the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The 1-16 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vicinity XT635355. The 1-28 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vicinity XT619373. The 1-4 Cav screened southwest of the 3d Bde AO vicinity XT692312, and the 2-11 ACR screened the southern edge of the AO. At 1700 hrs the squadron returned OFCOM TF DEANE. The TF continued search and destroy operations in sector.

14 January -- The 2-28 Inf located an extensive base camp vicinity XT594346 containing rifles, mines, grenades and ammunition. The 1-28 Inf helilifted to LAI KHE at 1445 hrs. The 3d RAG convoy moved to PHU CUONG. The 1-503 Inf destroyed a mine factory vicinity XT673283.

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15 January -- The 2d Bde, employing the 1st and 7th ANVN Abn Bns and the 1st Division Engineers, commenced destruction of BEN SUC. All other units continued search and destroy operations in sector with sporadic enemy contact.

16 January -- Elements of the division participating in Operation CEDAR FALLS met sporadic sniper fire throughout the day as they continued to locate and destroy VC stores and equipment within the Iron Triangle. The 2-28 Inf located a fresh grave site containing 20 VC bodies vicinity XT599350. The 1-16 Inf terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS at 0859 hrs and helilifted to LAI KHE at 1130 hrs. The CHIEF HQT results continued to rise with 199 the total to date.

17 January -- Changes in Task Organization

3d Bde: 1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-18 Inf
2-28 Inf (1600)
2-11 ACR

The 2d Bde terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS. CP units returned to DI AN, closing at 1707 hrs. The 2-28 Inf helilifted from BEN SUC to LAI KHE at 1600 hrs. The last elements leaving BEN SUC activated the timing device on 5 tons of demolitions planted in the area. The purpose of the explosives was to destroy remaining tunnels and any VC who returned to the area after US forces departed. The detonation occurred at 1954 hrs, leaving a large crater in the center of the razed village. The 3d Bde continued Operation CEDAR FALLS. The 1-2 Inf, the 2-18 Inf, and the 1-4 Cav remained in the Iron Triangle area with scattered enemy contact. The 1-26 Inf acted as BKF at LAI KHE.

TP DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS with the 1-503 Inf, the 2-503 Inf, the 4-503 Inf and E/11th ACR operating in the Iron Triangle. Scattered contact accounted for 17 VC KIA (BG), 1 PW, and 164 tons of rice.

The 1-7 Arty (-) displaced from Arty Base II to DI AN; the 6th Arty (-) displaced from Arty Base V to PHU LUU; and B/2-32 Arty displaced from Arty Base V to LAI KHE.

18 January -- Changes in Task Organization

1-2 Inf to 1st Bde (1730)
2d Bde: 1-26 Inf
2-18 Inf (1310)

The 1-2 Inf helilifted from Operation CEDAR FALLS AO to PHUOC VINH, closing at 1730 hrs. The 2-18 Inf departed Operation CEDAR FALLS AO by convoy and arrived at DI AN at 1310 hrs. The 3d Bde terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS. TP DEANE continued Operation CEDAR FALLS with the 1-503 Inf, 2-503 Inf, 4-503 Inf, 11th ACR, and the 1-4 Cav (-). Sporadic enemy contact continued throughout the day.

19-21 January -- Activities during this period consisted of limited search and destroy activities by TP DEANE and engineer jungle clearing and tunnel destruction by 1st Division engineers. General locations of security forces and engineer parties were as follows:

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1-503 Inf - southwest portion of the Iron Triangle between the SAIGON River and Hwy 14
 2-503 Inf - central portion of the Iron Triangle
 4-503 Inf and A/2-11 ACR - roadrunner patrols throughout the Iron Triangle
 11 ACR (-) - security operations near the confluence of the SAIGON and THI THINH Rivers
 1-4 Cav - screening west of BEN CAT along route 13

25 January - Changes in task organization

3d Bde: 1-16 Inf
 1-28 Inf
 2-28 Inf
 1-4 Cav

TF DEJANE terminated Operation CEDAR FALLS and reverted to OPCON II FFV at 0700 hrs. TF FIFTE, consisting of 1-4 Cav (-), C/2-2 Inf, B/2-28 Inf and 1st Engineer Bn (-), continued jungle clearing, tunnel destruction and security operations in the Iron Triangle. As a result of tunnel clearing operations during the day, TF FIFTE captured 20 VC.

26 January - Operation CEDAR FALLS terminated 26200 Jan 1967. C/2-2 Inf and B/2-28 Inf returned to their units. The 1-4 Cav continued road security in the Iron Triangle for departing engineer work parties.

8. (C) Supporting Forces:

- a. Artillery: See Annex F.
- b. Signals: See Annex G.
- c. US Army Aviation.

(1) For the initial airborne assaults in Operation CEDAR FALLS, sixty UH-1D's were made available to the division. Although the majority of aircraft was provided by non-organic aviation battalions, the 1st Aviation Battalion played a major role in planning, coordinating, and executing lift operations. All airlifts were controlled by either the 1st AVN Bn or 11th AVN Bn. The movement of six infantry battalions on 9 February was marked with precise timing by the aviation, infantry, and artillery units participating. The schedule of airlifts on 8 & 9 February is shown below:

Unit	NR of A/C	Place from	LZ	Landing Time	Control
1-26 Inf (+)	60	DAU TIENG	BEN SUC	0800	1st AVN Bn
1-2 Inf	60	LAI KHE	1	0800	11th AVN Bn
1-16 Inf	60	LAI KHE	2	0840	1st AVN Bn
2-28 Inf	60	LAI KHE	3	0920	11th AVN Bn
2-503 Inf	60	XT 8228	4	1115	1st AVN Bn
1-28 Inf	60	DAU TIENG	5	1155	11th AVN Bn
4-503 Inf	60	XT 8228	6	1235	1st AVN Bn

* conducted on 8 Jan; all others on 9 Jan.

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(2) After 9 February the average daily aviation support to the division was 27 aircraft per day. These aircraft were used mainly for small unit moves and resupply. Aircraft from the organic aviation battalion flew a total of 431 sorties (UH-1D), transporting 3,682 personnel during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Average aircraft availability during the period was 63.7%.

d. US Air Force Close Air support

- (1) The mission of tactical air was as follows:
 - (a) Neutralization of enemy forces
 - (b) Destruction of enemy forces in contact with division units.
 - (c) Destruction of enemy base camps and tunnel complexes.
 - (d) Interdiction of enemy liaison/communication routes.
- (2) Control. All air strikes were controlled by Forward Air Controllers using O-1 type aircraft.
- (3) The 7th Air Force flew a total of 787 sorties in support of 1st Infantry Division elements during the operation. A total of 910 tons of ordnance was delivered. Requests for immediate TAC support were answered with a minimum of delay.

(4) Effectiveness. TAC Air was employed successfully on both preplanned and immediate targets. The 7th Air Force support contributed significantly to the success of the operation by uncovering several large base camps, destroying previously found base camps, suppressing ground fire and conducting Landing Zone preparations. Clearance procedures prior to delivery of strikes were simplified through the use of PsyOps messages. Vietnamese in the area were instructed to move to designated areas where they would be safe from US bombings. All personnel remaining in jungle areas would be considered Viet Cong and engaged accordingly. This measure precluded the large number of civilians in the area being injured by supporting fires.

e. Engineer. Engineer support was provided to the division from assets of the 79th Engineer Group. A total of 40 bulldozers and Rome plows was made available to the 1st Engineer Task Force. During the operation the task force cleared 2,233 acres or approximately 9 square kilometers of jungle. Dozer teams consisted of two tank dozers and six dozers. The tank dozers preceded the dozers and cut through the jungle exposed to sniper fire and booby traps. The following dozers cut swaths through the jungle along the infantry routes of march. The use of the dozers to open jungles as part of combat operations was a unique and challenging task. Since the Iron Triangle contained well over 100 square kilometers of heavy jungle and large rubber trees, a mass clearance-type operation was abandoned as impractical. Therefore, to open up the jungle for future operations, it was felt that cutting swaths across the jungle together with working dozer teams directly in support of the advancing infantry would provide the best results.

f. B-52 Strikes. A total of ten B-52 strikes was delivered in support of 1st Division operations. The strikes were based on intelligence and were delivered against heavily fortified areas. The strikes were particularly effective in destroying bunkers, collapsing tunnels and uncovering VC supply bases.

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9. (C) Results:

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a. Friendly losses:

KIA 32
MIA 181
Equipment damaged: 2 OH-13, 4 APC, 1 M151, 3 M80A1
Equipment destroyed: none

b. Enemy losses:

(1) Personnel:

KIA (BC)	389
FW	180
CMIH MOK	471
Detainees	365

(2) Weapons and ammunition:

Small arms	429
Machine guns	18
Mortars	6
Recoilless rifles	2
Grenade launchers	3
Small arms ammo	49,593
Mortar rounds	219
Grenades	1,496
Arty rounds	28
Mines	188
CBU's	1A2

(3) Foodstuffs:

Rice (tons)	3,367
Peanuts (lbs)	3,550
Salt (lbs)	7,600
Tee (lbs)	40

(4) Supplies:

Uniforms	7,622
Bags, nylon cloth	6
Rolls poncho material	100
6 hp engine	1
Outboard motors	5
Sewing machines	3
Bolts cloth	54
Typewriters	3
Sheets Roofing tin	700
Sawpans	189
Gasoline (gallons)	1,520
TNT (lbs)	928
Motor oil (gallons)	845
Jungle boots (pairs)	20

(5) Installations:

Huts	169
Bunkers	207
Punji pits	85
Tunnels	173

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10. Administrative Matters:

a. The administrative planning for Operation CEDAR FALLS proved to be adequate, and the logistical support was able to answer effectively to the demands placed on it throughout the operation. All logistical support was provided from base areas outside of the Iron Triangle at established base areas at DAU TIENG, QUAN LOI, LAI KHE, and PHU LOI. The evacuation of refugees from the operational area was a problem which became of major logistical concern. Prior planning programmed the evacuation of refugees by civilian agencies; however, the large number of refugees to be evacuated from the area necessitated US military support. LAI KHE was established as a Forward Logistics Base, using the normally assigned combat service support elements of the base camp. Additional augmentation from Support Command units was extremely limited. The 1st Logistical Command furnished a Forward Ammunition Supply Point and trailer transfer point. Considerable improvement of the ASP area was made. PHU LOI became a logistical base with the establishment of a 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area handling Class I and III supplies. The Support Command Forward CP was established at LAI KHE in the Division Headquarters (Forward). The CP was co-located with the AC of S, G-4 element in the Logistics Operations Center (LOC) expandable van. The LOC functions were: to supervise and coordinate all support rendered and to receive, evaluate, consolidate, and transmit to Div Log Base in DI AN all requests for supply and service support for appropriate action; to coordinate demands exceeding the capabilities of the Support Command with the Logistical Command; and through aggressive follow up action, to insure that all valid demands were satisfied in the shortest possible time. The element also served as the focal point for the consolidation of information pertaining to the status of all CI I, II & IV, III and V supplies such as consumption, receipts, on hand, and due in. This information was translated into concrete planning data to insure the uninterrupted, adequate and timely flow of all classes of supplies to the ultimate consumer.

b. Supply

(1) LAI KHE

(a) The 3d Forward Supply Section of the battalion at LAI KHE, augmented with selected personnel, was the mainstay of supply support to the tactical units participating in the operation. All classes of supply (less Class V) were provided from LAI KHE as well as GE services. Of particular note were the PCL Jump Teams dispatched to provide refueling services to infantry and engineer units operating in locations where normal fueling by tank trucks was either impractical or altogether impossible. Petroleum equipment operators, together with dispensing equipment and 900-gallon collapsible drums, were airlifted to provide this service.

(b) Bath and Laundry service was provided by the Bath and Laundry Section, 624th Quartermaster Co, 29th Group, 1st Logistical Command.

(2) PHU LOI

(a) As a result of various tactical units staging through PHU LOI during Operation CEDAR FALLS, the supply support provided by the 4th Forward Supply of the 1st S & T Bn increased by approximately 25%. No particular problems were experienced. Shower and Laundry facilities were provided by the 1st Logistical Command.

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(b) The 4th Forward Supply Section provided all class III support (diesel fuel and lubricants) to the RAG-boat and LCM flotilla operating on the SAIGON River during the refugee resettlement phase of the operation at the river landing in PHU CUONG.

(3) QUAN LOI

The 5th Forward Supply Section of the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion at QUAN LOI played no major role in the support of Operation CEDAR FALLS, but was fully geared to provide class I and III support on a major scale if needed.

(4) DAU TIENG

A POL team was dispatched to this location on 4 January 1967 and remained operational until 10 January for the refueling of helicopters participating in diversionary maneuvers at the outset of Operation CEDAR FALLS.

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5. Experience Factors

A. Class I: Figures in parentheses represent stockage.

Objective: issue is stockage objective
for A rations.

1. Daily and Average Issues and On-Hand Balances

a. LAI KHZ

DATE	A Rations		B Rations (163,500)		C Rations (54,500)	
	Issues	O/H End	Issues	O/H End	Issues	O/H End
8	9,100	11,900	0	209,940	1,996	32,720
9	9,700	2,300	67,900	142,040	3,933	23,762
10	10,475	525	0	153,920	3,104	25,673
11	11,055	20	1,327	152,593	3,796	21,822
12	8,410	1,710	2,490	197,443	2,320	39,562
13	10,516	0	2,745	209,602	2,900	46,582
14	10,925	8,475	0	211,602	3,302	43,000
15	10,325	7,150	0	211,602	3,458	40,612
16	9,195	21,385	36,700	174,822	4,800	35,812
17	9,050	30,335	0	174,822	696	35,116
18	9,015	30,920	0	174,822	1,592	33,724
19	7,800	23,120	0	174,822	1,548	32,176
20	7,800	15,320	20,840	145,932	4,400	27,776
21	7,635	17,585	0	156,432	2,040	25,736
22	7,635	19,647	0	156,432	2,064	23,652
23	7,060	22,582	49,420	107,062	10,340	13,312
24	6,350	23,757	0	107,062	553	12,954
25	6,175	31,612	0	107,062	848	12,106

AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:

8,675 20,267 2,486

HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:

11,055 67,900 10,340

PERCENT OF AVERAGE:

127% 324% 411%

TOTAL ISSUES:

198,221 189,547 52,610

AVERAGE O/H FOR PERIOD:

15,191 164,098 2,922

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AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/O:

0 +1,390 -1,890

AVERAGE BALANCE: 6,790

TOTAL SUPPLIES ISSUED: 798

B. ...

DATE (Jan)	A Rations		B Rations (87,000)		C Rations (29,000)	
	Issues	O/H Bal	Issues	O/H Bal	Issues	O/H Bal
8	6,600	6,600	0	100,200	0	27,409
9	6,600	6,600	42,045	57,395	230	29,179
10	5,800	7,400	0	57,395	0	29,179
11	5,700	12,700	0	57,395	100	29,079
12	5,800	13,700	0	57,395	0	29,079
13	6,250	14,090	300	57,095	1,100	29,975
14	6,300	14,350	1,200	55,895	0	27,975
15	6,000	14,950	0	55,895	0	27,975
16	6,000	14,750	43,715	12,183	0	27,975
17	6,000	8,750	500	11,683	1,740	26,235
18	6,000	6,616	0	11,683	276	25,959
19	3,866	2,750	1,933	9,747	400	25,559
20	6,200	4,820	0	99,747	2,100	23,459
21	4,132	19,318	0	99,747	928	22,531
22	11,630	19,318	0	99,747	0	22,531
23	0	21,318	462	57,347	0	22,531
24	12,720	0,509	3,150	50,397	720	20,114
25	616	7,702	1,100	46,297	1,416	40,775

AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:

5,497 3,208 864

HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:

12,920 43,715 2,100

PERCENT OF AVERAGE:

235% 1,052% 242%

TOTAL ISSUES:

106,384 98,191 8,510

AVERAGE OF BALANCE PER PERIOD:

11,344 35,191 27,330

AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/O:

0 -31,907 -1,650

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AVERAGE HEADCOUNT:

5,913

TOTAL SUNDRIES ISSUED:

159

e. TIME LOT

DATE	A Rations		B Rations (13,300)		C Rations (4,500)	
	Issue	O/H End	Issue	O/H End	Issue	O/H End
8	250	4,450	750	5,070	400	2,490
9	550	3,900	0	5,070	400	2,098
10	250	3,650	0	5,070	400	1,698
11	250	3,400	750	4,320	400	1,298
12	250	3,150	0	3,920	320	9,510
13	250	2,900	0	3,520	900	2,610
14	750	2,650	750	3,070	900	4,534
15	250	2,400	0	3,070	420	4,106
16	1,450	1,700	0	3,070	200	3,826
17	750	1,250	2,250	5,620	120	3,706
18	800	3,390	0	5,220	0	3,706
19	750	2,600	0	5,220	300	3,322
20	677	1,923	900	4,920	0	3,322
21	950	2,751	0	6,756	0	9,972
22	750	3,603	0	6,756	0	9,972
23	950	5,572	0	9,302	0	9,972
24	950	4,572	0	19,302	300	9,472
25	950	4,572	0	19,302	0	10,942

AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:

637

237

297

HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:

1,450

2,250

900

PERCENT OF AVERAGE:

230%

94%

304%

TOTAL ISSUES:

11,777

6,200

5,944

AVERAGE ON HAND FOR PERIOD:

3,244

6,179

5,071

AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/O:

0

-5,321

+531

AVERAGE HEADCOUNT:

654

TOTAL SUNDRIES ISSUED:

23

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2. Daily Receipts and Method of Transport

a. LAI KHE:

DATE	A Rations			B Rations			C Rations		
	Rations	a/t	a/t Day	Rations	a/t	a/t Day	Rations	a/t	a/t Day
8	3,400	11.2	0	0	0	0	12,200	0	31.0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	8,600	10.0	0	11,300	0	16.5	0	0	0
11	10,500	12.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	10,100	12.0	0	47,340	0	70.1	20,000	0	73.0
13	8,500	6.0	0	14,900	0	22.3	10,000	0	73.0
14	19,400	15.9	0	2,000	0	1.5	0	0	0
15	9,000	15.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	23,400	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	10,000	20.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	9,600	8.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	9,900	2.2	0	10,500	0	15.7	0	0	0
22	9,000	7.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	10,000	12.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,333	0	35.0
25	16,700	75.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS:									
	172,794	216.1	0	66,624	0	126.1	40,621	0	221.0

b. PHU LAM

DATE	A Rations			B Rations			C Rations		
	Rations	a/t	a/t Day	Rations	a/t	a/t Day	Rations	a/t	a/t Day
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	6,600	0	2.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	6,600	0	11.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	11,000	0	14.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	6,600	0	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	6,600	0	5.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	6,600	0	11.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	6,600	0	11.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	5,000	0	13.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	3,066	0	4.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0,300	0	11.5	90,000	0	135.0	0	0	0
21	10,600	0	15.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	11,500	0	15.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	2,000	0	4.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,333	0	35.0
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	14,247	0	31.5
TOTALS:									
	120,766	0	134.3	90,000	0	135.0	20,400	0	126.5

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c. QUAN LOI: **CONFIDENTIAL**

DATE	A Rations			B Rations			C Rations		
	Rations	a/t	s/t	Rations	a/t	s/t	Rations	a/t	s/t
		Air	Hwy		Air	Hwy		Air	Hwy
21	1,778	5.2	0	1,846	2.7	0	6,650	23.2	0
22	1,607	2.6	0	1,984	2.7	0	0	0	0
23	2,914	2.6	0	11,520	40.0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	950	2.2	0	0	0	0	1,476	28.3	0
TOTALS:									
	7,249	12.6	0	15,350	46.0	0	8,126	28.3	0

NOTE: No Class I receipts 8 - 20 January 1967 at QUAN LOI.

d. PHU CUONG Refugee camps:

The following items were issued during the period 11-15 Jan

Powdered Milk (cs)	-	80
Beef and Gravy (cs)	-	45
Noodles, Chow Mein (cs)	-	30
Lunchmeat Meat (meal)	-	120,000
Pork Sausage (meal)	-	115,000
Frankfurters (meal)	-	192,000
Eggs, Dehydrated (meal)	-	205,000
Milk, Chocolate, canned (meal)	-	29,000

B. Class III:

(1) Daily and Average Issues and On-Hand Balances:

(a) L-I KH:

DATE	UP - A (60,000)		WELLS (10,000)		MOULS (4,000)		Diesel (4,000)	
	Issues	Q/H End	Issues	Q/H End	Issues	Q/H End	Issues	Q/H End
8		63,000		12,000		35,000		31,000
9	28,000	50,000	1,000	12,000	10,000	40,000	6,000	35,000
10	10,000	80,000	1,000	16,000	5,000	30,000	2,000	55,000
11	10,000	75,000	0	16,000	7,000	43,000	11,000	44,000
12	10,000	85,000	3,000	13,000	8,000	45,000	9,000	45,000
13	16,000	75,000	1,000	12,000	5,000	44,000	3,000	45,000
14	17,500	62,000	3,000	9,000	13,000	36,000	18,000	29,000
15	12,000	50,000	1,000	9,000	13,000	25,000	12,000	18,000
16	13,000	80,000	1,000	16,000	2,000	50,000	2,000	46,000
17	14,000	70,000	3,000	14,000	7,000	46,000	10,000	40,000
18	15,000	85,000	0	14,000	7,000	49,000	5,000	45,000
19	13,000	72,000	1,000	13,000	1,000	48,000	5,000	40,000
20	28,000	74,000	1,000	17,000	8,000	10,000	5,000	35,000
21	2,000	72,000	0	17,000	10,000	30,000	8,000	37,000
22	1,000	71,000	0	17,000	2,000	43,000	2,000	60,000
23	3,000	68,000	0	17,000	8,000	50,000	10,000	50,000
24	8,000	60,000	2,000	15,000	10,000	40,000	5,000	45,000
25	7,000	53,000	0	15,000	4,000	36,000	3,000	42,000

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<u>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:</u>			
10,600	970	5,133	7,230
<u>HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:</u>			
23,000	3,000	13,000	12,000
<u>PERCENT OF AVERAGE:</u>			
264%	286%	253%	249%
<u>TOTAL ISSUES:</u>			
207,500	17,000	120,300	116,000
<u>AVERAGE DAILY O/H:</u>			
69,166	12,000	40,000	41,222
<u>AVERAGE VARIATION PER 3/4:</u>			
+9,160	-7,112		-4,222

b. PER LOT:

R-13	JP - 4 (75,000)		AVGALS (15,000)		INDALS (25,000)		DIRKAL (30,000)	
	Issues	O/H End	Issues	O/H End	Issues	O/H End	Issues	O/H End
8		41,000		14,000		16,375		21,075
9	21,000	45,300	4,000	10,300	5,075	21,000	4,075	39,000
10	5,300	60,000	3,000	12,000	9,100	22,000	10,300	22,700
11	15,000	60,000	2,300	9,600	5,340	20,960	1,900	37,200
12	25,000	54,150	1,600	8,000	4,200	26,960	12,450	29,750
13	19,150	55,000	0	13,000	3,000	23,160	3,500	36,250
14	15,000	65,000	2,000	16,000	3,160	20,000	16,200	25,000
15	49,700	25,300	0	16,000	5,000	23,000	7,600	17,400
16	22,000	45,300	4,000	12,000	4,000	26,000	7,200	20,200
17	12,600	45,700	1,000	16,000	2,000	29,000	5,200	24,400
18	19,700	46,000	4,000	17,000	5,000	29,000	4,400	30,000
19	15,200	42,000	2,000	15,000	7,600	26,400	7,800	27,500
20	14,000	30,000	4,000	11,000	5,400	12,000	7,800	20,000
21	13,400	59,600	1,200	9,000	5,300	23,000	5,000	20,000
22	2,600	62,000	0	14,000	2,000	26,000	2,000	23,000
23	12,000	70,000	0	14,000	2,000	29,000	5,500	22,900
24	20,000	70,000	0	19,000	3,000	36,000	5,800	22,000
25	20,000	55,000	3,000	16,000	0,000	33,000	12,000	25,000

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<u>JP-4</u>	<u>AVGAS</u>	<u>ADGAS</u>	<u>DIBCHL</u>
<u>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:</u>			
10,030	1,307	4,942	6,366
<u>HIGHEST DAILY ISSUES:</u>			
47,000	4,000	9,000	16,250
<u>PERCENT OF AVERAGE:</u>			
48%	30%	102%	255%
<u>TOTAL ISSUES:</u>			
354,000	33,000	55,375	115,375
<u>AVERAGE DAILY O/H:</u>			
52,413	13,621	24,042	26,443
<u>AVERAGE VARIATION FROM O/H:</u>			
-22,537	-1,119	-950	-3,557

e. GULF LOT

<u>DATE</u>	<u>JP-4 (40,000)</u>	<u>AVGAS (20,000)</u>	<u>ADGAS (5,000)</u>	<u>DIBCHL (2,000)</u>
	<u>Issues</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>Issues</u>	<u>O/H</u>
8		115,527		24,630
9	300	115,227	0	24,630
10	400	114,927	0	24,630
11	2,000	112,027	0	24,630
12	300	112,727	0	24,630
13	2,500	109,227	1,100	23,900
14	450	108,777	190	23,200
15	750	108,027	100	23,200
16	3,700	104,327	220	22,350
17	6,027	97,800	1,230	21,160
18	2,700	94,000	0	21,160
19	1,300	93,000	0	21,160
20	2,000	91,000	0	21,160
21	600	91,200	0	21,160
22	900	90,000	30	21,110
23	2,300	88,000	100	21,110
24	1,240	85,760	30	20,900
25	300	86,460	0	20,900
<u>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES:</u>				
	1,350	132	974	111

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JP-4	JP-5	JP-6	JP-7
<u>PERCENT DAILY ISSUES:</u>			
6,827	1,230	3,090	121
<u>PERCENT OF AVERAGE:</u>			
500%	600%	800%	411%
<u>TOTAL ISSUES:</u>			
29,067	3,370	14,273	2,363
<u>AVERAGE DAILY O/R:</u>			
101,127	22,520	42,130	54,741
<u>AVERAGE VARIATION FROM S/O:</u>			
+61,127	+2,520	+37,130	+34,741

2. D.U. TIME

DATE	JP-4 Issues	O/N End	JP-4's Issues	O/N End	JP-4's Issues	O/N End	JP-4's Issues	O/N End
7	0	30,000	3	0	0	0	0	0
8	2,777	27,223	0	0	0	0	0	0

2. Daily Receipts and Method of Transport

2. LI III

DATE	JP-4			JVC-15			MD-45			BOMB		
	a/s	a/s		c/t	a/s		a/s	a/s		a/s	a/s	
	Gallons	lb	lb	Gallons	lb	lb	Gallons	lb	lb	Gallons	lb	lb
8	0,000	24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	15,000	0	45	0	0	0	15,000	0	45	10,000	0	30
10	40,000	0	120	5,000	0	15	15,000	0	45	22,000	6	60
11	5,000	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	20,000	15	45	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
13	6,000	12	0	0	0	0	4,000	12	0	5,000	9	0
14	16,500	13.5	0	0	0	0	5,000	15	0	2,000	6	0
15	0	0	0	1,000	3	0	2,000	6	0	1,000	3	0
16	43,000	9	120	2,000	9	15	27,000	7	75	3,000	0	90
17	4,000	12	0	1,000	3	0	3,000	9	0	4,000	12	0
18	20,000	0	90	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	30,000	0	90	5,000	0	15	0	0	0	10,000	0	30
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,000	0	45	25,000	0	75
23	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,000	0	45	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,000	0	45	0	0	0
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL:	217,500	126.5	510	20,000	15	45	121,000	45	315	100,000	36	365

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B. PHU LOI

DATE	JP-4			ATOLIS			HOG/S			HURRY		
	Gallons	air	Bay	Gallons	air	Bay	Gallons	air	Bay	Gallons	air	Bay
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	25,000	0	75	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	15,000	0	45
10	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30	0	0	0
11	15,000	0	45	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
12	20,000	0	60	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
13	20,000	0	60	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	10,000	0	30
14	25,000	0	75	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
15	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	0	0	0
16	55,000	0	165	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	10,000	0	30
17	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30
18	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30
19	15,000	0	45	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
20	10,000	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	5,000	0	15	0	0	0	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15
22	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
23	20,000	0	60	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	5,000	0	15
24	20,000	0	60	5,000	0	15	10,000	0	30	5,000	0	15
25	5,000	0	15	0	0	0	5,000	0	15	15,000	0	45

TOTAL: 290,000 0 895.5 35,000 0 105 105,000 0 315 115,000 0 330

C. QUIN LAY and BAN TIEBO

No receipts during the operation.

3. JP - 4 Consumption Experience During Assault Airlift of Infantry Battalions.

a. During this operation some airifts were monitored by personnel at the refueling points and aircraft crewmen. The following is the results, which appear to contain variables which preclude these figures for detailed planning.

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JP-4 CONSUMPTION		ASSEMBLY AIRLIFT OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS			
UNIT	NR L/C	TOTAL G/L	NR/LC	STRAIGHT LINE DIST to LZ	SIZE UNIT DATE
ROBIN HOOD	10	1700	170	9 MI	One Inf Bn 9 Jan
RESEARCH	10	1610	161		
TOP THINGS	10	1250	125	19 MI	One Inf Bn
RESEARCH	10	1900	190		
VULFORD	10	1250	125	12 MI	One Inf Bn
COUSINS	10	1250	125		
TOP THINGS	10	1200	120	29 MI	One Inf Bn 15 Jan
ROBIN HOOD	10	1000	100		
RESEARCH	6	650	100		
TOTAL	66 L/C	13,520	1,352	10 MI	4 Bn
AVERAGE	9.6 L/C	1,592.7	159.3	16.2	1 Bn
	For Hel Co	For Hel Co	For L/C	For L/C	

b. The following planning factors are used by Combat Aviation Battalions for planning purposes, and have proven reliable.

- (1) An Assault Helicopter Company has 10 HH-1D's.
- (2) To lift one Infantry Company it requires 20 HH-1D's.
- (3) To lift one Infantry Battalion it requires 60 HH-1D's.
- (4) The difference between the straight line distance to the LZ and the deconvoluted flight route is 35% more distance.
- (5) For combat assaults, HH-1D's carry 1400 lbs of fuel, or 213.4 gals each.
- (6) Fuel consumption of the HH-1D is 12 lbs, or 1.9 gals, per minute at 30 knots speed.
- (7) "Clicks" will fly 2 hrs on a fuel load. One-clicks will fly 1.5 hours.
- (8) One "Click" will use 550 lbs, or 82.5 gals per flying hour.
- (9) Most Infantry Battalion lifts use 2 Assault Helicopter Companies making 3 sorties per company (total of 6 sorties).
- (10) JP-4 weighs 6.42 lbs per gal. To convert lbs to gals multiply by 0.156.
- (11) The more aircraft used in a lift, the greater the fuel consumption rate will be.

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C. Class II - IV

1. All CI II & IV support for operation GEMAL FILL was provided by the 3rd FSC, LBI HRL. A breakdown of issues of fast moving items follows.

Paper Plates (ea)	-	59,533
Paper Cups (ea)	-	67,000
Plastic Knives (ea)	-	74,000
Plastic Forks (ea)	-	75,000
Plastic Spoons (ea)	-	74,000
Battery 21 3X6 (ea)	-	900
Battery 21 3X6 (ea)	-	12,550
Water Can, 5 gal (ea)	-	150
Spray, aerosol,		
insect repellent (ea)	-	1,366
Snap, CI (lbs)	-	60
Da Size clothing pack (ea)	-	6

2. The following CI II & IV items were furnished in support of refugee and CHIN HRI resettlement:

Tent, GP - 16d	-	44
Tent, Emergency	-	150
55 - gal drum	-	925*
Field Kitchen fire units	-	6
Field Kitchen cooking utensils	-	29
Field Kitchen stove cabinets	-	2
Shower pit	-	1
Water Can, 5 gal	-	2,125*
Water Trailers, 400 gal	-	15
Water Trailers, 500 gal	-	2
Gasoline Tank truck,		
500 gal	-	1
Pump, 55 GPM	-	1
Light net	-	1
Generator, 1.5 KW	-	1
Generator, 1.5 KW	-	2
Barbed wire, rolls	-	54*
Concertina, 80lb	-	13*
Infant, 31, XCL	-	5*

NOTE: Items with asterisk (*) were outright issues, all others were furnished on a loan basis.

3. Total tonnage of CI II & IV items issued:

a. TOTAL CI II & IV tonnage:	45 a/t
b. Barrier Material only:	30 a/t

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B. Class V:

1. LAI HEC ASP storage objectives:

The following storage objectives were maintained initially at the LAI HEC ASP. During the latter part of the operation these objectives were adjusted downward:

ITEM	STOCKING OBJECTIVE
17mm HE	517 rds
5" HE	1200 rds
105mm HE	22,000 rds
4.2" HE	792 rds
110mm HE	3900 rds
60mm HE	1000 rds
40mm HE	3200 rds
110mm HE	3000
90mm HE (TK)	623 rds
90mm Cannon (TK)	960 rds

Items not listed were stocked in accordance with GUNFAS Reg 710-15.

2. Ammunition Tonnes:

Approximately 7934.03 tons of ammunition were shipped from the LONG BINH LENO Depot in support of Operation CHIEF FABLE. This quantity is broken down as follows:

	ARTILLERY	SMALL ARMS
Land LOC:	6375.25	426.99
Air LOC:	1146.27	4.22
TOTALS:	7522.22 a/t	431.21 a/t

3. Class V Consumption (Issues) Data

	Tonnage Issued (all Land LOC)
Small Arms:	64.003 a/t
Artillery:	306.199 a/t

4. Expenditure data (Artillery)

ITEM	kg Rds Exp	Total Rds used
4.2" Mortar	17 Rds/Tube/Day	1692
105mm How	197 Rds/Tube/Day	51915
155mm How	100 Rds/Tube/Day	30043
170mm Gun	32 Rds/Tube/Day	1008
5" How	60 Rds/Tube/Day	3940

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(c) Services:

(1) Graves Registration - remains processed

(a) LAI KHE 30
(b) PHU LOI 13
(c) QUAN LOI 0

(2) Showers provided (1st Log Cnd)

(a) LAI KHE 3,523
(b) PHU LOI 5,205
(c) QUAN LOI 2,227

(3) lbs of Laundry Processed (1st Log Cnd)

(a) LAI KHE 16,136
(b) PHU LOI 15,490
(c) QUAN LOI 6,188

e. Maintenance

(1) 701st Maintenance Battalion: Due to the limits of the area of operations, the service rendered to the division did not differ greatly from the normal day-to-day support operations. Other than usual technical assistance visits, no special maintenance teams were organized for the operations. The back-up support units for the division remained the same. The main repair parts re-supply source was HQ and A company, DI AN, which in turn supplied the forward support companies: B (DI AN), C (LAI KHE), and D (PHUOC VICH). Of the latter, C Company was involved to a greater degree due to its close proximity to the Iron Triangle. On occasion, contact teams were sent by the company in support of their customers.

(2) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the 701st Maintenance Battalion experienced the following workload:

Job orders received	3,268
Job orders completed	3,455
Forms	16,465
Issues	12,014
Total Transactions	27,816
Average ASI on hand	608
Average demand accommodation	725
Tons moved to Forward Support Companies	253
Technical Assistance Visits	299

(3) The following data lists the important major and items involved in Operation CEDAR FALLS. In all cases, the number of items reported represents an average figure due to the shifting of tactical units to and from other concurrent operations. The number of major assemblies replaced represents the type of work done on these major end items.

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<u>TYPE OF EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>AVERAGE NR SUPPORTED</u>	<u>REPAIR/REPLACEMENTS</u>
M113	75	5 Transmissions 7 Engines 2 Sprockets 5 Road Wheel Arms 1 Transfer 80 Road Wheels
M113A1	61	1 Transmission 3 Engines 5 Road Wheel Arms
M113	30	1 Transmission 1 Final Drive 26 Track Blocks 20 Road Wheels 3 Road Wheel Arms
M132A1	6	22 Sprockets
M577A1	13	1 Engine
M578	5	30 Road Wheels 151 Track Pads
M58	5	1 Transmission 1 Final Drive 1 Engine 1 Road Wheel Arm
105 How	57	2 Tubes 3 Recoil Mechanisms 1 Sight
155 How	20	6 Tubes 6 Recoil Mechanisms 9 Obturator Spindles
6" How	5	2 Recoil Mechanisms 1 Obturator Spindles 3 Sights 1 Counter Recoil Mechanism 1 Spare 1 Converter

(4) If any comparison can be drawn between Operation CEDAR FALLS and earlier operations, it may be said that consumption rates of repair parts and maintenance efforts expended were at lower levels for Operation CEDAR FALLS than previously experienced. This is probably due to the better maintenance posture of the division at the present time.

4. Medical

(1) The operation was primarily supported by Company B, located at LAI KHE base camp. Company A, 8 Jan through 11 Jan, and Company C, 11 Jan through 17 Jan, medically supported Operation LAI KHE throughout the operation. All other elements of the battalion supported the operation from their base camps by being ready to reinforce the forward companies or to send out a treatment section as required. Two

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air ambulances were located at LAI KHE in general support. These air ambulances were controlled by Company B. 1st Medical Battalion also supported the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the operation.

(2) (C) Total number of patients treated:

(a) DRMA	41
(b) DRMA	263
(c) NBI & DIS	1,067
(d) Vietnamese civilians	412
(e) ARVN	29
(f) Viet Cong	52
(g) Viet Cong Suspects	4
(h) American civilians	1

(3) (U) Medical services rendered:

The 1st Medical Battalion rendered the normal services to all elements of the Division and units we were directed to support. The normal services are hospitalization, treatment, evacuation, dental care, psychiatric care, and medical re-supply.

(4) (C) Air evacuations:

Battle casualties in urgent and priority categories were evacuated to the 3d Surgical, 3d Field, 93d Evacuation and 12th Evacuation Hospitals according to the type wound or disease and the tactical situation at the time of evacuation. Lift-offs made 161 field patient pick-ups from the operational area in the vicinity of LAI KHE and on two occasions two additional helicopters were requested to assist in evacuation. On 13 Jan a CH-47 Chinook was used to assist in evacuating 23 patients from the clearing station at LAI KHE to Army hospitals.

(5) (C) Medical Supplies:

During the operation 59,300 pounds of medical supplies were shipped to units involved in the support of the operation. In addition, 5,500 pounds of medical supplies were furnished for the refugee camp at PHU CUONG. All medical re-supply was accomplished by dust-off aircraft. Normal supply support was accomplished without any major problems. Prior planning to increase our stock levels by 25% made it possible to fill 90% of all requisitions immediately and the remainder within a 24 hour period.

(6) (C) Whole Blood:

A total of 229 units of whole blood was shipped to units in support of the operation.

a. Transportation:

(1) Division Transportation Officer:

(a) During Operation CHAR FALLS the Division Transportation Office was divided into two main elements, one functioning at DI AN and one at LAI KHE. The DI AN element was composed of personnel to operate the airstrip and the traffic control center. Airstrip operations included controlling all cargo loading of aircraft. The prompt movement of replacement personnel to and from the forward area was also accomplished by airstrip control personnel.

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(b) The traffic control center was responsible for road clearances in and around the DI AN area to include SAIGON. They further coordinated all convoy movements in the division TACC with the DTO element in the forward area.

(c) The Division Transportation Officer and the Assistant Division Transportation Officer operated the DTO section of the Logistics Operation Control Center. From here, all fixed-wing traffic in the division was controlled along with all convoy movement. Requests for aircraft were received, processed and passed on to II FFV headquarters. Allocations were then made requesting units. Requests for convoy clearances were submitted to the DTO element at LAI KHE as well as to the TCC at DI AN. Assistance was also given to the Military Police in lining up convoys departing the LAI KHE area and assisting in their control as they departed.

(d) All convoy scheduling for route 13 was done in LAI KHE. The procuring of trucks for various re-supply missions was done by the LAI KHE DTO element.

(e) Support to the division was rendered by the 48th Transportation Group. In addition to the vehicles supplied for the evacuation of refugees from BEN SUC to PHU LOI.

(2) Transportation Data:

(a) Division Transportation Officer:

(1) Convoy Data:

During Operation GEDDA FALLS 18 re-supply convoys were run to LAI KHE. Included in these were 2,000 re-supply vehicles carrying approximately 14,000 tons of supply, mostly class V.

(2) Airlift Data (Logistical):

The following sorties were flown in

logistical support:

1. LAI KHE: 34 sorties C 123; 16 sorties C7A
2. PHUOC VINH: 26 sorties C 123; 13 sorties C7A
3. QUAN LOI: 26 sorties C 123; 13 sorties C7A
4. MIEN THANH: 2 sorties C7A
5. DU HEP: 1 sortie C7A

TOTAL SORTIES: 86 C 123
45 C7A
TOTAL: 131

(b) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

Convoys DI AN to LAI KHE:

DATE (JAN)	TOTAL NO. VEHICLES	CL I a/h	CL II & IV a/h	CL III (BULK) a/h	CL III (PRO) a/h
8	8	4	4	0	0
9	9	0	0	0	0
10	22	2	5	15	0
11	24	15	2	7	0
12	24	15	2	7	0
13	12	9	2	0	1

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DATE (JAN)	TOTAL NO. VEHICLES	CL I a/t	CL II & IV a/t	CL III (BULK) a/t	CL III (PKG) a/t
14	3	2	1	0	0
15	3	2	1	0	0
16	27	0	5	20	2
17	2	0	2	0	0
18	8	0	0	8	0
19	2	1	1	0	0
20	12	0	1	11	0
21	5	5	0	0	1
22	10	0	0	9	1
23	6	0	2	2	1
TOTAL	153	40 a/t	26 a/t	80 a/t	7 a/t

NOTE: All vehicles carrying bulk CL III were dispatched by the 64th QM BN

f. Communications

(1) Operations:

A definite improvement in the operation of the communication equipment plus an increase in the quality of VHF system was evident during this operation. This can be attributed to: the training classes the Battalion conducted prior to the operation; and the reorganizing of Battalion Systems Control.

(2) FM Radios:

(a) Greater range was realized by the infantry battalions by having them erect 60 foot masts with multiple heads where feasible.

(b) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the Division realized the need to give the infantry battalion commanders more communications between the ground forces and the UH-1D helicopter. The task of improving the communication capability of the UH-1D was given to the Signal Battalion. The battalion R & D team planned, designed and built a console that could be mounted on the ceiling of the UH-1D. The console consisted of three AM/FRC 25's plus two control heads and four headsets. This gave the commander the capability of four monitoring positions, two transmitting, plus intercom between all personnel utilizing the console and the pilots. One major advantage of this console is that it can be installed and removed in less than three minutes. Also, the console is out of the way and allows the helicopter to be utilized in air lifts without the necessity of removing the console. Further, no additional radios are required other than what the commander has in his possession. In other words, the commander brings his own organic radios (AM/FRC 25) with him and inserts them into the console for airborne operation. Once he lands, he can use the same radios for portable operation. The radio's power in or out of the console comes from an authorized dry cell battery.

(3) VHF: The MRC-112 proved to be advantageous in establishing a rapid 4 channel system. Being light and easily air lifted it can be deployed rapidly and put on the air in a relatively short period of time. One major disadvantage is that the radio utilizes the same frequencies as the tactical FM set and frequencies must be carefully selected.

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(4) TTY: The handling time for teletype traffic was reduced significantly during the period of the operation. This handling time reduction is attributed to new procedures whereby tactical traffic was expedited by typing the format line only and processing the tape immediately and to concerted effort on the part of the OIC and NCO supervisors.

(5) The operation must be considered, as far as operating here in Vietnam is concerned, routine. The Battalion was very extensively committed, more than ever before, therefore leaving less equipment for back up. The construction of 120 foot AB216 Tower the Division Forward location allowed greater distances to be obtained from VHF system along with retaining high quality voice circuits.

g. Personnel

(1) U.S. losses during Operation CEDAR FALLS were 32 KIA and 181 WIA.

(2) Enemy losses during Operation CEDAR FALLS were 389 VC KIA (BC), 180 VC PW, 471 CHIEU HOI, and 365 detainees.

11. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. An engineer, artillery navy was innovated to seal the confluence of the SUICON and the THI THUAN Rivers at the southern tip of the Iron Triangle. The engineers used two M16 floats as rafts, powered by a 27 foot utility boat. A quad .50 cal and 6 in. .30 cal machine guns were mounted on the vessel. Two of these craft were constructed and proved very effective at controlling river traffic and searching inlets.

b. The use of bulldozers to open jungle as a part of combat operations was initiated during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Fifty-two bulldozers took part in the operation. A dozer-infantry concept was employed with dozer teams consisting of two tank dozers and six bulldozers. The tank dozers preceded the bulldozers and cut through the jungle, exposed to sniper fire and booby traps. The dozers that followed cut paths through the jungle along the infantry route of march. The concept proved very practical and effective. 2,233 acres of jungle in the Iron Triangle were dozed away. Numerous roads and LZ's were cut throughout the area.

c. Acetylene was used for destruction of almost 10 kilometers of tunnels. Generators were used to pump acetylene into the tunnels, where it was ignited. Acetylene was found excellent for destruction of tunnels with not more than 7 foot overburden. Later experiments using HE and acetylene together proved most successful for tunnels as deep as 15-20 feet below the surface.

d. The 1st ACZ employed the IENON searchlight mounted on the helicopter. The device proved to be ineffective when the aircraft was at 1,000 ft or higher. Accordingly, the attempt to conduct night aerial surveillance of river banks and rivers was not considered successful.

e. The 2d Bde employed flame throwers to assist in the capture of enemy personnel located in bunkers and tunnels. The flame throwers reduced the amount of oxygen in the tunnels and produced an adverse psychological effect on the VC.

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12. (c) Commander's Analysis: Operation CEDAR FALLS was long overdue. The Iron Triangle and nearby village of BEN SUC had been lucrative targets for some time. However, this was the first time sufficient forces and equipment were available to properly execute such an undertaking.

The Triangle had been a notorious VC haven. From its confines attacks were launched on the surrounding area, and VC control over such areas was unchallenged. Rallies confirmed that the Triangle contained numerous tunnels and bunkers and huge stores of foodstuffs and equipment. Continual bombing and artillery fires certainly disrupted VC activity, but civilian occupants in the area hampered free-fire activities. Additionally, B-52 strikes and artillery bombardment could not be exploited with ground troops. There were simply no access routes, air or ground, into the heart of the Triangle. The few existing narrow roads and foot trails were heavily mined and booby trapped. The 100 square kilometers of the Iron Triangle provided a secure jungle haven which no one division could seal, search and destroy.

BEN SUC, northwest of the Triangle, was VC dominated. It served as a major tax collection headquarters for the heavy traffic moving up and down the SAIGON River between DAN PHUNG and SAIGON. It was also a logistical headquarters. VC supplies were brought in by road and boat and transported through BEN SUC to the THANH BINH Forestry Reserve and the Iron Triangle. If BEN SUC was threatened by US or ARVN forces, the VC retreated into their nearby jungle base camps.

We had no idea at the beginning that Operation CEDAR FALLS would turn out to be the most significant operation thus far conducted by the 1st Infantry Division. It is most significant in many respects. First of all, it was aimed at the headquarters, Military Region IV. This headquarters is responsible for operations in and around SAIGON. The headquarters directed attacks on TAN SON NHUT and on US troop billets in SAIGON itself.

Because the 27th Division started two days earlier than we did, the bulk of the personnel of Military Region IV came across the river to the north, in the operation area of the 1st Division.

Although the 1st Division killed twice as many VC in Operation EL PASO and ATTLEBORO, the number of VC who were captured and who surrendered in Operation CEDAR FALLS, when added to the killed, brings the grand total to the largest achieved in any single operation in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

The US forces involved captured, mostly in tunnels and caves, the vast majority of the records and plans of Military Region IV. Over 235,000 pages of MR IV documents have been processed by MACV documents section. Some of these documents described in detail the activities of MR IV from 1962 through 1966, and their intelligence value is tremendous. These contain the strengths of VC units, the names of their members, the towns and villages in which they operate, some of their meeting places, and a great amount of information on exactly how they operate and what their future plans are.

In the course of the Operation, 7,000 refugees were resettled from the area. These refugees, who were mostly VC families, provided the labor corps and the logistic support for VC units throughout the entire area. The medical facility discovered by the 1st Battalion 28th Infantry contained medical supplies in a depot on which all the main force regiments in the III Corps area drew for their principal support.

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For the first time in the history of the war in Vietnam, infantry-engineer bulldozer teams cut their way through the jungle, finding and destroying base camps, creating landing zones, pushing back the jungle from roads which can now be used for rapid repenetration of the area. One entire jungle area was completely eliminated. All in all, the engineers cut down 9 square kilometers of solid jungle. This is a technique which will be used again in the penetration of other VC war zones and base areas--a technique pioneered by the 1st Division. Everyone who worked with the engineers recognizes the tremendous contribution they made to the success of the operation.

In addition to the destruction of the base area of Military Region IV, the most significant and unexpected result was the surrender, as of 26 January, of 471 Viet Cong. This has never happened before in the war in Vietnam, and in this area at least, is a reflection of the complete breakdown in confidence and morale on the part of the VC.

Although I do not expect the war to end quickly, I believe this has been a decisive turning-point in the III Corps area; a tremendous boost to the morale of the Vietnamese Government and Army; and a blow from which the VC in this area may never recover.

13. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions: Operation CEDAR FALLS proved to be one of the more successful operations of the 1st Infantry Division and may be a major turning point in the III Corps Tactical Area. The operation significantly eliminated VC supply bases and staging areas. The enemy's fighting strength was reduced by over 1,000 (KIA, PW, and ralliers), and his available labor force, in the form of the six thousand inhabitants, was removed from his control. The removal of this labor force and agricultural resources has significantly reduced the Iron Triangle's value as a logistics and headquarters base. The enemy-initiated incidents decreased dramatically during the latter part of January and February. This decrease is probably due to Operation CEDAR FALLS. The use of engineer-infantry teams in jungle clearing operations was very effective. The removal of jungle growth is the only sure means of denying unobserved use of the area by VC forces.

b. Lessons Learned:

During Operation CEDAR FALLS, bulldozers required refueling in as many as six locations daily. Normally, field refueling is performed by a POL team of two men with a 50 GPM pump transported in a CH-47 with bladders slung underneath. Refueling in this manner would have required two CH-47 teams all day. A more efficient method was developed during Operation CEDAR FALLS. Units accomplished their own refueling by having a dozer dig itself into a trench deeper than ground level. 55 gallon drums of diesel fuel were placed on the edge of the trench and gravity-fed into the fuel tank. The same method will be used if similar operations are conducted in the future.

Present TO&E personnel are insufficient to operate battery and battalion fire direction centers on a 24 hour basis. However, there is a continual requirement to operate both fire direction centers on a 24 hour basis since batteries are very frequently separated from the battalions by great distances and must always be prepared to operate independently. Recent investigation of artillery incidents indicated that extremely long duty hours of fire direction center personnel is a contributing factor to the incident. TO&E personnel authorizations must be increased to insure competent, accurate fire direction procedures.

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LC construction is a continual problem in jungle terrain. The 121 chain demolition and Bangalore torpedos have proved very effective against bamboo thickets and thick underbrush. Positive control is increased if the demolitions are fired electrically.

The closer team of two tank dozers and six bulldozers proved very effective during Operation CEDAR FALLS, particularly when working in a joint effort with infantry. Infantry provided security, whenever the infantry stopped, dozers cleared resupply LC's. The dozers destroyed tunnels, fortifications and base camps as they were discovered. This technique is recommended for use in future operations. One or two APC's or a VT should be attached to each team for maintenance support.

Dead 90's were hoisted by CE-47 into ambush positions inaccessible to track and wheel vehicles. The results were excellent. Positions were secured by infantry, and, if necessary, platforms were constructed. Due to site selection, the machine guns were able to engage targets at all ranges.

The GVN has established the CHIEF DOI program to provide a means for the VC to return to government control. Due to the relatively limited assets and shortage of trained leaders available to GVN, it is essential that US military units assist the GVN in making the program work. Experience shows that the following are required:

- (1) US troops must be informed so they will honor promises made.
- (2) Command interest is required to obtain universal support.
- (3) Division representatives must be assigned to CHIEF DOI centers to assist in the operation of the center and to keep the Division informed.
- (4) Pay/for efforts must support the program.
- (5) Aid in job placement of defectors after release from the centers is necessary.

Defectors have a detailed knowledge of VC methods and beliefs. Knowing how the VC think, they are able to prepare excellent propaganda material. As a living example of the benefits of defecting, they are the best face-to-face salesman for the GVN program. They are also an excellent intelligence source.

During Operation CEDAR FALLS it became apparent that VC combat units move regularly and do not have time to dig tunnels. They rely on foxholes, trenches and bunkers for protection. Tunnels are dug and inhabited by relatively permanent VC elements. Therefore, although most prisoners are frequently given the general location of tunnels, efforts to precisely locate tunnels should be focused on local cadre and rear service personnel.

The 7,000 refugees recruited during Operation CEDAR FALLS caused major problems in transportation, site clearing, shelter erection, provision of water and food and caring for livestock. The military has the necessary assets to take care of massive initial problems encountered. Experience has shown that the GVN, assisted by the Office of Civilian Operations, can assume full responsibility for refugees after a camp is established. Military units must plan to handle the initial phase of any possible refugee relocation.

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Experience has shown the value of the pictorial supplement and the use of low oblique photographs by the 1st Aviation Battalion. The battalion briefs all flight leaders prior to any mission with these graphic aids. Therefore, the actual reconnaissance can be accomplished in one pass over the objective area, thus minimizing the probability of the reconnaissance flights giving away an impending operation. The flight leaders in turn by use of the photographs are able to better brief their separate flights giving each member of the flight a vivid tool in picking out the assigned LZ.

In the event of low level air assaults on an objective, it is mandatory that each flight leader is able to positively identify his assigned LZ, i.e., "LZ 1 will be marked with yellow smoke, LZ 2 with green smoke, etc".

To keep to a minimum time spent on the ground by gunships, re-arming points must be planned far with sufficient personnel to prepare the ammunition and assist the crews in re-arming the aircraft. Re-arming points and refueling points should be in close proximity to each other. This insures the objective area with continuous coverage during the initial stages of the air assault.

FOR THE COMMANDER

E. J. HEDLOCK
E. J. HEDLOCK
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

ADMINISTRATIVE:

- 1 - 1st Lt. Commander Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
- 2 - Operations Officer See fold-outs
- 3 - 2d Lt. After Action Report
- 4 - 3d Lt. After Action Report
- 5 - 4th Lt. After Action Report Distributed separately.
- 6 - Division Artillery After Action Report
- 7 - 1st Lt. After Action Report
- 8 - 2nd Lt. After Action Report (Distributed Separately)
- 9 - 3rd Lt. After Action Report Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO U.S. FORCES 96345

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AFV-B-UP

14 February 1967

Subject: Combat Operations After Action Report (AACV/ACS/J3/J2)

From: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AFV-B-T
APO San Francisco 96345

To: Commanding General
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J3
APO U.S. Forces 92243

1. (U) Basic and Type of Operations: Operation CLAR FALLS: an airborne assault to seal and search the village of BUK SUC, the preparation for and the evacuation of the inhabitants of BUK SUC in conjunction and cooperation with TFMD and GVN, and search and destroy operations in same.

2. (U) Date of Operations: 080725H Jan 1967 to 171700H Jan 1967.

3. (C) Summary: Operation CLAR FALLS was initiated by Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Plan 30-66 dated 301200H December 1966. The Bde TAC CP and 2/18 Inf departed DZ at 070650H by road to BUK SUC airfield then airlifted to DZ TILIG (XT495474) closing at 0855H in preparation for Operation CLAR FALLS. The 2/16 and 1/18 Inf continued operations FALLOU and LAM SUC respectively and became OLC N 1st Bde at 070700H Jan 1967. The 1/26 Inf was airlifted from PHUOC VIEH at 070945H closing DZ TILIG at 1109H becoming OPCON 2d Bde. Co B 2/2 Inf (Mech) was attached to 1/7 Arty (-). 1/7 (-) was airlifted by CH-47 at 0805H closing Arty Base IV at 1424H. The operation commenced at 080725H with the conduct of an airborne assault by the 1/26 Inf (+) to seal the village of BUK SUC. The next two days the Bde prepared for and executed the evacuation of the inhabitants of BUK SUC combined with a thorough search of the village. S&D operations were also conducted to the N of the village. 2/18 Inf remained MUP until becoming OPCON 3d Bde at 100730H. 2/28 Inf became OPCON 2d Bde at 110800H conducting S&D operations to the N of BUK SUC. Bde received 1st Div Frpg 0 1-67 dated 071850H Jan and prepared for and executed the following missions: 1. Be prepared to assist in the opening of the road from BUK SUC to BUK CAT; 2. On order provide one rifle company to reinforce and escort TF Bravo; 3. Be prepared for OPCON ARVN 10th Task Force; 4. After arrival ARVN 10th TF, 1/26 Inf in BUK SUC in readiness for employment as Div reserve (1 hour alert); 5. Secure H&G Route via BUK SUC. The evacuation of all inhabitants with personal belongings, the destruction of BUK SUC and S&D ops in same continued until the completion of the operation on 17 Jan 1967.

a. Reporting Officers: Col and James A. Grimsley, Commanding Officer, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division

b. Task Organizations:

- (1) 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry: Lt Col H. H. Big
- (2) 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry: Lt Col Edgar D. Pendleton
- (3) 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry: Lt Col L. R. Bussard
- (4) Co B, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry: Captain Edward L. C.
- (5) HHC, 2d Brigade, 1st Inf Div: Captain Sherman D. Goldberg
- (6) 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery: Lt Col George L. McFadden
- (7) Division Tunnel Team: Lt Charles Burbor, Team Leader

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ANNEX C
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A. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operations: All intelligence concerning the operation was received from the Division G-2. Units and organizations that were reported to be in the area were the 7th Bn, 165th Regiment, 661 Local Force Company, the headquarters and security elements of Military Region 4 Committee, the BINH DUONG Province Committee, and local guerrillas in the area around BEN SUC (XT587335). General locations were known but none of the units were reported in the Brigade Area of Operations. There was no estimate of the strength of these units.

b. Enemy Situation During Operations: There was no contact made with an organized unit following the insertion of the Brigade in the operational area. Contact was made on a daily basis with small groups of VC in and around BEN SUC. These were apparently VC elements guarding caches and local guerrillas.

Following the seal of BEN SUC on 6 January 1967, 126 individuals were detained. Of these twenty-eight were classified as Viet Cong. Most of these were local VC who were of little intelligence value and had virtually no information. On 12 Jan the Platoon leader of B2 Platoon (139 Group 4) was captured. This platoon transported rice in the area around BEN SUC. Captured documents and interrogation of prisoners indicated that this area was designated Snow Zone C by the VC and Rear Service Unit (Group 6) was the major unit normally stationed in the area.

c. Terrain and Weather: Weather was excellent during the operation. Days were clear and relatively cool. There was no precipitation or fog. Terrain in the operational area was flat along the SONG River with dried rice paddies extending inland 500 to 1,000 meters. Observations and fields of fire were excellent in this area. Cover and concealment were provided by the dikes between rice fields. To the north of the SONG River vegetation consisted of old rubber plantations and dense jungle. Concealment in the jungle was excellent, however, fields of fire were restricted. The SONG RIVER could be crossed by boat. The XUY HO Stream via XT602341 could be forded by truck vehicles and foot troops. A ford or bridge would have to be constructed for wheeled vehicles.

d. Fortifications: Two base camps were located (see Annex 1 and 2). Also one fortified village was located via XT5636. The houses had reinforced sides with short tunnels leading to sub shelters. The town was still occupied. Approximately 335 bunkers were located and destroyed, the majority of which were used for protection from airstrikes and artillery. Major means of destruction used to destroy these fortifications was to call in airstrikes and artillery following the evacuation of the area.

One major tunnel complex was found in the town of BEN SUC (see Annex 3). Tunnel rats were used to explore and destroy this complex.

The major discovery made by the Brigade was the location of 818 tons of rice. Caches were located along the XUY HO Stream from XT602345 to XT603380. The rice was stored in platforms with tin roofs over them and the four walls open. Fifty tons of rice was found in the village of BEN SUC. Following the evacuation of the inhabitants of BEN SUC, bulldozers started destruction and uncovered bunkers and caches. These were holes lined with woven matting, was two feet below the surface and filled with loose rice (see Annex 4 for illustrations and caches located in Operation CHINA FALLS).

A. Civil Action and Psychological Warfare Operations

(1) Civil Action: National Civil Action programs during the operation were limited to one which was held on the first day of the operation in the village of BEN SUC by the 17th AFJCS team. A total of 357 personnel were screened, examined, and treated. 777 personnel also served a meal to 3,612 personnel on the same day. The civil action/civil affairs functions performed during the remainder of the operation were confined to evacuation of the population and their belongings to insure men/cattle and rice, burning of rice fields in numerous caches under houses, and destruction of houses, fruit trees, and rice which could not be evacuated. All of these activities were undertaken jointly by 17th AFJCS and 2d Bde 3-5 sections. Amounts of personnel, animals and material evacuated were as follows:

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BOLT			CH-47			
Date	Personnel	Rice	Oxen/Cattle	Personnel	Rice	Carts Rice
11 Jan	872	unk	11	315	none	None 19
12 Jan	555	unk	113	398	98,000#	70 8
13 Jan	308	unk	232	195	149,000#	45 none
14 Jan	181	140,000#	76	none	none	5 none
15 Jan	No lift this date	140,000		No lift this date		
16 Jan	0	140,000		No lift this date		
Sub Totals	1,916	260,000#	432	899	247,000#	120 27
Totals	2,815	527,000#	432	899		120 27

In addition to the amounts of rice indicated above, each family which was evacuated took such amount of rice along. No figures are available as to how much rice was taken on board boats during the first three days of the evacuation, but estimates of more than fifty (50) tons have been made.

The first informed of the evacuation, the populace became extremely concerned, and while not openly hostile, were definitely unfriendly. Once the Province Chief, Col Ly Tony Ba, had spoken to the citizens, and had informed them that the evacuation would take place, and that no alternatives would be entertained, all personnel seemed to accept the fact, and seemed eager to leave. It is interesting to note that in not one case did the citizens make any attempt whatsoever to take with them the rice which was later found in caches underground. In all instances these caches were left undisturbed by the inhabitants of the houses and were discovered by demolitions or bulldozer operations during the destruction phase. Many houses were destroyed by bulldozer operations, thatch houses were destroyed largely by fire. Fruit trees were cut down by personnel, or uprooted by bulldozers. These rice caches which could not be salvaged or barged for evacuation due to time limitations were soaked with diesel fuel and left in place. In some cases, rice was dumped on walls or burned inside houses.

(2) Psychological Operations: Because of the nature of this mission, Psy War activities by AD SUC 5th section were limited to the first day of the operation. During the conduct of operations on 8 January, three missions were flown for a total of seven hours less than broadcast time. The first mission was conducted over the village of AD SUC during the morning to inform the villagers that the village was surrounded by Allied Forces, that they should remain in their homes and wait for instructions, and that they would not be harmed. The second mission was flown to inform the populace of the evacuation, and instruct them to gather in the center of the village at the school house. The third mission was flown along the highway to the East of BEN SUC, informing all personnel there that the area was to be evacuated, and that they were to gather all their possessions and move to the school house in BEN SUC.

These missions were highly successful in that all instructions given were followed by the populace rapidly and to the letter. No incidents occurred in which the explanation that "I did not understand" was given. Rules of engagement were plain, and were understood. Personnel from outside the immediate environs of the village followed instructions and came into BEN SUC within a very short time.

(a) Conclusions:

1. That messages used were timely, well-phased and easily understood.

2. That the use of Psy Ops aircraft materially assisted in the success of the cordon and search, and in the subsequent search and in the subsequent evacuation of the community.

(b) Recommendations:

1. That Psy Ops missions continue to be used in such future operations.

2. That commanders at all levels examine plans for future operations to determine the advisability of including Psy Ops activities.

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Annex 1 to Part 4 (Intelligence) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

The following information pertains to the Base camp located at XT576347.

a. The base camp was discovered by C 1/26 Inf on 12 Jan 67 and was reentered 131320N with demolition teams and tunnel rats to explore then destroy the complex. Only one (#4) bunker of the four was damaged by indirect fire and air strikes both of which were very extensive. The base camp had one well-used trail entering from the west and the thick natural undergrowth was such that the camp could not be seen from the air.

b. Building #1 was approximately 9' wide by 10' long and 10' below the surface of the ground. The building had cement on all four sides and flooring about 5" thick. The only overhead protection was afforded by sheets of tin. On the NW corner was a bunker with no overhead protection. Beds and tables were on the floor.

Building #2 was approximately 9' wide by 12' long and 10' below the surface. It had concrete identical to Building #1. Overhead cover over one-half of the structure consisted of 5" logs and 3' packed dirt. There were no fighting positions located near the building and beds were located on the 1st floor and on top of the overhead protection. Buildings #3 and #4 were exactly identical to building #1.


c. Bunker #5 located north of the camp and connected by tunnel to building #3 had overhead protection of 5" logs and 3 feet of packed dirt. There were four firing apertures, each 2" high and 4-6" wide and each could cover an area over 100m wide to the front.

d. The second level tunnel going north was made so that at every 10-15m it came to a dead end; and a trap door on the floor connected with a tunnel which went down-around and back up to the other side and on the same level with the fake dead end. There were two small holes in the dead end permitting one man to observe and fire through the tunnel.

e. It is estimated that the four bunkers/buildings are 100% destroyed and the tunnel system 75% destroyed connecting the buildings. It is thought that this complex possibly could have been a safe haven for high ranking VC passing through. (See Appendix 1 for Diagram).

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Annex 2 to Part 4 (INTELLIGENCE) - Operation GEAR FALLS

The following information pertains to the Base Camp located at XT566370.

a. West Camp: The four buildings were all 10' x 10'. Building #1 was only 4' below surface and was used only for sleeping apparently. Buildings 2 & 3 were 7' below surface and had overhead cover of about 1 foot of dirt and 1 foot of logs. The kitchen was above ground and had a tin roof above it. Building #2 had a large amount of photographic material and is assumed to be the location where film was developed. None of the buildings were burned and the tunnels were left untouched.

b. East Camp: This camp, which might consist of more buildings than indicated, was assumed to be the headquarters of a propaganda unit (LHM 864/3865A). The buildings were very large, 12' x 35' and 6-7' below the surface. All buildings had overhead cover consisting of one foot of log and 1 foot of dirt. In building #1 there were three large tables and at least 10 lbs of loose paper, the type used to make small envelopes and letters. Due to the limited time the area was not searched properly. The buildings were burned to the ground (See Appendix 2 - Diagram).

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Annex A to Part 4 (INTELLIGENCE) - Operation CEDAR FALLS

Hard installations and caches found on Operation CEDAR FALLS:

XT585334 - tunnel	XT596346 - tunnel complex
XT588333 - tunnel	XT603348 - 3 foxholes
XT610367 - bunkers - airstrike	XT550368 - 1 concrete bunker (destroyed)
XT556359 - bunkers - airstrike	XT599345 - 2 bunkers
XT560362 - foxholes - airstrike	XT550360 - 5 bunkers (destroyed)
XT613345 - foxholes & trenches	XT562336 - bunkers & tunnels
XT596335 - base camp	XT566365 - tunnel
XT576332 - tunnel	XT595348 - base camp, 9 huts
XT585242 - tunnel	XT568337 - foxholes
XT577327 - tunnel	XT584313 - tunnel
XT587336 - tunnel (destroyed)	XT566370 - base camp (photo equipment)
XT589336 - tunnel	XT570355 - 3 bunkers
XT579313 - bunker (destroyed)	XT551366 - 3 huts, 40 bunkers
XT579342 - bunker (destroyed)	XT599347 - base camp (9 huts, 3 bunkers)
XT579312 - bunker (destroyed)	XT596335 - rice cache
XT564337 - tunnel	XT597335 - rice cache
XT582345 - tunnel	XT593345 - rice cache
XT566341 - bunker (destroyed)	XT569350 - ammo cache
XT587333 - tunnel	XT581312 - rice & medicine
XT559363 - base camp	XT574324 - rice
XT605349 - AW position	XT589314 - medicine
XT561384-572389 - trenches & tunnels	XT562316 - rice
XT575397 - possible base camp	XT577338 - ammo (mine)
XT575335 - tunnel	XT569336 - medicine
XT581336 - tunnel	XT580314 - rice
XT563353 - tunnel	XT564311 - rice
XT584339 - tunnel	XT577331 - ammo (mine)
XT559363 - bunkers	XT582345 - arms & ammo
XT589343 - bunkers	XT562354 - rice and bike parts
XT566357 - trench	XT572326 - rice
XT559363 - bunkers	XT605364 - ammo
XT605364 - bunker	XT604361 - rice
XT601363 - base camp	XT601362 - ammo
XT541378 - bunkers	XT604364 - ammo
XT566357 - trench	XT601362 - rice
XT565364 - 3 bunkers (destroyed)	XT599359 - rice
XT585365 - foxholes	XT596359 - rice
XT585324 - tunnel	XT601379 - weapons and uniforms
XT577334 - tunnel	XT603366 - rice
XT576347 - base camp 3 huts/berm	XT601371 - ammo
XT576347 - 3 concrete bunkers	XT597356 - rice
XT576347 - 3-4 story tunnel	XT600366 - rice
XT555365 - bunkers, trench partially destroyed	XT594356 - rice
XT552362 - 1 bunker (destroyed)	XT594346 - rice
XT576347 - 2 bunkers (destroyed)	XT574347 - ammo
XT558413 - 6 bunkers (destroyed)	XT594361 - rice
XT582361 - 6 bunkers (destroyed)	XT590373 - rice
XT585347 - 4 bunkers (destroyed)	XT504313 - ammo
XT600352 - 1 large concrete tunnel	XT563332 - weapons, ammo, & uniforms
XT552367 - 10 bunkers	XT592355 - rice
XT583332 - tunnel	XT56367 - rice
XT626429 - base camp	XT562334 - rice
XT647403 - base camp	XT567355 - rice
XT566366 - base camp, 7 huts	XT568334 - rice
XT557364 - tunnel	XT596359 - rice
	XT594346 - weapons & ammo

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5. (C) MISSION: 4-Hour, D-Dry 2d Bde conducts airmobile assault from DAN TIEU (DUSTOIT) to seal and secure village of D-1 SUC (DALTDAK); prepares to evacuate village inhabitants on D+1; conducts S&D operation in area; clears and secures Arty Base II via DALTDAK; in conjunction with US 11D and GVN Forces, prepares to commence evacuation of inhabitants of DALTDAK by R&G boats on D+1; and prepares to detach one battalion to 3d Bde on order on or after D+1.

6. (C) EXECUTION:

Chronology:

7 Jan 67 (Prepositioning of Forces) - The Bde T&C CP and 2/18 Inf departed DI AM at 0654H by road to BURN NGU Airfield then airlifted to DAN TIEU (XTA95474) closing at 0655H in preparation for Opn CEMER FALLS. 2/16 Inf and 1/18 Inf were detached at 0700H and placed OPGON 1st Bde. 1/26 Inf was airlifted from PHUOC VIEU at 0945H closing DAN TIEU at 1107H becoming OPGON 2d Bde. 1/7 Arty with Co B 2/2 Inf (Nuch) attached moved by road and CM-47 closing Arty Base IV (XT527278) at 1426H.

8 Jan 67 - 2d Bde initiated Opn CEMER FALLS. 2/18 Inf (-) initiated Opn CEMER FALLS remaining at DUSTOIT as D's HQ. Co A was attached to 1/26 Inf. At 080725H 1/26 Inf (+) conducted simultaneous air assaults into multiple LZ's and sealed the northern sector of the village of D-1 SUC. Sixty helicopters touched down and off-loaded the 1/26 Inf within 45 seconds. Elements of 1/26 Inf conducted S&D operations north and east of the village with A 2/18 Inf attached. At 0805H via XT582339 C 1/26 Inf apprehended 8 detainees. B 1/26 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC via XT576331 at 0815H. C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 booby traps at 0830H via XT582357. At 0835H via LZ CHALIE, A 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC attempting to flee on bicycles. At 0830H A 2/18 touched down at LZ HOTEL and received sporadic small arms fire from the west with no casualties. At 0856H B 1/26 received 31 enemy fire via XT576332 and returned fire killing 1 VC. At 0858H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 5 VC mines at XT583340. At 0900H C 1/26 located and destroyed 3 booby traps via west end of LZ BALVO. B 1/26 captured 3 women detainees via XT576331 at 0903H. At 0907H via XT584330 A 2/18 searched a series of huts and apprehended 17 detainees who were evacuated to HELPER. At 0910H B 1/26 apprehended 2 detainees via XT576338. At 0925H A 2/18 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 15 detainees. At 0930H 1/26 killed 1 VC in coordination with D-18LR 78 who engaged by helicopter, VC flushed into the Saigon River. At 0927H A 1/26 moved to search area via XT589331 where several VC had been observed in bunkers. At 0945H via XT578330 A 2/18 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 4 detainees. At 1020H A 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC attempting to flee across the river via XT589330. At 1025H A 2/18 via XT584330 evacuated to HELPER 1 detainee. At 1025H C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 mine via XT583357. At 1035H via XT574338 B 1/26 located and destroyed 12 sampans. At 1056H via XT578340 C 1/26 located and destroyed 8 VC mines. Elements of C 1/26 observed 6 VC with weapons and immediately engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1057H Recon 1/26 was alerted for S&D mission where VC were observed via XT580313. A 1/26 found a VC body via XT589331 at 1113H. At 1115H via XT583339, Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 8 booby traps. At 1124H C 1/26 located and destroyed 3 VC mines via XT578340. Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 3 sampans via XT582317. At 1140H A 2/18 found VC bag with documents, wallet and ID card via XT589333. At 1151H via XT578340 A 1/26 received small arms fire; fire was returned by mortar and artillery with unknown results. At 1314H via XT581316 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 1 sampan. C 1/26 captured 1 VC with weapon via XT576331 at 1315H. VC was evacuated for interrogation. Via XT589341, A 1/26 captured 3 VC attempting to escape across river at 1336H. B 1/26 found 1 AK rifle via XT576332 at 1335 H. At 1340H via XT576332 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 3,400 lbs of rice. In addition Recon 1/26 found at XT581331 2 sampans containing 6,815 uniforms, 3 rolls of assorted color cloth, 6 bags nylon cord, and 7 bags of nylon netting. Sampans were destroyed and other items evacuated. At 1426H A 1/26 requested evacuation of 1 detainee, 2 VC KIA, 2 VCC, and 1 VC KIA from via XT585340. At 1425H via XT574333 B 1/26 located and destroyed 14 sampans and 200 lbs rice. At 1425H via XT586342 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 booby trapped 105mm rd. At 1545H Recon 1/26 located a bunker containing 3 waterproof packs containing mine clothing, documents, diary, and several rds of Russian 7.62 mm. At 1620H Recon 1/26 was airlifted to Base II to secure Arty Base adjacent to LZ H.T.L. A 1/26 via XT589332 found 4 small sampans and 3 large sampans with cabins and outboard motors. The sampans were destroyed and not re-evacuated at 1630H. At 1651H via XT586342 C 1/26 blew a bunker which yielded 1 VC enemy and several 30 batteries. At 1733H via Base II, Recon 1/26 apprehended and evacuated to HELPER 1 detainee. At 1800H 1/26 assumed night defensive posture. At 1835H via XT583333, A 1/26 located 2 VC KIA in tunnel.

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which A 1/26 had contaminated earlier with CS gas. At 1855H vic XT586242, C 1/26 located and destroyed 4 VC mines. B 1/26 received small arms, M-79 and 50 caliber fire from vic XT573342 at 1855H and fire was countered with mortars, artillery and M-79 with unknown results. At 1905H vic XT585342 C 1/26 received ineffective carbine fire from vic XT571342, fire was not returned. C 1/26 at 1920H received mortar fire from the north vic XT535345, counter mortar fire was placed in the area, there were no friendly casualties. At 1930H vic XT585342 C 1/26 also heard and evacuated pick with mail containing pictures and documents. At 1930H a flare ship was called on station for continuous illumination throughout the night. At 2005H vic XT590340 A 1/26 engaged 3 VC moving toward their position, capturing 1 female VC with pick and 1 VC male. At 2008H 2/18 Inf engaged and killed one VC that set off trip mine fire vic XT584347. At 2012H A 1/26 received mortar fire with no casualties vic XT590341. At 2025H vic XT584326 A 2/18 killed 1 VC with weapon and web gear. At 2045H vic XT581331 Recon 1/26 was fired on by 6 VC and fire was returned with unk results. At 2150H vic XT572333 A 1/26 received AM fire and carbine fire. At the same time vic XT577328 A 2/18 received SA fire. Artillery and mortar fire was placed on suspected area. At 2152H vic XT584339 C 1/26 received several hand grenades and immediately engaged suspected location with M-79 and mortar fire. At 2157H A 2/18 received AM fire from vic XT575325. The area was illuminated and artillery fires called in. At 2236H vic XT584340 C 1/26 received one hand grenade. The night passed without further contact. D Trp 1/4 Cav conducted Eagle flights in S portion of BULIMHEE. At 0645H, Trp reported circular trenches vic XT605350. SA fire was received and artillery was called in the area. At 0630H Trp engaged 1 VC flucing on a bicycle vic XT593391 resulting in 1 VC KIA (DC). At 1055H vic XT573324, a rice cache was located and at 1059H vic XT581313 another rice cache was located. Three VC were engaged resulting in 3 VC KIA (DC) and 4 weapons captured. Area was exploited by Recon 1/26 Inf in the afternoon. At 1150H another rice cache was located vic XT574324. Trp was relieved by Co. 20 at 1200H. A 2/2 Inf (Reck) remained at Arty Base IV. The 2d Bde 2d CG AF Airlifted from BETHLEHEM closing BULIMHEE at 1030H. TFND with 3/8 MIV began search of BULIMHEE at 0945H. At 1245H search forces located a tunnel vic XT585334 containing 6 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (DC) and 5 VC PW's (3 of which were wounded). A search of the village resulted in 106 detainees being located in the Church and 16 to Liu KIE. 3-5 Pay One ships broadcasted, over BULIMHEE engaged 3 VC vic XT663255 resulting in 3 VC KIA (DC). Airstrikes vic XT610317 resulted in 2 VC KIA and extensive bunker destruction.

9 Jan 67 - 2d Bde continued Opn CUBA FALLS. 2/18 Inf (-) continued Opn CUBA FALLS remaining at BETHLEHEM as Div HQ. At 1340H the 1st Bn was placed OPCK 3d Bde and reported to Co. 2d Bde at 1630H. The 2d Bn HQ'd vic BULIMHEE (XT595343). Co. 2/2 Inf (Reck) continued to secure Arty Base IV until 1305H at which time it moved by road to Liu KIE at 1715H reporting OPCK 3d Bde. 1/26 Inf with a 2/18 Inf attached continued mission of sealing JER SUC, conducting S&D operations in the CHUCK, KUI, and DICK; provided security for Arty Base II and conducted S&D operations vic LZ DAVO. At 0950H vic XT585328 A 2/18 engaged 5 VC vic XT589329 with unknown results. At 0950H vic XT588328 A 2/18 engaged weapon on river with 2 VC aboard resulting in 2 VC KIA (DC) and 1 weapon destroyed. At 0705H A 2/18 vic XT584327 reported 1 carbine, 4 VC bodies, and 1 wounded VC female with carbine. At 0737H A 2/18 reported 1 VC KIA vic XT583327. Recon 1/26 reported 1 VC KIA with pistol belt and knee pouch vic XT582334 at 0757H. At 0622H element of B 1/26 received SA and M-79 fire vic XT573335. The sniper was engaged with M-79 and mortar fire with unk results. At 0640H A 2/18 captured one VC with transistor radio hiding in water hole vic XT586328. At 0652H vic XT585323, A 2/18 located and destroyed 1 hut and 2 weapons. At 0524H C 1/26 vic XT579341 located and destroyed 2 VC mines. At 0930H vic XT592327, A 2/18 engaged with grenades, 1 VC in a saucer. The VC was thrown into the river and the saucer was captured together with 6 uniforms, 1 rifle, 1 pick and assorted dishes. At 0938H 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC vic XT581344. The VC had a carbine, 25 lbs of ammo, cards and a triangular time flag. At 0942H A 2/18 located and destroyed 2 weapons vic XT586329. At 1000H vic XT577336, B 1/26 located and destroyed 10 mines. At 1017H vic XT573339 B 1/26 located and destroyed 10 weapons. At 1020H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 1 bunker, 1 can motor oil, 1 bag of bicycle parts, and 1 pack of rice. At 1024H C 1/26 located a bunker vic XT579342. At 1035H vic XT579341, C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 butterfly bombs. At 1105H Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 2,300 lbs rice vic XT572339. At 1117H B 1/26 apprehended 1 individual hiding under straw vic XT591337, they also discovered 1 VC pick, 1 protective mask, 1 mosquito net, 1 uniform, and several documents.

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At 1115H via XT578342 B 1/26 located and destroyed 3 sampans, 16 mines, and 3 CBU bomblets. At 1224H via XT583339 C 1/26 located extensive tunnel system. Tunnel rats were requested to search tunnel complex. The search yielded a large amount of NVN currency and documents, 5 muscar rifles, 450 r/s 30 caliber ammo, 50 r/s muscar ammo, 1 mine, 1 bomb fuse, 200 r/s 7.62 ammo, and 8 rifle bolts (for muscars). All items were evacuated. At 1314H via XT591313 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 2,000 lbs of rice. At 1342H via XT593338 A 1/26 located 2 bamboo mines, 3 sampans, several 50 caliber r/s, large carbide lamp and fishing equipment. Mines and sampans were destroyed, other items evacuated. At 1340H B 1/26 located and destroyed 14 M-16 mines via XT575340. At 1353H 1/26 via XT574316 located and overcasted 2 sandbags of coxo wire, 7-3' by 75' bolts of cloth and 6-100 lb bags of white paper. At 1452H via XT586342 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 15 small sampans. At 1509H Recon 1/26 closed down II and assumed a 2/10 area of responsibility. A 2/18 was detached from 1/26 effective 1600H. At 1610H via XT592341 A 1/26 had a claymore detonated against an OP with 2 friendly MIA, and 1 friendly KIA. Blocking fire was called in and WHI's and KIA evacuated. 1/26 closed nighttime positions by 1800H. At 1846H via XT586341 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 bunker position. At 2000H via XT576339 a claymore was detonated against B 1/26 with neg friendly casualties. The area was placed under surveillance with a starlight scope. At 2010H via XT577339 C 1/26 observed 1 VC and engaged with hand grenades with unk results. At 2044H via XT587343, LP of A 1/26 engaged undetermined number of VC with claymores, mortar fire was placed in the suspected area with results unknown. At 2046H A VC were observed near the same location through starlight scope and the VC were again engaged with claymores and mortar fire with unk results. At 2048H via XT576344 C 1/26 detected an undetermined number of VC and engaged them with artillery with unk results. At 2116H via XT578342 C 1/26 detected undetermined number of VC moving toward his location, artillery was placed on the area and movement ceased. At XT575335 B 1/26 engaged and destroyed a sampan with M-79 at 2153H. At 2156H C 1/26 had light probe by VC and engaged with SA fire via XT578344. Movement ceased. At 2346H via XT574333 undetermined number of VC were detected between B 1/26 line and an LP. VC were engaged with hand grenades with unk results. TFAD continued to search village of "HILL" and coordinate formation Center 1 Center. At 0410H 2 VC were apprehended via XT579335. At 1010H via XT593336 search forces located 9-5 gal drums of medical supplies and documents. The VC with hand grenades were apprehended at 1010H via XT576335; 200 lbs of rice was also located. At 1055H via XT583341, 2 VC I.D.'s were apprehended and 3 persons detained. The VC detainees were apprehended at 1214H via XT586340. At 1125H via XT584337, a tunnel was located containing numerous links, sandals and medical supplies. The VC were apprehended in the tunnel. At 1410H via XT577337, another tunnel was located containing 1 French 30 c-1 S.G. Search for VC contact with 1 VC at 1555H via XT589336. VC fled and a search uncovered 1 Russian carbine. At 1710H via XT578332 contact was made with 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (3C and 2 VC FUM'S).

10 January 1967 - 2d Div continued Opn CHALK FALLS. 2/18 Ind continued Opn CHALK FALLS becoming Opn 3d Ind at 0730H. At 1000H B 1/26 engaged a sampan with M-79 fire with unk results via XT575335. At 0017H C 1/26 received incoming ground fire from VC via XT575333. The area was illuminated and 1 VC was observed and engaged with SA and artillery. At 0042H C 1/26 observed and engaged with artillery 3 VC moving toward their location via XT583340 with unk results. At 0344H via XT575335 B 1/26 observed and engaged 5-7 VC attempting to infiltrate from village resulting in 2 VC KIA. Via XT582339 C 1/26 received heavy mortar attack at 0410H. Counter mortar fire and artillery was initiated and enemy mortars were silenced without casualty. The crater analysis at first light confirmed that at least 4 60mm r/s and 2-42mm r/s were received. At 0424H 1/26 fired offensive mortar concentrations which produced a secondary explosion in A 1/26 area via XT580336. At 0427H A 1/26 observed 2 VC fleeing east to west and engaged with SA with unk results. At 0507H a fluro ship was called on station for constant illumination and defensive fire was increased to disrupt and prevent attack. At 0520H via XT585342, A 1/26 observed 15-20 VC wearing camouflaged helmets and received 10-20 r/s SA fire. LP was pulled back 1/26 prepared for possible attack. At 0546H A 1/26 reported 15-20 VC to their front via XT586342. VC were engaged with artillery resulting in 3 VC KIA (1C). At 0655H 1/26 initiated a sweep to the front of their position. At 0745H via XT575335 1/26 apprehended and overcasted 1811H 1 detainee, who later was confirmed as VC. At 0800H via XT587345 A 1/26 had two personnel slightly wounded by an LP mine during sweep of the area. A mine-sweep team was called in to check area. At 0943H via XT577334 B 1/26 captured and overcasted 3 VC with documents. At 0945H via XT585342 C 1/26 located and overcasted 1 commercial transistor radio found in a hut. At 0951H via

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 XT56342 A 1/26 located and destroyed 4 bunkers, 1 pistol belt, 1 pair sandals.
 At 1033H via XT573345 C 1/26 apprehended and evacuated to ... 2 detainees.
 At 1142H via XT574376 B 1/26 located 3 sampans filled with 25 bolts cloth, 26-70" cargo straps, 1 pack, 5,000 feet silk rope, 80 spools of thread, 2 bags of buttons, 25 rds S. ammo, 18 rifle grenades, 155 rolls waterproof cloth, 100 rolls poncho material, 400 shirts, 135 bolts nylon, 25 bundles cotton flannel. Samples of the materials were evacuated, the remainder destroyed. At 1044H via XT56339 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 tunnel complex running northwest and southeast. At 1137H via XT563339 C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 shape charges. At 1201H via XT567354 C 1/26 located a hut containing 8,000 lbs of rice, 20 bicycle tires and 16 lbs. Items were destroyed. At 1224H via XT569352 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 large sampan. At 1334H via XT569326 A 1/26 located and destroyed 1 24' sampan. At 1335H via XT572326 B 1/26 located and destroyed 2,500 lbs of rice. At 1513H via XT569326 B 1/26 located and destroyed 100 lbs rock salt and 1 mine. At 1416H via XT564326 C 1/26 located and destroyed a tunnel complex. At 1424H via XT590326 A 1/26 located and destroyed 1 40' sampan with inboard motor and 1 40' sampan containing 3 tons of black and blue cloth. At 1435H via XT574323 B 1/26 engaged and wounded 1 VC who fled leaving his medical pack. At 1445H via XT576334 B 1/26 apprehended and evacuated 1 detainee. 1/26 elements closed perimeter by 1600H and ARVN personnel arrived and tied in with A and B 1/26 by 1730H. At 1846H via XT563321 C 1/26 located 12-60mm mortar rds with neg casualties. Mortars and artillery fired counter mortar fires on suspected locations. At 1855H gunships were also on station. At 1858H flare ships arrived on station. At 1900H a gunship via XT574351 spotted light flashes along river and adjusted artillery on area extinguishing the lights. At 1900H a flare ship began illuminating 1/26 area. At 1925H via XT574333 C 1/26 engaged 3 VC with M-79 fire with unk results. At 2057H via XT575334 10 15 VC tried to break out of town, attempting to break seal in B 1/26 sector at two locations along the perimeter. The VC drove cattle ahead of them while throwing grenades and firing their weapons. They were engaged with claymores, small arms and M-79 resulting in 3 VC KIA, 4 VC WIA, 5 VC, 2 M-79's and 1 carbine captured. The wounded and captured VC were evacuated for treatment and interrogation. Maximum illumination was called in and the area kept under surveillance. At 2130H via XT564322 C 1/26 detonated a claymore against 3 VC with unk results. At 2100H A 1/26 received 1 mortar rd with neg casualties. Counter mortar fires were called in on suspected areas. At 2200H C 1/26 engaged undetermined number of VC with mortars and artillery via XT561343 with unk results. TFRD continued population control. Search forces at 0900H located a tunnel via XT561326. At 1015H a detainee was apprehended in a tunnel via XT562323. At 1740333 a boat motor and Russian carbine were located. At 1940H 10 flashlight batteries were located via XT574331. One POW was captured at 1400H via XT576332 along with a carbine, 15 magazines of ammo, 500 lbs of wire, sugar, clothing, documents, medicine, and batteries. Two VC were captured in a tunnel at 1915H via XT567333 and at 1645H via XT563334 two more detainees were apprehended with documents and a 45 cal pistol.

11 Jan 67 - 2d Bde continued Opn CHIAI FALLS. TFRD continued population control and began evacuating refugees. 672 persons were evacuated by ... G boat and another 315 by CH-47 (9 lifts). ARVN TF in cooperation and conjunction with 2d Bde relieved 1/26 Inf at 1224H and assumed mission of maintaining a cordon of BALTIMORE. 1/26 was relieved from the seal mission BALTIMORE by ARVN, and initiated C&D operations to the north. At 0011H via XT591328 A 1/26 engaged and wounded 2 VC who attempted to flee from village. VC were evacuated for interrogation. At 0512H via XT575335, B 1/26 engaged an undetermined number of VC with SA and M-79 fire with unk results. At 0714H via XT561331 R.O.V. 1/26 detained one VC who surrendered with a safe conduct pass in his possession. Railler was evacuated. At 0715H via XT575335 B 1/26 saw 2 VC surrender with safe conduct passes. At 0845H B 1/26 engaged and killed 1 VC who attempted to flee when challenged. At 1245H relief of 1/26 by ARVN was completed. At 1745H A 1/26 commenced attack north in AO ALPHA. At 1750H via XT564344 the lead elements of A 1/26 received SA fire resulting in one US slightly wounded. Artillery was immediately called in on the area. At 1330H 1/26 S-3 while airborne located a trench extending 300-500 meters north to northeast which ended underground via XT564357, also located were bunkers or storage areas extending 200 meters east and west. At 1430H via XT569343 a fire team size point element of A 1/26 moved into the fringe of a heavily fortified VC area containing elaborate tunnel and trench systems. The area was heavily mined with AP mines and by by troyd. Grenades hanging from greaserings the area, and claymores were set up to protect the perimeter of the fortified positions. As the element

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moved into the area they received heavy SA and AW fire resulting in 1 US KIA. As the element began to return fire, claymores and co. and detonated mines were detonated against them resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. Massive artillery fires were brought in to form a protective umbrella of fire to silence the VC weapons and cover the extraction of wounded US personnel. At 1443H the element was extracted and artillery began saturating the area of contact. Artillery fires were lifted and accurate airstrikes brought in, blasting the area with 750 lb bombs, and napalm resulting in 10 VC KIA. At 1415H vic XT572345 B 1/26 located 2 suitcases containing 8 uniforms and medical supplies. At 1456H B 1/26 vic XT573356 located a trench system and booby trapped area. At 1600H units of 1/26 began moving to nighttime locations. At 1600H vic XT574347 B 1/26 located a bunker system containing 250 bunkers, 32,600 lbs of rice, 23 huts, 20 lbs bombs, 30 lbs salt, 30 lbs peanuts, 50 lbs flour, 1 RVN flag, documents and pictures, 21 butterfly bombs and 25 rds carbine ammo. All were destroyed. 1/26 closed nighttime location vic XT573342 at 1704H. The night passed with no contact. 2/26 Inf continued to conduct combat reconnaissance patrolling vic XT5737 located several VC rice and munition caches. The battalion came under SPKX 2d Bde at 11030H. Co A conducted combat reconnaissance patrols to the Southwest of the NDP locating several large rice caches and munition caches. At 110847H Co A patrol located footprints of at least four personnel freshly made vic XT573342. Co A also located a freshly occupied base area containing 2,270-100 lb bags of rice (unmilled), two 12 gauge shotguns, 51 rolls of new blue claymore wire (10' ft each) six packets of opium powder, 22 rolls of wire-tied tin sheeting (50 lb each - 3' x 12'), seven 40 lb sets TNT, nine 27 lb blocks of TNT and misc supplies, cook ware and printed materials. At 111707H three personnel from Co A were wounded by a booby trapped hand grenade vic XT573363. None of the casualties required medical evacuation. At 111230H Co A reported that during the B-52 strike, air and artillery TOT, the VC moved into vic XT573363, removed old booby trapped devices previously located by elements of Co A and placed new booby trapped devices in the area. At 111332H Co A located 1,750-120 lb bags of milled and unmilled rice, 55 rolls of aluminum sheeting, three five gallon cans of tar and 6,750 empty rice bags vic XT573362. At 1342H Co A located 500-100 lb bags of milled and unmilled rice vic XT573359. At 1350H Co A located 700-120 lb bags of unmilled rice vic XT573367. At 1535H Co A located two unmilled rice caches in bins 12' x 6' vic XT573366. The 1st Infantry Division and 2d Brigade chemical teams destroyed the rice on 12 Jan 1967. Co A also located and destroyed eight booby trapped CHIXIN grenades vic XT573355 during the day. Co B conducted combat reconnaissance to the West of the NDP. At 0900H Co B located a bunker vic XT573364 containing 21-25 lb US manufactured shape charges, one claymore and 150 blasting caps and three boxes of TNT. At 1030H Co B located a VC ox cart, a small amount of penicillin and other medical supplies vic XT573364. At 1250H Co B located 50-100 lb mortar rds vic XT573364. All munitions were evacuated. Co C conducted combat reconnaissance to the Northwest of the NDP. At 0940H Co C located a hut vic XT573372 with fresh rice in it (recently cooked), and other indications of recent use. A thorough check of the area revealed nothing further. At 1535H Co C located an arms and uniform cache in a concrete bunker vic XT573379. The cache consisted of two sewing machines, six 7.90 belt action rifles, 450 pr trousers, and 350 coats (dark CD) and printed materials. All items were evacuated. The uniforms were not completely sewn together. The Recon platoon provided security and conducted local patrolling vic the CP. The Recon platoon located and destroyed one 55 gallon drum of US manufactured oil vic XT573370.

12 January 1967 - 2d Bde continued Opn CEDAR FALLS. TFWD continued population control. 555 refugees were evacuated by LC boats another 387 by CH-47. ALVIN Abn TF continued to maintain the seal around B-1 SUC and conducted a search of the village resulting in 7 VC KIA's. 1/26 conducted S&D operations in AO's ALMA and ALVO. At 0713H A 1/26 had 1 US KIA by an AP mine vic XT573391. At 0720H C 1/26 received sniper fire vic XT573345, mortar fire was placed on the suspected area with unk results. At 0800H preplanned artillery and airstrikes saturated the operational area. Upon completion of airstrikes, artillery fires were kept on the area ahead of friendly troops. At 0950H C 1/26 began attacking north to AO BRVO. At 1123H B 1/26 conducted an air assault onto LZ JOE with no contact. LZ was secured by B 1/26 and A 1/26 and TAC CP closed LZ at 1155H. At 1156H B 1/26 located bunkers and newly constructed emplacements vic XT573351. At 1215H vic XT573377, while conducting S&D operation the 1st platoon of C 1/26 entered the fringe of a VC base camp area. Three huts were located and an element of the platoon began destruction operations. As the first hut began burning, the VC poured heavy MG, M, and carbine fire into their midst, killing the lead soldier.

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The fire was quickly returned and artillery called for. The enemy were deterred against the small element as the rest of the platoon was maneuvered into maximum firepower to bear. Massive artillery fires began hammering away at VC targets as CO 1/26 went airborne to assist. CO 1/26 observed VC outside of bunkers in an extensive bunker and trench complex outside the base camp area, and adjusted artillery resulting in 5 VC KIA. (EC) and 10 probable VC KIA. At 1330H following an airstrike, artillery fires were adjusted to form a protective curtain of steel around the base camp area as G 1/26 moved in to search. The base camp contained an elaborate concrete bunker system containing 3 sub-levels, separated by trap doors and with tunnel systems connecting adjoining bunkers. The perimeter of the base camp area was protected by an elaborate wire system, extensive booby traps, a protective shield of claymores and a VC force with machine guns and automatic weapons. Search of the area revealed 10 VC bodies and 5 fresh blood trails. Examination of the bunker system revealed that because of the massive construction they could not be blown with explosives on hand. At 1430H as search teams began exploring the bunkers, one US personnel was wounded by SA fire when he opened the trap door entrance to the third level of the system. CS and fragmentation grenades were thrown into the tunnel with unknown results. Results of the search included documents, containing 1966 letter box numbers, 1 cabin, and 1 M47 magazine, all of which was evacuated. The following items were destroyed: 3-14" claymores, 50 hand grenades, 28 butterfly bombs, 32-479 m's, 4 sets of black pajamas, and 8 booby trapped 105m m's. At 1522H G 1/26 hit 1 US. This was result of a booby trap. At 1610H G 1/26 withdrew from the base camp and moved to LZ for extraction to 1/26 CP location, closing nightline position at 1715H. All units closed BUCOL location by 1715H and had occupied LP's and AP's by 1935H. At 2059H via XT563362 B 1/26 received mortar or rifle grenades with no friendly casualties. At 2103H via XT572366, B 1/26 received SA fire. Mortar fire was heard on some other areas. Situation for the remainder of the night was quiet. 2/28 Inf continued to conduct combat reconnaissance patrols in and leaving additional rice caches and maintaining light enemy contact. Co A later sighted four or more VC via XT605265 at 0050H. The VC were engaged with SA fire with unknown results. At 0907H Co A located a two day old grave containing a decaying body via XT598357. At 0911H Co A located a hut with medical supplies and documents via XT598364. At 1025H Co A located 1,000-100 lb bags of rice and 15 pills of corrugated tin via XT594396. At 1440H Co A reported that the battalion S-3 was seriously wounded in the head by a sniper via XT603355. The battalion S-3 died at 1705H while undergoing surgery. At 1512H Co A sighted a VC via XT598368 while searching the area of the earlier fire. An attempt to engage the VC with SA with unknown results. At 1520H Co A located one freshly dug grave with a 25 year old male body killed by artillery via XT595364. Co A and the 1st Infantry Division Chemical Team destroyed approximately 450 tons of rice which Co A located on 11 and 12 January 1967. Co B patrolled to the west of the DMZ. At 0447H via XT600371 Co B located 30 shrimp cages, 15-25 lb bangal mortar bombs and five CHICOM claymores. Co B continued to search to the west. At 1445H Co B sighted five or more VC via XT598368. Co B pursued the VC, tracked two in a tunnel and woman's arm running through a VC base camp. The action resulted in two VC KIA (EC) and one VCC (P.L.). The VCC was evacuated. Co C conducted combat reconnaissance patrols to the Northwest of and leaving several old VC base areas that had not been used recently.

13 January 1967 - 2d S'c continued on CENR P. 125. T/RO continued population control and refugee evacuation. 406 persons, 73 water buffalo, and 159 cows were evacuated by R.G. boat. 103 persons, 165,000 lbs of rice, and 35 ox carts were airlifted by C-47 (20 lifts). At 0925H a R.G. boat via XT634319 apprehended a VC who was wounded. ARV Abn TF continued its cordon of 1 LTIDU B and conducted S&D operations to the E of the village. At 0916H 4 detainees were apprehended in a tunnel via XT582332. At 0950H via XT576336, 25 lbs of documents were located and evacuated and at 1015H via XT563339, 30 lbs of medical supplies were located and evacuated. At 1410H, search forces located 2-50 kilo enticement mines in a tunnel via XT564333. Another tunnel was located at 1811H via XT583332 containing 3 rifle grenades, 100 m's SA ammo, and 5 sets of uniforms. Four VC were captured at 1700H via XT589331. 1/26 Inf conducted S&D operations in 10's MIA and DRVO. At 0700H artillery and airstrikes began bombarding the previously located base camp. After extensive preparation, B 1/26 and G 1/26 moved out on S&D operations toward the operational area. At 1105H via XT556362, B 1/26 located freshly dug fishholes. At 1219H via XT573347, G 1/26 located and destroyed 1 bunker. At 1221H via XT575347 as G 1/26 lead elements approached the base camp area, they received ineffective SA fire. Artillery was increased and the S&D teams began moving into the bunker complex. At 1319H via XT574347, G 1/26 located and destroyed 7 bunkers.

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and 7 butterfly bombs. At 1344N elements of C 1/26 secured the base camp while S&D teams begin their work. At 1500N via XT575347 C 1/26 located and destroyed 1 gr. mine, sub pump, 10 sleeping mats, and documents in a bunker complex. At 1602N tunnel rats completed search of the sub level bunker system and planted cratering charges for destruction. At 1645N destruction of the bunker complex was completed, and C 1/26 began to move back to the CP area. At 1649N via XT551369, CO 1/26 from an LCH observed a ric. cache. The area was marked for the following days operation. At 1907N via XT550353 Recon 1/26 located and destroyed 3 armories. At 1600N 1/26 received 12 ric. M. sniper fire. Fire was returned with M-79, S, mortar, and artillery fire with unk. results. CO 1/26 observed 3 VC via XT570360 and adjusted artillery in with unk. results. 1/26 elements closed night defensive positions by 1715N. At 1840N via XT562362, 1/26 received heavy M. fire from three locations to their front. An extended column of VC was observed moving through the woodland and massive artillery was called in, a light fire team was called on station and a flare ship alerted. A sweep of the area on 14 January by Recon 1/26 indicated that the VC force suffered heavy casualties. Six butterfly bicycles were found in a 105mm crater inflicting a direct hit. Remnants of clothing hung from trees and littered the area. Masses of trails were found and paths which personnel had been trapped from the area were observed. There were 12 VC killed and evidence of at least 20 VC left. At 2022N via XT561354 a force of 1 VC moved north along a road leading from the river and approached the ambush of B 1/26 from the rear. The ambush was repulsed its position and caused the VC to retreat. In 1 VC killed (M). The VC had no weapons, but were moving away from their position and engaged with unk. results. 5-10 VC moving away from their position and engaged with unk. results. VC fire on mortars were called in on them. As illumination commenced, the VC reported 3 VC hiding behind trees and engaged with unk. results. At 2205N movement was detected at several locations along the 1/26 perimeter. Defensive fire was increased, strikes were planned and placed on call and gunships were alerted as 1/26 prepared itself for possible attack, however, the night passed without further contact. 2/28 Inf continued to conduct S&D operations in 1/26 locating a large amount of rice and additional evidence of the large VC logistical base in the AO. Co A conducted S&D operations in 1/26 reporting the RDP at 0735N. At 1155N Co A located 45-5 grain cans of rice in a small VC base area via XT599364 which they destroyed. At 1155N Co A located an older base area in which the bunker contained medicine, documents, chalk on a 12 page character sheet. At 1635N Co A located several boxes of clothing in Vi. trunks, fuel bags and assorted printed and written materials via XT596356. At 1700N Co A entered a heavily trapped device warning them US personnel via XT595354. Co A was also the target of two enemy claymores in 1/26 fire, however, no one was injured. The 1/26 fire was returned with unk. results. During the night, turbulence from the helicopter destroyed two M161 rocket launchers resulting in six additional casualties. Seven of the nine M161 were evacuated. Artillery on air was employed in the vic of the heavy traps in the enemy fire. This fire uncovered a concrete bunker with four separate entrances, several other bunkers and trenches and produced a severe casualty. Co A patrolled to the South and West of the RDP. At 0935N Co B located a small enemy rest area via XT593372 that had been recently occupied by two or more individuals who left behind a warm bowl of rice. At 0945N Co B located two M161 mortar rounds in a tree with a full wire via XT592372. At 0945N Co B located two M161 mortar rounds via XT592372. At 1200N Co A located two tons of brown polished rice via XT590373 which they destroyed. At 1620N Co B located 15 tons of rice in bags via XT593363. The rice was destroyed in place. Co C patrolled to the North and South of the defensive perimeter. Co C also secured an area via XT594358 allowing personnel to rest and eat on 12. From 1225N to 1617N Co C located 161 tons of both polished and unpolished rice, the majority of which was in bags. Co C located 103 tons via XT594361 and an additional 58 tons via XT592355. Co C alerted the battalion RDP at 1700N. Co C located movement of an unidentified number of individuals with weapons via XT593354. M-79 fire was directed at the target with unknown results. The Recon platoon and Headquarters Co B were from 12-13 January to RDP and 12 via XT594368 with no incident.

14 January 1967 - 2nd S&D continued. On 14 JAN F LIES. TRAP operations, personnel and refuge evacuation. 161 persons, 63 water buffalo, 13 cows, and 140,000 lbs of rice were evacuated by R&G boat. At 1310N via XT592336, a R&G boat received sniper fire. Fire was returned with unk. results. 12th S&D continued its search of the AO and conducted S&D operations. At 1010N, search forces had contact with 1 VC via

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XT564328 resulting in a VC BL (DC). One detainee was apprehended at 1205H in village of B TLH. Another detainee was apprehended in a tunnel at 1536H via XT562336. A Russian rifle was located at 1725H via XT568333. At 2030H contact was made with 2 VC via XT561336 with unk results. 1/26 Inf continued S&D operations in the area, no L&A, no H&A. At 0745H airstrikes and artillery began destruction of the area and at 0845H C 1/26 located and destroyed 5,600 lbs rice and 400 lbs peanuts via XT567355. At 0940H via XT567358 C 1/26 located a network of partially covered bunkers with connecting trenches. The bunkers were freshly dug and were oriented northeast running for approximately 150 meters. At 0950H via XT533362 while machine gun to the north, B 1/26 located freshly dug positions, and at XT533362 located and destroyed a claymin set up for firing. Evidence confirmed that the VC had prepared an ambush against 1/26 as they moved north. Sweep was continued. At 0955H one US personnel of 1/26 was injured by an M-16 via XT 552361. At 1045H via XT552361 1/26 had 1 man US wounded by an M-16. As B 1/26 continued to sweep north, their lead loc entered a village containing an elaborate protection complex including bamboo trees, roads, and a network of bunkers 24 inches thick with concrete floors. At 1100H B 1/26 received SA fire from northwest of the village and artillery and air were called in silencing the fire. At 1415H via XT557364 B 1/26 swept north 2 detainees, age 30, one having a large amount of Vietnamese currency, and evacuated them for interrogation. At 1437H B 1/26 located VC hidden in a wall who was killed by grenades. At 1430H B 1/26 located buried arms and contraband clothing, clothing, and documents; they also located a VC briefing room with blackboard and benches. The briefing room was surrounded by bunkers and a trench system. At 1450H via XT553358, B 1/26 apprehended and executed 1 Vietnamese who was found hiding in a tunnel in the village. At 1500H B 1/26 apprehended an additional 5 Vietnamese who were executed for interrogation. B 1/26 withdrew from village and began moving back to nightline location after completing their sweep and clearing at 1645H. At 1045H C 1/26 located a bunker system running southeast to north-east via XT564358. The complex extended approximately 100 meters. At 1130H airstrikes and missile artillery hit the bunker system via XT560370, setting up bunkers and tunnel systems on the surface in a VC BL. At 1245H elements of A 1/26 via XT565369 located 7 unarmored huts, and destroyed 2 VC who fled north. A 1/26 continued with unk results. A search of the huts revealed a number of documents and individual items. At 1255H via XT574354 C 1/26 located and destroyed 2 C-100 rocket launchers. At 1321H via XT565363 B 1/26 located 30 bunkers which had been occupied the previous night. The area contained blood trails and additional VC body was found. At 1405H via XT566365 A 1/26 located 9 huts and 1 bunker which appeared to be the outpost of a large size base camp. A search of the huts yielded 1 pistol belt, documents and 500 lbs of fisher rice. All 1/26 units closed nightline positions by 1730H. At 2212H via XT559357 one M-16 using a spotlight saw observed 8-12 VC to their south. At 2216H the group dispersed with 5 moving west, 2 were C 1/26 located and 3 others were still at the same location. Illumination and mortar were called in. The M-16 reported VC stumbling and staggering toward the wall line as the first bullet fell approximately 50 meters from them. The action resulted in 2 VC KIA. At 2320H via XT564358 of C 1/26 detected 2 VC moving away from the ambush site. Mortars and M-79's were fired in an effort to drive them into the ambush site. The VC moved within 75 meters of ambush site and the area was illuminated, however, contact with VC was lost. 2/28 Inf moved from its NDP of 13-14 January conducting search and destroy operations to the south. Co A and Co C preceded the movement of Co B and Headquarters Co. The battalion closed via XT569339 at 142330H. Co A conducted search and destroy operations to the South. At 0830H Co A located two bamboo tree groves via XT595358 and at 0850H 35 bags of unpolished rice via XT596356. All items were destroyed. At 0915H Co A entered nightline and located one VC via XT597357 with unk results. The patrol located and executed one CHIDM element. At 1007H Co A located 350 bags of rice in 100 lb bags via XT597367 which they destroyed in place. At 1445H Co A located five fresh fish traps via XT601351 with the sticks still in the holes. Co A closed the NDP without further incident. Co B conducted a search and destroy operation to the South. At 1700H Co B was engaged by five VC snipers who withdrew into a bunker-tunnel complex via XT595346. The VC were engaged with small arms, grenades and flame-throwers. The VC threw several hand grenades from the bunker-tunnel complex resulting in five US WIA, who were evacuated. The action resulted in one VC KIA (DC) and one VC (LI). The action terminated at 1600H. Co B closed the NDP at 2330H. Co C conducted search and destroy operations to the South of the NDP location assuming no more VC were in the heavily built up area. At 1506H Co C located five fresh fish traps along a North-South trail via XT595346. At 1633H Co C

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G located an ammunition and weapons cache in a heavily booby trapped area via XT596347. The cache included eight bolt action rifles (4th bolts removed) 30 "Bouncing Betty" mines, 50-2mm WP shells, 3-15" claymores, two 12" claymores, seven 60mm and five 81mm mortar rds, 30 blasting caps, three stick fragmentation grenades, eight handcannon concussion grenades, one GIICK AT mine, three blocks of TNT, three VC rifle grenades with US rifle adapters, one M-17 (Bouncing Betty) mine, four Thompson SIG clips and one can of sky bean salad oil. All items were destroyed in place. Co G also provided route security for Co B and Headquarters elements to the NDP. The Battalion CC located three fresh graves, via XT596348 at 1745H. None of the graves had been covered and one body was in what appeared to be a full dress uniform. The Battalion S-3 was wounded by a flying wood missile resulting from an explosion when personnel were attempting to destroy rice nearby. The M S-3 was evacuated.

15 January 1967 - 2d Bde continued Op CROWN FALLS. TF D assisted M W units in bagging rice and evacuation of ox carts by 0647. A W unit continued to overrun the village. At 1400H A Co (+) conducted an air assault onto an LZ via XT593112 while another Co (+) conducted a sea assault via XT593119. At 1430H via XT593112 contact was made with 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (3C) and 1 VC RW. The RW had 2 hand grenades on his person. At 1445H contact was made resulting in 1 VC KIA (3C) and an M 90 weapon captured via XT593113. At 1420H in the same area, contact was made with 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (3C) and one Russian cartridge in 1 Browning M2 and pistol captured. At 1939H, 1 VC KIA was located via XT593130. All elements closed BLINDERS by 1739H. 1/26 Inf continued S&D operations in M (X), M (M), and M (S). At 1700H AP 1 of 1/26 observed 3 VC through the sterility rope and artillery was called in. VC fled back into the woods line. At 1715H AP 1 of 1/26 observed 4 VC with weapons moving from the southwest. The AP engaged with small arms and machineguns and observed 2 VC falling while one fled screaming. A sweep of the area at first light revealed blood trails and paths where 3 bodies had been dragged from the area. At 0112H the AP reported 1 body near AP 1 location. At 0117H the AP detected an unknown number of VC in woodline to their front and fired artillery with tank results. At 0550H 1/26 received heavy SA fire via XT593130, from 3-5 VC. VC were engaged with SA and mortars. At 0913H an airstrike hit the area of contact and artillery followed by gunships saturated the area. A sweep of the area revealed 1 VC KIA and 2 VC MIA's, no weapons were located however, numerous blood trails were found. At 1021H the point man of the second platoon of 1/26 was killed by M and carbine fire via XT593131. The platoon engaged with SA and mortars. Artillery was called in as VC fled toward a trench line. A sweep of the area was made and 2 VC KIA and 1 VC wounded were confirmed. At 1510H via XT593139 C 1/26 located a bunker complex of 40 bunkers with connecting trenches and tunnels. Due to the late hour C 1/26 withdrew and proceeded to nighttime location closing at 1620H. At 1210H 1/26 located what was ascertained to be a VC propaganda complex via XT593139. The following items were located and destroyed or evacuated: 2 huts, one with false flooring which yielded mosquito netting, rice clothing and blanket material; medical supplies, a portable darkroom, video camera parts, 20 packs 35mm film, 7 rolls movie film, 150mm camera lens, assorted documents, 2 bicycles, 25 rds assorted SA ammo, 2 body trapped grenades, 5 large cooking pots, 5 cranks of salted fish, and 40 lbs of polished rice. Five of the huts were recently constructed and were used in assembly line fashion. At 1630H 1/26 withdrew and moved to nighttime locations closing at 1715H. At 1325H while conducting S&D operations, 2 1/26 located and destroyed a large rice cache via XT593130 containing 22 tons unpolished rice. Via XT593139 1/26 located a large camp area 1/26 located and destroyed 3 caches of rice totaling over 100 tons. The rice was stored in bins 30' long, 20' wide, and 10' deep. At 1410H 1/26 began moving to nighttime positions closing at 1645H. 1/26 conducted all nighttime operations by 1800H. 2/26 Inf conducted local security operations and care and maintenance of equipment and personnel care and cleaning. Co A conducted one platoon size and three reinforced squad size combat reconnaissance patrol to the East of the defensive perimeter. At 0020H Co A patrol located one bunker with overhead cover and one dead male approximately 40 years of age. The man was dressed in a black uniform. The body was located at a point 100 meters from the site via XT593137. Co B and Co C defended in sector via XT593139 and prepared for future operations. The Battalion S-3 air received SA fire at 1020H via XT593138 while conducting an aerial reconnaissance.

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16 January 1967 - 2d Bde continued Cyn CLM: FALLS. TF D continued to evacuate rice from the village of BALIDAI. ARVN 1st TF continued to search the village of BALIDAI without contact. At 0500H elements of 1/26 conducted sweeps with negative contact. At 0600H 1/26 began preparation for extraction. A PZ was selected and staked out and artillery was adjusted around the PZ to form a protective curtain. Airstrikes were called in on suspected VC targets and gunships raked the area with machine guns and rockets. At 0900H C 1/26 moved forward behind a screen of artillery to search and secure the PZ area. At 0930H C 1/26 received automatic weapons fire from the fire vic XT555655. The company engaged with its fire. Mortars & artillery were called in and the company continued to receive sporadic fire. At 0940H via XT 507353 element of C 1/26 received heavy automatic weapons and machine fire from undetermined number of VC resulting in 1 US KIA. The VC were engaged with SA and M-79's. As artillery was shifted to the area of contact, 7 VC with weapons were observed fleeing, and artillery was called in to saturate the area. As a result the PZ was relocated 100 meters south to XT565357 to provide greater protection. By 1100H C 1/26 had withdrawn from the area of contact and formed a protective screen around the new PZ. At 1150H as artillery fires encircled the PZ, extraction of 1/26 to Base II commenced with 1/26 closing Base II at 1220H. At 1230H 1/26 was airlifted from Base II closing LAI KHE at 1400H and coming under VC fire of 2d Bde at 1500H. 2/20 Inf conducted search and destroy operations to the Northeast of its defensive perimeter destroying enemy installations and materials. Co A defended via IT 509339 and conducted local security patrolling to the East of the perimeter. Co A also continued to destroy the structures in IEN SUC. Co B conducted a company size search and destroy operation via XT593447 and square to the Northeast of the perimeter. Co B departed at 0745H locating a total of seven bunker-tunnel complexes in a VC base area via XT599347. The bunkers had three or four tunnels each which extended into the ground. The tunnels were investigated but produced nothing of value. The bunkers had been constructed within the week. Co B located a total of three new bicycles in the vic of the base area. Co B also located a second and similar base area already heavily bombed out via XT600349. At 1015H an aerial observer, when marking unit locations for Co B, noted a violet smoke that was not thrown by Co B elements. The Co B Commander believed the smoke to be thrown by the VC to confuse the AC. At 1100H Co B located and destroyed five tons of loose unmillable rice in a ground level rice cache via XT599346. At 1100H Co B located the second base area containing the bunker-tunnel complex and several huts. The tunnels were investigated and found to contain a VC poncho, newspapers and bloodied bandages. The bloodied bandages were found in the same bunker-tunnel in which Co B engaged at least five VC on 14 January 1967. The blood on the bandages was one to two days old. The bandages were found via XT595346. At 1207H Co B located five "Bouncing Betty" mines in the tunnel via XT593346. The mines were destroyed. At 1227H Co B reported movement in the same tunnel. A check of the tunnel failed to produce anything of significance. At 1325H Co B located a small amount of medical supplies in a tunnel via XT595352. At 1327H Co B located a burial site via XT599350 10' x 15' with numerous bottles 3-4 feet deep. Although no bodies were uncovered in the fresh graves, the stench at the grave site indicated the presence of decaying bodies. Co B also located two freshly dug empty graves at the same location. At 1500H Co B located 500 lbs of polished rice via XT594347 which was destroyed. Co B closed at 1500H without further incident. Co C conducted search and destroy operations W of Co B. At 0315H Co C threw a hand grenade at one or more individuals via XT590341 who were moving outside the perimeter. A search of the area was made with no results. At 0937H Co C departed the perimeter. At 1005H Co C destroyed 200 lbs of unmillable rice via XT596344. At 1040H Co C located a sign warning of DANGER via XT600345. At 1200H Co C CC, conducting an aerial reconnaissance, reported receiving several rds of sniper fire from via XT591350. Fire was not returned. At 1311H Co C located two 55 gallon drums of kerosene via XT600345 which was destroyed. At 1500H Co C located and destroyed 300 lbs of polished rice via XT597346 and at 1515H 2.5 tons of rice via XT595346.

17 January 1967 - 2d Bde terminated its portion of Cyn CLM: FALLS. 2d Bde CP and attachments airlifted from BALIDAI at 1150H closing PHU QUANG at 1640H then motor marched to IEN SUC Camp closing at 1711H. TF D airlifted from BALIDAI at 1000H to PHU QUANG. ARVN 1st TF was relieved of its portion of BALIDAI at 0750H by 2/20 Inf and airlifted to PHU QUANG at 1150H. 2/20 Inf terminated its participation in Cyn CLM: FALLS closing LAI KHE at 1700H. Co A defended in sector via IEN SUC assuming responsibility for a portion of the ARVN sector at 0000H. Co A continued to secure the area for the departure of ARVN and 2d Bde CP during the dry. Co A closed LAI KHE at 1600H. Co B defended in sector via IEN SUC assuming responsibility for a portion of the ARVN and 2d Bde CP during the dry. At 1500H Co B patrol

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located one dead VC via KT9931 in the SAIGON River. The VC was wearing black pajamas and MA CHI MINH sandals, and was killed by artillery shrapnel. Co C closed at 1750H. Co C provided security for engineer elements who linked up with 1/2 Inf. Co C continued to destroy existing structures and crops via 120MM SUG. At 1200H Co C located 500 lbs of rice via KT6934 which was destroyed in place. Co C closed LAM KHE at 1710H.

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery: 1st Bn, 7th Artillery (-) and one platoon of attached 4.2" mortars were in Direct Support of the 2d Bde throughout the operation. Artillery fires were extremely effective and were credited with twenty-eight (28) VC (IC), one rice cache destroyed, one hut destroyed, and an estimated forty-five VC KIA.

MISCELLANEOUS

By Rds Expanded

8 Artillery Destruction Progress	069
297 MIA	2554
1 S&M Mission	20
140 missions in support of troops	8940
25 Preparations	9607
20 Demonstrations	275
33 Suspected Locations	64
6 Material Targets	515
	23,443

b. Air Force:

(1) TAC Air was employed successfully on both preplanned and immediate targets. The brigade ALA and 3-3 Air processed all airstrikes, requesting an average of 12.3 strikes daily of which an average 9.4 strikes were received daily. The actual effects of TAC Air was hard to gauge as troops usually did not enter all target areas to obtain Post Action Assessment.

(2) Skyrods were used on known VC assembly areas and base camps. The high degree of accuracy inherent in the Skyrod bombing system with this an effective weapon providing additional fire power to infantry battalions when in tight defensive positions (not within enemy held territory). Skyrods were engaged as close as 1,000 meters from friendly positions.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Army aviation was used extensively to conduct tactical troop moves, artillery aircraft, Eagle Flights, resupply, command and control and medical evacuation and it was effectively assessed.

(2) The 11th Aviation Battalion provided two pathfinders to each maneuver battalion with radios and equipment for the entire operation. This aid proved invaluable to all parties concerned.

d. (C) Results:

a. US Losses: 7 KIA, 32 MIA, 3 M16 rifles, serial numbers 17742, 16494, and 16579; and one M-79 serial number 2C4442

b. VC Losses: 170 KIA (IC), 28 MIA, 169 detainees, 50 PWs, 3 railfists, 1 AK 47 rifle, 1 French 30 cal SMC, 7 German sniper rifles, 3 Russian carbines, 2 CHICOM carbines, 6-7.98 rifles, 4 French rifles, 2 US Winchester rifles, 6 carbines, 1 Russian rifle, 2 US M-79's, 2-43 cal pistols, 2-12 gauge shotguns, 24 rifle grenades, 7 CHICOM hand grenades, 54 frag grenades, 8 homemade concussion grenades, 142 AP mines, 1 CHICOM AT mine, 2-50 Kilo anti-ship mines, 32-M79 rds, 30 claymores, 13 bangalore torpedoes, 2 booby trapped 105mm rds, 1-81mm booby trapped mortar rd, 1 booby trapped hand grenade, 81mm HE rds, 7-60mm rds, 21-30mm rds, 50-20mm WP rds, 62-12 gauge shotgun (?) 30 rds 7.62 ammo, 430 rds SA ammo, 15 mag ammo, 3 US rifle grenade adapters, 4 Thompson SMC magazines, 5 boxes TNT, 920 lbs TNT, 1 bomb fuse, 51 sumps charges, 180 blasting caps, 33 huts, 333 bunkers, 16 tunnels, 8 fences, 35 sampans (4 with motors), 3 boats (1 with inboard motor), 1 boat motor, 793 tons of rice, 430 lbs of peanuts, 20 lbs beans, 30 lbs salt, 50 lbs flour, 6,824 black uniforms, 430 pr trousers, 350 coats, 730 black shirts, 40 rolls cloth, 100 rolls of poncho material, 25 bolts cotton flannel, 129 bolts nylon.

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155 rolls water proof-cloth, 133 bolts black poplin, 2 bars buttons, 5 bars thread, 12 bars nylon cloth, 7 bars mosquito nets, 1 water proof pack, 2 US protective masks, 2 VC protective masks, 172 flashlight batteries, 12 AA 30 batteries, 21 rolls of claymore wire, blankets, sandals, 9-5 gal cans medical supplies, radio with commercial receiver, 20 bicycle tires, 1 wheel rim, 20-25" cargo straps, 20 rolls wire screen, 5,000' silk rope, 600 yds wire, sugar, 6 pkts of opium, 37 rolls of corrugated tin, 55 rolls of sheet aluminum, 3-5 gal cans of tar, 5,750 empty bars rice, 2 sewing machines, 1 oil can, 12 sleeping mats, deck playing cards, 2 sets web gear, parji pits, portable darkroom, camera parts, 1-150mm lens, 20 rolls 35mm film, movie film, 5 crabs salted fish, 15-5 liter cooking pots, female clothes, medical training circulars and manuals, 2-55 gal drums kerosene, bicycles, 1 BWW flag

9. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel Strength: The assigned strength of the Bde as of the beginning of the period was 176 (Officers, 12 Warrant Officers, and 2,006 Enlisted Men). Strength of the Bde at the end of the period was 172 (Officers, 12 Warrant Officers, and 2,992 Enlisted Men, as opposed to an authorized strength of 171 (Officers, 15 Warrant Officers, and 2,913 Enlisted Men).

b. Replacements: The Bde received 257 personnel replacements, and lost twenty-four during this period. The status of training of replacements was excellent.

c. Military Discipline: Military discipline during the period was excellent. There were no unusual problems concerning law and order. The 2d Platoon, 1st Military Police Company did an outstanding job in conjunction with the 177th with regards to Civilian Refugee Control at the village of HX. SOC.

d. Logistics

(1) The logistical support base for Cpn CE AF FALLS was located at LAI HTE for supply point distribution.

(2) Units supported on a continuing basis were HHC, 2d Ldn and 1/26 Inf. For the first two days of the operation, support was furnished by the 2/16 Inf. All supplies were delivered to the forward elements by aircraft. 24,000 sandwiches were provided WFO at HX SOC.

(3) Medical support was provided by Co B, 1st Medical Bn in LAI JNK. An Aid Station was provided in the forward CP area by Co C, 1st Medical Bn.

(4) The only problems encountered was an insufficient stockpile of demolitions in the forward Ammunition Supply Point to meet the desires of the attached Division Tunnel rats. In future operations where the mission requires construction of base camps, outposts, and tunnel systems, stockpile level of demolitions should be sufficient to meet the requirements.

(5) The attachment of a pathfinder team from the 11th AW Bn, especially during night resupply, provided excellent coordination between ground and aircraft personnel as well as providing needed equipment to the forward logistics team. The future use of the pathfinder teams is highly recommended to facilitate such operations.

(6) Equipment that is rotated between the forward and rear area on a continuing basis should be clearly tagged describing the requirement for care in handling, i.e., flame throwers should be in at right angles to the next morning to facilitate their use. If the item is unserviceable, it should be tagged by the operator indicating the nature of the failure so that immediate reaction can be taken by the repair services.

(7) The supported units experienced several instances when the M-16 hand grenade did not detonate. The M-26 hand grenade is recommended as standard fragmentation grenade to be carried by the individual soldier.

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10. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. The employment of the flame throwers was highly effective in assisting in the capture of enemy personnel located in bunkers and tunnels. For the most part, they proved more effective than hand grenades or M fire. The flame thrower reduced the amount of oxygen in the tunnels and caused adverse psychological effect upon the VC.

b. The cratering charges and the shape charge (primarily 4.2") were used extensively in destroying tunnels and bunkers. The battalions were supplied with the proper demolitions in the built up area with munitions being brought in by helicopter to a LZ or with a sling load.

c. Both the cratering charges and flame throwers were used in the destruction of rice.

d. The principle techniques contributing to the effectiveness of the 2d SUC seal included:

(1) The use of multiple landing zones which permitted the rapid deployment of assault troops to control exit and control key locations in and around the town.

(2) Detailed, coordinated planning with the Air Mission Commander which insured complete controllability of loads and lift, precise timing and establishment of flight paths and air entry corridors.

(3) Insistence by ground commanders on high intensity, short duration preparatory fires between the first and second lifts which completely disoriented defending forces in the jungle area south of the town while preserving maximum surprise. No preparatory fires beyond 3 minute periods were made prior to the initial "touchdowns."

(4) Thorough and detailed planning for movement from landing area to LZ to include the formations at LZ for both troops and aircraft (movement of troops and positioning of lifts were accomplished during the hours of darkness); weapons to include sand table studies by all participating ground forces down to and including the individual rifleman.

(5) The massive employment of supporting fires including mortar, artillery, and air to the extent that efforts by VC forces external to the seal, to rupture the cordon were repeatedly frustrated.

(6) The allocation of adequate time (72 hours) to hold the seal and follow-up and exploit the numerous cracks and tunnel complexes within and surrounding 2d SUC. The VC who originally sought refuge in the countless tunnels within the town became increasingly restive as the duration of the seal continued.

11. (C) Commander's Analysis: The 2d SUC's participation in the CH-47 FILL was characterized by rapidity of movement, detailed and precise planning under a veil of unusual secrecy, massive and accurate fire control of both air and artillery and the employment of adequate helicopter lift capabilities. The detailed coordinated planning with the Air Mission Commander and ground commanders concerning the capability of loads and lift, precise timing and establishment of flight paths and air entry corridors were significant factors in the success of this operation. The outstanding performance of the Task Force for Revolutionary Development staff in the execution of the inhabitants of 2d SUC is particularly worthy of mention. As the operation progressed, it became increasingly evident that 2d SUC served as an important link in the Viet Cong logistical system. The total destruction of this facility will greatly hinder the efforts of the Viet Cong in the operational area for some time to come.

12. (C) Conclusions and Lessons Learned:

a. Conclusions: The 2d SUC participated in its most successful operations in several months. The SUC located and evacuated or destroyed a significant amount of the overall weapons, supplies and rice located in the CH-47 FILL. The numerous base camps found and destroyed and the ultimate destruction of the sprawling VC logistical transfer complex of 2d SUC will impair VC efforts in the operational area for some time to come.

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To: Lessons Learned:

(1) The employment of multiple landing zones is a principle worthy of special consideration in airmobile seal operations. The utilization of 5-1, ship L2's combined with adequate initial lift (60 UH-1s) permitted the simultaneous touch down of rifle elements in platoon packages throughout the seal area. This factor insured a prompt and effective seal within moments of touch down.

(2) As the operation progressed and additional battalions were committed to the operation, coordination of air and artillery became increasingly more difficult. Detailed prior planning was required to insure that preplanned airstrikes were not permitted to block essential supporting artillery fires for units adjacent to those benefiting from the airstrikes. The placement of multiple artillery bases prior to an operation can do much to alleviate this problem and provide additional flexibility.

(3) Detailed coordinated planning with the Air Mission Commander is vital to the success of an airmobile operation to insure complete compatibility of loads and lift, precise timing and establishment of flight paths and air entry corridors.

(4) The weapons and munitions caches the battalion elements located were stored in bunkers resembling the hut hills that are frequently found in the jungle. The bunkers had two entrances which were located within 50 to 75 meters of a trail large enough to allow an ox cart to pass. The weapons caches in the bunkers were a hasty trapped.

(5) The combined effect of the CS grenade, the flame thrower and the white phosphorus (WP) grenades were effective in assisting in the capture of VC located in tunnels.


(6) Fire support, delineation of boundaries and location of units must be coordinated with adjacent units, supporting indirect fire units and higher headquarters.

(7) A unit moving into a base camp area must do so with a definite plan. The plan must include a minimum force to locate the base, a security element and a force to react to an enemy in the base camp.

(8) The "slower-leafin'" technique again proved invaluable in searching a densely vegetated area as proved by the weapons, munitions, rice and supply caches the battalion elements located.

(9) The VC employ various techniques in employing hasty trapped devices. The rifle elements located numerous "Bouncing Betty" mines in the minefields encountered. The mine was located as near as possible to the base of a bush or tree. A pull wire was well camouflaged by leaves or was buried in the ground.

ATTN: THE COMMANDER


CHARLES P. DARNALL II
Major Infantry
Adjutant

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Department of the Army
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE AND 1st INF DIV
1st Infantry Division
APO 96343

AVDS-MS-C

10 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operations After Actions Report (Operation CEDAR FALLS)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO US FORCES 96343

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO US FORCES 96343

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation CEDAR FALLS, Search and destroy.
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 090000 January - 181305 January 1967 and 230700 to 262400 January 1967.
3. GENERAL: Command Headquarters - II Field Force Vietnam. 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division ORD 1-67 (Operation CEDAR FALLS) dated 051530 January 1967 was used initially. The operation continued under daily operations schedules distributed by 1st Infantry Division. Operation CEDAR FALLS was conducted in the BINH DUONG Province throughout the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve. The 3rd Brigade operated North of the DMZ TRIANGLE, while elements of other II Field Force Vietnam units operated West, South, and East. The plan was to conduct extensive patrolling around Battalion and Company field locations to search for and destroy VC equipment and personnel.

- a. Reporting Officers: Colonel SIDNEY M. MARKS
- b. Task Organization:

Headquarters 3rd Brigade, Colonel Sidney M. Marks, CO
1/2 Infantry, Lt/Col William C. Simpson, CO
1/16 Infantry, Lt/Col Rufus C. Lassell, CO
1/24 Infantry, Lt/Col Jack C. Whitted, CO
2/18 Infantry, Lt/Col Lewis R. Beaumont, CO
2/26 Infantry, Lt/Col Elmer J. Pennington, CO
1/4 Cavalry, Lt/Col Thomas W. Fife, CO
2/11 Cavalry, Lt/Col Kirby H. Hume, CO
2/33 Artillery, Lt/Col Charles D. Daniel, CO

4. INTELLIGENCE:

- a. Intelligence prior to the operation: G2 CO listed the area of operation as the site for HQ NRIV. The main objective of the operation was to destroy the NRIV infrastructure. Additionally the area was thought to be an important VC supply base and hospital area. All units thought to be in the area were listed as unidentified base caretaker elements and headquarters defense units. Indications were that base camps and supply installations would be protected by extensive well-constructed bunkers, tunnels and trenches and armed with extensive use of mines and booby traps.
- b. No major contact was made during the operation. The largest VC units contacted were of platoon size. The VC did not defend their base camp areas, but elected to make taken resistance employing snipers, booby traps, and claymores. During the conduct of the operation numerous VC local guerrillas as well as headquarters personnel from NRIV facilities. Many others were captured while trying to

ANNEX D to
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escape through friendly lines. The VC within the area were tactically surprised by the 1st Brigade and a diversionary operation being conducted by their friendly elements. This resulted in creating a state of confusion within the VC ranks, destroying all VC power and unity. Many important base camps and supply bases were discovered. Significant amounts of rice, other foodstuffs, new uniforms, weapons, ammunition and documents were captured. Additionally, several large hospital complexes were captured, intact, with large quantities of medicines, drugs, bandages, and medical instruments. The VC river communications system was virtually destroyed in the area with the destruction of numerous VC sampans. Intelligence information continued to be received indicating that NVN was experimentally and seriously hurt by the operation.

c. Terrain in the area of operations was flat to gently rolling, with some undergrowth. Streams in the area were fordable with some difficulty. The terrain did not cause any change in plans. Movement was greatly facilitated by the use of ballistars. Weather did not affect operations. There was no precipitation, but was there early morning fog. Temperatures ranged from 60 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit during early morning hours.

d. Base camp discoveries were extensive in construction. Facilities and fighting positions were usually connected by either tunnels or trenches. Most fighting positions were constructed with overhead cover, consisting of logs approximately 4 inches in diameter covered with hard soil up to about 6 inches in thickness. The use of ballistars in destroying fortifications was extremely effective. All VC base installations were located in such a manner as to be convenient to roads, trails, or water ways. GI base installations likewise proved to be very accurate.

e. All civilians who entered in the area were either VC families or VC laborers living under VC control. All of these people were evacuated and resettled under government control.

5. MISSION: 1st Brigade conducts airmobile assault from LAI ANG and LAU TIEN into THAM DIEN Forestry Reserve; conducts search and destroy operations in AO to kill or capture enemy forces and to destroy enemy installations; evacuate all inhabitants within AO.

6. Concept of Operations: 1st Brigade conducts an air assault on the THAM DIEN Forestry Reserve landing four battalions in four columns and conducts search and destroy operations in four VC's to kill or capture VC/PA personnel, to destroy his installations and to evacuate all inhabitants from the AO.

7. EXECUTION: The Operations Order, OPORD 1-67 (Cubuk 7115) was issued to the participating battalions on 5 January 1967 and 6-8 January 1967 were used for planning and preparations. The 2/31 Artillery moved from LAI ANG to Artillery Base I via XT727346, on 8 January 1967.

9 January - at 0735 hrs an extensive air and artillery preparation began on LZ1 via XT603068. Operation CUBUK FALLS was initiated at 0800 hrs when 1/2 Inf touched down on LZ1. The air assault was conducted with 60 helicopters and the whole battalion was on the ground in less than 5 minutes. The artillery and air shifted immediately from prep prep LZ1 to preparation of LZ2 via XT603062. At 0800 1/16 Inf touched down on LZ2 and the artillery began to prepare LZ3 via XT607366. At 0910 A 1/2 received 4 rounds of small arms fire via XT603370 with negative casualties. At 0920 2/28 Inf touched on LZ3 and almost immediately began to find signs of very recent occupation on the edge of the LZ. At 0940 hrs A 2/28 Inf found an 8 x 10 x 15' tunnel with one pot of hot rice and a bunker via XT603367. 3 2/28 Inf found several fresh dug foxholes and recent mortar tracks just off LZ3. C 2/28 Inf destroyed a 30 KC (66lb) mine via XT607368, and 2/28 destroyed a 55 gallon can of diesel fuel. At 1005 hrs A 2/28 Inf located a chicken coop, 18 blasting caps, 12 (Gren) mortar rounds, 11 KC hand grenades, and 400 rounds of 7.62 mm via XT603367. At 1015 hrs C 2/28 Inf located a new base camp via XT603369. At 1020 hrs 1/16 Inf LON with the Battalion CO received several rounds of sniper fire from XT604367 with negative result. At 1030 hrs B 2/28 Inf discovered several pieces of discarded clothing via XT604368. At 1047 hrs A 2/28 Inf received several rounds of sniper fire from XT604365, and B 2/28 Inf located 10 rolls of discarded cam via XT604367. At 1050 hrs C 2/28 Inf located several bats and fighting positions via XT604368. At 1110 hrs 1/2 Inf LON received 3 hits from ground fire via XT604367 with negative casualties, but had to be evacuated. At the same time 1/16 Inf LON was hit by 2 rounds via XT604367 and had to be evacuated. At 1115 hrs C 2/28 Inf found 700 hand grenades in barrels, 124 mortar 2 AP mines, and a bumpy trapped tunnel entrance via XT604367. At 1130 hrs 1/2 Inf detonated a booby trapped grenade via XT607361 resulting in 2 KIA. At 1155 hrs 1/28 Inf touched down on LZ3 via XT622343 and began to S & D in zone. At 1156 A 2/28 Inf received more sniper fire via XT604365 and saw an unknown number of VC escaping south on bicycles. At 1200 hrs B 2/28 Inf captured 2 57mm recoilless rifles and 1 60mm mortar via XT603368 in a base camp. Further searching revealed 135 mortar rifle

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In the same area A 2/28 Infantry located 1 ton of loose polished rice, 5 rifle grenades, and 24 VC gas masks. At 1300H C 1/2 Infantry located 10 tons of salt and 75 tons of rice, via XT642382. The rice and salt were destroyed by the Division Chemical Section. At 1350H 2/18 Infantry became OPCON to 3rd Brigade and prepared for movement into operational area. C 1/28 Infantry found an old base camp via XT642381 consisting of bunkers and spider holes and 1 body-trapped grenade, blown in place. C 2/28 Infantry found and evacuated 28 rounds of 60MM mortar ammo, via XT642380. B 2/28 Infantry located 70 luts, 45 bunkers, and 2 bicycles via XT642385. At 1415H B 2/28 Infantry made contact with an unknown number of VC via XT642384, when the VC detonated a claymore mine on the patrol. The incident resulted in 1 US KIA, 1 VC KIA, and 1 carbine captured. At 1515H the 3rd Brigade set up a forward outpost just off communications at BSI SUC via XT642383. At 1600H, as the first lift of 2/18 Infantry was going into an LZ via XT642387, the playforces were contacted on the LZ. The 2/18 Infantry then went into an LZ via XT642382 with negative contact, while artillery and air were called into the hot LZ. At 1655H 3 1/2 Infantry made contact with 2 VC via XT642388. Fire was exchanged with unknown results. At 1725H A 1/16 Infantry suffered 1 KIA from sniper fire via XT642389. At 1810H C 1/2 Infantry found a body-trapped base camp containing 6 rounds and had prolonged contact with 2 VC via XT642390. The results of the contact were: 1 VC KIA, 1 bilkfield and several documents captured. At 1820H A 2/28 Infantry evacuated 60 personnel via XT642391 and evacuated them to the refugee camp at BSI C. At 2200H B 2/28 Infantry received 2 mortar rounds inside the perimeter via XT642398 resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US KIA. The remainder of 9 January passed with considerable movement around all NDP's, but with negative further contact.

10 January - At 0700H 3rd Brigade CP began movement from LCI HSE to Artillery Base III, via XT642393. The Forward CP closed at 0915H and took over operational control of C 2/28 Infantry at 0930H. At 0715H 2/23 Artillery began serving from Artillery Base I via XT642394 to Artillery Base III via XT642395, closing at 1915H. At 0730H, as a B 2/28 Infantry patrol was returning to the perimeter via XT642396, contact was made with VC forces resulting in 5 US KIA, 1 VC KIA. At 0800H B 1/16 Infantry found 2 VC KIA with (HUM) captured via XT642397 that had been killed during the night as a result of rocket and claymore firing. At 0830H A 2/18 Infantry received 2 CHIEU HOI's via XT642398, and C 2/18 Infantry received 1 CHIEU HOI via XT642397. At 0900H C 1/28 Infantry found the first 34.5 tons of polished and unpolished rice via XT642399. A 2/28 Infantry located 4 bicycles and several documents via XT642400 and contacted a body-trapped claymore via XT642401 resulting in 5 US KIA. All battalions began to search and destroy in area. 1/28 Infantry found a VC base hole and claymore via XT642402. A 1/28 Infantry located and destroyed 21 tons of rice via XT642403. At 1030H A 1/16 located and destroyed 25 tons of rice via XT642404. A 2/28 Infantry located 110 rounds of 20MM ammo and 700 lbs of rice via XT642405. At 1050H B 2/28 Infantry found the first of 170 tons of rice via XT642406. At 1115H B 2/28 Infantry found a total of 31 machine guns, automatic rifles, carbines, grenade launchers, and rifles via XT642407. At 1150H B 2/28 Infantry, via XT642408, found a bin 10'x12'x30' filled with milled rice and 104 more machine guns and small arms. At 1215H 3 1/2 Infantry engaged 4 VC and killed two, capturing an M1 rifle also via XT642409. At 1230H 3 1/28 Infantry located an extensive base camp via XT642410 and were engaged by an unknown number of VC resulting in 4 US KIA and 4 US KIA. At 1315H C 1/2 Infantry located a concrete bunker via XT642411 and killed 3 VC inside. At 1402H A 1/28 located 15 tons of rice via XT642412 in a base camp and planned artillery and airstrikes in the area. A large secondary explosion was observed when the airstrikes were put in. At 1515H C 2/18 Infantry received 3 more CHIEU HOI's via XT642413. At 1915H 6 more CHIEU HOI's turned themselves in at 2/18 CP via XT642414. The remainder of 10 January passed with numerous sightings, movements, including fire, and general noises. There were no more casualties throughout the night.

11 January - At 0705H A 2/18 Infantry received 8 CHIEU HOI's at their CP. At 0800H 2/28 Infantry became OPCON to the 3rd Brigade. At 0815H an Air Force F4C started putting airstrikes into the base camp from the way before by B 1/28 Infantry via XT642415. A total of 12 secondary explosions were observed during the strikes. At 0850H 3 1/2 Infantry fired on 1 VC with unknown results. At 0945H A 1/16 Infantry located and destroyed 45 tons of rice via XT642416. Throughout the day bulldozers were used to clear paths through the jungle, destroy rice and bunkers, and expose landing zones. At 0945H a large cache of unpolished rice, found the way before by 1/28 Infantry, was extracted by CH47 helicopters. A total of 70 tons were extracted from XT642417. At 1010H C 1/2 Infantry destroyed 5 CHIEU HOI's via XT642418. At 1024H C 1/2 Infantry moved into a large base camp via XT642419 and destroyed 11 claymore mines, 7 CHIEU's, and numerous rations. At 1025H the Engineers working with 1/28 Infantry located and destroyed 28 tons of

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rice. At 1125H C 1/28 Infantry found 25 tons of rice via XT620375. By 1200H A 2/18 Infantry found the first of a total of 152 tons of rice via XT611333 which was destroyed with bulldozers. At 1200H B 1/28 Infantry located an extensive medical complex via XT619373 that contained surgical blocks, surgical instruments, and a large stock of medicine which was made available. The remainder of the afternoon the battalions continued to search for and destroy numerous base camps in their respective sectors. At 1230H A 1/16 sustained 2 MIA from rice chattering small arms machine fire and the remainder of 11 January passed without incident.

12 January - At 0400H A 2/18 Infantry located the first of 251 tons of rice via XT614355. At 1005H B 1/2 Infantry captured 2 VC, one who was taken to the VC via XT615326. The wounded VC had a transistor radio, P50 pistol, and many documents. At 1040H A 1/28 Infantry found the first of a total of 85 tons of rice, via XT614369. At 1055H C 1/2 Infantry located and destroyed 25 tons of rice via XT614371. At 1100H A 1/16 CV located 1 ton of rice, fresh blood trails, and several M16s via XT663374 and 2 tons of rice, 1 pistol, and 1 rifle via XT614371. At 1100H B 1/16 Infantry captured a wounded VC via XT656356. At 1315H extraction was begun on one of the rice captured. A total of 925 100 lb bags of paddy rice were extracted from the caches via XT619372 and XT614355. At 1320H A 1/16 found a large M16 tunnel entrance via XT623394. At 1500H B 1/2 Infantry a captured size 10 shoe via XT614371. The battalions continued to search and destroy in their respective sectors into their MIA's. At 1600H A 1/16 Infantry captured 1 VC MIA, via XT614371. At 1650H A 1/2 Infantry ambush patrol received 2 incoming grenades resulting in 2 US KIA via XT620385. At 2115H A 1/2 Infantry captured a claymore resulting in 2 VC KIA via XT618384. The remainder of 12 January was marked by numerous claymore strikes, and small arms fire directed toward the battalions and considerable movement around their positions. At 2455H A 1/28 Infantry sustained 1 MIA from incoming mortar rounds, but 12 January passed without any further incidents or casualties.

13 January - At 0700H 10 CHIEU HOI's turned themselves in to A 2/11 CV via XT619327. By 0815H an LZ via XT614327 was secured by B 2/11 CV and at 0940H 1/2 Infantry was airlifted to the LZ to be in search and destroy in the area. 1/2 Infantry closed the LZ at 1025H. At 0940H A 1/2 Infantry received 2 CHIEU HOI's in the area of the LZ via XT614327. At 1010H A 1/16 patrol hit a VC base via XT656362 resulting in 2 MIA. The battalions continued to search and destroy in their sectors throughout the day due to varying new base camps and caches and destroying caches found earlier. At 1215H A 1/2 Infantry was struck by a claymore via XT623394 resulting in 1 KIA, 25 MIA, and 1 scout dog KIA. At 1200H B 2/16 Infantry took 7 VC mortar fire via XT635355 resulting in 1 VC KIA, 145 casualties, several documents and SV's currency captured. At 1525H A 2/18 Infantry engaged 3 VC via XT623342 resulting in 1 VC KIA, 2 Russian carbines, 2 bicycles. At 1530H A 1/28 Infantry received 10 rounds of US artillery via XT633341, resulting in 9 US KIA and 44 US MIA. The battalions closed their LZ's on 13 January passed without incident.

14 January - At 0725H 6 CHIEU HOI's turned themselves in to 1/2 Infantry CP via XT621328. The battalions continued to search and destroy in their sectors throughout the day. At 1410H 1/28 Infantry began extraction from a PZ via XT610361, closing LAI HNE at 1445H. At 1430H A 1/4 CV apprehended 1 CHIEU HOI with a Swedish carbine via XT639360. At 1545H A 3/2 Artillery apprehended 1 VC and 2 VC set traps via XT671304, the remainder of 14 January passed without further significant incident or discovery.

15 January - At 0515 hrs A 1/16 Infantry ambush patrol located a VC base via XT671357 and detonated a claymore resulting in 1 VC KIA with a pistol and several documents captured. The battalions continued to S & D in their sectors and base camps with small amounts of foodstuff and equipment and one unit ran several snipers. At 1100 hrs B 2/2 Infantry attached to the 1/2 Infantry killed 1 VC via XT620322. At 1205 C 1/16 extracted 4 women and 6 children from XT614371 to LAI HNE. At 1330 C 1/16 Infantry received several rounds of mortar fire with no positive casualties, artillery was placed in the area resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1620 hrs C 1/2 Infantry captured 1 VC MIA via XT611336. The battalions closed their LZ's without further significant finds. At 2045 hrs B 1/2 Infantry had a claymore detonated against their perimeter resulting in 3 MIA and 1 wounded. The remainder of 15 January passed without incident.

16 January - At 0718 hrs 8 CHIEU HOI's turned themselves in to C 1/2 Infantry via XT623329. At 0900 hrs 1/16 began extraction from PZ via XT677349 closing LAI HNE at 1000hrs. At 1025 hrs A 3/2 Artillery received 4 CHIEU HOI via XT677309. The battalions continued to S & D in their sectors throughout the day finding and destroying

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several bunkers with miscellaneous equipment in them. At 1125 C 1/4 Cav found 1 VC KIA via XT674351. At 1405 A 5/2 Artillery captured 5 VC and 2 VN detainees via XT679308. At 1433 A 1/2 Infantry found 1 VC KIA via XT619314. The remainder of 14 January passed without further incident.

17 January - At 0745 4 Chieu Hoi turned themselves in to C 1/2 Infantry via XT623329. At 1013 A 1/2 Infantry captured 1 VC KIA via XT623327. The battalions continued to find and destroy bunkers and installations in their areas throughout the day. At 1154 B 2/2 Infantry attached to 1/2 Infantry found 3 Russian carbines at the bottom of a well via XT689328. At 1325 C 2/18 Infantry engaged 1 VC via XT687345 swimming across a stream resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1555 1/4 Cav apprehended 2 Chieu Hoi and 4 VN detainees. At 1645 headquarters 1/2 Infantry received 1 Chieu Hoi via XT623329. At 2105 C 2/18 Infantry patrol detonated a claymore against a vehicle via XT678346 with unknown results. The remainder of 17 January passed without incident.

18 January - The 3d Brigade suspended operation CEDAR FALLS and moved out of the operational area. The Brigade CP began displace; at 0700 hrs. At 0800 2/18 Infantry began road march to DI AN closing at 1305 hrs. At 0933 1/2 Inf was airlifted from their MDP chasing LAI KHE at 1020 hrs. The Brigade CP and 2/33 Artillery began road march from artillery base III closing LAI KHE at 1230 hrs. The operation was suspended with the closure of 2/18 Infantry into DI AN at 1305 hrs.

25 January - Operation CEDAR FALLS was reinitiated at 0700 hrs when 3d Brigade assumed OPCON of 1/4 Cav (-) and C 2/2 Infantry operating in the Iron Triangle. 1/4 Cav continued to find bunkers, tunnels, and supply caches which were destroyed by attached engineers. At 1135 hrs C 2/2 Infantry captured 3 VC via XT687260 along with 1 carbine. At 1230 hrs C 2/2 Infantry captured 2 more VC and 1 carbine via XT687260. At 1300 hrs C 2/2 Infantry found 1 VC KIA in a fresh grave via XT695245. At 1415 B 1/4 Cav APC hit a mine via XT651324 resulting in 3 US KIA. At 1430 B 2/28 Infantry moved to Iron Triangle and became OPCON 1/4 Cav (-). At 1500 hrs 1/4 Cav captured 5 VC via XT653321. At 1515 hrs C 2/2 Infantry destroyed 4 tons of polished rice via XT687357. The major elements pulled back to HCM CAT to HCM for the night leaving numerous small ambush patrols along the west side of the triangle. At 2055H, via XT684263, a C 2/2 Infantry patrol engaged 20 VC moving North, by artillery, with unknown results. At 2145H via XT672295, a B 2/28 Infantry patrol engaged 2 VC swimming the river with unknown results. At 2155H via XT651314, an A 1/4 Cav patrol fired artillery on 10 VC near the river resulting in 4 VC KIA. The remainder of 25 January passed without incident.

26 January - At 0145H C 2/2 Infantry sustained 1 WIA from H & I fires that landed too close via XT678253. At 0240H a C 2/2 Infantry patrol observed several VC moving North via XT665257. Throughout the day the units continued to find and destroy bunkers, tunnels and material. At 1035H B 1/4 Cav suffered 2 WIA from an anti-personnel mine via XT652342. At 1200H C 2/2 Infantry reported 6 VC KIA in 6 fresh graves via XT683254. At 1244H via XT680254, C 2/2 Infantry located 45 tons of rice and 1 VC KIA 2-3 days old. At 1300H C 2/2 Infantry found a heavily body trapped base camp via XT680253 and suffered 1 WIA from a body-protective grenade. At 1445H B 1/4 Cav received several rounds of sniper fire via XT650325 resulting in 2 WIA. The remainder of the day passed with several insignificant incidents of snipers and movement and Operation CEDAR FALLS terminated at 2624H January 1967.

6. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: 3rd Brigade units were supported on Operation CEDAR FALLS by 2/33 Artillery (105), 8/6 Artillery (155), 1/7 Artillery (105), 2/32 Artillery (8", 175), and 2/35 Artillery (155SP). Although 2/33 Artillery supported unit with long range fires from LAI KHE, the majority of the fires came from advanced artillery bases I (XT727348) II (XT580335), and III (XT647326). Again, as always, the artillery accounted for a large number of the VC KIA. A number of the CHIEU HOI reported that artillery and airstrikes were some of the winning factors in their surrender. The 2/33 Artillery, in direct support of the 3rd Brigade, fired 21,047 rounds of 105MM during the Operation CEDAR FALLS.

b. Air Force: The Air Force contributed significantly to the success of the operation by uncovering several large base camps, destroying previously found base camps, suppressing ground fire, and conducting LZ preparations with tactical air support. A total of 256 close air support sorties were flown, which includes 9 immediate sorties used to suppress enemy ground fire. The known results of the air support were: 6 VC KIA, 228 bunkers and 1605 meters of trench uncovered or destroyed, and 19 huts, 74 bunkers, 2 tunnels destroyed. The sorties were flown as listed below:

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b. Air Force: Conti

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9 January	35
10 January	36
11 January	28
12 January	17
13 January	24
14 January	22
15 January	12
16 January	13
17 January	10
18 January	15
25 January	7
26 January	17
Total	256

9. RESULTS:

a. Personnel Losses:

	US	VC
KIA	17	46
MIA	—	6
WIA	117	2
VOC	—	22
VND	—	18
CHIEU HOI	—	55
REFUGES	—	70

b. Equipment Losses:

(1) - US Losses:

(a) Weapons:

1 Machine guns	total 15
a Light	6
b Heavy	1
c SMG	8
2 Automatic rifles	total 18
Recoilless rifles (57MM)	2
Rifles	127
Shotguns	2
Grenade Launcher (M79)	1
Mortars (50MM)	1
Pistols	4
Mines	21
CNU	62

(b) Ammunition:

Dumbs (250 to 750 lb)	total 5
Artillery (105-175MM)	total 4
Mortar	total 70
Grenades	total 740
Munitions	735
Rifle	5

Cannon (20MM)	total 110
Small arms (assorted)	total 31,000

(c) Demolition Materials:

Shape charges	total 6
Blasting caps	total 22
Detonating wire (feet)	total 56,000
Batteries	total 226
Galvanometer	total 1

(d)

Rice (tons)	total 1446
Destroyed (tons)	1330
Extracted (tons)	116
Grain (pounds)	total 800
Peasants (pounds)	total 900

(6)

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1	Tea (pounds)	total	40
2	Cucumbers (pounds)	total	30
3	Fish (gallons)	total	160
4	Pepper (bottles)	total	1

(e) Medical Supplies:

- 1 Penicillin - 4 total of 130 boxes of bottles containing 500,000 units each
- 2 Syrettes of assorted medicine - 140 boxes
- 3 Assorted pills and capsules - 100 bottles
- 4 Assorted antibiotics - 100,000 ampules
- 5 Assorted vitamins - 625,000 ampules
- 6 Vitamin B12 & C - 400 pounds
- 7 Dextrase - 1,000 bottles
- 8 Glucose - 100 bottles
- 9 Saline - 100 bottles
- 10 Instruments - 4 large bundles containing examination, treatment, and surgical instruments.
- 11 Books & documents - 9 large bundles of books, journals, and records
- 12 Miscellaneous medicines, salves, powders and bandages.

(f) Miscellaneous:

1	bicycles	83
2	axcars	3
3	Sampans & boats	97
4	rifle stocks	135
5	VC gas masks	36
6	cutlery & knives	6
7	corrugated tin (sheets)	360
8	stoves	3

9	FOL (gallons)	
	gasoline	110
	kerosene	15
	diesel oil	2000
	lubricating oil	10

10	Animals	
	chickens	116
	cats	1
	dogs	2
	ducks	106
	pigs	15
	water buffalo	12

11	Tools	
	saws	10
	axes	17
	pick and mattoes	6
	shovels	5
	hoe	1
	cutting tools	18
	miscellaneous wrenches and screwdrivers, ETC.	

12 Clothing and living Material:

Several miscellaneous items including: uniforms, ponchos, wrist watches, cloth, female undergarments, hammocks, blankets, cooking utensils, and furniture.

13 Installations:

Great quantities of installations were found and destroyed throughout the area of operation to include: base camps, hospitals, mess halls, class rooms, bunkers, tunnels, huts, wells, punji pits, and landy traps.

14 Documents:

A large amount of printed and written material was found and extracted including: books, journals, records, photographs, letters, and leaflets.

c. Ground Reconnaissance:

Whenever possible ground troops followed up airstrikes to determine the extent of damage done and to search for enemy material. Due to the terrain and tactical plan, however, it was not always possible to conduct a ground follow-up.

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10. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Administrative plans were considered adequate throughout the operation.

(1.) Supply

3rd Brigade remained at LAI KHE and 1st Infantry Division Support Command located the Division Logistical Base at LAI KHE. First Log Command operated an ASP at LAI KHE and supplied all Class V items. The 3rd Brigade water point operated on a twenty-four (24) hour basis to meet the increased demand. Resupply was made by both road and air. Stationary units with secure access were resupplied by road. Infantry Battalions were resupplied exclusively by helicopter. During one phase of the operation the IRON BRIGADE supported 5 Infantry Battalions, 1 Armored Cavalry Squadron, and 1 Artillery Battalion. Prior to the beginning of the operation, the IRON BRIGADE Resupply Pad was organized into four lanes with five (5) landing pads per lane. The lanes were cleared with PFP and four units could be resupplied simultaneously with a total of twenty (20) helicopters. The majority of the support was from the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company and the cooperation and personal interest demonstrated by the pilots was outstanding in materially enhancing the resupply operations. The major problems encountered were caused by late and timely requests for resupply on the part of the battalions. Also a marked increase in the number of sorties required for resupply was noticed. This was caused by a failure to assure that only the necessary material was sent to the field. The equipment sent to the field should be held to a minimum for both logistical and tactical reasons.

(2) Maintenance:

No major problems arose with maintenance during the operation.

(3) Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation and Hospitalization:

The evacuation of casualties continued to be excellent using the "pushoff" helicopters. On one or two occasions, due to the large number of casualties, resupply helicopters and command and control helicopters were used for evacuation to speed the process.

(4) Transportation:

Traffic congestion became a problem as more units and convoys closed LAI KHE Base. In order to alleviate this problem in the future schedule of arriving and departing convoys and the complement of convoys should be furnished the Brigade S-4, Military Police, and other offices concerned.

(5) Communications:

At the initiation of the operation communications were excellent. As the operation continued on 9 January, however, it became increasingly difficult to communicate with all the Infantry Battalions. The reason for this was not exactly determined, but the Brigade was ordered to displace to the operational area at 091513 January. A forward Brigade TAC CP was established the afternoon of 9 January at BEN SUC via XT5833 and they provided a manual relay throughout the night. On 10 January the Brigade CP displaced to Artillery Base III via XT667313 and no further communications problems were encountered.

b. Personnel Analysis:

Only the minimum number of personnel remained behind at base camps to secure personal equipment. The 3rd Brigade TOC at LAI KHE was manned by the administrative and logistical personnel remaining behind.

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

For the first time in Vietnam, Engineer bulldozers were used extensively in the very middle of the thick tropical jungle. The results were overwhelming. Considering the dry season as a necessity, the bulldozers, secured by maneuver and security elements cut their own paths into the jungle to destroy bunkers, grind large rice caches into the ground, and enlarge landing zones and pick up caches. In one particular instance, the bulldozers could be credited with saving lives of several wounded men. On 13 January, when a 1-25 Infantry was hit with friendly artillery, the bulldozers present immediately began enlarging a landing zone for extraction of wounded and carrying other wounded to a nearby larger landing zone for extraction. The use of bulldozers is definitely a very valuable asset to S & D operations.

12. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

Although operation CEDAR FALLS was planned on a large scale and large risks were anticipated, the operation far exceeded the expected results. The operation was the most successful yet for the IRON BRIGADE in every category except VC killed. This one item was more than offset, however, by the largest number of CHIEU HOI's ever surrendering to the Brigade.

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The length of the operation, the use of bulldozers to destroy the hiding places and material of the VC, and the quantity of material destroyed together created a very noticeable decline in the morale of the VC in the area.

The IRON BRIGADE has dealt the VC a staggering blow from which he will be a long time recovering.

13. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions:

Operation CEDAR FALLS was the most successful operation conducted to date by the IRON BRIGADE. The largest quantity of rice captured on a single operation coupled with the number of CHIEU HOI's, indicate that the VC will continue to have increasing serious morale problems.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) The use of Engineer bulldozers and tank dozers is extremely desirable during the dry season for operating in thick jungle areas. They proved invaluable in the destruction of rice, bunkers, and hard installations, as well as flattening the jungle and clearing LZ's and PZ's.

(2) Sufficient quantities of ammunition should be supplied to allow random firing of all weapons, including claymores, around FDP's at night.

(3) Units should remain in lucrative areas for long periods of time. This has a psychological impact on the enemy, allows CHIEU HOI's to reach over lines, and facilitates a thorough search.

(4) A more effective operation is possible using small battalion areas of operation and thoroughly searching them, and taking time to overtake material found and destroying emplacements discovered, then using large AO's and requiring a battalion to move relatively far in a short time, searching and destroying on a hit or miss basis.

(5) The weapons and munitions caches located generally were stored in bunkers resembling the hut hills frequently found in the jungle. The bunkers had two (2) entrances, were not heavily trapped, and were located within 75 meters of a trail large enough to allow an ox cart to pass.

(6) The combined use of CS and WP grenades along with the veritable flame thrower was effective in assisting in the capture of VC located in tunnels.

(7) The throwing of a colored smoke grenade in conjunction with the use of WP grenades will preclude possible confusion by aerial observers in ascertaining targets and location of friendly elements.

(8) The VC employed a new technique with the "braking botty" booby trap. The mine was located as near as possible to the base of a bush or tree. A pull-wire was well camouflaged by leaves or buried in the ground.

Sidney H. Marks
SIDNEY H. MARKS
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US FORCES 96345

AVOS-RIT

20 February 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96345

1. (U) Operation CEDAR FALLS
 2. (U) 8 Jan 67 - 28 Jan 67
 3. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION
- a. Organization for combat 080000 Jan 67

1st Inf Div Arty

1/5 Arty (-) DS 1st Bde,
A/1/5
B/1/5
C/2/40 (atch)
LH1/10 (atch)
1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
A/1/7
C/1/7
2/33 Arty DS 3rd Bde
D/1/5 (atch)
B/1/7 (atch)
8/6 Arty GS-Reinf 2/33 Arty
LH1/1 (atch)
B/2/32 Arty Reinf 8/6 Arty
2/35 Arty (-) GS-Reinf 2/33 Arty
B/2/35
C/2/35
A/6/27 Arty GS-Reinf 1st Inf Div Arty
3/319 Arty DS 173rd Abn Bde
How Strics, 11th ACR, DS 11th ACR

b. Deployment: Artillery was prepositioned as much as possible on D-1 and D days. A number of artillery bases were developed to support operations of the division and attached units (see Annex C). Support was provided by the assignment of standard artillery missions to artillery units assigned and attached to the division. The 1st Bde was largely responsible for base camp security while the remainder of the division was involved in Operation CEDAR FALLS. Thus, their supporting artillery, 1/5 Arty, was not actively involved in artillery deployment in the Iron Triangle and vicinity.

The 5/2 Arty (LW) was largely attached to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to provide convoy and perimeter security. Four M2's were attached to 8/6 Arty for security purposes. A detailed listing of the major moves in support of the operation, missions assigned, and a map showing the

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main artillery bases and area of operations are attached as annexes.

The highlights of artillery deployment follow:

8 Jan - 1/7 Arty (-8) moved from Arty Base IV to Arty Base II, after Ban Sue was secured in one of the classic airmobile operations of the Vietnamese conflict. Elements of the 2nd Bde secured the Arty Base and artillery of 75th Inf Div Arty provided artillery support during occupation of position. 8/6 Arty, 2/33 Arty, 2/35 Arty (-A), and 2/2/32 Arty occupied Arty Base I to support a 3rd Bde assault into the Iron Triangle on 9 February. Two missions were fired by AO's in which 16 VC (SC) were KIA.

9 Jan - Six 1st Inf Div Bns landed in the Iron Triangle following massive preparations utilizing as many as 14 artillery batteries. Programs of fires were programmed to support operations. One alone, Program RIDEWOOD, expended 2546 rounds of all calibers. A/E's and 2/8/6 were given missions of DS to 2/28 Inf and 1/28 Inf, respectively.

10 Jan - A heavy VC concentration was being built up in the western part of the Iron Triangle. 2/33 Arty and 2/35 Arty (-) moved to Arty Base III to support infantry maneuvers.

11 Jan - C/2/40 was released from Div Arty control and reverted to control of parent unit.

12 Jan - 2nd Bde continued operations North of BEN SUC. Arty Base I was closed, units moving to Arty Base V, in order to provide medium and heavy fire support to all committed brigades.

13 Jan - Fourteen CHIEU NOI personnel turned themselves in to 8/6 Arty, bringing 9 water buffalo with them. An unfortunate artillery incident occurred at approximately 1530 hours. A/8/6, due to a transposition of coordinates, fired out on a 2/33 TOT. Intending to fire a coord 633322 a transposition caused them to fire at 633359. Friendly troops were occupying this area and were not posted on the FDR's map. This error of some 3600 meters caused the rounds to land on 1/28 Inf, killing 9 men and wounding 39.

14 Jan - 1/28 Inf uncovered 12 fresh VC graves that they credited artillery with killing the night before.

15-26 Jan - Artillery supported engineer task teams and infantry search and destroy operations. Infantry units uncovered a vast amount of intelligence documents and supplies. Movement of artillery units into base camps was accomplished during this time.

c. Fire Support Coordination: Boundaries between AO's were designated as Fire Coordination Lines. Div Arty FSE was colocated with the Division TOC (Pw). Liaison officers were sent to adjacent US units, ARVN units and to the normal maneuver elements to aid in this coordination.

d. Army Aviation Support:

(1) The Div Arty Aviation Section, with 10 assigned aircraft, flew 425 hours in support of the operation. The average daily availability of aircraft was 65%, and the primary mission was command and control.

(2) The serial observer section flew 340 hours in support of Operation CHIEU NOI. The 184th Aviation Company provided a daily average of four O-1's. Aerial observers were utilized in firing TOT's, Registrations, blocking fires, targets of opportunity, visual reconnaissance, and assisting forward observers in firing defensive concentrations and map-spotting friendly elements. Observers were instrumental in firing successful preparations on Landing Zones, when they adjusted the fires of four to six batteries with great success.

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e. Artillery warning to aircraft: Artillery advisory was coordinated and supervised by the Div Arty aviation section and was handled at LAI KHS by NIGHTHAWK Control and in the B-N SUC area by THOOPER Control.

f. Metro: Electronic metro messages were rebroadcast on Division Artillery Operations Net (FM) from the data obtained by II FTV artillery stations in CU CHI, LONG BINH, and PHUOC VINH.

g. Survey Operations: Division artillery survey section brought 4th order survey control to artillery BASS I, R-D and WHITE from the survey control points located in the vicinity of BEN CAT.

4. (c) COMMANDERS DURING OPERATION:

1st Inf Div Arty - Col Lawrence E. Caruthers, Jr.
 1/7 Arty - Lt Col Thomas A. Minnie
 1/7 Arty - Lt Col George L. McFadden, Jr.
 2/33 Arty - Lt Col Charles D. Daniel, Jr.
 8/6 Arty - Lt Col Benjamin D. Safar

5. (c) ADMINISTRATION:

a. Participating Strength:

	Start of Operation	End of Operation	Casualties
Div Arty (-)	74	31	0
1/7 Arty	200	228	1 KIA
8/6 Arty	669	723	0
2/33 Arty	338	338	0

b. Awards and Decorations:

	Bronze Star	ACM	EM
Div Arty (-)	11	35	0
1/7 Arty	21	52	1
8/6 Arty	5	2	0
2/33 Arty	10	50	0

* Figures do not include the 1/5 Arty as they were not directly involved with Operation CINDY FALLS.

6. (c) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operation: The Iron Triangle was a well-known VC administrative and supply center. Populated areas were known to support VC units with intelligence information and labor. Intelligence studies supplied by higher headquarters were used in artillery fire planning.

b. During operation: Division G2 continued to disseminate available intelligence and information in the form of spot reports and intelligence summaries. These reports were exploited for artillery targeting. Division artillery air observers were on a constant lookout for indications of enemy movement in the area of operation. Targets of opportunity were engaged without delay.

7. (c) COMMUNICATIONS:

a. FM voice radio: Prior to the operation, it was anticipated that forward observers and their parties would experience difficulty in maintaining communications with their respective fire

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direction centers with radio set AN/PRC-25 due to heavy jungle in the area of operations. To combat this, two solutions were offered. First, observers were instructed to use Division Artillery retransmission system. This was used in several isolated instances. Secondly, an airborne radio relay system was arranged, to use if required.

b. Scrambler equipment was used on the Division Artillery operations net for reporting locations of friendly units. Initially, excessive equipment failure was experienced and the full potential of this communications means was not exploited during Operation CEDAR FALLS.

c. Continuous reliable FM voice communications were maintained with all echelons. The retransmission station was utilized extensively to maintain communications with battalions located at a great distance from division artillery.

d. Some difficulty was experienced in sharing of frequencies. The Division Signal Officer was notified and the problem quickly rectified in all instances.

e. AN Radio Teletype: Equipment failure was experienced by two battalions. Since the units were colocated, a set from Bq, Div Arty was sent to the area for their common usage. FSR and Div Arty were likewise colocated and these two elements used the RTT belonging to Div Arty. Motor courier service was utilized between Div Arty and FSR.

2/33 Arty and 8/6 Arty have only one teletypewriter AN/CAC-44 on hand. Equipment failure could seriously hamper operations. The additional set, authorized by TOSG, has been requisitioned by both units, but has not been received to date.

f. Wire-VHF Communications: Division signal battalion established and maintained XE-122, 4 channel VHF between Div Arty Bq and established artillery battalions. Continuous, reliable communications were maintained throughout this operation.

8. (U) MEDICAL: Outpatient: During the operation, the Div Arty medical section in the forward area treated a total of 14 patients as follows:

a. UMI	4
b. Gastro Intestinal	2
c. ENT	3
d. Injuries	2
e. Others	3

Of the injuries, one was the result of hostile action. One person required medical evacuation to the 93rd Evac Hospital for acute gouty arthritis.

9. (C) AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES:

105 mm	155 mm	175 mm	8 in	4.2 in mortar
51,915	30,043	1086	3940	1652

Units of Div Arty and GSR units to Div Arty fired a total of 88,636 rounds of artillery. Figures do not include howitzers batteries.

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of the 11th ACE or 173rd Abn Bde artillery, which were under OPCON, 1st Inf Div Arty.

10. (c) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Fire planning on a Div Arty wide scale was accomplished during CEDAR FALLS. Series of fires were planned throughout the area of operations to be executed on order. On the night of 8 January, over 1000 rounds were expended in 11 pre-planned Div Arty TOT's. Once the air landings had been made, and "clover-leafing" by maneuver elements had begun, however, Div Arty control of fires became too complicated by the problem of locating moving units and coordinating massive fires close to them. Control was best exercised in these instances by the DS battalions working closely with LNO's and FO's. Air observers controlled massed close in fires when this was required. Massed pre-planned fires were useful for on call missions when proximity of friendly elements did not over complicate the fire clearance problem.

b. Tables of Organization and Equipment did not provide for a sufficient number of FDC personnel. A battalion could adequately supply personnel to man all battery FDC's on a 24 hour basis; it could also supply personnel to man a battalion FDC on a 24 hour basis. However, they could not man both battery and battalion FDC's on a sustained, day in and day out, 24 hour basis and maintain high gunnery standards.

c. Serious artillery incidents must be completely eliminated. In addition to the tragic and needless loss of life, morale of maneuver units is seriously hampered when friendly artillery strikes them. A double system of checks must be in force at all times, without exception. To deviate from this, even the slightest bit, is to invite a serious incident which can negate much or all of the success of a particular operation.

d. Liaison must be established prior to the start of an operation between organic ordnance units and the ordnance units of attached artillery units, if the type weapon is different from those organic to the division. In particular, attached 155 mm howitzers (SP) of 2/55 Arty had difficulty during the operation and organic 1st Division ordnance units were unfamiliar with their equipment and did not have spare parts. It is imperative that an arrangement for spare parts and P/L be settled before the operation.

e. Ammunition Supply was enhanced by the use of stake platform trailers to bring ammunition directly to using units at a great savings in time and effort.

f. The M-1 collimator, when employed with the towed 155 mm howitzer, was best emplaced directly to the rear of the piece. This placement reduced to a minimum the displacement that needed to be taken up and eliminated frequent relay of the piece due to excessive collimator displacement. No loss of accuracy resulted from such emplacement.

g. During an airmobile operation, large quantities of 105 howitzer shell casings, empty 55 gallon drums, and metal waste accumulated in the battalion forward position. The battalion logistical base should have had on hand a minimum of 6 large cargo nets to forward to the artillery base for extraction of metal residue.

h. The nylon straps used by the CH-47 to lift the water trailer and AM/GRC-46 became bent and weakened when placed over the

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sharp corner of the item lifted. Removing the fender of the water trailer prior to airlift reduced the danger of strap overheating and eliminated the sharp bends in the strap. Using the longer 20 feet, 4-leg, 20,000 lb strap, sufficient strength was available to adequately lift the A/CES-46.

FOR THE COMMANDER

3 Incl

1. ANNEX A: Artillery missions
2. ANNEX B: Artillery moves
3. ANNEX C: Schematic diagram of area of operations.

David R. Gammell
DAVID R. GAMMELL
Captain, Artillery
Adjutant

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ANNEX A (Organization for Combat) to After Action Report (Operation CEDAR FALLS)

3 Jan 1/5 Arty (-) DS 1st Bde
 A/1/5
 B/1/5
 C/2/10 (atch)
 A/7/7 (atch)
 LHMAL (atch)

1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
 A/1/7
 C/1/7

2/33 Arty DS 3rd Bde
 D/1/5 (atch)
 B/1/7 (atch)

1/319 Arty DS 173rd Abn Bde
 How brics, 11th ACR, DS 11th ACR

C/6 Arty GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
 LHMAL (atch)

B/2/22 Arty Reinf C/6 Arty

2/35 Arty (-) GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
 B/2/35
 C/2/35

A/6/27 Arty GS Reinf 1st Inf Div Arty

9 Jan C/6 Arty (-) GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
 C/8/6
 D/8/6
 LHMAL (atch)

A/1/6 Arty DS 2/28 Inf

B/1/6 Arty DS 1/28 Inf

C/2/35 Arty GS Reinf 1/319 Arty

All others, no change.

10 Jan A/1/7 Arty DS 2/18 Inf

B/6 Arty GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
 LHMAL (atch)

All others, no change.

11 Jan C/2/40 Arty detached from 2/33 Arty released Div Arty 1115

C/8/6 Arty GS Reinf 1/319th Arty

2/35 Arty (-) GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
 B/2/35
 C/2/35

All others, no change

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APPENDIX A (Organization for Combat) to After Action Report (Operation CEDAR FALLS)
(continued)

- 12 Jan No changes
- 13 Jan B/6 Arty GS Reinf 2/33
LHAAL (atch)
2/35 Arty (-) GS Reinf 2/6 Arty
B/2/35
C/2/35 Arty GS Reinf 3/319th Arty
All others, no change.
- 14 Jan 1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
C/1/7
LHAAB (atch)
8/6 Arty GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
All others, no change.
- 15 Jan A/6/6 Arty GS Reinf 1/5 Arty
All others, no change.
- 16 Jan 1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
A/1/7
C/1/7
LHAAB (atch)
All others, no change.
- 17 Jan 1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
A/1/7
C/1/7
8/6 Arty (-) GS Reinf 2/11 Arty, base defense, Phu Loi
B/6/6
C/6/6
D/6/6
LHAAL (atch)
LHAAB (atch)
B/2/32 Arty GS Reinf 3/319 Arty
2/35 Arty (-) GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
B/2/35
A/6/27 Arty GS Reinf 2/33 Arty
All others, no change.
- 18 Jan 1/7 Arty DS 2nd Bde
2/33 Arty DS 3rd Bde
2/35 Arty (-) GS Reinf 3/319 Arty
B/2/35
C/2/35
All others, no change.

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ANNEX A (Organization for Combat) to After Action Report (Operation CEDAR FALLS)
(continued)

19 Jan 1/5 Arty DS 1st Bde
LHLC (atch) 1/7/7 released from Div Arty 0730

All others, no change.

20 Jan 3/6 Arty (-) GS Reinf 1/7 Arty
B/3/6
C/3/6
D/3/6
LHLC (atch)
LHLC (atch)

HQ & B/2/35 Arty released from Div Arty 1117

C/2/35 Arty GS Reinf 1/319 Arty

C/2/13 Arty Reinf 1/7 Arty

All others, no change.

21 Jan 1/5 Arty DS 1st Bde
LHLC (atch)
LHLC (atch)

2/33 Arty (-) DS 3rd Bde
1/2/33
B/2/33

C/2/33 Arty Reinf 1/5 Arty

8/6 Arty (-) GS Reinf 1/7 Arty
B/7/6
C/3/6
D/3/6
LHLC (atch)

All others, no change.

22 Jan 8/6 Arty (-) GS Reinf 1/7 Arty
C/3/6
D/3/6
LHLC (atch)

B/3/6 Arty DS RUTP

A/6/27 Arty GS Reinf 1st Inf Div Arty

All others, no change.

23 Jan 1/7 Arty (-) DS 2nd Bde
A/1/7
B/1/7

C/1/7 Arty Reinf 2/33 Arty (-)

8/6 Arty (-) GS
B/3/6
C/3/6

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ANNEX A (Organization for Combat) to After Action Report (Operation CORDAZ FALLS)

D/8/6
ISALL (atch)

All others, no change.

24 Jan No change

25 Jan 2/6 Arty (-) GS
C/R/6
D/8/6
HUAA (atch)

D/8/6 Arty Reinf 2/33 Arty

W/2/32 Arty GS Reinf 2/33 Arty

L/6/27 Arty GS Reinf L/5 Arty

C/2/35 Arty released from Div Arty 0924

All others, no change.

26 Jan No change

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ANNEX B - Artillery moves in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS to After Action Report to Operation CEDAR FALLS

8 Jan - Locations of organic, attached and supporting units as of 0800 hrs:

1st Inf Div Arty TAC CP	Lai Khe	XT 762372
1/5 Arty		
HQ	Phuoc Vinh	XT 967107
A	Quan Loi	XT 80983030 (3 tubes)
		XT 81359057 (3 tubes)
B	Phu Loi	XT 86852586
D	Lai Khe	XT 77093752
8/6 Arty		
HQ	Phu Loi	XT 85331731
A	Lai Khe	XT 75343648
B	Phu Loi	XT 8461149
C	Phu Loi	XT 866156
D	Phu Loi	XT 85331731
1/7 Arty		
HQ	Arty Base IV	XT 53182836
A	Arty Base IV	XT 53162813
B	Di An	XT 911069
C	Arty Base IV	XT 53192834
2/33 Arty		
HQ	Lai Khe	XT 762365
A	Lai Khe	XT 768378
B	Lai Khe	XT 75943701
C	Lai Khe	XT 75903650
IRLA		
A	Phu Loi	XT 85611699
B	Phu Loi	XT 85621699
C	Quan Loi	XT 81359056
1/7/9 Arty	Thu Duc	XS 96699864
C/2/10 Arty	Phuoc Vinh	XT 95674967
2/35 Arty		
HQ	Lai Khe	XT 774360
B	Lai Khe	XT 771377
C	Lai Khe	XT 771378
1/2/32	Cu Chi	XT 8431149
1/2/32	Lai Khe	XT 75733716
1/6/27	Lai Khe	XT 75863633

8 Jan - D/1/5 occupied new position in Lai Khe, closing at XT 75953701.
 8/6 Arty moved by road to Artillery Base I, via XT 725352. HQ, A and C/1/7 moved by CH 47 to Arty Base II, via 580331. B/1/7 moved by road to Lai Khe.
 B/2/32, 2/33 Arty and 2/35 Arty (-4) all moved by road to Arty Base I, via XT 726350.

9 Jan - No moves

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ANNEX 3 - Artillery moves in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS to After
Action Report to Operation CEDAR FALLS (continued)

10 Jan - 2/33 Arty and 2/35 Arty (-) moved by road to Arty Base III, via
XT 659326.

11 Jan - D/1/5 moved by C-130 to Phuoc Vinh, XT 95854925.

12 Jan - 8/6 Arty, B/2/32 moved by road to Arty Base V, via XT 659310.

13 Jan - 1/7/9 moved by road to Phu Loi, via XT 852175. A/1/5 moved by road
to XT 867874 and then to Quan Loi via XT 812903.

14 Jan - D/1/5 moved by road to Lai Khe, via XT 757370.

15 Jan - B/1/5 moved by CH-47 to Blast II, XT 849336. D/1/5 moved by road
through Phuoc Hoa, XT 916430 to Phuoc Vinh, XT 95034939. A/1/6 moved by road
to Lai Khe, XT 75723690.

16 Jan - D/8/6 moved by road to Phu Loi, XT 85331731. C/1/7 moved by C 47
and road to Di An, XT 90640732.

17 Jan - HQ/1/5 moved by CH-47 and UH-1B to Blast II, XT 849335. HQ, B, and
C/1/6 moved by road to Phu Loi, via XT 950150. HQ and A/1/7 moved by CH-47
and road to Di An, via XT 90630702. B/2/32 moved by road to Lai Khe, XT 75733716.

18 Jan - B/1/7 moved by road to Di An, XT 91140693. 2/33 Arty moved by road
to Lai Khe. HQ, B and C/2/35 moved by road to Base White, XT 78972400.

19 Jan - HCB, 1st Inf Div Arty (- IAC GP) moved by road to Phu Loi.

20 Jan - HQ/1/5 moved by CH-47 to Phuoc Vinh, XT 956493. 1/7 Arty moved by
road to Phu Loi.

21 Jan - HQ/1/5 by road and B/1/5 (-) by CH-47 to Blast I, XT 915429. Three
battalions of B/1/5 moved to Phuoc Vinh by road. D/1/5 moved to Blast I, via
XT 916430 by road.

22 Jan - No moves

23 Jan - 1/7 Arty (-C) moved by road to Di An, XT 906070.

24 Jan - No moves

25 Jan - B/6/6 moved by road via Ben Cat, XT 725318. A and B/2/33 moved
by road via Ben Cat, XT 727319.

26 Jan - No moves


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ANNEX C

AREA OF OPERATIONS
(NOT TO SCALE)

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to
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HEADQUARTERS
121ST SIGNAL BATTALION
APO 96345

26 February 1967

AVDB-SI-3

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO 96345

1. (U) Name and Type Operation:
NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS, a search and destroy operation.
2. (U) Dates of Operation:
2 January 1967 - 26 January 1967
3. (C) Location:
IRON TRIANGLE, vicinity of XEN SUC.
4. (U) Command Headquarters:
121st Signal Battalion, 1st Infantry Division
5. (C) Unit Commanders:

LTC James M. Rockwell	Battalion Commander
CPT Pierce A. Rushton	CO, Company A
CPT Gary Hawley	CO, Company B
CPT Allen R. Wild	CO, Company C
1LT Arpad De Kovacs	Plt Ldr, 1st Fwd Sig Plt
1LT Dale M. Carlsen	Plt Ldr, 2d Fwd Sig Plt
1LT Richard D. Mohlere	Plt Ldr, 3d Fwd Sig Plt

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26 February 1967

AVDB-SI-3

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

6. (U) Intelligence:

No enemy electronic warfare was noted during operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS.

7. (C) Mission:

To provide VHF, AM and FM radio, and secure on line teletype to all advanced elements of Division Forward. Provide all three Infantry Brigades with a VHF link into the Division Communications System.

8. (C) Concept of Operation:

Extensive planning preceded the start of operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS, allowing all elements of the Battalion to be prepositioned and become operational before the Division actually moved. The Division Fwd TOC was established in the same location as during the previous operation, allowing the CP and communication equipment to be set up with very little difficulty.

a. Company "A" was given the mission to support Division Main and all supporting elements at Di An Base Camp.

b. Company "B" was tasked to support Division Artillery at Phu Loi and provide a VHF link into the Division Communication System for each of the Division Brigades.

c. Company "C" was tasked to provide VHF, AM, and FM radio communication for Division Forward.

9. (C) Execution:

a. Company "A" was given the mission of providing communications support for Division Main at Di An Base Camp. Additionally, Company "A" provided a supervisor for the single sideband radio nets at Division Forward, and a PA set and team for the Lam Son Refugee Camp. Major items of equipment utilized were:

<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>
AN/GRC-69	6	Provide 144 VHF channels for elements of Division base camp.
AN/GRC-46	2	Provide AM RTT communication for Division net #1.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

AN/VRC-46	4	Provide FV Radio in support of Division R&I and Division Command Net.
AN/MTC-1	2	Provide local and trunk switching for all elements at Di An.
SB-675	1	Provide patching and test position for all VHF circuits.

b. Company "B" was given the mission of providing communication support for Division Artillery, 1st, 2d and 3d Brigades. The company displaced the following personnel and equipment:

(1) 1st Platoon: Received warning order on 1 Jan 67. All communication equipment required was checked along with personnel equipment. On 3 Jan 67, personnel and equipment conveyed from Phouc Vinh to Brigade Forward location and established necessary communications. Major items of equipment utilized were:

<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>
AN/VRC-34 1/2	1	Provide VHF radio link into Division Communication System from Brigade Forward location.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide secure radio, teletype communication and back up for com center teletype.

(2) 2d Platoon: Received warning order on 5 Jan 67 and began to prepare personnel and equipment for deployment. On 8 Jan 67 airlifted one 34 1/2 and one AN/GRC-46 into BEN SUC to support forward elements of 2d Brigade. Additional communications equipment and personnel were conveyed to 2d Brigade trains location to be pre-positioned for deployment. Major items of equipment utilized were:

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation HILMARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>
AN/VRC-34 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	Provide VHF radio for 2d Brigade forward location.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide HF communications in Division Net #1 and back up for teletype.
AN/VRC-69	1	Held at Brigade trains as reserve.
AN/VRC-17	1	Held at Brigade trains as reserve.
SB-611	1	Held at Brigade trains as reserve.
AN/VRC-46	1	Held at Brigade trains as reserve.

(3) 3d Platoon: Platoon received warning order on 10 Jan 67 and conveyed to field location on 11 Jan 67 to support forward elements of 3d Brigade. Major items of equipment utilized were:

<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>
AN/VRC-34 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	Provide VHF radio link between Brigade Forward and Ranger Forward.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide HF radio in Division Net #1.

(4) Company Headquarters: Received warning order 3 Jan 67. Mission was to support Division Artillery at Phu Loi and establish VHF radio system 5455 and relay for 5573B. Major items of equipment utilized were:

<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>
AN/VRC-69	1	Provide VHF radio link between Division Forward and Phu Loi.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

AN/ARC-112	2	Provide 4 channel VHF radio link between Parachute Forward and Blackhorse.
AN/ARC-69	1	Provide VHF radio link between Phu Loi and Lai Khe.

c. Company "C" was given the mission of providing personnel and equipment to support the Division Forward CP. Adequate time was afforded to prepare personnel and equipment. All of the communications equipment was conveyed to Forward CP two days prior to the start of operation and pre-positioned. As a result of adequate prior planning and pre-positioning of communication equipment and personnel, the change over of the command elements from Division Rear to Division Forward was accomplished very efficiently. Major items of equipment utilized were:

<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>
AN/ARC-69	5	Provide VHF radio links from Division Forward to the following: Division Main, Division Artillery, Brigades Forward.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide secure teletype and back-up for communications center teletype.
AN/GRC-26	1	Provide secure teletype for III Corp Net.
SB-611	1	Providing patching and test facilities for all VHF circuits.
AN/ARC-128	2	Provide FM communication for Divisional and Brigade Nets.
AN/ARC-112	2	Provide 4-Ch VHF radio link between Drumfire FWD and FWD Artillery Base.

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AVF-SI-3

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation HIGHER FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

10. (C) Results:

a. The Battalion provided simultaneous communication for 10 different elements of the division plus one non divisional unit.

- (1) Division Main
- (2) Division Forward
- (3) Division Artillery
- (4) Devil
- (5) Devil Forward
- (6) Dagger
- (7) Dagger Forward
- (8) Duty
- (9) Duty Forward
- (10) Quan Loi
- (11) Parachute Forward

b. Telephone Circuits Provided:

(1) Sole User Circuits are:

(a) Danger Forward	15
(b) Danger Main	12
(c) Phu Loi	11
(d) Devil (Phone Vinh)	4
(e) Devil Forward	5
(f) Dagger (Di An)	2
(g) Dagger Forward	2
(h) Duty (Lai Khe)	9

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AVIB-SI-3

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

- (i) Duty Forward 6
- (j) Quan Loi 1
- (k) Parachute Forward 4
- (2) Common User Telephone Service:
 - (a) Danger Main - Danger Fwd 10
 - (b) Danger Main - Danger North 6
 - (c) Danger Main - Devil 4
 - (d) Danger Main - Danger 4
 - (e) Danger Main - Duty 4
 - (f) Danger Main - Quan Loi 1
 - (g) Danger Forward - Danger North 2
 - (h) Danger Forward - Devil 2
 - (i) Danger Forward - Danger 1
 - (j) Danger Forward - Duty 3
 - (k) Danger Forward - Quan Loi 1
 - (l) Danger Forward - Devil Fwd 2
 - (m) Danger Forward - Danger Fwd 2
 - (n) Danger Forward - Duty 2
 - (o) Danger Forward - Parachute Fwd 2
 - (p) Danger Forward - Lightning 1
 - (q) Danger Forward - Hurricane 4
 - (r) Danger Forward - Saigon LD 2

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AVDR-SI-3

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation HTAO'RA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

11. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Forward elements received Administrative Support from the headquarters with which they were deployed.

b. The Battalion continues to receive poor maintenance support on deadlined signal items at Forward Platoon Locations. A new program was initiated by the Forward Platoons in order to correct this problem. Where possible, defective signal items are evacuated to "B" Company Maintenance at Phu Loi where they are repaired and returned to the platoons. Defective items beyond the capability of "B" Company are evacuated to Battalion Maintenance at Di An. The length of time that equipment is deadlined has been reduced considerably. In addition, greater sense of urgency exists when the defective item remains within company maintenance channels.

12. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Operations:

A definite improvement in the operation of the communication equipment plus an increase in the quality of VHF System was evident during this operation. This can be attributed to the training classes the Battalion conducted prior to the operation and the reorganizing of Battalion Systems Control.

b. FM Radio:

(1) Greater range was realized by the Infantry Battalions by having them erect 60 foot mast with multiple heads where feasible.

(2) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, the Division realized the need to give the Infantry Battalion Commanders more communications between the ground forces and the UH-1D Helicopter. The task of improving the communication capability of the UH-1D was given to the Signal Battalion. The Battalion R&D team planned, designed and built a console that could be mounted on the ceiling of the UH-1D. The console consisted of three AN/PRC-25's plus two control heads and four headsets. This gave the Commander the capability of four monitoring positions, two transmitting, plus intercom between all personnel utilizing the console and the pilots. One major advantage of this console is that it can be installed and removed in less than three minutes. Also, the console is out of the way and allows the helicopter to be utilized in air lifts without the necessity of removing the console. Further no additional radios are required other than what the Commander has in his possession. In other words, the Commander brings his own organic radios (AN/PRC-25) with him and inserts them into the console for airborne operation. Once he lands, he can

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation NIAGARA FALLS/CEDAR FALLS (U)

use the same radios for portable operation. The radio's power in or out of the console comes from the authorized dry cell battery.

c. VHF: The MRC-112 proved to be advantageous in establishing a rapid 4 channel system. Being light and easily air lifted it can be deployed rapidly and put on the air in a relatively short period of time. One major disadvantage is that the radio utilizes the same frequency as the tactical FM set and frequencies must be carefully selected.

d. TTY: The handling time for teletype traffic was reduced significantly during the period of the operation. This handling time reduction is attributed to new procedures whereby tactical traffic was expedited by typing the format line only and processing the tape immediately and to concerted effort on the part of the OIC and NCO supervisors.

e. The operation must be considered, as far as operating here in Vietnam is concerned, routine. The Battalion was very extensively committed, more than ever before, therefore leaving less equipment for back up. The construction of a 120 foot AB216 Tower near the Division Forward location allowed greater distances to be obtained from VHF system along with retaining high quality voice circuits.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incls


1. VHF System Diagram
2. Telephone Traffic Diagram
3. VHF Radio Diagram

Steven P. Stahl
STEVEN P. STAHL
CPT, SigC
Adjutant

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TACTICAL VHF DIAGRAM

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
Enclosure 71 to
ANNEX G

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INTERNAL TELEPHONE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM




Enclosure # 70
ANNEX 6

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HF RADIO DIAGRAM



Enclosure 7 to Annex 5

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2. (U) Name or Identity of Operations:

2. (3) Area of Operations

3. (c) Location:

4. (C) Command or Control Headquarters:

5. (C) Reporting Officers:

Subordinate centers during the operation were as follows:

3. (C) Task Organization:

Regimental Controls:

7 2-11;

7 221

0300P b
DOWNGRADED AT 2 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
NND 88-570618

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7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. ~~Amphibious~~ All amphibious forces were controlled by the 173rd Airborne Brigade and will not be covered in this report.

b. USAF Support: The fact that the Regiment was OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade for the operation required close coordination between the Air Liaison Officers of the two units. During planning sessions between the ALO's from the two units the relatively small size of the areas of operation of subordinate units together with the close proximity of the ground troops was taken into consideration. It was decided by the two ALO's that due to these factors a Joint Forward Air Controller schedule, coordinated by the Tactical Air Control Party attached to the 173rd Airborne Brigade would be the responsive system in filling the FAC requirements of both units. The soundness of this plan was demonstrated as the operation progressed.

The FAC's were airborne over the AO's during all daylight hours of the operation and were standing by on ground alert status during all night hours. Had either unit TACP attempted individually to cover only their individual units, this constant coverage would not have been possible, because of the limited amount of aircraft and pilots available to each TACP.

Both the FAC and Tactical Air coverage provided during the operation were of the highest quality and contributed to the overall success of the mission.

FAC and fighter/bomber sorties flown and/or directed by the 11th Armored Cavalry Forward Air Controller.

(1) Total O-1 Sorties - 63

- (a) Forward Air Control - 18
- (b) Visual Reconnaissance - 36
- (c) Escort (Convoy) - 9

(2) Fighter Support:

- (a) Total strike aircraft missions - 22
- (c) Immediate Missions - 7 (16 sorties)
- (d) Preplanned missions - 15 (41 sorties)

(3) Size and Composition of forces:

(a) Immediate missions - by flight

- 1 2 F-5 (CBU, napalm, bombs, 20mm)
- 3 F-5 (20mm)
- 2 357 (napalm, bombs)
- 3 F-100 (napalm, bombs)
- 3 F-5 (Napalm, bombs, 20mm)
- 2 F-100 (Rockets, bombs)
- 1 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs, 20mm)

(b) Preplanned Missions:

- 3 F-5 (bombs)
- 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 3 F-4C (Napalm, bombs)
- 3 F-100 (Napalm)
- 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 2 F-100 (bombs)
- 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 3 F-5 (Napalm, bombs)
- 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs, 20mm)
- 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)
- 3 F-100 (Napalm, bombs)

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(b) Deployment and Results: Of the total of twenty-two tactical Air Support missions listed above, four were employed in a close support role against enemy troops and the remaining against ground targets such as fortifications and tunnels, or at positions where hard targets were suspected.

One close air support mission controlled by a F.O. from the 11th Armored Cavalry Tactical Air Control Party and flown for elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade resulted in four VC KIA (3C). Additional results were thirteen bunkers uncovered or destroyed, 239 meters of trench uncovered or destroyed, forty-two fan holes uncovered or destroyed, and three small structures destroyed.

c. Engineer Support: The 919th Engineer Company (Armored) provided direct engineer support to the Regiment as follows:

(1) Bridging: After the failure of a Class 60 Bailey Bridge in the area of operations elements of the company cleared the rubble of the old span and prepared the site to enable the 1st Engineer Battalion to employ a temporary AV18 span.

(2) Red Clearing: Extensive mine clearing operations were conducted by utilizing mine detecting equipment in suspected mine locations in the Regimental AO.

(3) Demolitions: Extensive demolition operations were required to neutralize enemy bunkers, tunnels, booby traps and mines. Over four kilometers of enemy tunnel complexes were reconnoitered and/or destroyed.

d. Army Aviation Support.

(1) Armed Helicopter Support: Preplanned and Immediate missions were run on a daily basis. Preplanned missions included convey escort and reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations. Immediate missions included escort of UH-1D DUST-OFF aircraft and on-call supporting fires provided to units in contact. The basic fighting and maneuvering element was the Light Fire Team consisting of (2) two UH-1C armed helicopters. Other missions flown in support of the operation included ambush reaction force, convey escort, reconnaissance by fire, and river patrol flights. Timely support was achieved by stationing the armed helicopters at the Regimental Forward and/or Squadron Command Posts as appropriate.

(2) Administrative Helicopter Support: Combat and road reconnaissance, logistic troop and cargo lift, command and control, and PSYOP missions were flown during the operation. A total of 700 missions entailing 513 flying hours were flown. Fifty-one tons of cargo and 1,320 passengers were carried.

(3) DUST-OFF Helicopter Support: DUST-OFF's were flown on an "on-call" basis and the reaction time was good. In many cases inflight aircraft were called to perform the evacuation, thus cutting reaction time to a minimum. Twelve individuals were evacuated by the 11th Armored Cavalry elements, fifteen by other DUST-OFF aircraft. Evacuation was to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital, and the 12th Evacuation Hospital. All wounded or injured personnel evacuated from the field were taken by DUST-OFF.

(4) Special Techniques: The "Fire-Fly" or "Lighting Bug" missions proved to be unsuccessful. The KIMU searchlight mounted on the helicopter proved to be ineffective when the aircraft was at 1,000 feet or higher. Accordingly, the attempt to conduct night surveillance of river banks and rivers was not considered successful.

8. (c) Intelligence:

a. Anticipated enemy situation:

No VC Main Force units were known to be located in the INCH TRI-MOUNT. However, Main Force units had previously been located in and had operated throughout the area, and it was considered possible that contact with VC Main Force units would be made.

The INCH TRI-MOUNT area had long been under VC domination and had the local population under firm control. It was expected, therefore, that contact with local

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force units from squad to company size could be made. Enemy emplacement of mines and booby traps was expected throughout the area, and enemy sniper, harassing, and mortar attacks were anticipated. It was believed that the VC would defend valuable stores cached throughout the HUEI THIEU until the material could be evacuated or concealed. It was anticipated that the VC would then withdraw to prevent destruction of their units by US forces.

b. Actual Enemy Situation.

The intelligence estimate proved to be quite accurate. No Main Force VC units were contacted during the operation. Small unit actions predominated during the operation. In only one instance was even a platoon engaged. The expected mines, booby traps, snipers, and harassing mortar attacks materialized as anticipated.

"A total of 177 separate facilities were found which ranged from foxholes and trenches to bunkers and tunnel complexes, and to rice caches of all sizes. A comparison of each of these locations with all previously available intelligence information, principally the VC installations list, shows that 156 or 88.1% fell within 500 meters of a reported installation. The average error for these 156 installations was 1.5% (247) by 147 (M-S) or an average radial error of slightly over 200 meters. Thus the value of utilizing the VC Installation list, normally published as a P-3 to the Intelligence Annex, (of an OPGUD) is readily apparent. Such lists should be considered as a starting point for a search of any area." (11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Intelligence Bulletin 78, dated 29 January 1967) The list of enemy installations is included as T-3 A.

c. Sources of Information:

The VC installation list in the Operation CUBER P-3 M-S OPGUD reflected such diverse intelligence sources as ARVN and US divisions, III Corps, B-3 III Corps, LRP's, PC's, and PAC's.

d. Terrain Analysis:

(1) General: The area of interest for Operation CUBER P-3 M-S, known as the HUEI THIEU, lies east of the S-3 IGON river, south of east-west gridline II 37, west of National Highway 13, and north of east-west gridline II 20.

(2) Observation in the HUEI THIEU is dependent on the type of vegetation in the immediate area. Wetlands and rice areas offer good observation both on the ground and in the air. Observation in rubber plantation areas is fair, though dependent on the thickness of the undergrowth in the immediate area. All streams and rivers are lined with trees which limit ground observation. The jungle area in the central portion of the HUEI THIEU severely limited observation.

(3) Fields of Fire:

Fields of fire are good in rubber tree areas, wetlands, and rice paddies. Fields of fire are limited in the dense jungle areas.

(4) Cover:

The major cover available to the enemy is in the form of bunkers and tunnels.

(5) Concealment:

All forested areas offer good concealment. Small, dismounted elements receive excellent concealment in villages and hamlets in the area. The rice paddies offer no concealment.

(6) Obstacles:

The S-3 IGON River flows from northwest to southeast on the western boundary of the area and varies in width from 100 to 150 meters. The HUEI THIEU River flows generally from the north to the south through the area varying in width from twenty to fifty meters. Both rivers have low and gently sloping banks.

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The dense forest which dominates the center of the FIM FIM FIM constitutes a major obstacle to cross country movement. The marsh area adjacent to the GLO LI Stream (IX 72225-XT 712286-XT 712273) also severely restricts vehicular movement in the area.

(7) Movement and Avenues of Approach:

Movement is generally channelized to roads and trails in areas of dense growth. Cross country mobility is limited in rice paddies and marshlands. Existing trails and roads offer the best avenues of approach.

(8) Key Terrain Features:

The area is generally a level plain with no prominent or commanding terrain features.

9. (C) Operations: The mission of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was to attack west from BEN CMT to cut the ENH FIM FIM destroying a VC Base Camp (Objective 1), seizing and securing an artillery base (Objective 1A) and to destroy a VC HQ (Objective 2). The Regiment then was to link-up with helicopter forces and to screen along the eastern edge of the Area of Operations to prevent enemy withdrawal to the east. The Regiment was under the operational control (OPCON) of the 1st Infantry Division who in turn passed OPCON to the 17th Airborne Brigade for the operation.

10. (C) Concept of Operations:

The concept of the operation was to break the operation into two Phases. Phase I was initiated and completed on 8 January. During this phase the Regiment (-1st Sqdn) conducted a night road march from the Regimental Base Camp (Regimental Headquarters, 3rd and Provisional Squadrons) and from 31st CMT Base Camp (2nd Squadron) to forward assembly areas, IX 8515. Phase II began on 9 January. The Regiment attacked west from BEN CMT and seized Objective 1 and Objective 1A. From Objective 1, elements of the Regiment attacked northeast to establish a link-up of helicopter forces in KIMHO ZONE 5. Other Regimental elements attacked west from Objective 1 to destroy a VC HQ (Objective 2). The Regiment then established a screen along KIMHO RD and secured engineer bases and work parties. The Regimental maneuver elements then prepared to conduct search and destroy operations in their assigned sectors.

11. (C) Execution:

8 January:

At 1200H the Regiment came under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division who in turn placed the Blackhorse under the 17th Airborne Brigade. The Regimental Command Post, escorted by ACH's and the 3rd Squadron Scouter Battery, initiated (1200H) a road march from the base camp to forward assembly areas north of FIM LOI (IX 857162) arriving at 1617H. The Regimental Troops (Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 919th Engineer Company (-) and field trains) with escorts provided by Troop E departed the base camp at 1950H closing at FIM LOI (IX 7921) at 2322H.

2nd Squadron:

The 2nd Squadron was located at FIM CAT, the location of a recently completed operation (Operation GIMATI/DOCK). The first element to move was its Scouter Battery escorted by an armored cavalry platoon. Crossing the starting point (SP) at 1330H it cleared its release point (RP) at 1627H. The remainder of the squadron departed at 1900H closing in a forward assembly area at 2222H.

3rd Squadron:

The 3rd Squadron (-) made a night move from the Regimental Base Camp at LOI 8740 to a forward assembly area vicinity IX 7820 closing at 2315H. During the move a 4-ton truck from Company H was hit by a claymore mine resulting in one US KIA and one US MIA. Shortly after the mining incident traffic control elements from the 720th Military Police Battalion received small arms fire and grenades vicinity IX 937069 with negative results. At 2159H, Company N also received one recoilless rifle round (IX 937069) with negative results.

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9 January:

The Regiment remained (GOC) to the 17th Airborne Brigade. (See Annex 1 - OVERVIEW SUMMARY)

2nd Squadron: At 0815H Troop F, secured Position GRIZ (X 7232), Troop F moved through Position GRIZ to seize Objective 1, at 0900H, and Troop F then established a screen from XT 652117 to XT 653130. Company H relieved Troop F of the security of Position GRIZ at 1100H. Troop G secured a company from the 1st Engineer Battalion, located at XT 7031, at 1537H. An I.C.V. from Troop G hit a small mine at XT 695315 resulting in a broken track and damaged road wheel. Troop F received an unknown number of small arms rounds at XT 723318 with negative casualties resulting. Company H discovered and evacuated 2200 pounds of rice from XT 703140, and Troop F found 1500 pounds of rice at XT 662307, which later was turned over to the National Police.

3rd Squadron:

At 0912H, Troop I seized Objective 1 at XT 5730. At 1000H, Troop I seized Objective 2 at XT 6630. Troop L initiated search and destroy operations at XT 6828. Beginning at 1300H, Troop L and Company H screened Engineer Base 2 at XT 7031, while Troops I and J moved to secure Engineer Base 3 at XT 6630 and were in position at 1715. During operations on 9 January, Troop I detonated a booby trap with an I.C.V. at XT 721317, and located twenty foxholes 3 to 5 feet deep and five feet wide at XT 635208. Troop L received ten rounds of sniper fire at XT 650304, and captured 2.2 tons of rice at XT 663302. Troop L observed and fired on two armed VC at XT 684272 with negative results. At 1510H, one trooper from Troop I was wounded by sniper fire, at XT 662306.

10 January: The Regiment remained (GOC) to the 17th Airborne Brigade. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was placed (GOC) to the Regiment. At 2000H, a truck from the Regimental Scout Platoon was hit by a claymore mine resulting in extensive vehicle damage and one US KIA.

2nd Squadron: On 10 January, Troop J secured Engineer TF 11.VO operating along Highway 11. Troop F screened from XT 634221 to XT 733324. Company H secured an Engineer Base at XT 725318. Troop G escorted Engineer TF 11.VO to 17th Airborne Brigade boundary at XT 662375. At 1115H Troop G found a hut containing ten tons of rice and three grenades, both of which were booby trapped. The hut and grenades were destroyed, the rice was secured for evacuation.

3rd Squadron: Engineer Bases at XT 671302 and XT 701310 were secured by squadron elements, as was Engineer TF 12.VI operating between XT 677306, and XT 671325. Troops I, J, and L conducted search and destroy operations in the assigned AO. During these operations Troop I found a squad sized base camp at XT 660310, in which was found one 125 US grenade, 12.15 ammunition, and an unidentified part of a large caliber weapon. Troop I captured one VC the camp out of a tunnel and surrendered at XT 662305. Troop I received four rounds of small arms fire at XT 675305, with negative casualties resulting. Troop L found and destroyed numerous punji stakes in the vicinity of XT 707315, and a Company H dozer tank hit an AT mine with negative casualties. A wheeled vehicle from Troop L was hit by a claymore mine at 2007H in the vicinity of XT 762236 resulting in one US KIA and light vehicle damage. At 1015H Company H discovered and destroyed an extensive tunnel system under buildings at XT 700313, and at 1151H uncovered a base camp. The camp, located at XT 699314, had an extensive tunnel and bunker system which was reinforced by logs. 1 VC was captured during a search of the camp, several radio equipment, documents, rice, C rations and medical supplies. Some of the tunnels were booby trapped.

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry: Squadron elements established a screen from XT 662313 to XT 662373. At 1900H, a tank from Troop B hit a mine in the vicinity of XT 659359 blowing off a track and four road wheels and wounding one individual. At 2215H Troop F received ten rounds of small arms fire with negative casualties.

11 January:

The Regiment remained under the operational control of the 17th Airborne Brigade. A and C Batteries, 5th Battalion, 2nd Artillery were (GOC) to the Regiment at 0700H. (See Annex 3 - FAS OVER 2 OVERVIEW OVERLAY)

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2nd Squadron:

Troop B secured Engineer and Artillery Base 3 at XT 725118 while Troop C secured an Engineer Base at XT 701111. Company E secured the bridgehead at Position G1321. Troop F continued its searching mission from XT 634321 to XT 682113. Troop G found a platoon sitedbase camp at XT 654325. Troop E received two G1321 EMI at XT 671302. An M1V from Troop F ran over a 105mm shell rigged as a mine, but detonated only the fuse.

3rd Squadron:

Company C, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, was attached effective 0700L. The squadron attacked south along Axis CAT at 0900L, from XT 6730 along Route 14 to seize objectives at XT 715238, XT 725243, XT 744238, and XT 744237, and to clear Area L-111 (XT 6925) while enroute. Troop I conducted search and destroy operations in Area L-111. Troop I secured Objective 1 at 1055H. Company M secured Objective 2 at 1306H, and Objective 3 at 1545H. Troop L secured Objective 4 at 1640H. Troop I found 2 VC KIA (BC) at XT 708244 and detained nineteen persons at XT 671302. Interrogation revealed that they had been hiding for two days; two individuals also had large sums of money on them. Troop K discovered an undetermined amount of rice in a village at XT 648300 which was evacuated by the 1st Infantry Division. The Troop engaged 1 VC at XT 704242 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). At 1132H, the troop received small arms fire in the vicinity of XT 725324, and at 1251H, an M1V hit a mine at XT 708254. Neither incident resulted in casualties or vehicular damage. At 1500H, the troop evacuated 700 pounds of rice from XT 744238. Troop L detained one person at XT 695302 at 0430H. At 1430H, thirty to fifty small arms rounds were fired at the troop. A search of the area (XT 699260) from which the fire came disclosed 2 C1000 AT mines, 5 C1000 grenades, 2 rounds RPO-2 ammunition, a siren, 150 rounds of Caliber .30 ammunition and 1 1/2 tons of rice, all of which were evacuated. At 1545H, the troop uncovered another twenty-five tons of rice, twenty rolls of corrugated roofing, and ten bicycles in the vicinity of XT 695247. All material and foodstuffs were evacuated. Company I received light small arms fire twice during the day without casualties. At 1030H the company found and destroyed one mine in the road at XT 695257. At 1145H, one of its tanks hit a mine at XT 698250 with negative casualties or damage. At 1147H, the company received three mortar rounds which fell short at XT 697256. Another tank hit an AT mine at XT 693257, disabling the tank without causing any casualties. A 105mm artillery shell rigged as a command detonated mine was discovered and located at XT 747226. Five minutes later a 105mm shell also rigged as a mine was found at XT 740227. Both rounds were blown in place. As the mines were being blown, elements of the company observed men dressed in black pajamas who appeared to be mining the road at XT 767213. The men scattered as a tank went to investigate. At 1930H, seven VC were spotted and taken under fire resulting in one VC KIA (BC) and one US M1 sartime captured.

1st Squadron 4th Cavalry:

Elements of the squadron blocked from XT 663373 to XT 682113. At 1308H, an M113 from Troop I hit a pressure mine at XT 685344 with no casualties or damage resulting from the incident. The Troop located and burned 5000 pounds of rice at XT 662370.

12 January:

The Regiment continued to remain OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. 2nd Squadron became OPCON to 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at 0700H, as did the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and A and C Batteries, 5th Battalion, 2nd Artillery (AV). At 1720H, two Regimental Light Fire Teams located one VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

3rd Squadron:

Conducted search and destroy operations in areas O, P, and Q. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained attached. At 0620H, Troop I spotted movement in front of their perimeter, and fired into the area resulting in the capture of one wounded VC at XT 722236. Troop I discovered and destroyed two 100 pound RP bombs at XT 722236. Forty-five minutes later, at 1000H, the troop found a bunker and tunnel (XT 720228) with a booby-trapped grenade and parts of an unknown type of fixed wing aircraft. The troop also uncovered and evacuated a cache of 5.5 tons of rice in the vicinity of XT 722222. An hour earlier, at 1100H, six tons of

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rice and a sampan was found at XT 724270. The sampan was destroyed and the rice evacuated. The troop discovered 1200 pounds of rice at XT 733277. The rice, found at 1535H, was evacuated. At 1535H, the troop found an abandoned hut with four booby-trapped grenades and a dugout with a tunnel that appeared to be a small workshop for making items, as tools were found in the tunnel. The complex and material were destroyed at XT 733277. Troop E found three tons of rice at XT 735219 which was evacuated. At 1010H, the troop located a five by six foot crevice at XT 722233, containing ten pounds of clothing. Ten minutes later a large tunnel was found at XT 734223. The tunnel was searched with negative results. At 1039H, a hut containing 300 pounds of rice was discovered and destroyed. Just nine minutes later two huts were found at XT 748214 which contained twenty tons of rice, all of which was evacuated. At noon the troop had two VC's hit by command detonated mines in the vicinity of XT 736218 damaging road wheels on both vehicles, resulting in negative casualties. Two hours later the troop received fire from a car and detonated mine which resulted in one individual KIA, and slight damage to the M16. At 1535H, the troop engaged in a fire fight with a VC unit of unknown size. A heavy volume of automatic and small arms fire was received as well as three rounds of recoilless rifle fire. One VC was damaged in the fight, but there were no friendly casualties. Troop L spotted five VC in the vicinity of XT 740274 at 1120H. A patrol chasing the VC was hit by two claymore mines resulting in four US KIA and three US MIA. Company H found a 105mm round fired for command detonation at XT 748224 and destroyed it in place. At 1130H, the company found a bunker at XT 745230 containing one 155mm round rigged as a command detonated mine. The bunker and mine were blown in place. Five minutes later an AT mine surrounded by five 120mm mines was found and destroyed at XT 748233. At 1130H, the company had received four rounds of 82mm mortar fire at XT 747232, resulting in one US KIA. Fifteen minutes later the company found an AT mine at XT 747232 and blew it in place. At 1140H, the company found three CHICOM grenades at XT 745233 and destroyed them in place. A well constructed tunnel in the vicinity of XT 747232 was found at 1430H, and was penetrated to a depth of 250 meters. Documents and a diagram were found in the tunnel. The underground complex was marked for future operations. At 1525H, the company found a tunnel, freshly occupied, containing five pounds of documents, overalls, technical manuals, 2 CHICOM grenades and 120 rounds of 7.62mm rounds. The tunnel (at XT 744244) was destroyed. At 2040H, the company observed 2 VC attempting to turn a claymore mine toward friendly positions. The claymore was detonated, resulting in one VC KIA (DC).

11 January:

2nd Squadron reverted to Regimental control at 1657H. The Regiment remained OCCC to the 17th Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Troop G discovered and exploded in place a 155mm round equipped for command detonation at XT 633335. At 1405H, a small base camp with two huts was found in the vicinity of XT 691311. A 60mm mortar round found in the camp was blown in place. A second base camp was discovered at XT 69333.

3rd Squadron:

Conducted search and destroy operations. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, remained attached. Troop I found fifteen 100 pound bags of rice in the vicinity of XT 732227. At 1230H, a tunnel containing two booby-trapped grenades which were destroyed, was located at XT 717243. A hidden complex of huts was located at 1247H, at XT 718242, which contained one pound of documents. The huts were destroyed and the documents evacuated. At 1400H, fifteen CBU bomblets rigged as booby traps were found in and around trails at XT 733225. One US was KIA, and the booby traps were destroyed. At 1350H, thirty to forty rounds of small arms fire was received by the troop with no casualties resulting. The fire was returned at XT 733224, with unknown results. At 1430H, a 100 pound bomb rigged as a pressure mine was found surrounded by punji stakes at XT 717245. The bomb was destroyed and the punji stakes were buried. A trench three to four feet deep was found running northeast for an undetermined distance beginning at XT 713247. Troop E found a tunnel complex at XT 743219 at 1030H. The tunnel had three branches and was destroyed. More tunnels were found in the vicinity of XT 746224 containing documents and clothing. The tunnels, discovered at 1140H, were destroyed, and the documents evacuated. A tunnel and cave complex with compartments was discovered at XT 744232, and destroyed at 1215H. Forty booby-trapped grenades were found at

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AT 720240, and destroyed at 1211Z. A small base camp at XT 742226, was found containing three small tunnels and one mine. The camp was destroyed at 1500Z. Twenty minutes later a search was conducted and destroyed at XT 745223. Five pressure fuses found at XT 745223, were destroyed at 1400Z. At 1440Z, an ARVN hit two AT mines at XT 702252, causing slight damage. At 1500Z, another ARVN was slightly damaged by an AT mine. Neither incident produced any casualties. At 1520Z, a 250 pound bomb was found at XT 742216, and destroyed in place. Thirty-two bags of rice, each weighing 100 pounds, were found at XT 745218. A booby trap under a bed was found in a hut at XT 745213, and destroyed. Troop I tripped a booby-trapped grenade hanging in a tree resulting in three US KIA. At 1209Z, an ARVN tank was blown off by a mine at XT 720240, however, there were no casualties. A 250 pound bomb fired for detonation was found at XT 720240 and destroyed at 1220Z. A Company II tank struck a mine at XT 745245 resulting in the tank being blown off. The incident occurred at 0715Z. At 1020Z, a tunnel complex with six entrances was found at XT 745234. Only the northern portion of the tunnel had been sealed by the VC. The search continued to the next day. Howitzer Battery killed one armed VC POW attempting to escape at 1625Z in the vicinity of XT 752328 with the 51st Military Intelligence Detachment assisting. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry found a booby trap igniter at XT 747218 and destroyed it at 1220Z. At 1540Z, it destroyed a sampan at XT 730214 and two tons of rice found in the vicinity of XT 730214.

14 January:

The Regiment remained OGCN to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. (See Annex C - JUNGLED HOPPER LOG OVERLAY)

2nd Squadron:

Elements of the squadron continued to provide security for engineer work parties at XT 725318, XT 701311, and XT 671302. Troops I and F, and Company E conducted search and destroy operations northeast of Route 14 from XT 7325 to XT 7523. An ARVN from Troop I received moderate damage from an AT mine at XT 711248 detonated at 0630Z, resulting in 2 US KIA in the incident. Mine sweeping in the area resulted in the discovery of a fort, found OGCN mine. At 1030Z, the troop located two claymore mines at XT 712247, and destroyed them in place. The troop received ten rounds of automatic weapons fire at 1115Z with no casualties resulting. A CSU bomblet located by the troop was destroyed in place at 1650Z. An ARVN of Troop F detonated an AT mine in the vicinity of XT 692259 at 1045Z with no casualties or damage experienced. A tank from Company E, received moderate damage at 0630Z in the area of XT 711248, from a pressure type AT mine.

3rd Squadron:

Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained attached to the squadron as elements of the squadron conducted search and destroy operations in the area from XT 7241 to XT 7124. Troop I engaged a VC squad at XT 728219 at 1310Z with no casualties on either side. Troop I found one OGCN carbine in a tunnel at XT 739216. Search operations for 14 January resulted in the capture of eleven pounds of documents, one pound of medical supplies, and thirty-three tons of rice. Destroyed were eleven tunnels, one base camp, six structures, twenty-six pounds of small arms ammunition, four 60mm mortar rounds, two 105mm artillery rounds, one 155mm artillery round, twenty-three CSU bomblets, two 100 pound bombs, one 250 pound bomb, three mines, three grenades and 1.85 tons of rice.

15 January:

The Regiment remained OGCN to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Squadron elements continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. Troop G continued security operations for engineer work parties at XT 725318, XT 701311, and XT 671302. At 0806Z, Troop I sustained one US KIA from a command detonated claymore mine and small arms fire in the vicinity of XT 711254. The fire was returned with unknown results. Thirty minutes later a tank attached to the troop from Company E, detonated two claymore mines at the same location. There were no casualties and no damage sustained from the action. At 1115Z, the troop sustained one US KIA, after receiving ten rounds of small arms fire from

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AT 716219. At 1100, a booby trap detonated at XT 716218 causing six US KIA from the troop. Search operations resulted in the squadron capturing and evacuating two tons of rice and two half pound sets of documents. Thirteen grenades, two bats, two claymore mines, one 155mm round, one CMU bomblet, and fifteen 61mm mortar rounds were also destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPCON to the squadron. Elements of the squadron continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. Troop L sustained 2 US KIA from the explosion of a booby-trapped grenade at XT 716215 at 1020H. Five minutes later one grenade and automatic weapons fire were received; fire was returned with unknown results, and there were no casualties to the troop. An ARVN hit a mine at 1040H, in the same location sustaining light damage to the vehicle. At 1104H, Company D engaged a VC force of unknown size and killed one VC (OC). During a DUTY-OFF, in support of Company D, the US were KIA and one KIA from sniper fire. Two VC V's from Company D were destroyed by two large command detonated mines at XT 713219. Seven US were KIA, and one KIA. Squadron operations for 15 January netted the capture of 5.5 pounds of documents, one-half pound of medical supplies, two CMU carbines, two M carbines, one US submachinegun, and 27.8 tons of rice. In addition two tunnels, one base camp, seven structures, five CMU bomblets, six mines, and seven tons of rice were destroyed.

16 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade

2nd Squadron:

Squadron elements conducted search and destroy operations in sector. Troop G continued to secure engineer work parties at XT 725118, XT 701311, and XT 671302. Troop F encountered light small arms fire at XT 726216. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1125H, a Company D tank detonated an unknown type of booby trap killing one individual from the company. At 0300H, two CHUNG HUI surrendered to a patrol from the company at XT 716215. At 1659H, Troop E found one CHUNG type 50 carbine and one US caliber .30 rifle. Operations for 16 January resulted in the capture of 21.4 tons of rice, one CHUNG carbine, and one US rifle evacuated, and the destruction of three 105mm artillery rounds, one 61mm mortar round, one 60mm mortar round and 1.5 tons of polished rice.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in sector. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry was detached at 0732H. Troop K found one Russian Mosin rifle in a tunnel at XT 739216. At 1130H, elements of the troop observed one VC entering a tunnel at XT 734222; the VC was pursued resulting in one VC killed and the capture of one M Carbine. An hour and a half later the troop killed two VC(OC) and captured one caliber .45 pistol and one type 43 CHUNG submachinegun at XT 712238. Elements of Company H searching a tunnel received automatic weapons fire resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA, at XT 711221. Operations for the day terminated with the squadron capturing (in addition to the items noted above) 16.5 pounds of documents, ten pounds of clothing, one rifle, one carbine, one grenade, and 100 rounds of CHUNG small arms ammunition. Three mines, and three grenades were also destroyed.

17 January:

The Regiment remained OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Elements of the squadron conducted search and destroy operations in an area immediately to the northeast of Highway 14. Troop G provided security for two engineer work parties (XT 725118 and XT 701311). A tank/ARVN team from Troop E, while searching an area from which a Blackhorse M113 received fire, uncovered several bunkers. During search and destroy operations both Troop E and F discovered large caches of rice and numerous bunkers and tunnel complexes; one of which was a

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hospital complex at XT 734247, consisting of a mess area, trenches, and foxholes. A tunnel with a stone plug was found at XT 734255. At XT 734255, at XT 736250 a tunnel was discovered and searched for approximately 400 meters. A total of 65 tons of rice was also evacuated and five nets, five C IGD grenades, and twenty-seven tons of rice were destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Troop I discovered one US type M1 carbine and found a tunnel complex at XT 733223. The troop also found and destroyed a 500 pound bomb in the same area. A company H tank hit a pressure type mine at XT 739216 resulting in only light vehicle damage. At 0900H, and again at 1115H, Company H killed a VC (BC) by a booby trap. In addition to the two VC KIA (BC), one US type M1 carbine was captured. Besides the above mentioned items, twenty-one pounds of documents, one camera, and one bundle of clothing were captured and evacuated.

18 January:

The Regiment remained under operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector adjacent to Highway 14. Troop 3 discovered a tunnel at XT 726254, and found and recovered eight tons of rice from a bunker at XT 732245. Troop 7 discovered and evacuated six rolls of barbed wire from XT 730244. The troop also found a battalion size complex of bunkers and tunnels at XT 741239 containing a Soviet flag and ten pounds of documents. A company sized base camp at XT 746241 was located containing ten tons of rice which was evacuated.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Troop I found a mechanism mount for an anti-aircraft machine gun which was constructed of US, non-US and VC fabricated parts. A tunnel containing six VC was found and the tunnel was destroyed by acetylene gas, resulting in six VC KIA (POCS), at XT 733224. A large tunnel complex consisting of numerous long branches was found at XT 732222. Troop I found two tunnels and five bunkers at XT 730218. Nine tons of rice was evacuated from the bunkers. 100 feet of tunnel was demolished at XT 742215. A patrol from the troop killed one VC (BC) at XT 723232 at 1900H. An LGAIV in Company H detonated a small mine at XT 735224 with no casualties or damage resulting. A base camp containing fourteen tons of rice was found at XT 743222. A tunnel entrance at XT 743224 was booby-trapped. Operations for the day resulted in four US grenades, and one AT mine captured in addition, three tunnels and three grenades were destroyed.

19 January:

The Regiment continued operations under control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

Squadron elements continued to search and clear operations northeast of Highway 14. Company H was relieved of the security of engineer work parties at two locations by elements of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. Troop 3 discovered fifteen tons of booby-trapped rice at XT 735236. After disarming the booby trap, the rice was evacuated. In the same area the troop discovered and destroyed one ton of spoiled rice. An additional twenty-five tons of rice was evacuated at XT 745233. A twenty pound claymore was located and destroyed at XT 735231. Troop F destroyed forty pounds of rice found in a bunker that had been searched the day before. A booby trap exploded the day before had been tripped, but there was no sign of blood in the area. The troop discovered and evacuated 20 tons of rice from XT 742237.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned

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station. Company K became OPCOM to the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry at 0700H, with one platoon returning to squadron control at 1800H. Though the squadron experienced only slight VC contact during the day, five tons of rice were captured and five bunkers, two tunnels, fifty pounds of ammonium nitrate, one 57mm recoilless rifle round, and one CW umbrella were destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector and in addition dispatched sniper patrols into selected areas. Troop E remained OPCOM to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Troop I discovered one CHICOM type S3 carbine, a British Enfield rifle, and four pounds of documents at XT 728227. The tunnel was destroyed, and when the destruction charge was triggered two secondary explosions occurred with grey and white smoke appearing. Troop L destroyed a tunnel in which a CHICOM type S3 carbine had been found at XT 717233. Four tons of rice were destroyed at XT 745224 by the troop. Company K found a bunker with seventeen pounds of composition C-4 utilizing part of the explosive to destroy the bunker. The company destroyed two concrete and steel reinforced bunkers at XT 737221.

21 January:

The Regiment remained OPCOM to the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector while Company K (-) remained OPCOM to the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry. Though there was no significant contact with the enemy, Troop I found two fresh graves containing two VC at XT 748238, and destroyed one small base camp and one tunnel.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron continued search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Troop K remained OPCOM to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. One eighteen foot was destroyed by Troop I, as were two US 2.75" aerial rockets, two hits, and one tunnel. Troop L netted four CHICOM M16s during the day. A patrol killed one VC (DC) at XT 740215. Company M destroyed a small base camp and discovered and evacuated fourteen tons of rice from XT 738223.

22 January:

The Regiment remained OPCOM to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. (See Annex D FRAGORD 12 OPERATIONS OVERLAY). At 0700H, the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, was attached to the Regiment.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron, less detached units, conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Company K (-), remained OPCOM to the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and Troop E became OPCOM to the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry. There was no significant contact with the enemy during the day's operations. However, one French Cam M1916 rifle, one type 98 7.92mm rifle and one US M1 were captured as was a VC constructed caliber .30 rifle. 2 hits, 2 grenades, 4 tunnels and one half ton of rice were destroyed.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector of operations. Troop K remained OPCOM to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Company A, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry was attached effective 0600H, for operations. Although enemy contact was negligible, operations netted 3000 SHVN Piasters, ten tons of rice, fifty pounds of 7.62mm ammunition and one type S3 CHICOM carbine.

2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry:

Battalion elements conducted search and destroy operations in rice paddies within their assigned sector. No significant enemy contact was reported. However, Company B, did find one VC KIA (DC) in the THAI TIPA river at XT 762215, and received one CHICOM M16 at XT 735256.

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Operations for the day resulted in the capture of 1.5 tons of rice, one pound of documents, one bicycle, and forty-six rounds of small arms ammunition. 500 pounds of rice, one grenade, four sampans, ten huts, and one small base camp were destroyed.

23 January:

The Regiment re-assigned OPGON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPGON to the Regiment.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in its assigned sector. Company A, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPGON to the squadron while Troop I remained OPGON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Troop I found 2 dead VC (SC) who appeared to have been dead two to four days. A sniper patrol from Troop I accounted for one VC KIA (SC) at KT 722232. The operations during the day resulted in the destruction of one 207 pound bomb, three tunnels, three huts and one ton of rice.

2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry:

Battalion elements conducted search and destroy operations in rice paddies in its sector. Operations for the day accounted for 900 pounds of rice, five huts, three arrows, five bunkers, and one hand grenade destroyed.

24 January:

Operation CML 2 2000 was terminated and the Regiment was returned from the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade at 1710H. The 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry remained OPGON to the Regiment and was integrated into the tactical road march of the 2nd Squadron. The battalion was released to its parent unit upon arrival at HIEP FO.

2nd Squadron:

The squadron conducted a tactical road march from HIEP C&F (KT 7533) to the Regimental Base Camp closing with the main body at 1710H. Trail elements closed at 2100H without incident.

3rd Squadron:

The squadron conducted a tactical road march from HIEP C&F (KT 7533) to the Regimental Base Camp. The main body closed at 1455H, and the trail party closed at 2240H. There were no incidents during the march.

12. (C) Results:

a. Personnel:

26 VC KIA (SC) and 13 VC KIA (POSS). Seventy-four individuals were detained, and eight VC were captured. Twelve VC turned themselves in as CH 130 M&I's.

b. Fortifications and Buildings:

Sixty tunnels or tunnel complexes were found and all were partially or completely destroyed. Six base camps, fifteen bunkers and forty-seven huts were also destroyed.

c. Material:

Twenty-nine small arms were captured, along with 1100 rounds of ammunition. 174 mines were captured or destroyed as were 108 artillery or mortar shells. Thirteen rounds of medicine, six rolls of barbed wire, 150 barbed wire, one machine-gun tripod and seventeen rounds of C-4 explosive were captured.

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d. Miscellaneous Items and Foodstuffs:

179.5 tons of rice was captured of which only 79.5 tons had to be destroyed. The remaining 100 tons were returned to the GVN. One camera, fourteen bicycles, one 300 gallon fuel tank, M16 33000, twenty rolls of corrugated roofing and one siren as well as one gross of eight inch bolts were captured. Twenty sampans were destroyed.

e. Friendly Losses:

Friendly losses included eight US KIA, fifty-one US lightly WIA, six seriously WIA. Material losses were eight M41's, four tanks and four wheeled vehicles damaged. Two M4's and one tank were destroyed.

13. (U) Administrative Matters:

Administrative plans for the operation proved to be adequate, and logistical support kept pace with combat requirements throughout the operation. Classes I, III, and IV were supplied from a 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (FSA) at FNU LOI. Class V and VI and some Class IIIA were supplied from a 1st Logistical Command FSA located at LAF HUE. Maintenance support was provided by the 188th Maintenance Battalion. Regimental and Squadron Trains overrode from a central location at the FNU LOI Base Camp under the direction of the Regimental S4 and the Regimental Logistical Control Center.

a. Resupply:

Land lines of communications and daily resupply convoys were the primary methods of resupply for the operation. Organic transportation was the only transportation used except for Chinook helicopter air lift of water, rations, FMF, and ammunition to the 3rd Squadron.

b. Maintenance:

The maintenance support furnished by the 188th Maintenance Battalion was outstanding, and at times approached "Instant Maintenance". Items designated as the result of combat action one day were, in the majority of cases, ready for action the next day.

c. POL Statistics:

Issues of the following types of POL products was accomplished during the operation: JP4-18,400 gallons, AVIAS-3605 gallons, MOWAS-55200 gallons, Diesel-4,000 gallons.

d. Treatment and Evacuation of Casualties:

Although there were many lightly wounded casualties not requiring treatment, there were forty-six injuries as a result of hostile action treated during the operation. In addition, twenty-two individuals received treatment from non-hostile injuries. Of this total, nineteen DUK's and twenty-two individuals injured by other than hostile action were evacuated. All individuals evacuated were air-lifted by DUST-O-F to the 9th Evacuation Hospital, the 12th Evacuation Hospital, or the 3rd Surgical Hospital.

e. Communications:

Communications to the Regimental Base Camp and to higher headquarters was maintained by a multitude of communications methods as listed below.

(1) FM Nets:

11th Armored Cavalry entered the 17th Airborne Brigade Command Net and the 17th Admin/Intel Net with no difficulties encountered.

(2) Telephone Circuits:

(a) A Sole User (Point to Point) circuit was established between the 11th Armored Cavalry TOC and the 17th Airborne Brigade TOC with excellent results.

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(b) Common User circuits were established between the 173rd Forward Switchboard and the Blackhorse Forward Switchboard providing access to the Army Telephone System.

(3) Teletypewriter:

A common user circuit from Blackhorse Forward through the 173rd Airborne Brigade Forward and into the Army System was utilized.

(4) Regimental Trains Telephone:

Four common user circuits were established to the 1st Infantry Division Switchboard and into the Army System.

(5) Radio Teletype to Base Camp:

An AM RITT Net was established to the Regimental Base Camp from the Regimental Field location by using an MP/UC-26D at the Base Camp.

(6) Telephone to Base Camp:

Point to point circuits were established from Blackhorse Forward to Blackhorse S.R.

(7) Teletypewriter to Base Camp:

The circuit to base camp was operated from Blackhorse Forward through 173rd Airborne Brigade and II Force V circuits.

(8) FM to Base Camp:

An FM Administrative Net was operated by use of tactical radios on an intermittent basis as needed.

f. Administration:

Routine administration continued to operate smoothly in spite of the great distance between the field location and the administrative center at the Regimental Base Camp. This was accomplished by a daily run to the field location by the S-1. Replacements were sent to the field by a Caribou aircraft flown by the Air Force on a daily basis. The same aircraft was used to transport A-1 personnel to and from the 3rd SFG (A) Air Force Base. During the month the R&I program was greatly enlarged, and proved to be extremely beneficial to the morale of the troops on the operation.

14. (V) Special Equipment and Techniques:

The major innovation in military techniques employed during the operation is covered in paragraph 7,b, and paragraph 7,d,h.

15. (V) Commander's Analysis:

The operation, combining an initial rapid maneuver phase, a search and destroy phase, and screening, blocking and security missions demonstrated the great flexibility of the Blackhorse Regiment. The initial night move to assembly areas was rapid and smooth. The attack on successive objectives, the link-up with helicopter forces and establishment of screen and blocking positions demonstrated that the Regiment is capable of moving fast and arriving at its destination in excellent fighting trim.

The unique quality of the operation that the 11th Airborne Cavalry demonstrated its ability to conduct comprehensive, thorough and effective search and destroy operations. The discovery and destruction of sixty tunnel complexes and discovery and evacuation of well over 470 tons of rice are effective testimony to that fact.

The search and destroy portion of Operation CMT R F. L. A. was the final combat test of the modified TOI designed to tailor the Regiment's organization to the requirements of counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam.

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The search and destroy operations, plus the allied saturation and sniper patrols, and tunnel search operations proved the validity of the HITT. There proved to be sufficient personnel in the basic maneuver element - the Armored Cavalry Platoon - to allow for required dismounted tunnel and patrolling operations while maintaining sufficient crew members on the ACRV's to maintain the platoon's mounted combat capabilities.

15. (C) Recommendations: (Lessons Learned)

a. Operations:

(1) Item:

Discussion:

Saturation patrolling is the technique of placing many small patrols in areas of expected enemy activity.

The technique is best employed along definite and linear terrain features such as stream beds, trails, canals, and any probable enemy avenue of approach.

Three to four man patrols are situated all along the terrain feature, and lay in wait for the enemy.

Should an enemy force approach, one, two, or all of the patrols in the area can engage the force.

Saturation patrolling proved effective on Operation CHURCH FIELDS.

Observation: Saturation patrolling can be effectively employed in armored cavalry search and destroy operations.

(2) Item: Sniper Patrols

Discussion:

The sniper patrol is a smaller version of the night ambush patrol.

Each patrol is equipped with an M-79 grenade launcher, 3 M-16 rifles, and a radio.

The patrols are positioned near known or suspected rice caches and tunnel entrances.

It was discovered that the patrols proved to be a valuable source of information on VC daylight activities.

Observation: Like saturation patrolling, sniper patrolling was proven to be a valuable adjunct to armored cavalry operations.

(3) Item: Discovery of rice caches.

Discussion: During Operation CHURCH FIELDS it was observed that anytime a large cache of rice had been discovered, a flock of small birds had been frightened away by the approach of friendly troops. Accordingly, any time a flock of birds was noticed, a search for a rice cache was made in the area.

Observation: Flocks of birds should be watched to assist in locating rice caches.

(4) Item: Indications provided by intense booby-trapping.

Discussion: It was learned on Operation CHURCH FIELDS that intense booby-trapping of a particular area was a good indication that valuable stores were hidden nearby.

Observation: Analysis of the disposition of booby traps in an area can lead to the discovery of valuable VC stores and material.

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(5) Item: MMI fires along trails.

Discussion:

The effective use of MMI air bursts along trails prevented the VC from thoroughly evacuating mines, thus permitting easy detection by friendly forces.

The squadron uncovered nine poorly exploded mines in an area that had received air burst MMI fires the night before.

Observation: Expeditions use of air burst MMI fires may prevent the enemy from properly exploding mines.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Item: Centralized Interrogation and Document Exploitation.

Discussion: All available Military Intelligence personnel at the centrally located center have the following advantages over scattered MI Detachments located with Battalion size units:

Readily accessible to the commander.

Less hours saved in corroborating MI statements.

Rapid association between documents and MIs.

Rapid dissemination of information to all subordinate, adjacent, and higher elements.

Controlled work load, i.e., the CMC is able to interrogate MIs and exploit documents on a timely basis whereas in separate units one MI Detachment may have an overload while another is idle.

Availability of technical experts.

Economy of space, time, and resources.

Observation: Recommend that centralized interrogation and document exploitation means be utilized during future multi-unit operations.

(2) Item: Use of Military Police in handling PGs.

Discussion: This was the first opportunity the 11th Airmed Cavalry Regiment had to use TQM Military Police units during operations, and it was found that Military Police possess the following advantages over unit police:

Specifically trained in the various techniques used in handling PGs.

Free combat personnel from a responsibility they are not especially trained for.

Insures the rapid and efficient handling of PGs.

Relieves interrogator personnel from the additional requirement of supervising the handling of PGs.

Observation: Military Police personnel, when available, greatly facilitate the processing and safeguarding of PGs during combat operations.

(3) Item: Rapid evacuation and exploitation of detainees, PWs, and Chien Kai's.

Discussion: During this operation detainees, PWs, and Chien Kai's were evacuated by the fastest means available (generally by air) to the centralized interrogation point. At this location a rapid evaluation of the individual was made. Those personnel who had knowledge of storage locations or fortifications were quickly dispatched to interested units where they could be used as guides. Those Chien Kai's who knew or suspected the whereabouts of other possible Chien Kai's, were placed in a speaker aircraft and attempted to talk their cohorts into rallying.

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Observations: Rapid evacuation and exploitation of RVs and soldiers successful in the majority of cases. Recommend this tactic be continued in future operations.

c. Civil Affairs:

Item: Evacuation of captured rice from the battlefield.

Discussion:

During Operation CEDAR FALLS the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment captured a considerable quantity of rice from widely dispersed caches in the HCMC TACH LEU. Since the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment could not evacuate the rice due to its combat mission, all possible means of evacuation were considered. Consideration was given to the use of purely administrative transportation such as trucking companies. However, at the time there was insufficient transportation available to move the rice. Efforts were made to have the rice transported by the trucks organic to the 18th ARVN Division, and although the request was not denied outright, the Division set a pick up date so far in the future as to be unacceptable. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment then appealed to Province, and after considerable pressure had been applied through advisory channels, the rice was partially extracted from the centralized collection point in the vicinity of TACH LEU.

Observation:

The difficulties in evacuation of foodstuffs by transportation organic to combat units in a combat situation are numerous and complex. The extensive logistical demands of attacking units, coupled with the highly mobile nature of combat operations, made the use of organic transportation impractical.

The use of purely administrative transportation such as trucking companies offers a possible solution, but in a guerilla warfare environment adequate security would be essential for the vehicles, even when operating well behind the zone of contact. Often such security forces will not be available.

The most practical and logical means of foodstuff evacuation in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment TACH is by ARVN's organic transportation units. They have the vehicles necessary for such missions as well as the manpower to provide their own security and labor to load and unload the rice. Such a mission is appropriate to ARVN, with its assigned mission of following up and consolidating US gains as well as participation in the Revolutionary Development Program.

Another solution is to give the mission to Province Headquarters, and have them coordinate the transportation needed through such agencies as public works or RV units, both of which have organic transportation. This type of mission would give either ARVN or RV units an excellent chance for a worthwhile Civil Action Program. To gain ARVN cooperation, the US unit should notify the Vietnamese where rice has been captured and consolidated, the amount of rice allocated to them, and give the Vietnamese a reasonable length of time to pick it up. If they fail to pick up the rice within this time and have no valid excuse, the rice or other foodstuffs should be destroyed. That quantity of rice, or its dollar equivalent should be deducted from the provincial food or money allocation for the next month. If the Vietnamese were willing to fulfill their responsibility to their own people, much of the present destruction of rice in Vietnam would be unnecessary. Experience with the Vietnamese has demonstrated that as long as they feel the US will do a task for them, they have little incentive to help themselves. It is felt that the above proposal would provide this much needed incentive.

d. CHICKS:

Item: Use of loudspeakers on UH-1D helicopters to get VC to Chieu Hoi.

Discussion: During Operation CEDAR FALLS, 30 Chieu Hoi's rallied as the direct result of messages they heard from 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment UH-1D helicopter loudspeaker ships. The speaker ship would fly over areas where the VC were hiding and tell them to give up or they would die. As soon as one VC gave up he was taken up in the speaker ship and he would tell his comrades that they too should give up. It was found that some of them wanted to give up,

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but were afraid they would be shot as they came in because they had no safe conduct passes. So they were told to take off their shirts and wave them over their heads. This worked well and resulted in a group of nineteen coming in all at one time.

Observation: Airborne loudspeaker drops should be used to the maximum during operations to get VC to give up. They are most effective after about two weeks in which the enemy has received continual bombardment from both air and artillery. Using a Noi Chanh (Returnee) to talk on the speaker mission is more effective than the unit interpreter.

e. Logistics and Maintenance:

(1) Item: Equipment losses.

Discussion:

Primary equipment losses during the operation were caused by anti-tank mines. The mines destroyed or damaged road wheels, road wheel arms, hubs, bearings, and track, more than any other parts of the vehicles hit.

Observation: Stockage of armored vehicle suspension parts should be increased.

(2) Item: POL consumption factors.

Discussion: The POL consumption factors listed in FM 101-10 or factors based on training and European experience are not valid for search and clear operations in Vietnam owing to the lack of vehicular movement and considerable dismounted action.

Observation: Planning for POL consumption based on FM 101-10 should be modified in accordance with Vietnam counter-insurgency operations experience.

(3) Item: Logistical and Maintenance Support for the Regiment.

Discussion:

During the operation, logistical support was provided to the Regiment on a temporary basis from a 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area at FNU LQI and at an Ammunition Supply Point at LAI KHI. Maintenance support was provided by the 183th Maintenance Battalion. Logistical and Maintenance Support were adequate only because of the short turn around distances.

Transportation to effect unit distribution of supplies does not exist above squadron level. The Regiment was able to resupply the subordinate units only by using organic vehicles from the squadrons which was possible only because of the short turn around distances and augmentation by Chinook helicopters when they were available.

Observation:

The Regiment needs a Support Command with the necessary assets to support it wherever it may be employed.

The Regiment needs a Direct Support Maintenance unit assigned or attached to provide maintenance support.

f. Signals:

(1) Item: All Radio Range

Discussion:

All radio contact is necessary between the Regimental Base Compound and the Regimental Headquarters at all times, even when the two are separated by great distances as they were on Operation CND 1 FULB. The Antenna Kit AR/GR-1, attached to organic all radios would provide the necessary increased range.

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Observations: The Antenna Kit (U/VTC-29) should be issued on the basis of two per squadron and three to Regimental Headquarters.

(2) Item: Overheating of radios.

Discussion:

Twenty-four hour operation of the equipment mounted in the M-577 tracked vehicles and the resultant overheating of radios resulted in many radio breakdowns.

The use of fans blowing directly on the radios will tend to overcome this problem.

Placing the transmitter in ST 17-B position will help alleviate this problem in the U/VTC-29 radio.

Observations: Use of fans blowing on radios in the M-577 vehicle and use of the ST 17-B position capability of the U/VTC-29 will help overcome radio overheating problems.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST ENGINEER BATTALION
APO 96345

AVDB-CE-3

2 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO 96345

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO 96307

1. NAME OF OPERATION: Operation Cedar Falls.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 080700 Jan 67 to 262400 Jan 67.

3. GENERAL: The command headquarters for the Engineer portion of Operation Cedar Falls was Headquarters, 1st Engineer Battalion, acting in accordance with 1st Infantry OPORD 30-66 dated 318100H Dec 66 and 1st Engineer OPORD 1-67 dated 5 Jan 67. The 1st Engineer Battalion provided combat engineer support to the 1st Infantry Division, 173rd Brigade (ABN) and the 11th ACA during their Search and Destroy operations in the Iron Triangle. The primary missions accomplished were tunnel and base camp destruction, clearing with subsequent opening of VC dominated areas, construction of landing zones, road repair to include the construction of a 160' D.S. Bailey Bridge, and water-borne seal of the confluence of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers.

a. Reporting Officer: LTC J.M. KIERNAN, JR.
Commanding Officer
1st Engineer Battalion

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b. Task Organization:

HQ's, 1st Engr Bn - LTC KIERNAN

- (1) Company A - WAYNE L. LUCAS, CPT, CE
- (2) Company B - ROBERT C. LEE, CPT, CE
- (3) Company C (-) - LARRY A. BLAIR, CPT, CE
- (4) Company D - ROGER H. MILLAR, CPT, CE
- (5) Company E - ROBERT R. OLSON, CPT, CE

HQ's, 168th Engr Bn - LTC PELOSKY

- (1) Company B - DUANE LEE, CPT, CE
- (2) 1st Platoon, Co C - SHELFORD E. WILSON, 1LT, CE
- (3) Dozer Team #1 - MSG WILLIAM POLLACK
- (4) Dozer Team #2 - LT JOSEPH DURUSAU
- (5) Dozer Team #3 - LT ROBERT STONECIPHER
- (6) Dozer Team #4 - LT DUANE KIETH

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence Prior to Operation:

- (1) Numerous base camp, supply installations, and medical facilities in area.
- (2) Supply points protected by extensive, well constructed bunkers.
- (3) Indications that portions of MR4 located in area.
- (4) 2 VC battalions can reinforce immediately.
- (5) 3 VC battalions can reinforce within 24-36 hours.
- (6) Complex tunnel system in area (one possibly 8 kms long).

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b. Intelligence During Operation: From an intelligence viewpoint, Operation Cedar Falls was without exception the most successful operation of the war. Intelligence reports, which under most circumstances would be regarded as important, were overshadowed. As indicated by paragraphs 8d and 8e (4), the 1st Engineers definitely performed more than its share of intelligence collection. The most important find of the whole operation was the discovery of the Intelligence Section Military Region IV by the 1st Engineers. Slick loads of documents, records, and plans were found, and forwarded to G2, 1st Infantry Division. The discovery was of such value that the operation was extended for three days. The documents described in detail the activities of MR IV from 1962 through 1966. They contained strength of VC units, names of their members, towns and villages in which they operate, some of their meeting places, and a great amount of information on exactly how they operate and what their future plans are.

5. MISSION: The 1st Engineer Battalion reinforced with elements of the 79th Engineer Group clears jungle, conducts road repairs, construct LZ's and destroys base camps and tunnel complexes in support of the 1st Infantry Division, 173rd Brigade, and 11th ACR operations.

6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The 1st Engineer Battalion prepares for Operation Cedar Falls by constructing a D.S. Bailey Bridge over the Thi Tinh River west of Ben Cat. E Company constructs pile bent and constructs bridge. D Company 1st Engineer Battalion improves bridge approaches on East and West side of river. E Company constructs 2 "gun floats" at Phu Cuong, positions floats at confluence of Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers, and conducts waterborne patrols. A Company, 1st Engineers, provides one dozer team in D.S. 1/28 Infantry Battalion to assist in their search and destroy operations in the north-eastern sector of the Iron Triangle and clears jungle, opens and improves the east-west road through the Triangle from its intersection with Rt 14 east. B Company 1st Engineers provides one dozer team in D.S. of 1/16 Infantry Battalion, clears jungle, opens and improves route 14 north to Ben Suc with dozer and demolitions. D Company provides a dozer team in D.S. 1/503 Inf, 173rd Bde. to assist in their search and destroy operation in the southern portion of the triangle, and clears jungle, opens and repairs east-west road from Ben Cat west. B Company, 168th Engineer Battalion clears jungle, opens and improves Rt 14 south from the intersection of the East-West Road.

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7. EXECUTION:

21 Dec: 1st Platoon, E Company departed Di An at 0930 for Lai Kho with pile driving crane from A Company, 169th Engineer Battalion attached. Forward C.P. established at Lai Kho at 1226 hours.

22 Dec: E Company, 1st Platoon, constructed four float raft at XT 736331. Construction completed at 1400 hours and pile driving crane positioned on raft at 1425 hours. D Company demomen began to break up the remains of the concrete bridge resting on the west bank of the river.

23 Dec: Blasting of concrete bridge was completed and D Company started construction of headwall on east bank. Steel piling (L4H73) arrived on site from Di An at 1430 hours for the construction of an 8 pile intermediate support for the two 80' D.S. Baileys.

24 Dec: Pile driving commenced at 1000 hours. At 1250 hours pile number 1 had been driven with a capacity of 19 tons being obtained. Breakdown of crane precluded further work. 1st Platoon flown to Di An for Christmas.

25 Dec: Christmas.

26 Dec: Skeleton pile driving crew airlifted to bridge sight at 0700 hours to resume pile driving operations. Pile number 5 was driven; capacity of 21 tons obtained. Crane deadlined at 1100 hours because of broken hammer cable. Cable was replaced by 1600 hours.

27 Dec: Two piles, numbers 2 and 6, were driven with capacities of 16 tons and 19 tons, respectively.

28 Dec: Pile 3 and 4 driven with 21 ton and 18 ton capacities. Two trucks borrowed from C Company, 86th Engr Bn, hauled 28 loads of laterite to west abutment. Ben Cat sector advisors picked up a VC suspect who appeared to be measuring the existing Eiffel bridge by pacing.

29 Dec: Final piles, 7 and 8 were driven with 17 and 18 ton capacities. Welders began cutting piles to final grade in preparation for placing caps. Bailey Bridge arrived at Lai Kho at 1600 hours.

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30 Dec: Cutting of piles to final grade completed at 1300 hours. Raft was removed from bridge site and crane off-loaded to drive posts for headwall on east bank.

31 Dec: Pile driving crane loaded on lowbed and returned to Lai Khe at 1030 hours. Using a wrecker positioned on the Eiffel bridge, the caps, corbels, and column caps were placed. At 1100 hours, site layout was initiated on east bank. Construction of panel bridge commenced at 1400 hours.

1 Jan: Construction of bridge was completed, and launched with assistance of TDL5 on east bank. The 160' bridge was then broken in the middle and partially jacked down.

2 Jan: Bridge completely jacked down and E Company personnel disassembled and loaded M4T6 raft. Pile driver and panel bridge trucks were returned to their home station. Welders started welding "X" bracing on the pier at low tide.

3 Jan: E Company personnel returned to Di An with exception of 2 boat operators, welder, and supervisor. Twenty more loads of laterite were hauled by C Company, 1st Engineers, and placed on the approaches. At 1500 hours E Company was directed to load up materials for two each 2-float M4T6 rafts which were to be mounted with Quad 50 machine guns. The rafts would be pushed up the Saigon river to the confluence of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers where they would be positioned as a blocking force against VC flooding west from Tan An area during Niagara Falls and south from the Iron Triangle during Cedar Falls.

4 Jan: 2nd Platoon of E Company moved to the Vietnamese Engineer School at Phu Cuong to construct M4T6 floats. One officer and 8 E4 from the 2/5th Artillery arrived at Phu Cuong at 1030 hours. The two rafts were completed and the quad 50's mounted at 1645 hours.

5 Jan: At 0730 hours, with Ditchard 6 overhead, the flotilla moved up the Saigon River. In the vicinity of XT 74F190, the lead elements experienced sniper fire which was immediately countered with M4 fire from the rafts and the helicopter, accounting for 4 VC (BC). By nightfall the rafts were in position at the confluence with one raft being tied off at the east bank and the other anchored in mid-stream. Meanwhile the Bailey bridge was 100% complete, with the final welding being accomplished on this date.

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6 Jan: A Company reinforced with dozer team #4, departed Di An at 0845 and established a CP at XT 785225 at 1030 hours. Work was immediately initiated on clearing fields of fire around the perimeter, constructing defensive positions and clearing the Cau Dinh Jungle on both sides of Rt 13. Speed trials were held on the river by E Company and the quad 50's were test fired. Limited patrolling was conducted with one sampans being sunk in a small cove.

7 Jan: A Company continued to clear Cau Dinh jungle and began to clear jungle around four selected sites along Thi Tinh River for Quad 50 and Twin 40mm gun positions. At 1130 hours Headquarters, 1st Engineer Battalion, Headquarters, 168th Engineer Battalion, B Company and D Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, B Company, 168th Engineer Battalion and dozer teams 1, 2 and 3, departed Di An for XT 785225. All elements closed at 1330 hours. Defensive positions were prepared, fields of fire around the perimeter were cleared, and jungle clearing was begun. Tunnel destruction personnel explored and destroyed a tunnel at XT 789161. This tunnel was 135 meters long with 7ft of overburden and was destroyed by the acetylene method.

8 Jan: All units were employed in clearing and wind-rowing Cau Dinh jungle. A total of 330 acres of jungle was cleared. At 1600 hours the heavy maintenance support section moved via Route 13 to Lai Kie to set up base of operation. Aerial recon was flown over the Iron Triangle. At 1800 hours dozers were loaded in preparation for the move to the Iron Triangle. E Company, following air strikes at XT 754198 ferried 2 platoons of 1/503rd Inf. into village at XT 750200. River patrols made negative contact.

9 Jan: Bivouac area was struck and convoy departed for Cedar Falls Operational area at 0915. Dozer team #4 was placed in D.S. of 1/4 Cav to prepare six additional firing positions along the east bank of the Thi Tinh river for Quad 50's and Twin 40's. All units closed their respective bivouac areas at 1400 hours. Three Engineer camps were set up south of the east-west road cutting through the Triangle, at XT 672303 (B Co, 1st Engr Bn), XT 699307 (HQ's, 1st Engr Bn and 168th Engr Bn, A Co, 1st Engr Bn, and B Co, 168th Engr Bn) and XT 727318 (D Co, 1st Engr Bn). All units began clearing fields of fire and constructing defensive positions.

A Company - Began clearing a swath through the rubber trees along the road leading to Artillery Base III from XT 671328 to XT 664324. At 1500 hours Task Force Alpha, consisting of 30 E1, one officer, 2 tank dozers, and 6 bulldozers, linked up with Cav security at XT 695311, cut through the jungle to XT 687342, and then moved along the road cutting a swath on both sides to XT 676350.

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B Company - 1st Platoon repaired 2 kilometers of road north of their RDN position, cleared and windrowed 50 meters of jungle on each side of Route 14 from XT 668304 to XT 656320.

D Company - At approximately 1500 hours a VTR from the 11th ACR, pulling a disabled M48 tank out of the Iron Triangle, crashed through the western span of the Bailey Bridge, stopping all traffic. This emergency bridge repair was assigned to D Company, which was rapidly organized to remove the vehicles from the Thi Tinh River and replace the Bailey Bridge span temporarily with an AVLB. When the bridge collapsed, it also damaged the Eiffel Bridge next to it. The Eiffel Bridge was reinforced and opened to class 16 traffic at 1630 hours. The damaged Bailey span had to be removed immediately from the pile bent in the middle of the river and disassembled to preclude obstructing the AVLB launching. This work was tedious and time consuming. Using a second VTR with several block and tackle combinations the broken span was pulled from the pile bent without causing additional damage to the pier. The western approach was extended 20' to permit an AVLB to span the shorter (60') gap. Earth work combined with the use of damaged Bailey parts to bolster the fill was completed by 100515 Jan. By 0600 hours an AVLB was successfully launched to the center pier and by daybreak the completed bridge was opened to traffic.

E Company - Limited patrolling with negative contact.

10 Jan:

A Company - Clearing of rubber trees was continued around Artillery Base III (XT 664324). Task Force Alpha moved across country from XT 676350 to XT 639368 cutting a swath 50 feet wide and 2,000 meters long, and a 100 meter resupply LZ at XT 639368.

B Company - Constructed a 4 kilometer by-pass on Route 14 in grid square XT 6432. 2nd Platoon, relocated to XT 613337 and RDN with 1/4 Cav.

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C Company - At 1240 hours the 1st Platoon was lifted by CH47 to XT 619372 to cut a resupply LZ for the 1/28 Infantry. The CH47 hovered over the LZ area for 23 minutes allowing all personnel to descend the 70' ladder. At 1430 hours the LZ was ready to receive UH-1 aircraft. The platoon remained with the 1/28 Infantry until 11 Jan, clearing access roads to rice caches and enlarging LZ to accommodate 4 UH-1's.

D Company - Evacuated damaged Bailey Bridge parts to Lai Khe, and continued to improve the western bridge approach by placing 17 loads of laterite. The road was repaired for 1.5 KM west of the Bailey Bridge.

E Company - Limited patrolling with negative contact.

F Company, 168th - The road between XT 695311 and XT 713317 was shaped, graded, and ditched, and the jungle on both sides of the road was cleared for 100 meters from XT 695311 to XT 697313.

11 Jan:

A Company - Using Home Plows, bulldozers, chainsaws, demolitions and axes, a 200 meter wide strip was cleared of rubber trees between XT 708315 and XT 724315. A 400 meter by 200 meter area was also cleared at XT 706315. 2nd Platoon leveled and then burned 50 houses vicinity XT 705315. Task Force Alpha cleared a 50 foot swath in moving from XT 639367 to XT 626378 to XT 621372 to XT 620374 (total of 2900 meters), and cleared a 100 meter by 200 meter LZ at XT 620374. During the day they also destroyed 40,000 lbs of rice at XT 622374, and a five bunker base camp and hospital complex containing one trillion units of antibiotics at XT 621371.

B Company - 1st Platoon improved existing ford enroute to Ben Suc at XT 605346, and constructed both approaches making it passable to wheeled vehicles. Chain saws and demolitions were employed by 1st Platoon to fell rubber trees along road to Artillery Base III. Task Force Bravo in D... of 2/18th Infantry penetrated the jungle cutting a 50' wide swath and destroying a base camp and 30 tons of rice at XT 613367.

D Company - Performed road maintenance on East-West road through the Triangle from XT 730322 to XT 730327. Thirty loads of laterite were hauled and used to shape the road. Task Force Delta in D.S. of the 4/503rd Infantry cleared a 50' swath from XT 712317 to XT 724296 and a 75 meter by 75 meter LZ at XT 722302.

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E Company - Returned to Phu Cuong at 1045, disassembled rafts and returned to Di An.

B Company, 168th - Performed road maintenance and cleared jungle on both sides of the road from XT699311 to XT730322. At 1230 hours the S-2 section, 168th Engr Bn, apprehended 3 VC ralliers vic XT 679285.

12 Jan:

A Company - 20,000 square meters of jungle were cleared vic XT 716317 and XT 693312. Task Force Alpha was split into two segments; one cutting a swath, and one destroying a total of 50 tons of rice at coordinates XT 619371, XT 619369 and XT 620373. A 40' swath was cut from XT 620373 to XT 618371 where an expedient LZ was cut. The Zippo Platoon from the 1/4 Cav burned four windrows, each 50 meters in length, using 2600 gallons of diesel, 1500 gallons of mogas and 1500 lbs of chemicals.

B Company - 2nd Platoon linked up with the main body of Bravo proceeding North on Route 14 to ford site for RCN. Under OPCON of Dagger, elements of 1st and 2nd Platoon arrived at Ben Sue. Task Force Bravo slashed through the jungle cutting a 50' path from XT 61357 to XT 625352. A 150 meter by 100 meter LZ was cut, and 3 huts and 4 bunkers were destroyed at XT 625352.

C Company - At 1320 hours, the 3rd Platoon lifted off at Lai Khe by CH-47 and descended via 70' ladder into thick jungle at XT 595370 to cut a resupply LZ for 2/28th Infantry. All Engineers were on the ground at 1350 hours, and the LZ was ready at 1715 hours.

D Company - An area adjacent to the bridge site was cleared for the water point section to set up. Fields of fire were improved around the bivouac site. Task Force Delta cleared a 50 foot swath to XT 715290, and destroyed a base camp at XT 725300.

B Company, 168th - While clearing jungle along Route 14, a base camp was discovered at XT 679289. Two Tunnel rats were called to investigate the tunnel complex. While conveying south on Route 14, B Company was ambushed at XT 694250. The ambush was sprung by a command detonated mine, and small arms fire followed. Three VC were sighted, and fire was returned with unknown results. Another mine was located at XT 722242 and blown in place. At 1635 hours dozer team #3, working with B Company, was involved in a fire fight at XT 694242. Gunships were called to suppress the fire. Engagement ended at 1717 hours with no casualties or damages to friendly units. Although harrassed all day, B Company managed to repair 5 1/2 kilometers of Route 14 from XT 682273 to XT 736231.

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13 Jan:

A Company - Employing all available means, all platoons continued to clear jungle with the 1st Platoon clearing a 300 meter by 100 meter swath from XT 699312 to XT 671303, the 2nd Platoon clearing a 100 meter by 900 meter swath vic XT 671303, and the 3rd Platoon clearing a 150 meter by 50 meter swath vic XT 695325. Task Force Alpha proceeded to XT 617367 where they discovered and destroyed 40 tons of rice. The team then continued to XT 636359 where the "Big Red One" LZ was cut. A report was received that A Co, 1/28th Infantry was receiving incoming artillery rounds at XT 634360. One tank dozer and one bulldozer were immediately dispatched to construct an emergency LZ. The LZ was constructed in 15 minutes, and approximately 30 severely wounded infantrymen were evacuated. In the process of cutting this life saving LZ, the HD-16 bulldozer broke a fuel line and caught fire. The burning dozer was further destroyed by firing 3 HEAT rounds from the tank dozer. The destroyed dozer was then buried near the "Big Red One" LZ.

B Company - 1st Platoon supported B troop, 1/4 Cav, and cleared jungle around their base camp. The 2nd Platoon started their destruction of Ben Suc, and captured 4 VC in the process. Task Force Bravo cut a swath through the jungle from XT 625352 to XT 635345, stopping at XT 629347 to cut the "Iron Cross" LZ, and a 100 meter by 100 meter LZ at their final destination.

C Company - The 1st Platoon lifted off at Lai Kho at 1300 hours by CH47 to cut an LZ at XT 594360. Descending via the ladder at 1330 hours, the LZ was completed at 1715 hours.

D Company - Continued to clear jungle around their perimeter. Task Force Delta slashed through the jungle from XT 715290 to XT 722286, leaving a 50' path, and constructed a 100 meter by 100 meter LZ at XT 722286 in order to extract 35 tons of rice.

E Company, 168th - Road repair and jungle clearing was continued on Route 14. A base camp with tunnel complex was discovered at XT 719284, and the tunnel rats from the 168th Engineer Battalion were sent to investigate. Twenty tons of rice was found in the base camp and evacuated. The base camp was destroyed by dozers.

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14 Jan:

A Company - Clearing was begun on Route 14 south of the East-West road splitting the Triangle. The jungle was cleared for 100 meters on each side of the road for a distance of 2.5 kilometers. Task Force Alpha, having an uneventful day, slashed through the jungle to XT 678345.

B Company - Jungle clearing in support of B Troop, 1/4 Cav continued, as did the destruction of houses and trees in Ben Suc. Task Force Bravo cut a 50' swath through grid square XT 6434 and cut a 100 meter by 100 meter LZ at XT 650347.

D Company - Moved out of their bivouac area at 0930 hours and relocated to 1st Engr CP at XT 699307, moving into positions vacated by B Company, 168th Engr Bn. Immediately after opening their CP at 1100 hours, they began clearing jungle from XT 722286 to XT 728290. Task Force Delta proceeded from XT 732277 to XT 725279 destroying 5 tons of rice at the latter location.

B Company, 168th - Departed their bivouac area at XT 699307 at 0800 hours and moved south along Route 14 with elements of the 11th ACR. Three mines ranging in size from 40 to 200 lbs were found by the mine sweepers at XT 698289. All mines were blown in place. After closing their new CP at 1305 hours, clearing of jungle around the perimeter was begun.

15 Jan:

A Company - Cleared trees and brush from XT 677294 to XT 677289, and cleared approximately 1180 rubber trees at XT 686336. Task Force Alpha broke out of the jungle at XT 676350 and moved south clearing jungle on both sides of the road.

B Company - The 2nd Platoon, working in Ben Suc, uncovered large quantities of rice which were subsequently, turned over to the AAVN Airborne task force and evacuated. Destruction of Ben Suc and support of B Troop, 1/4 Cav, continued.

D Company - Using 2400 pounds of demolition and 300 feet of det cord, rubber trees were cleared in the following locations, 50m X 100m area at XT 670303, 45m X 200m area at XT 675317, and a 50m X 150m area at XT 670306. Two dozers placed in D.S. of the 173rd Bde cut a path 8m wide and 2000m long in vic XT 724274.

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B Company, 168th - Cleared jungle on both sides of Route 14 from XT 709250 to XT 690260. A tunnel entrance was discovered at XT 709245, and investigated with negative results. The tunnel entrance was sealed using demolitions. The tunnel destruction team destroyed a tunnel 75 meters long, using 200 lbs of conventional demolitions in Ben Sue.

16 Jan:

A Company - Task Force Alpha emerged from the jungle at XT 710315 at 1000 hours. The five bulldozers and two tank dozers were sent to Lai Khe for maintenance. Jungle clearing on both sides of Route 14 was continued by 1st Platoon.

B Company - 1st Platoon relocated to Dichard CT at 1130 hours. Huts, rice, and trees, were still being leveled and destroyed by the 2nd Platoon in Ben Sue. Task Force Bravo, breaking out of the jungle, cut their final 50' swath from XT 660340 to XT 682343. At 1200 hours the bulldozers and tank dozers were sent to Lai Khe for maintenance. The remaining elements of the task force MON at the Dichard CT.

D Company - In conjunction with B Company's move into Dichard CT, D Company moved out at 0930 hours to XT 725248. Route 14 was swept from XT 668303 to their new location at XT 725245 (8.5 kilometers). The remainder of the day was spent clearing the bivouac area and fields of fire. Task Force Delta cleared 4 LZ's, totaling 10 acres vic XT 726270. While clearing the last LZ, the task force was attacked by a squad size VC force. The squad was driven off with no injuries or damage to equipment.

B Company, 168th - Continued to clear jungle on both sides of Route 14. At 1100 hours elements working on Route 14 received small arms fire at XT 708250. While clearing jungle from the road, 2 VC base camps were discovered at XT 698253 and XT 696258 and destroyed. The tunnel demolition team in Ben Sue destroyed 175 meters of tunnel expending 160 lbs of demolitions.

17 Jan:

A Company - 1st Platoon cleared secondary growth from coordinates XT 679296 to XT 686266, cutting a 2700 meter by 200 meter strip along Route 14. Using chain saws and demolitions, the 3rd Platoon downed 1200 rubber trees in an area 300 meters by 50 meters at XT 692322. The 2nd Platoon stood down for maintenance and held a two hour demolition class.

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B Company - 1st Platoon began clearing a 400 meter strip of jungle and rubber trees around the town of X U Tau. At the end of the day 40 acres had been cleared. In Ban Sue the 2nd Platoon dug a 30 foot deep hole with covers. The hole was then filled with 10,000 lbs of demolitions and 1000 gallons of napalm. The hole was then backfilled with approximately 10 feet of overburden. Chemical fuzes were used to provide a 2 1/2 hour delay. At 1730 hours the fuzes were actuated, and at 1953 hours detonation occurred. The purpose of the exercise was to confine the explosion underground as much as possible in order to destroy any undiscovered tunnels in the area.

D Company - Transportation was furnished to the 11th ACR to haul captured rice out of the Iron Triangle. An 8 meter by 1250 meter swath was cut from XT 726270 to XT 732256, and the jungle was cleared for a distance of 175 meters, 50 meters on each side of the road vic XT 725248.

B Company, 168th - Cleared jungle along Route 14 vic XT 730235. While clearing, a base camp was found at XT 739216. Tunnel rats were called to investigate. The tunnel was destroyed after the tunnel rats had explored 250 meters with negative results.

18 Jan:

A Company - Working south on Route 14, 100 meters of jungle on each side of the road were cleared from XT 686263 to XT 691261. A small base camp was discovered and destroyed at XT 689263. The 2nd and 3rd Platoons blew and cut a total of 1600 rubber trees at XT 692318 and XT 689329 respectively.

B Company - Started road repairs on the east of the Triangle in addition to clearing the 400 meter strip around X U Tau. A 36 foot, 24 inch culvert was put in at XT 733324 by the 1st Platoon. The 2nd Platoon repaired the road south from X U Tau for one kilometer.

D Company - Transportation for evacuation of rice was again supplied to the 11th ACR. The jungle was cleared for 50 meters on each side of the road for 2000 meters vic XT 725248. Task Force Delta cut an eight acre LZ at XT 736254.

B Company, 168th - Clearing jungle from south to north on Route 14, a platoon size base camp was discovered at XT 698253. After investigation with negative results, the camp was destroyed. The tunnel rats searched a tunnel complex at XT 732222. After

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garaged 2100 meters of tunnel, the rats encountered five VC and pulled out. The tunnel demolition team arrived and destroyed the tunnel by the acetylene method. Approximately 2100 meters of tunnel was destroyed.

19 Jan:

B Company - Jungle clearing continued along the east road in the Triangle, and around X I Tau. 2nd Platoon started construction of the "1st Engineer Castle" at XT 6929. An 800 meter base was cut and the outline was completed. The cutting of the outline was supervised and directed from a helicopter hovering overhead. Communication was maintained between the helicopter and the tank dozer.

B Company, 165th - Concentrated their jungle clearing efforts along the roads in the south western portion of the triangle. Dozers uncovered and subsequently destroyed a small base camp located vic XT 7124. Tunnel rats explored an extensive tunnel system discovered by elements of the 11th ACR. 1500 feet of tunnel were destroyed by the acetylene method.

20 Jan:

B Company - Continued to shape, grade and ditch the eastern road in the triangle. Jungle clearing along the road also continued. The 2nd platoon also continued cutting the jungle for the "Castle".

B Company, 165th - Continued to clear jungle along roads in the southwestern portion of the Iron Triangle. At 1055 hours 11 VC suspects were apprehended at XT 690261, questioned by the Richard interpreter and turned over to 173rd Bde. At 1100 hours elements clearing jungle made contact with a VC in a hut at XT 742255. The VC entered a tunnel when fired upon. The tunnel rats were called to search the tunnel. After searching 1100 meters, the tunnel rats were extracted, and the tunnel was destroyed using the acetylene method.

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21 Jan:

A Company - While the 2nd and 3rd Platoons stood down for maintenance, the 1st Platoon cut a 50 foot swath through the jungle from XT 699262 to XT 735265.

B Company - 3rd Platoon continued to cut the "1st Engineer Castle", and at 1400 hours work was stopped as an air strike was called into the vicinity of the castle.

D Company - Cleared jungle 25 meters on each side of the road and widened, shaped, and ditched the road between XT 735255 and XT 737247.

B Company, 168th - Cleared 25 meters of jungle on each side of the road in the extreme south-western sector of the Triangle from XT 735218 to XT 735233. At 0630 hours 8 VC suspects were apprehended on Route 14 at XT 699256. The VCS were brought to the Dichard CP and interrogated. One VC confessed knowledge of a tunnel complex he helped dig at XT 695242.

Headquarters, 1st Engr Bn - A patrol was organized from personnel from the staff sections and accompanied the VCS to the tunnel complex. The VCS led the patrol to the tunnel area and pointed out several air holes and firing ports. Further exploration of the area uncovered a base camp with several tunnel entrances. Due to the late hour, the tunnels were not investigated and the patrol returned to their BOM position.

22 Jan:

A Company - Cut another swath 25 meters wide from XT 699271 north to XT 684307. Work ceased at 1500 hours, the equipment was loaded, and they departed the Iron Triangle at 1630 hours to join at Ben Cat with 173rd Bde.

B Company - Completed clearing the inside of the castle and cut the "1" (1st Engineers) above the castle. Equipment and personnel were brought into the CP at 1600 hours in preparation for the next day's move.

D Company - Proceeded south clearing jungle and repairing the road between XT 737247 and XT 747226. At 1600 hours they closed into their CP to prepare for the following day's move.

B Company, 168th - Cleared jungle along the road in the south-west section of the Triangle, 50 meters wide from XT 733213 to XT 723225. The tunnel destruction team destroyed 400 meters of tunnel at XT 720740 using 240 lbs of carbide with the acetylene method.

18th, 1st Engr Bn - The 1st Engineer "tunnel rats" moved out at 0000 hours to further investigate the tunnels found the day before. After posting security around the base camp, a thorough search was initiated. At first, results were negative. A breather hole was blown open revealing 600 meters of tunnel. Upon exploring the 600 meters, many documents were discovered. 1st Infantry Division tunnel rats were called to assist when CS gas was encountered approximately 600 meters into the tunnel. The documents were immediately evacuated to G2, 1st Division where they were evaluated. Because of the importance of these documents, G2 directed that the search be continued.

23 Jan: At 0900 hours, D Company departed their bivouac area and proceeded north on Route 14 to link up with the other 1st Engineer units. At 1030 hours link-up was completed and Headquarters, 1st Engr Bn, Headquarters, 168th Engrs Bn, and B Company departed the Iron Triangle. B Company, 168th Engrs remained behind to support the 11th ACR. The 1st Engr tunnel rats returned to the base camp with the tunnel rats from the 242nd Cnl Platoon. After exploring 800 meters of tunnel, a trap door was located. The trap door was removed and the additional tunnel was explored with more documents being found. The documents were evacuated through a tunnel entrance approximately 1100 meters from the base camp. Investigation of the area around this newly found exit (XT 699253), revealed another base camp. After limited exploration of this new base camp the tunnel rats moved with Dragoon Bravo.

24 Jan: The tunnel rats departed Dragoon Bravo CP with security and traveled by APC to the tunnel complex and base camp discovered the day before. The tunnels were investigated, yielding more documents which were immediately evacuated to G2, 1st Infantry Division. While searching the tunnels, voices were heard, and a CS grenade was thrown. Five VC were captured as they emerged from the tunnel. The security elements discovered still another hospital base camp complex 300 meters north of the second base camp. Toward the end of the day preliminary investigation of this complex was begun. Tunnel exploration was stopped at 1630 hours and all personnel returned to Dragoon Bravo CP.

25 Jan: Departing Dragoon Bravo CP at 0700 hours, the tunnel rats returned to the hospital complex. Approximately 5 huts were discovered and investigated. All huts were dug in the ground so that the roofs were at ground level. Approximately 300 meters of the hospital complex were explored. Medical textbooks and notebooks, small quantities of medicine, and medical instruments were discovered. The Chemical Tunnel rats returned to the second tunnel complex, where 5 VC were previously flushed out, hoping to investigate further. The presence of CS in the tunnel prevented any further exploration. No additional information was discovered in the hospital complex. Tunnel destruction personnel from 168th Engineers

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married up with tunnel rats at the RCH position.

26 Jan: At 0800 hours, tunnel destruction team departed for hospital complex, and the tunnel rats returned to the CS tunnel complex. The tunnel destruction team began setting up the conventional demolitions and the acetylene equipment. Meanwhile the tunnel rats explored the tunnel which contained CS gas. The hospital complex was destroyed at 1200 hours after receiving word that no additional information had been found by the tunnel rats. Results of the tunnel destruction were excellent; cracks could be seen on the surface for approximately 200 meters. The tunnel destruction team then proceeded to the second tunnel complex. Again using a combination of conventional demolitions and acetylene, the tunnels were destroyed. The results of this second tunnel complex were even better than the first one. (Cracks in the form of a room could be seen on the surface). After using claymore mines to close the entrance of the first tunnel explored, the tunnel rats and demolition team departed the Triangle.

8. RESULTS:

a. Personnel: 1st Engineer Battalion sustained 1 KIA and 7 MIA during the operation. Supporting Engineer units sustained 7 MIA during the same period.

b. Awards: 1st Engineer Battalion personnel received 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 6 Bronze Stars with "V", 36 Bronze Stars, 11 Army Commendation Medals with "V", and 132 Army Commendation Medals for their actions in Operation Cedar Falls. Supporting Engineers from the 79th Engineer Group received 6 Bronze Stars with "V", 40 Bronze Stars, 8 Army Commendation Medals with "V", and 50 Army Commendation Medals. These awards were personally presented by the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division, the Assistant Division Commanders, the CO, 79th Engineer Group and the CO, 1st Engineer Battalion at two awards ceremonies held in the Iron Triangle on 20 Jan, and D1 An Base Camp on 8 Feb. Many of the personnel were recommended for awards by the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

c. Equipment: One HD-16 medium dozer, combat loss.

d. Enemy Losses: 1st Engineer Battalion was credited for 27 VC KIA's (BC) and 38 PW/CHIEU HOIS.

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a. Construction:

(1) Roads and Bridges

- road.
- (a) Repaired and maintained 34 kilometers of
 - (b) Constructed a 4 kilometer by-pass on Route 14.
 - (c) Installed one 36 foot culvert.
 - (d) Constructed one ford.
 - (e) One 160 foot double single bailey constructed.
 - (f) 60 foot AVL installed to replace one damaged span of D.S. Bailey Bridge.

(2) Field fortifications: Individual and command protective emplacements were constructed for several infantry units as well as those constructed for our own use.

(3) Landing Zones: Three Heliborne LZ's, and 31 Ground LZ's were constructed.

(4) Reduction of enemy obstacles:

(a) The following mines were discovered and destroyed:

- 1. 45 ea - Anti-tank mines.
- 2. 10 ea - Anti-personnel mines.
- 3. 19 ea - Claymore mines.

(b) The following ordnance items were discovered and destroyed:

- 1. 8 ea - 25-250 lb bombs.
- 2. 11 ea - 105-175 mm Artillery rounds.
- 3. 49 ea - Mortar rounds.
- 4. 24 ea - Grenades.
- 5. 103 ea - Butterfly bombs.

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(5) Denial Activities:

- (a) 2711 acres/10.9 sq km of jungle cleared.
- (b) 9445 meters of tunnel destroyed.
- (c) 1 - town destroyed (Ben Sue).
- (d) 6 - villages destroyed.
- (e) 27 - base camps destroyed.
- (f) 60 - miscellaneous bunkers destroyed.
- (g) 4 - rubber factories destroyed.
- (h) 1 - hospital and 1 dispensary destroyed.
- (i) 10 - sampans destroyed.
- (j) 672 tons of rice destroyed.

(6) Engineer Reconnaissance - Numerous aerial, ground, and waterborne reconns were performed by 1st Engineer Battalion elements daily.

(7) Water Supply; Ben Cat: Approximately 18,000 gallons of water distributed daily for a total of 270,000 gallons. Water was trucked to bivouac areas where approximately 1200 men were showered daily.

9. ADMINISTRATIVE:

- a. Average strength in the field during the operation - 725.
- b. Supply: Normal supply channels were used for resupply of units in the field with all units being resupplied by road convoys from Lai Khe. Emergency resupply was effected by air. One S4 representative was at the Battalion Forward location, and one was at Lai Khe.
- c. Maintenance: Company maintenance personnel maintained and repaired vehicles and equipment in the field. They were assigned by the Battalion Maintenance Section which stayed with the Battalion Forward CP during the entire operation and provided technical advice and assistance, and assisted in obtaining repair parts. Non-organic heavy maintenance support was supplied by elements of the 79th Engr Group, who set up shop in Lai Khe. Maintenance problems which could

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not be repaired quickly were sent into Lai Khe, where they worked on a 24 hour basis to repair the piece of equipment.

c. Transportation: With the exception of occasional low boy support from U.S. units, organic transportation was used.

d. Communications: TOE FM radios were principle means of communications.

f. Medical: The Battalion Aid Station was operational in the field with the aid station set up with Battalion Forward. The Battalion Surgeon and his medics conducted roving patrols to the work sites daily, both by air and ground, so as to be close to areas of possible trouble.

10. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Jungle Clearing: During Operation Niagara and Cedar Falls an effective method for clearing jungle was developed. Clearing was done using a dozer task force consisting of tank dozers and bull dozers. A tank dozer led the way in order to detonate booby traps in the area. The bull dozers followed cutting swaths approximately 30 meters wide perpendicular to the road and extending the desired distance from the road, normally 100 meters. A similar swath was cut parallel to the initial swath approximately 100 meters away. The jungle between these two swaths was then cleared by operating the dozers from both swaths and parallel to the road. A windrow of cut material was pushed up midway between the two swaths. The windrow was doused with fuel and napalm and burned, thereby reducing its value as an ambush site.

b. Heliborne LZ Missions: Electrically initiated demolitions were used in LZ construction, increasing positive control to reduce delays. All chain demolition blocks and Bangalore torpedoes were used very effectively against bamboo thickets and thick underbrush. The time required for placement of demolition is also reduced by using M1 chain. Also, absolute control and coordination must be constantly maintained with infantry security during use of demolitions to prevent injuries.

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c. Tunnel Destruction: The length of tunnel destroyed and extent of destruction was increased by using conventional demolitions in conjunction with acetylene. Thirty pound charges of TNT and forty pound cratering charges were placed at critical places (rooms, junctions, exits and entrances) in the tunnel complex. These charges were dual primal, connected in series by cut cord and fired electrically. When detonated these conventional charges acted as a booster charge for the acetylene.

d. Dozer LZ Teams: During Operation Cedar Falls infantry battalions were given search and destroy missions. In order to successfully accomplish their missions, several problems had to be resolved: How would the infantry battalions be resupplied? How would they be reinforced? How would they destroy any fortifications and base camps they found? A dozer team in D.S. of each battalion provided the answers. The dozer team consisted of two tank dozers and six bulldozers. Secured by the infantry the dozer teams slashed through the jungle clearing swath as they moved. When the infantry stopped, the dozers cleared resupply LZ's for present and future use and destroyed fortifications and base camps as they were found. Since a resupply LZ could be constructed in a matter of minutes, the infantry could continue their search and destroy operations until late afternoon. Faced with an emergency, the dozers cleared a dust-off LZ in 15 minutes evacuating 30 seriously wounded infantrymen, and saving several lives.

e. Gun Floats: The Quad 50's with platform were mounted on 2 float M476 rafts during Operation Cedar Falls. Two floats were mounted with the Quad 50's and positioned at the intersection of the Thi Tinh and Saigon rivers to control, search and seal the river traffic. The rafts were propelled by 27 foot erection boats and patrolled the rivers during daylight hours.

f. Refueling of Dozer Teams: Refueling of dozer teams was accomplished daily by CH-47. At first, 600 gallon pails with hand pumps were airlifted into the resupply LZ cut by the dozer team. Due to a lack of hand pumps, which had to be shuttled between dozer teams, it took 3 hours to refuel 4 dozer teams. A quicker process was needed. The solution was to gravity feed the fuel. The dozers cut a hole approximately 8 feet deep, and the CH-47 dropped the fuel next to the hole. A hose was connected from the fuel pod, and the dozer was refueled in the freshly dug hole. A further improvement was the use of 55 gallon drums of diesel instead of the 600 gallon pail, thus eliminating the recovery problem.

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
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11. COMMAND ANALYSIS:

Starting with the construction of the D.S. Bailey Bridge at Ben Cat on 21 Dec 66, and ending with the demolition of the tunnel complexes on 26 Jan 67, Operation Cedar Falls was without exception the most significant combat engineering operation of the war to date. New concepts of jungle warfare using dozers to open heretofore inviolable VC strongholds, the emergence of a new "Secret Weapon", the dozer-infantry teams, and combined acetylene and HE tunnel demolitions, all have proven unique, successful, and of tremendous value to future operations. Operations Niagara Falls and Cedar Falls introduced massive jungle clearing in conjunction with tactical infantry operation on a scale never attempted before. A total of 54 bulldozers were under the O.C.N. of the 1st Engineer Battalion. Senior Commanders including MG De Fay, LTC Scorman, and GEN Westmoreland have expressed the opinion that an entire new concept of warfare has been inaugurated. Additionally, the need for a greater number of bulldozers in divisional engineer battalions was dramatically shown. Indeed, the 1st Engineer Battalion lived up to its motto:

"ALWAYS FIRST"

FOR THE COMMANDER:



THOMAS E. BARNES
CPT, CE
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
Special

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION CEDAR FALLS

10 MAR 67

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation CEDAR FALLS was a search and destroy and blocking operation along the SAIGON River to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas, denying the use of the SAIGON River in the sector to VC/NVA forces. This operation was conducted in two phases.

Phase I: (D Day) 25th Inf Div under the guise of normal operations deploys the 196th Bde (reinf) by air and ground means to seize the critical ground overlooking the SAIGON River in the HO BO Woods and destroys VC/NVA forces and installations in sector.

Phase II:

a. (D+1 to D+9) 2d Bde deployed by ground means to blocking positions along the SAIGON River in sector. The 2d and 196th Bdes prevented VC/NVA exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas and controlled the SAIGON River in their sectors to deny its use by VC/NVA forces.

b. Brigade blocking forces conducted detailed search of their sectors and destroyed VC/NVA forces and installations.

2. DATE OF OPERATION: 8 January 1967 - 26 January 1967.

3. LOCATION: Along the SAIGON River from south of the BCI LOI Woods to a line 4 kilometers east of PHU HOA DONG.

4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: II FFORCEV

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Major General Frederick C Weyand, 8 Jan - 26 Jan 67.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

25th Inf Div:

2d Bde, 25th Inf Div;

1st Bn, 27th Inf
2d Bn, 27th Inf
2d Bn, 34th Armor
1st Bn, 8th Arty (CS)
3d Bn, 13th Arty (-) (GS)
B Co, 65th Engr Bn (-)

DOWN GRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl 6

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196th Inf Bde (LT)(SEP)

2d Bn, 1st Inf
1st Bn (M), 5th Inf
2d Bn (M), 22d Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
F Trp, 17th Cav
3d Bn, 82 Arty
A Btry, 2d Bn, 77th Arty
175th Engr Co

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Air Support.

During Phases I and II air support was provided by fighter bombers and heavy bombers. A total of 409 sorties were flown in the area of operations from 8 Jan - 26 Jan 67. B-52 Strikes were flown in the AO during the period in support of the operation. They are as follows:

<u>DATE/TIME STRUCK</u>	<u>AREA COVERED</u>
060200 Jan 67	XT626303 - XT634314 XT648282 - XT656296
070240 Jan 67	XT582312 - XT586303 XT612322 - XT616312
070200 Jan 67	XT649290 - XT660293 XT653270 - XT669274
061600 Jan 67	XT654248 - XT665270 XT660242 - XT672246
190400 Jan 67	XT570352 - XT601359 XT574340 - XT604347

b. Artillery Support:

(1) 5 January: A command and control element from HQ Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty and A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty displaced from CU CHI Base Camp to vicinity TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center. A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8" - 175mm), moved from CU CHI to TRUNG LAP and was GSR to the 25th Inf Div. A platoon of M42's from B Btry, 5th Bn, 2d Arty (AWSP) were attached to 3d Bn, 13th Arty (-) to provide security for the fire support base. The MTQ-4 Radar Section from 7th Bn, 11th Arty was attached to the 3d Bn, 13th Arty at TRUNG LAP.

(2) 6-7 January: No change in status or location of units.

(3) 8 January: Operation CED.R FALLS commenced with the 1st Bn, 8th Arty, located in CU CHI Base Camp, providing direct support to the 2d Bde. A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 3d Bn, 82d Arty from its fire support base at TRUNG LAP. D Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty

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was in general support of the 25th Division from its location in CU CHI Base Camp.

(4) 9-12 January: No change in status or location of units.

(5) 13 January: C Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty displaced from base camp to vic XT74701464 to better support the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. The 8" platoon of A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty displaced from TRUNG LAP to vic TON SON NHUT and an 8" platoon of D Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty moved from CU CHI to the TRUNG LAP fire support base and was attached to A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty.

(6) 14 January: No change in status or location of units.

(7) 15 January: 8" platoon from A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty returned to TRUNG LAP and the 8" platoon from D Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty was detached from A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty and returned to CU CHI Base Camp.

(8) 16-20 January: No change in status or location of units.

(9) 21 January: C Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty displaced from XT74701464 to CU CHI Base Camp.

(10) 22-24 January: No change in status or location of units.

(11) 26 January: Operation CEDAR FILLS terminated. HQ Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty (-); A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty; A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty and the platoon of M42's from B Btry, 5th Bn, 2d Arty displaced by convoy from TRUNG LAP to CU CHI Base Camp.

(12) Special Equipment and Techniques. During the operation, Armor Infantry units established multiple base camps and forward positions in the FILHOL Plantation and HO BO and BOI LOI Woods. Up to this time there had been little or no target area survey because of the lack of high ground for a target area base and because of the requirement for an inordinate amount of security for isolated survey parties. Taking advantage of the security offered by the forward bases and by using DME's with NUI BA DEN as a control base, the survey parties were able to establish control in areas that are frequently target areas.

(13) Commanders Analysis. With the artillery fire support originating from CU CHI Base Camp and TRUNG LAP, administrative and supply matters were greatly simplified. Supporting from the base camp enabled the firing batteries to improve defenses and living conditions.

(14) Total missions and rounds fired:

- (a) Missions: Support 515, H&I 2,276.
- (b) Ammunition expended: HE 14,644, WP 868, ILL 386
- (c) Results: 12 VC KIA. (BC), 40 VC KIA. (poss), 6 bunkers, 25 sampans, 23 buildings destroyed and 27 buildings damaged.

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8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. General: The area of operation for the 25th Inf Div during Operation CEDAR FALLS encompassed the area from south of the BOI LOI Woods to a line 4 kilometers east of PHU HOA DONG. The division positions were located along the SAIGON River in former VC safe havens in both the HO BO Woods and FILHOL Plantation. Enemy units operating in and around the AO included the 1st, 2d, 7th, and 8th Bns of the 165th A Regt, elements of the D 14 Local Forces Bn, elements of 1R 4, and local guerrillas. The area contained many foxholes, trenches, tunnels, bunkers and underground fortifications. The VC utilized the SAIGON River to a great extent in moving supplies and equipment.

b. Terrain: The terrain in the area of operation varied from broad, flat plains of wet rice land to scrub brush and forested areas with heavy canopy. Cover in the rice paddies, marshes, and swamps was limited to road embankments and dikes. Concealment in the rice land was poor with fair to good concealment in the forests and high marsh grass area. Fields of fire were poor in the forests to generally good in the rice lands and marshes, however, fields of fire were limited by stream banks and vegetation. Obstacles to overland movement were the interconnecting streams, ditches, and dikes in the rice land marshes.

c. Weather: The weather during the operation was generally clear to partly cloudy with good visibility and light winds. The maximum temperature was 93 degrees and the minimum was 63 degrees with an average high of 86 degrees and low of 68 degrees. Total rainfall for the period was .2 inches.

d. Operations: Light enemy contact was made initially as friendly units moved to the occupied blocking positions in the HO BO Woods and FILHOL Plantation. In the extreme eastern portion of the division sector, heavy contact was made with forces of the 2d Bn, 165 A Regt on 3 January 1967. Elements of the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. The enemy encountered by 1st Bn, 27th Inf withdrew under the cover of darkness on the night of 3-9 January. Throughout the remainder of the operation no other heavy contact was made with the enemy forces and most of the body count resulted from contacts with small groups of VC. During hours of darkness, maximum use was made of ambushes along the SAIGON River and several VC were killed by ambush patrols as they sought to escape from the CEDAR FALLS Operational Area. Search and Destroy Operations accounted for most of the daylight activity of friendly forces. Through these S & D operations, several VC base camps along with large amounts of rice, equipment, ammunition and weapons were located. A large tunnel complex was discovered by the 1st Bn (H), 5th Inf in the HO BO Woods on 21 Jan at coordinates XT650235. The tunnel is believed to have been the location of a VC headquarters unit. It was destroyed after it had been fully searched.

9. MISSION: To conduct S & D and blocking operations south and west along the SAIGON River to prevent infiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas and to destroy VC base areas.

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10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

- a. 2d Bde: Attached: 2d Bn, 34th Armer, effective D-1.
B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav, effective 1900H D Day.
B Co, 55th Ingt Bn, effective 1900 H D Day.
MED element, effective 1900H D Day.
Attach: 1st Bn (H), 5th Inf to 196th Bde, effective 1900 H D-1.

- (1) Establish blocking positions in sector along SAIGON River early on D+1 to prevent VC/NVA exfiltration from the IRON TRIANGLE area.
- (2) Maintain control of the SAIGON River to prevent its use by VC/NVA forces.
- (3) Destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in sector.
- (4) Conduct BUDDY Operations in conjunction with 2d Bn, 7th ARVN Regt to destroy VC/NVA infrastructure in PHU HOA DOIE and expand government control over that village.
- (5) Continue reorganization of 4th Bn, 23d Inf in base camp.
- (6) Be prepared to release 4th Bn, 23d Inf to 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in the event 25th Inf Div or II FFORCEV reserve is committed.

- b. 196th Inf Bde: Attached: 1st Bn (H), 5th Inf, effective 1900 H D-1.
2d Bn (H), 23d Inf, effective 0600H D-1.
B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav, effective 1900H D-1.

- (1) Conduct airborne operations on D Day to destroy VC/NVA forces in sector with priority of effort in objective ...
- (2) On D+1 secure high ground overlooking SAIGON River in sector and establish blocking positions to prevent exfiltration from the THLEN DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE.
- (3) Maintain control of SAIGON River in sector to deny its use to VC/NVA forces.
- (4) Conduct detailed search of sector to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations.
- (5) Upon shift of left limiting point from vic XT571349 to a point east of BEN SUC be prepared to release control of B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav to parent unit.
- (6) Maintain security of base camp and retain responsibility of securing Route 26 in LP BLUE.

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(7) Be prepared to release one battalion to the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in the event 25th Inf Div or II FPOCEV reserve is committed. If this battalion is released, 196th Bde is relieved from responsibility for securing of Route 26.

11. EXECUTION:

a. General: On D-2 (6 Jan 67) the Div, under the guise of normal operations, deployed the 196th Inf Bde reinforced. The 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf moved from DIU TIENG along the southern edge of the BOI LOI Woods to an over-night position. At the same time the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf with Trp B, 3d Sdn, 4th Cav attached moved into the area north of the TRUNG LIP Ranger Training Center to initially open a route and secure artillery fire support bases. The 3d Bn, 21st Inf and supporting artillery consisting of the 3d Bn, 82d Arty and 1 Btry, 2d Bn, 77th Arty was lifted into these bases. The 196th Inf Bde CP and elements of the 3d Bn, 13th Arty and 2d Bn, 32d Arty moved by convoy to TRUNG LIP. On D-1 the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf secured an LZ for the 2d Bn, 1st Inf. All elements less the fire support base security forces moved to blocking positions along the SAIGON River at the same time the 2d Brigade moved to blocking position along the SAIGON River north of the FILHOL Plantation and NHA VIEG. They deployed with TF 2d Bn, 34th Armor in the north, TF 2d Bn, 27th Inf in the center, along with 2d Bn, 7th ARVN Regt and 1st Bn, 27th Inf in the south. During the nights a maximum amount of ambushes were emplaced along the river. During daylight hours minimum forces secured the river allowing extensive S & D operations in the VC base areas. Control of traffic on the SAIGON River was the responsibility of the 25th Inf Div while the 1st Inf Div was responsible for the control at the junction of the SAIGON-THI TINH Rivers. The 1st Inf Div with the 173d Bn Bde and 11th Arty Cav Regt blocked enemy escape routes east of the THI THAN River; executed an air-cavilo assault north of the Iron Triangle and then executed S&D operations south through the area. Highlights of the operation were: (1) B-52 strikes exploited by ground followup and occupation; (2) the effective denial of VC escape routes and use of the SAIGON River as evidenced by the high casualty toll suffered by the VC through out the operation; (3) the discovery of a major VC HQ's tunnel complex by the 1/5 (M) Inf in the HOBO/BOI LOI Woods complex from which exploitation resulted in the recovery of important and timely intelligence; (4) the US and ARVN cooperation in the evacuation and relocation of personnel and live stock from the village of BEN SUC to a new Life Hamlet; (5) the use of a 3d Riverline RAG Task Force enabling the 196th Inf Bde and 2d Bde to search thoroughly along and beneath both sides of the SAIGON River resulting in the exploitation of several VC safe havens; (6) the destruction of numerous VC fortifications and structures along with the discovery of many VC cache sites and (7) the effective fire support provided by the supporting artillery from the forward fire support bases and CU CHI plus the integration by tactical air support greatly aided the success of the operation; (8) the utilization of bull dozers and engineer equipment on the outskirts of PHU HOA DONG to isolate that village from the VC in the FILHOL Plantation.

b. Significant Actions:

(1) On 8 January, B Co, 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf, located 10 tons of rice, 1500 gals of fish sauce, 2 boats (one with motor), 12 CEJ's and 3 Bicycles via XT566323. All were destroyed except the rice and motor which were evacuated.

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- (2) On 8 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf Ambush Patrol engaged an unknown number of VC with SA and M fire vic XT733197. Results: 5 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification). One US Carbine and one Russian rifle were captured and evacuated.
- (3) On 9 January, C Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22d Inf, destroyed 2 underground fortifications vic XT597324. In the same area 35.65 tons of rice were destroyed.
- (4) On 9 January, D Co, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor engaged 15 VC on a raft with 90mm fire vic XT683222. Results: 15 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification).
- (5) On 10 January, B Co, 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf, destroyed 5 VC structures vic XT 563313. In the same area 100 tons of rice and 100 gals of tar were located and evacuated.
- (6) On 10 January, C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, destroyed 30 underground fortifications vic XT744155 and 30 underground fortifications vic XT734184.
- (7) On 11 January, A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, destroyed 1 Sampan, 1100 lbs of rice, 9 underground fortifications and 20 VC structures. B Co destroyed 61 underground fortifications and 1 Sampan vic XT7319.
- (8) On 12 January, A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, conducted an airmobile operation from the SUICON River to vic XT747142 and conducted S&D Operations resulting in the capture of 4 tons of rice, 2,000 rds of SA, 2 Sampans, 1 underground fortification, 1 VC structure and 5500 lbs of rice destroyed.
- (9) On 12 January, between 2000 and 2130, A Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, engaged 13 VC in Sampans vic XT715214 to XT716210. Results: 13 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification) and 2 Sampans destroyed.
- (10) On 13 January, C Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf engaged 4 VC in a Sampan vic XT573255. Results: 4 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification) and 1 Sampan destroyed.
- (11) On 13 January, B Co, 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT569306 with SA and M fire. Results: 6 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification).
- (12) On 15 January, B Trp, 2d Sqdn, 4th Cav destroyed 1 underground fortification, 4 tunnels, 60 60mm rds, and 5 grenades vic XT592288.
- (13) On 16 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 1st Inf engaged 13 VC in a Sampan attempting to cross river vic XT673287. Results: 10 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (POSS) and 1 Sampan destroyed. Miscellaneous documents were captured and evacuated from the same area.
- (14) On 16 January, B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav destroyed 2 underground fortifications and 1 tunnel vic XT615305. One shotgun, 1 cal .45 S&W, 2 GHIOM rifles, 1 pellet gun, 1 cal .25 rifle were captured and evacuated.
- (15) On 17 January, B Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22d Inf, located 14 tons of polished rice vic XT590305, which was evacuated. In the same location 12.5 tons of rice were destroyed.

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(16) On 19 January, B Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf located 9 VC KIA (BC) via XT664274 that were a result of operations conducted by the unit in the area. Five tons of rice were located and evacuated.

(17) On 20 January, Co C, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, engaged 6 VC in a Sampan via XT718213. Results: 5 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification), 1 VC PW and 1 cal .45 pistol captured and evacuated.

(18) On 20 January, B Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, with the assistance of a HOI CHANH located the following: 2 Springfield Rifles, 2 US SMG, 1 French Rifle, 1 Mauser Rifle, 6 CHICOM Carbines, one Shotgun, and 700 rds SA ammo via XT661281.

(19) On 21 January, A Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, located a tunnel complex consisting of a main tunnel 600 meters long and 10 branch tunnels via XT650235. Sixty pounds of documents were evacuated.

(20) On 22 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, apprehended 3 VC PW's via XT704210. VC PW's led the unit to XT704216 where the following items were destroyed: 3 hand grenades, 10 AT Mines, 4 homemade bangalore torpedoes, and two 155mm rds. Located and evacuated were: 2 commerial radios, miscellaneous web equipment, 1300 rds SA ammo, 4 CHICOM carbines, 1 Russian rifle and 1 Mauser rifle.

c. Revolutionary Development Activities: MEDCAP Teams were used and helpd Hard items distributed in PHU HOA DONG. Mass evacuation and relocation of the villagers and livestock of BEN SUC to a New Life Hamlet was completed.

d. ARVN participation: The 2d Bn, 7th ARVN Regt, conducted successful seal and search operations in PHU HOA DONG in coordination and conjunction with the 2d Bde. The 30th RIG of the 3d Riverine Zone provided boats to allow the banks of the SLECON River to be checked for VC caches and sampans.

12. RESULTS:

a. US Losses:

- (1) Personnel: 40 KIA, 156 WIA.
- (2) Equipment: 3 APC destroyed, 3 APC damaged (moderate), 2 APC's damaged (heavy), 1 tank dozer damaged (heavy), 1 tank destroyed, one 1/2 ton truck damaged (heavy)

b. Enemy Losses:

(1) Total Personnel Losses:

VC KIA (BC)	331
VC KIA (poss)	155
VC PW's	39
HOI CHANHS	147
Detainees	147

(2) Total Material Captured:

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(a) Small Arms Weapons:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Rifle, Cal 30, M-1 US	7
Rifle, 7.92mm, Mauser	7
Rifle, AK-47, Soviet Assault	6
Rifle, U/I	5
Rifle, U/I, Soviet	2
Rifle, MAS-36, French	3
Rifle, Type 56, CHICOM	7
Rifle, Cal .25	1
Rifle, Enfield	1
Rifle, Springfield, (US)	2
Rifle, 7.62mm, M-14 (US)	1
Carbine, Cal .30 (US)	12
Carbine, Type 53 CHICOM	35
Carbine, 7.62mm, Soviet	3
SG, Cal .45, (US)	4
SMG, 7.92mm	2
SMG, CHICOM	1
Pistol, Cal. 45, (US)	6
Pistol, Hernandez	8
Pistol, 9mm, P-38	4
Shotgun, U/I	2
Gun, Pellet	1

(b) Crew Served Weapons:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Launcher, RPG-2 Rocket	3
B.R., Cal .30, (US)	2
Rockets, U/I	3

(c) HE Rounds:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
-------------	-----------------

82mm Mortar	2 rds
(d) SA ammo	7717 rds
(e) Rico	253.85 tons
(f) Miscellaneous:	NONE

(3) Total Material Destroyed:

(a) HE Rounds

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
.155mm	10 rds
105mm	18 rds
90mm	1 rd
81mm	23 rds
60mm	117 rds

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Bombs	15
4.2 Inch	2 rds
82mm	1 rd
57mm	26 rds
RPG-2	2 rds
8 Inch	3 rds
75mm	3 rds
2.75	6 rockets
175mm	1 rd

(b) Mines and Grenades:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Bangalore Torpedos	4
CBU	135
Grenades	451
Shape Charge	1
AT Mines	101
AP Mines	59

(c) SA Ammo: 3013 rds

(d) Miscellaneous:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
TNT	4 lbs
Salt	200 lbs
Outboard Motors	6
Bicycles	10
Sawpans	11
Printers Ink	5 gals
Tar	5 gals
Cement	600 lbs
Documents	285 lbs
Books	Four 5 gal cans
CHICO flashlight batteries	260
Roll of tin	1 roll (1000' X 3')
Gasoline	10 gals
Typewriters	2
Grenades	10
Medical Supplies	15 lbs
Mask, gas (VC)	121
Mask, protective, (US)	4
Sewing Machine	1
Batteries	24
Misc clothing and web equip	0
Civilian Radios	6
Camera	1
Tape Recorders	2

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Sound Tapes	74
Forging Kit	1
Rolls of Wire	2
Fish Sauce	1500 gals
Outboard Motors	3
Boats	4
Trenches	14
Bicycles	9
Salt	1200 lbs
Sampans	145
Claymore Mines	7
Fortholes	129
TIF	292 lbs
Printing Press	1
Bridges	6
Kerosene	5 gals
Punji Pits	26
Tunnels	521
VC Structures	340
Rice	100.4 tons

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Logistics. For a listing of logistic problems encountered see the After Action Report of the 25th Inf Div SUPCOM (App 1).

b. Signal. The circuits established to support this operation are described in the 125th Signal Bn After Action Report (App 1).

c. Aviation. For Aviation Operations see 25th Aviation Bn After Action Report (App 1).

14. CIVIC ACTION:

a. 196th Bde:

- (1) Conducted a total of 3 MEDCAPS at TRUNG LAP treating 301 patients.
- (2) Provided 2,500 lbs of captured rice to ARVN dependents at TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center.
- (3) Constructed 5,000 meters of road vicinity TRUNG LAP.

b. 2d Bde:

- (1) Conducted a total of 10 MEDCAPS vicinity of PHU HOA DONG treating 2,123 patients.
- (2) Distributed clothing to approximately 1,000 people at PHU HOA DONG

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- (3) Constructed a swing for school at PHU HOA DONG.
- (4) Constructed playground at PHU HOA DONG.
- (5) Delivered 4,000 lbs of captured rice (sour) to PF Compound at TIN PHU TRUNG to be used as hog feed.

c. Division:

(1) Provided clothing and commodities to 83 people evacuated from operational area.

(2) Provided 4,000 lbs of captured rice to KMU NGHIA Province Chief.

d. Civic Action by Divisional units was confined generally in the vicinity of TRUNG LAP (XT5921) and PHU HOA DONG (XT7119) villages. The proximity of US forces has enabled units to increase civic action projects in those villages. The security provided by 2d Bde has enabled the district chief of PHU HOA DONG to reestablish the district office at PHU HOA DONG from PARIS TAN QUI. Evacuation of non-combatants was primarily handled by 1st Div units. 25th Div was involved in the evacuation of 83 non-combatants who were subsequently returned to GVN control at TRUNG LAP New Life Hamlet.

e. Psychological Operations:

(1) The task organization of the division had a HB, light Mobile (Loudspeaker Team) attached to 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div and an ARVN PSYOPS team attached to the 196th Lt Inf Bde. The 246th PSYOP Company was in general support of the 25th Inf Div PSYOP program.

(2) The general attitude of the population toward the US forces was one of mistrust and concern. In the area in and around the village of PHU HOA DONG (XT7121), the population was extremely hostile as this had been a Viet Cong stronghold for many years.

(3) Psychological Operations were directed against enemy targets, emphasizing Allied Might and Introductory Themes. As the operation continued, emphasis was placed on themes to convince the VC that their situation had deteriorated in order to induce them to rally. For this purpose, GHIU HOI and inevitable victory themes were used. Target areas were systematically covered to reach all intended target audiences. On D+1 the 246th PSYOP Company and brigades commenced leaflet and loudspeaker operations in the AO. Preplanned operations to D+5 were executed and then conducted as the tactical situation presented itself. Ground mounted loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted on a nightly basis at (XT7121) across the SAIGON River. There were 3 HOI GHIUHS exploited with personalized leaflets and 4 with loudspeaker tapes. Altogether there were 976,265 leaflets dropped and 29 loudspeaker sorties flown in support of the operation. Total aerial broadcast time was 10 hours and 40 minutes. Total ground broadcast time was 17 hours and 20 minutes. Approximately 70% of all loudspeaker operations were conducted at night.

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29 (4) The operation resulted in 37 HOI CHANHS who returned, 11 of them to US units. Those who were interviewed acknowledged seeing leaflets and hearing loudspeaker broadcasts, and admitted that they were to some extent influenced by the propaganda.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl

Appendix-1--

Appendix-2-- Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

James D. Dethlefsen
JAMES D. DETHLEFSEN
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96256

AVBFHO

7 March 1967

SUBJECT: Extract from ORLL, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Period Ending
31 January 1967 (U)

CEDAR FALLS (5-25 January 67)

The Brigade Task Force consisted of: 2/1 Inf, 3/21 Inf, 3/82 Arty, F Troop, 17th Cavalry, 175th Engineers Company, 2/22 (M) Inf, 1/5 (M) Inf, B Troop, 3/4 Cavalry, 2/13 Arty (-) and A Btry 2/77 Arty. The mission of the Brigade was to locate and destroy key VC installations and fortifications, deny the VC the use of the area as a logistical base and headquarters and to establish blocking positions to prevent exfiltration by the VC across the Saigon River. The operation began when the Brigade Command Post moved overland to TRUNG LAP. On 6 January 1/5 (M) Inf moved to secure LZ's vicinity FSB #2 (XT6023) and FSB #3 (XT5925) for an air mobile assault by companies A and B, 3/21 Inf. These two companies provided security for the FSB's and the eventual airlift by CH-47 of Btry B, Btry C and Btry A, 3/82 Arty to FSB #2 and FSB #3 respectively. Battery A, 3/82 Arty and A 2/77 Arty were located at FSB #3. Battery A, 3/13 Arty was located at FSB #1 and secured by Company C, 3/21 Inf. On 7 January 1/5 (M) Inf moved and secured LZ Victor for an airmobile assault by 2/1 Inf. The 2/22 (M) Inf attacked toward Obj C vicinity (XT5631). During the remainder of the operation, 3/21 Inf secured FSB #1, FSB #2 and FSB #3 and conducted company sized airmobile assaults to search and clear villages, acting mainly on information received from Returnees. F Troop, 17th Cavalry and 175th Engineers Company cleared and secured routes for necessary resupply convoys. The remaining Brigade elements conducted search and destroy operations in some and established blocking positions along the Saigon River. The 175th Engr Co improved roads from TRUNG LAP and constructed new roads to FSB 2 and 3, permitting ground resupply. The occupation of blocking positions proved highly successful as large numbers of VC were killed attempting to flee from the area North of the river and the Iron Triangle. Information from "Returnees" assisted the Brigade in locating cache sites and large tunnel complexes. It was in these tunnel complexes that the most valuable intelligence information was gained. Significant results achieved during Operation CEDAR FALLS by the Brigade included: 220 VC KIA (BC), 66 VC KIA (poss), 21 VC (PW), 357.1 tons of rice and 73 weapons captured, and numerous documents of vital interest to Army Intelligence, including key maps of the battle area, and VC After Action Battle Reports.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
Office of the ACofS for Security, Plans and Operations
APO 96307

AVCA GO-O

11 May 1967

Logistical Critique 3-67 Operation CEDAR FALLS

1. (C) Operation CEDAR FALLS, a search and destroy operation, was conducted in the THANH DIEN Forestry reserve and the IRON TRIANGLE (center of mass XT 7030)*from 8 January 1967 to 26 January 1967 by II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV). The II FFORCEV task organization included units of the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, 196th Infantry Brigade, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and ARVN airborne and ranger battalions. Units began withdrawing from Operation CEDAR FALLS on 14 January. The operation terminated on 26 January.

2. (U) Tactical contact was sporadic throughout the operation.

3. (C) Support Operations: Logistical support for Operation CEDAR FALLS was provided by 1st Logistical Command's three major subordinate commands in the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ): US Army Support Command, Saigon (USASUPCOM, Sgn); 4th Medical Brigade; and 4th Transportation Command.

a. USASUPCOM, Sgn established a Forward Support Area (FSA) at Phu Loi (XT 8516)*to provide C1 I and C1 III support for the 11th ACR. A C1 V FSA was established at Lai Khe (XT7738)*for support of 9 Inf Bns, 2 Armd Cav Sqdns (non-divisional), 1 Cav Sqdn (-), 16 Arty Btry's 105mm (96 tubes), 2 Arty Bn, 155mm (36 tubes), 1 Arty Btry 8" (4 tubes), 1 Arty Btry 8"/175mm (2 tubes ea) and 2 Arty Btrys (AWSP). Both FSAs became operational on 8 Jan 67. The Phu Loi FSA closed on 26 Jan 67. The Lai Khe C1 V FSA remained operational to support other 1st Inf Div operations. Throughout the operation unit distribution of C1 V was provided to the 25th Inf Div at its Cu Chi base camp (XT 6514)*and fire support base (FSA) located vic Trung Lap (XT 5921)*. The evacuation of refugees from Ben Suc (XT 5833)*and the IRON TRIANGLE and support of the Phu Cong refugee Center (XT 8215)*was a major logistical concern. Pre-operational planning envisioned civilian agencies evacuating refugees and in conjunction with provincial officials setting up and operating a temporary refugee center vic Phu Quong. It was soon evident that military assistance and assets were required in transporting refugees and establishing and operating the refugee center. From 9 January until 2 February, trucks with drivers were provided daily to assist USAID at the refugee camp. A full-time liaison officer was provided to the 1st Infantry Division Control and Coordination Center at the refugee camp to insure that supplies and logistical services, which were above the civilian agency's and 1st Inf Div capability to provide were provided in an expeditious manner.

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SUBJECT: Logistical Critique 3-67 Operation CEDAR FALLS

Examples of supplies furnished for use at the camp were: Two 5,000 gallon water trailers, 15 four-hundred gallon water trailers, 450 five man hex tents and 25 GP medium tents. Services provided included delivery of potable water and operation of a water point.

b. 44th Medical Brigade provided hospitalization, evacuation and medical regulating in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS. There were 2 dustoff helicopters located at Lai Khe and 2 dustoff helicopters at Cu Chi for air evacuation. Back-up medical evacuation helicopters were located at Long Binh and Saigon. Medical regulating was provided by a team operating out of Lai Khe. Casualties were evacuated when appropriate to a surgical hospital at Bien Hoa; evacuation hospitals at Cu Chi, Long Binh and Vung Tau; and a field hospital at Saigon.

c. 4th Transportation Command provided medium boat support for Operation CEDAR FALLS. On 11 January three Landing Craft Mechanized Mark VIII (LCM-8's) sailed for Phu Quoc on the upper Saigon River, joining ARVN River Assault Group (RAG) boats which had been in support of the operation since 8 January 1967. Direct operational control was assumed by the US Navy advisor to the RAG. Boats committed to movement of refugees from Ben Suc to Phu Quoc. These US Army boats began operations with the RAG unit on 12 January 1967. 4 additional vessels were committed and sailed from Saigon on 13 January. From 14 January through 17 January all 7 LCM-8's participated in the movement of military personnel and cargo and evacuation of refugees, livestock, and personnel. On 18 January the vessels rejoined their parent organization.

d. Resupply to the Lai Khe and Phu Loi PSAs was accomplished by land line of communication (LOC) utilizing Route 13 from Saigon and Long Binh. Route security was provided by the 1st Infantry Division. Resupply to Cu Chi and the Trung Lap fire support base was by land LOC utilizing Route 1 from Saigon and Long Binh. Route security was provided by the 25th Inf Div.

e. Lessons Learned:

(1) CHL7 (Chinook) helicopters were provided by II FFORCEV to evacuate large numbers of patients from hospitals in forward areas to Long Binh and Vung Tau on maximum of four hour notification.

(2) On 17 January, a CHL7 helicopter loaded a landing craft with 62 tons of 105mm howitzer ammunition in 35 minutes, executing a 400 meter shuttle from the gun position to the LCM in the stream. The operation was extremely smooth, and indicated an excellent technique for water/air resupply in areas where materials handling equipment and beaches limit over the shore discharge.

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SUBJECT: Logistical Critique 3-67 Operation CEDAR FALLS

(3) As the evacuation of refugees came to an end, the number of Vietnamese skilled in handling water buffalo decreased at Ban Suc. The result was an attempt by US troops to assist in handling these animals. Several of the buffalo "spooked" at the presence of strangers. One enlisted man was gored by a water buffalo. Use of civilian herdsmen who know the animals would speed up loading and reduce the danger of injury to US troops unfamiliar in the handling of water buffalo. After several trips, it was established that 70 head of water buffalo is the maximum safe capacity of an LCM-8.

4. (U) Personnel: The following personnel were provided by the 1st Logistical Command in support of Operation CEDAR FALLS.

Operation CEDAR FALLS

a. Phu Loi FSA

OIC	- 1 Officer
Class I	- 12 EM
Class III	- 8 EM
Total	21 Personnel

b. Lai Khe FSA

OIC	- 1 Officer
Class V	- 1 WO
	- 38 EM
Maint	- 4 EM
TTP*	- 8 EM
Total	52 Personnel

*These personnel operated a Trailer Transfer Point for shuttle operations.

c. Landing Craft Operations

OIC	- 1 Officer
Crew	- 28 EM
Total	29 Personnel

+ Map references: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, series L7014, sheets 6231 I & II; 6230 I; 6331 III & IV; and 6330 IV.

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Logistical Critique 3-67 Operation CEDAR FALLS

for Arthur R. Bicknell
WALLACE D. PARDEE LTC
Colonel, GS
ACofS, SP&O

Annex A - Logistical Support Data (Phu Loi) Operation CEDAR FALLS
Annex B - Logistical Support Data (Lai Khe) Operation CEDAR FALLS
Annex C - Logistical Support Data (Movement of Cargo by LCM-8) Operation CEDAR FALLS

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- 2 - CG, USARV G-3
- 2 - CG, USARV G-4
- 3 - CC, I FFORCEV
- 3 - CG, II FFORCEV
- 3 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div
- 3 - CG, 1st Inf Div
- 3 - CG, 4th Inf Div
- 3 - CG, 9th Inf Div
- 3 - CG, 25th Inf Div
- 3 - CG, 1/101st Abn Div
- 3 - CG, 173d Abn Bde
- 3 - CG, 196th Inf Bde

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ANNEX A
Operation CEDAR FALLS (Pm 101)
PARENT UNIT: 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
TASK ORGANIZATION: 1 Regt Sq, 2 Arm Cav Sqds, 1 Air Cav Trp (-)

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PERIOD COVERED FROM 7 Jan 67 TO 24 Jan 1967

COMMODITY	EST DAY OF SUPPLY	STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE	SUPPLY O/N BEGIN PD	SUPPLY O/N END OF PD	TOTAL RESUPPLY	TOTAL CONSUMPTION	AVERAGE DAILY RESUPPLY	AVERAGE DAILY CONSUMPTION
CLASS I (RATIONS)	2,200	6,600	0	1,750	43,108	39,358	2,395	2,187
JFM (GALLONS)	6,000	18,000	0	1,700	30,000	28,300	1,667	1,572
AVIOL (GALLONS)	1,000	3,000	840	600	5,000	5,200	278	289
MOULS (GALLONS)	7,700	23,100	0	5,200	64,600	59,400	3,589	3,300
DIESSEL (GALLONS)	9,400	28,200	0	22,000	54,600	32,600	2,033	1,811
TOTAL TONNAGE	92	276	3	116	690.5	577	38	32

NOTE: CI V was provided by the Lat Kba FSA

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AMWZ B
OPERATION CEDAR FALLS (Lat Ene)
PARENT UNIT: 1ST Inf Div
PERIOD COVERED FROM 6 Jan TO 24 Jan 67
TASK ORGANIZATION: 9 Inf Bns, 2 Armd Cav Sqdns, 1 Cav Sqdn (-), 16 Arty Btlys 105mm (96 tubes),
2 Arty Bns 155mm (36 tubes), 1 Arty Btry 8" (4 tubes), 1 Arty Btry 8" 1/5mm (2 tubes on)
2 Arty Btry (AMSP)

COMMODITY	EST DAY OF SUPPLY	STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE	SUPPLY O/N BEGIN PD	SUPPLY O/N END OF PD	TOT-L RESUPPLY	TOTAL CONSUMPTION	AVER-GE DAILY RESUPPLY	AVER-GE DAILY CONSUMPTION
CLASS V (3/7)	661	1,983	524	2,829	8,105	6,099	142	321
TOTAL TONNAGE	661	1,983	524	2,829	8,105	6,099	142	321

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ANNEX: C Logistical Support Data (Movement of Cargo by LCM-8)

OPERATION: CEDAR FALLS


Significant items of military and civilian cargo moved by LCM-8's were:

a. Bulk military cargo	98 tons
b. Pieces of military equipment	21
c. Passengers military	237
civilian	354
d. Sacked rice	383 tons
e. Livestock	
(1) Water buffalo	242 head
(2) Cattle	244 head
(3) Hogs	39 head
(4) Chickens	131
(5) Ducks	130
(6) Dogs	8
f. Miscellaneous	
(1) Trucks (civilian)	1
(2) Bicycles	25
(3) Sewing machines	2
(4) Lumber	700 bd ft
(5) Tin Roofing	425 lbs
(6) Hand Carried Packages	3 per refugee (est)

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
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
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
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